TMI Blog1951 (5) TMI 3X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... so far as it affects the consumption or use of such medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. (4) Clause (a) of section 23, so far as it prohibits the commendation of any intoxicant or hemp. (5) Clause (b) of section 23, in entirety. (6) Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 24, so far as it prohibits commendation of any intoxicant or hemp. (7) Sub-section (1) of section 136, in entirety. (8) Clauses (b), (c), (e), and (f) of sub-section (2) of section 136, in their entirety. Rest of the provisions of the Act are valid, and also some of the provisions of the Act to be invalid does not affect the validity of the Act as it remains. - C.A. 182 OF 1951 - - - Dated:- 25-5-1951 - FAZAL ALI, SAIYID, SASTRI, M. PATANJALI, MUKHERJEA, B.K. DAS, SUDHI RANJAN AND BOSE, VIVIAN, JJ. For the Appellant : M.C. Setalvad and C.K. Daphtary (M. M. Desai and H.M. Seervai with them) For the Respondent : N.P. Engineer (G. N. Joshi, R.J. Kolah and N.A. Palkiwala, with him) JUDGMENT FAZL ALI J.- These appeals arise from the judgment and order of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay upon the application of one F.N. Balsara (hereinafter referred to as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t and is not relevant to the present appeal. Chapter III, which contains a number of prohibitions in regard to liquor as defined in the Act, is said to enact sweeping provisions which are liable to be assailed. Sections 12 and 13 and the relevant provisions of sections 23 and 24 in this chapter may be quoted:'- 12. No person shall(a) manufacture liquor; (b) construct or work any distillery or brewery, (c) import, export, transport or possess liquor; or (d) sell or buy liquor. 13. No person shall (a) bottle any liquor for sale; (b) consume or use liquor; or (c) use, keep or have in his possession any materials, still, utensils, implements or apparatus whatsoever for the manufacture of any liquor. 23. No person shall- (a) commend, solicit the use of, offer any intoxicant or hemp, or (b) incite or encourage any member of the public or any class of individuals or the public generally to commit any act which frustrates or defeats the provisions of this Act, or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, or ............. 24(1). No person shall print or publish in any newspaper, news-sheet, book, leaflet, booklet or any other single or periodical publicat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ces punishable under section 65 or 68 of the Act, he may arrest such person without a warrant and direct that such person shall be committed to such' custody as such officer may deem fit for a period not exceeding 15 days. By section 136(2), the State Government is given the extraordinary power of imposing restriction on the right of free movement of any person if it is satisfied that such person is acting or is likely to act in the manner aforesaid. Chapter XI contains certain miscellaneous provisions and the only sections of this Chapter which need be referred to are section 139 (c), which states that the State Government may by general or special order exempt any person or class of persons or institution or class of institutions from the observance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any rule, regulation or order made thereunder, and section 147, which declares that nothing in the Act shall be deemed to apply to any intoxicant or other article in respect of its import or export across the customs frontier as defined by the Central Government. The High Court accepted the contention of the petitioner that the definition of liquor in the Act was too wide and went ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... be necessary to refer to entry No. 31 in List II, under which the law purports to have been made, and entry No. 19 of List I, which is said to have been transgressed. These entries run as follows:-- Entry 31, List II: Intoxicating liquors and narcotic drugs, that is to say, the production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale of intoxicating liquors, opium and other narcotic drugs, but subject, as respects opium, to the provisions of List I and, as respects poisons and dangerous drugs, to the provisions of List I11. Entry 19, List I: Import and export across customs frontiers as defined by the Dominion Government. Prima facie, it would seem that there is no real conflict between these two entries, because entry 31 of List II has no reference to import or export but merely deals with production, manufacture, possession, transport, purchase and sale. Dealing with this entry, Gwyer C.J. observed as follows in the case of Bhola Prasad v. The King Emperor ([1942] F.C.R. 17 at 25):- A power to legislate 'with respect to intoxicating liquors' could not well be expressed in wider terms, and would, in our opinion, unless the meaning of the words ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ehousemen, could defeat the power of the Federal Legislature to regulate imports of foreign liquors across the sea or land frontiers of British India which are customs frontiers as defined by the Central Government and thus seriously jeopardise an important source of central customs revenue. As under section 100 of the Constitution Act the Provincial legislative powers under List 11 were subject to the exclusive powers of the Federal Legislature in List I, the Bombay Act to the extent to which it trenched upon the subject of item 19 of the latter List must, it was submitted, be regarded as a nullity. It will be seen that the rationale of the argument there is the same as that of the argument advanced in the present case, but it was rejected for reasons which are clearly set out in the following passage :- These is, in our view, no irreconcilable conflict here such as would necessitate recourse to the principle of Federal supremacy laid down in section 100 of the Constitution Act. Section 14-B does not purport to restrict or prohibit dealings in liquor in respect of its importation or exportation across the sea or land frontiers of British India. It purports to deal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dships do not doubt that the effect of these words is that, if the legislative powers of the Federal and Provincial Legislatures, which are enumerated in List I and List II of the Seventh Schedule, cannot fairly be reconciled, the latter must give way to the former. But it appears to them that it is right first to consider whether a fair reconciliation cannot be effected by giving to the language of the Federal Legislative List a meaning which, if less wide than it might in another context bear, is yet one that can properly be given to it, and equally giving to the language of the Provincial Legislative, List a meaning which it can properly bear. In the present case, as already pointed out. the words possession and sale occurring in entry 31 of List II are to be read without any qualification whatsoever, and it will not be doing any violence to the construction of that entry to hold that the Provincial Legislature has the power to prohibit the possession, use and sale of intoxicating liquor absolutely. If we forget for the time being the principles which have been laid down in some of the American cases, it would be difficult to hold that the word 'import' standing by it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d, while rejecting the argument that it was beyond the legislative competence of the Provincial Legislature which had enacted it, their Lordships observed as follows :- As Sir Maurice Gwyer C.J. said in the Subrahmanyam Chettiar case: It must invevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list, and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter-twined that blind observance to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the Judicial Committee, whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its `pith and substance', or its true nature and character, for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that . Their Lordships agree that this passage correctly describes the grounds on which the rule is founded, and that it applies to Indian as well as to Dominion legislation-(1). The same principle was reiterated by the Federal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ovided that no State shall without the consent of Congress allow any imposts or duties on imports or exports except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. In the course of his judgment, Marshall C.J. observed inter alia as follows :- There is no difference, in effect, between a power to prohibit the sale of an article and a power to prohibit its introduction into the country. The one would be a necessary consequence of the other. No goods would be imported if none could be sold. No object of any description can be accomplished by laying a duty on importation, which may not be accomplished with equal certainty by laying a duty on the thing imported in the hands of the importer. (2) The learned Chief Justice further observed :- Sale is the object of importation, and is an essential ingredient of that intercourse, of which importation constitutes a part. It is as essential an ingredient, as indispensable to the existence of the entire thing, then, as importation itself. It must be considered as a component part of the power to regulate commerce. Congress has a right, not only to authorise importation, but to authorise the importer ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ive measures had to be passed by the Congress like the Wilson Act, Webb-Kenyon Act, etc. I do not wish to pursue the matter, but wish only to point out that the doctrine has no place in this country, having regard to the scheme of legislation that has been outlined in the Government of India Act, 1935, and in the'present Constitution, in which the various entries in the Legislative Lists have been expressed in clear and precise language. In The Province of Madras v. Boddu Paidanna and Sons(1), Gwyer C.J. while expressing his profound respect for the views expressed by Marshall C.J. in Brown v. Maryland(2), mildly hinted that it was easier to follow the line of reasoning of Thompson J. in his dissenting judgment in that case and concluded with the following remarks :- Next, it is to be observed that the American Constitution also provides that Congress alone has power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian tribes , and it was held that the Maryland tax was no less repugnant to this provision also. Marshall C.J. asked: To what purposes should the power to allow importation be given, unaccompanied with the power to authorise the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... transport, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor will necessarily_ amount to prohibiting and restricting inter-provincial. commerce, and inasmuch as they tend to stop and restrict entry into or export from the Province of Bombay of goods of a particular class or description, the Act contravenes section 297(1)(a). This section runs as follows :-- No Provincial Legislature or Government shall-(a) by virtue of the entry in the Provincial Legislative List relating to trade and commerce within the Province, or the entry in that List relating to the production, supply and distribution of commodities, have power to pass any law or take any executive action prohibiting or restricting the entry into, or export from the Province of goods of any class or description ...... ' ' It should be noticed that this provision refers to trade and commerce within the Province , which is the subject of entry 27 of List II and to production, supply and distribution of commodities , which is the subject of entry 29 of List II. The provision virtually means that import into or export from a Province of goods of any class or description cannot be prohibited or restricted on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the High Court, is the definition of the word 'liquor' in section 2 (24) of the Act. The definition runs thus:-- Liquor includes-- (a) spirits of wine, methylated spirits, wine, beer, toddy and all liquids consisting of or containing alcohol; and (b) any other intoxicating substance which the Provincial Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare to be liquor for the purposes of this Act. The High Court has held that the word liquor ordinarily means a strong drink as opposed to soft drink but it must in any event be a beverage which is ordinarily drunk. Proceeding upon this view, the High Court has held that although the legislature may while legislating under entry 31 prevent the consumption of non-intoxicating beverages and also prevent the use as drinks of alcoholic liquids which are not normally consumed as drinks, it cannot prevent the legitimate use of alcoholic preparations which are not beverages nor the use of medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. This view of the High Court was very strongly supported on the one hand and equally strongly challenged on the other before us, and I therefore proceed to deal with th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... et and antiseptic preparations, flavoring extracts and sirups, vinegar and preserved sweet cider (s. 4) which suggest that they were included in the definition. In some of these items, we have the qualifying words unfit for use for beverage purposes , but the heading of section 4 of the Volstead Act, under which these exceptions are enumerated is exempted liquors. ' The Licensing (Consolidating) Act, 1910, of England was an Act relating to licenses for the sale of intoxicating liquor, etc. The definition of intoxicating liquor in this Act was as follows;-- 'Intoxicating liquor' means (unless inconsistent with the context) spirits, wine, beer, porter, cider, perry and sweets, and any fermented, distilled, or spirituous liquor which cannot, according to any law for the time being in force, be legally sold without an excise licence. The word spirits has been defined in the Spirits Act, 1880, as meaning spirits of any description, and includes all liquors mixed with spirits, and all mixtures, compounds, or preparations made with spirits. It was contended before us that the definition of the word spirits in the Spirits Act should not be imported ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsideration. Remembering that the object of the Prohibition Act was not merely to levy excise duties but also to prohibit use, consumption, possession and sale of intoxicating liquor, the legislature had the power to legislate upon the subjects included in the Act not only under entry 31 of List II, but also under entry 14, which refers inter alia to public health. Article 47 of the Constitution, which contains one of the directive principles of State policy, provides that the State shall regard the raising of the level of nutrition and the. standard of living of its people and the improvement of public health as among its primary duties and, in particular, the State shall endeavour to bring about prohibition of the consumption, except for medicinal purposes, of intoxicating drinks and of drugs which are injurious to health . This article has no direct bearing on the Act which was passed in 1949, but a reference to it supports to some extent the conclusion that the idea of prohibition is connected with public health, and to enforce prohibition effectively the wider definition of the word liquor would have to be adopted so as to include all alcoholic liquids which may be used as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bject and scope of the present Act. I now come to section 39 of the Act which has been impugned on the ground that it offends against article 14 of the Constitution which states that the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India . The meaning and scope of this article has been fully discussed in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others ([1950] S.C.R. 869), and the principles laid down in that case may be summarized as follows: (1) The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. (2) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class. (3) The principle of equality doe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ation, the existence of that state of facts must be assumed. One who assails a classification must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis. (1) With these principles in view, I have to decide whether article 14 of the Constitution has been violated by the provisions contained in section 39 of the Act before us. That section runs as follows :- The Provincial Government may, on such conditions as may be specified in the notification published in the Official Gazette, permit the use or consumption of foreign liquor on cargo boats, warships and troopships and in military and naval messes and canteens. What is contended is that the concession shown to the warships, troopships, and military and naval messes and canteens is a violation of the principle of equality and the legislature has acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting certain bodies or groups of people for favoured treatment, while subjecting the petitioner and other citizens to the general provisions of the Act. It is said that the law should have been enforced alike against the civil population and military personnel, between whom no distinction can be made at ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tioned and regulated by rules and regulations which are the product of long experience and which aim at maintaining at a high level their morale and those qualities which enable them to face dangers and perform unusual tasks of endurance and hardship when called upon to do qualities such as dash and courage, unbreakable tenacity and energy ready for any sacrifice which should be unfaltering for long days together. By these rules and regulations, drinking among the forces is not prohibited, but it is properly and carefully regulated, It is easy to understand that the legislature chose not to interfere with the mode of life to which the forces have been accustomed, lest such interference should affect their morale and and lead to subterfuges which may prove unwholesome for their discipline and good behaviour. Besides, when drinking is regulated among a class of persons by specific rules and regulations and drunkenness is made an offence, the relaxation of the law of prohibition in their case is not likely to produce the same evil results as it may produce under other circumstances. I find therefore nothing wrong prima facie in the legislature according special treatment to persons wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rohibition against any other outsider being granted a permit, and secondly, because the policy underlying the rule is quite consistent with the policy underlying section 40 of the Act which enables permits to be granted to foreigners under certain conditions. The High Court has also declared sections 52, 53 and 139 (c) of the Act invalid on the ground that they constitute delegation of legislative power . The reasons given by the High Court for arriving at this conclusion are stated in its judgment as follows: -- Under section 52 power is given to the Government to grant licences in cases other than those specifically provided under any of the provisions of the Act. Under section 53 Government is inter alia empowered to vary or substitute any of the Conditions of the licence laid down in the Act, and under section 139 (c) power is given to Government to exempt any person or institution or any class of persons or institutions from the observance of all or any of the provisions of the Act or any rule or regulation or order made thereunder. The policy of legislation has been clearly laid down by the legislature in the Act itself. As pointed out by us before, the legi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aw with respect to liquor even as broadly defined. It is however contended that the power of making laws has to be exercised subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and in particular to those relating to the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part/II of the Constitution. The provisions to which I have referred have been assailed on the ground that they are in conflict with article 19 (1)(f) of the Constitution which guarantees that all the citizens shall have the right to acquire, hold and dispose of property . This clause is wide enough to include movable as well as immovable property. The provisions in question undoubtedly prevent a citizen from possessing, selling,. buying, consuming or using liquor as defined, and therefore they prima facie infringe the fundamental right of the Indian citizens to acquire, hold and dispose of a kind of property, namely, liquor as defined in section 2(24) of the Act, and as such would be void under article 13. The question to be considered is whether they can be saved by clause (5) of article 19, which runs as follows :-- Nothing in sub-clauses (d), (e) and (f) of the said clause shall affect the operation of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd how any restriction on the legitimate use of these articles can be in the interests of the general public so as to make these restrictions reasonable within the meaning of article 19)(5). If a citizen uses eau-de-cologne or lavender water for the purpose of toilet, he is not doing anything against public interest. It is only when he is perverting their use that it may be said that he is acting against public interest. Therefore, in our opinion, while it was open to the legislature to provide against the abuse of these articles, it was not open to it to prevent its legitimate use. But the legislature has totally prohibited the use and possession of all liquids containing alcohol except under permits to be granted by Government. It is contended by the Advocate-General that a citizen may possess eau-de-cologne or lavender water under a permit. But that is a restriction upon the right of the citizen to acquire, hold and dispose of property, and, in our opinion, that restriction is not reasonable. The same argument applies to medicinal and toilet preparations containing alcohol. Therefore we hold that tO the extent to which the Prohibition Act prevents the possession, use and consump ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39 of the Act authorises the Provincial Government, by general or special order, to exempt any intoxicants or class of intoxicants from all or any of the provisions of the Act. An order made by the Provincial Government in exercise of the power conferred by this section owes its legal efficacy to this section and therefore in the eye of the law the notification has the force of law as if made by the legislature itself. In exercise of powers vested in it by section 139(d) the Provincial Government issued an order No. 10484/45(e) exempting intoxicants specified in column 1 of the Schedule thereto annexed from the provisions of the Act specified against them in column 2 of that Schedule. Turning to the Schedule, we find that in item (1) duty-paid perfumed spirits (except eau-de-cologne), in item (3) dutypaid spirituous toilet preparations (except lavender water) and in item (4) duty-paid spirituous medicinal preparations other than 123 specified liquids, are exempted from the operation of sections 12(c) and (d) and 13(b) to the extent specified therein. This notification was superseded on the 1st April, 1950, by another notification which is more liberal in certain respects, and these ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ituous medicinal preparations from the following provisions of the Act :(i) Section 12 (c); (ii) Section 12 (d), in so far as it relates to buying of such preparations; (iii) Section 13 (b), in so far as it relates to use of such preparations. But it is to be noted that the sale of these articles is not covered by the above notification, but is regulated by two other notifications, namely, Notification No. 2843/49, dated the 6th April, 1950, and Notification No. 2843/49, dated the 11th April, 1950. In these two Notifications, there are provisions imposing limits on sales. For example, in the first notification issued on the 6th April, rule 10(1) provides as follows:- ''The licensee shall not sell to any person on any one day any kind of perfumed spirits, spirituous toilet preparations or essences in excess of such quantity as may be prescribed by the Commissioner under the Similarly, in the second notification of the 11th April, rules 9 and 10 run as follows :-- 9. The licensee shall not sell medicated tonics or medicated wines containing more than 10 per cent of alcohol (or containing alcohol in strength more than 17.5 per cent. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d extent of the right which the law confers upon him. Indeed it was only with the help of the learned counsel appearing for the parties that we were able to know what the position was up to the 31st March, 1950, and what changes were made on the 1st April, 1950. But in the bundle of notifications which have been placed before us. there is no notification stating what step has been taken after the 31st March, 1951, and none was brought to our notice in the course of the arguments. Having given my careful consideration to the matter, I am of the opinion that the restrictions imposed by the Act even when read with the above notifications are not reasonable, and I would affirm the conclusion arrived at by the High Court. The next group of sections which the High Court has held to be invalid, are sections 23(a) and 24(1) (a) in so far as they refer to commending any intoxicant, section 23(b) in its entirety, and section 24(1)(b) in so far as it refers to. inciting or encouraging any individual or class of individuals or the public generally to evade the provisions of any rule, regulation or order made thereunder or the conditions of any licence, etc. These provisions run as follow ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n its entirety. So far as article 24(1)(b) is concerned the judgment of the High Court in regard to it cannot be upheld. The learned counsel for the petitioner also conceded before us that he was not going to assail this provision. The High Court has also declared sections 136(1), 136(2) (b), 136(2)(c), 136(2)(e), 136(2)(1)to be void as offending against various provisions of article 19 the Constitution, but no argument was addressed to us on behalf of the Government of Bombay assailing the judgment of the High Court with regard to these provisions. The judgment of the High Court in regard to them will therefore stand. I will now deal with two Notifications Nos. 10484/45 (c) and 2843/49(a), dated the 30th March, 1950, which the High Court has held to be invalid. As regards the first notification, the High Court has stated that section 139 (c) having been held to be ultra vires the legislature, this notification, which was issued under that section is ultra vires the Bombay Government. But. since this Court has taken a different view in regard to the validity of section 139(c), the decision of the High Court as regards the above notification cannot stand. It appears from certain ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rmits issued under section 40 to Indian citizens as well as foreigners, and in our opinion it is improper to allow a foreigner permit-holder to stand drinks to other permitholders and to deny that privilege to Indian permit-holders. The guarantee of equality before the law extends under our Constitution not only to legislation but also to rules and notifications made under statutory authority and even to executive orders and as the notification offends against the principle of equality it is, therefore, void. In order to understand these remarks, it will be necessary to state that persons holding permits under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 40 are foreigners as described in sub-clauses (i)and (ii)of clause (c), that persons holding special permits under section 41 are foreign sovereigns, ambassadors, etc., and that persons holding interim permits under section 47 are persons applying for permits under either section 40, or section 41. The last class will include not only foreigners but also Indian citizens applying for permits on the ground that their health will be seriously and permanently affected if they are not permitted to use or consume liquor. Thus, the assumptio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ds of morality should be given permits. Now, insistence upon a medical certificate in this form is not at all warranted by the provisions of the Act. The point is a small one, but it seems to me that there is some substance in it. In my opinion, the word addict in the medical certificate should be replaced by the words used in section 40(1)(b) of the Act or words corresponding to them. The only other point which remains to be decided is whether as a result of some of the sections of the Act having been declared to be invalid, what is left of the Act should survive or whether the whole Act should be declared to be invalid. This argument was raised before the High Court also, but it was rejected and it was held that it was not possible on a fair review of the whole matter to assume that the legislature would not have enacted the part which remained without enacting the part that was held to be bad. It is to be noted that upon the findings of the High Court, the question should have assumed a more serious aspect than it presents now, because the High Court has declared several important sections of the Act including the definition of liquor to be ultra vires the legislature. I ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he State of Bombay, is therefore substantially allowed and Appeal No. 183 preferred by the petitioner is dismissed. On the question of costs, I am disposed to make the same order as the High Court has made, not only because some of the provisions of the Act are still found to be invalid, bUt also because the present case appears to have been instituted to test the validity of a controversial measure and to secure a final decision on it to set at rest the doubts and uncertainties which may have clouded the minds of a section of the public as to how far the provisions of the Act conform to law and to the Chapter on Fundamental Rights in the present Constitution. PATANJALI SASTRI J. -I agree and have nothing more to add. MUKHERJEA J.-- I have read the judgment of my learned brother Mr. Justice Fazl Ali and I am in entire agreement with his conclusions and reasons. There is nothing further which I can usefully add. S.R. DAS J.- -I agree and I have nothing further to add. VlVlAN BOSE J.--I also agree. Appeal No. 182 allowed. Appeal No. 183 dismissed. Agent for the appellants in Case No. 182 and respondents in Case No. 183: P.A. Mehta. Agent for the respondent ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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