TMI Blog2008 (1) TMI 863X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Judge, Ropar and Senior Sub Judge, Ropar, basically on the ground that there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the above three Civil Courts since the issues squarely fall within the ambit of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and as such the remedy for the 9 respondents-workmen, who are workmen under the Industrial Disputes Act, lies with the authorities thereunder and not with the Civil Court. BASIC FACTS 3. Nine respondents herein filed a Civil Suit before the Senior Sub Judge, Ropar for the relief of (i) declaration to the effect that the orders of their termination/retrenchment from service were illegal and (ii) that they were entitled to reinstatement in service with back-wages. It was pleaded that the plaintiffs-respondents were skilled workers and were working on the Anandpur Sahib Hydel Project (hereinafter called \023the Project\024) in various capacities such as T. Mate, Mixer Operator, Beldar, etc. for more than 5 years and, therefore, as per the Standing Orders and Rules they were regular employees of the defendants. It was alleged that the defendants did not maintain any seniority-list of the workers and various categories of services on the said Project an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... suit is maintainable in the present form? Opp 4. Whether no valid notice u/s 80 CPC has been served by the plaintiff on the defendants? OPP 5. Whether the suit is within limitation? 6. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for? OPP 7. Relief.\024 5. The Trial Court, on the basis of the evidence, came to the conclusion that the defendants-appellants had not observed the principle of last come first go in making the retrenchments. The Trial Court also relied on the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Piara Singh Ors. V. State of Haryana[1989 PLR 396] and one another judgment, the copy of which was filed Vide Exhibit D-13 wherein the High Court had given directions that the workers so retrenched should be accommodated somewhere-else in some other projects and such appointments in the new projects would be treated as new appointments for the purpose of seniority and that the relief given to such workers would be without prejudice to the retrenchment and any other compensation that such workers would be entitled to under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Relying on these observations, the impugned o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e was not strictly adhered to and further held that the Anandpur Hydel Project was a \023State\024 and the plaintiffs-respondents were entitled to the protection contained under the Constitution of India and CSR which provided that the work-charged employees could not be allowed to remain as such for more than six months. Relying on the decision of this Court reported in Supreme Court of India v. Cynamide India Ltd. (AIR 1987 SC 1801) and Piara Singh v. State of Haryana (1989 PLR (1) 396), the Appellate Court confirmed the findings of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. 7. The matter was taken before the High Court by way of a Second Appeal on various grounds. To begin with the High Court granted stay of the operation of the orders passed by the courts below. However, by the subsequent order, the stay application was dismissed and the said order granted on 20.12.1991 was vacated. This came to be challenged by way of a Special Leave Petition before this Court. In the Special Leave Petition a contention was raised by way of Ground (8) that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit since the relief of reinstatement in the present case was available only under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in the civil court. (2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute arising out of a right or liability under the general or common law and not under the Act, the jurisdiction of the civil court is alternative, leaving it to the election of the senior concerned to choose his remedy for the relief which is competent to be granted in a particular remedy. (3) If the industrial dispute relates to the enforcement of a right or an obligation created under the Act, then the only remedy available to the suitor is to get an adjudication under the Act. (4) If the right which is sought to be enforced is a right created under the Act such as Chapter VA then the remedy for its enforcement is either Section 33C or the raising of an industrial dispute, as the case may be.\024 10. The second decision came in Jitendra Nath Biswas\022s case (supra), wherein this Court specifically held, interpreting Section 9 of the CPC that the Civil Court shall have no jurisdiction where its jurisdiction is expressly or impliedly barred. The Court held: \023It could not be disputed that a contract of employment for personal service ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sputes Act can be adjudicated only by the forum created by the Industrial Disputes Act. This was a case where the Corporation was armed with the Certified Standing Orders. The Court held that the Certified Standing Orders are not in the nature of delegated or subordinate legislation. It was held that the Certified Standing Orders were statutorily imposed conditions of service and the complaint made by the workman relating to breach thereof could only be tried under the machinery and the procedure provided by the Industrial Disputes Act and the civil court\022s jurisdiction was impliedly barred to that extent. The Court while referring to the seven principles culled out by this Court in Dhulabhai v. State of M.P. [(1968) 3 SCR 662: AIR 1969 SC 78] further explained the decision in Premier Automobile (supra) to hold that not only the disputes under the Industrial Disputes Act were barred but the disputes arising out of the sister enactments like Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act also stood outside the jurisdiction of the civil court since they did not provide a special forum of their own for enforcement of the rights and liabilities created by them. The Court, therefore, he ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... came to be terminated after the completion of the Project in January, 1985 as they were not required due to the completion of the Project and since they were engaged temporarily. It was pointed out before us and not disputed that the services were terminated vide order dated 6.7.1985 under Rule 20(1) read with Rule 3-A of the Certified Standing Orders for work-charged staff. It is also not disputed that they were paid gratuity, retrenchment compensation as also the compensation for notice and that they had duly accepted the order. In the civil suit it was prayed that a decree be passed for declaration to the effect that the orders of termination/retrenchment of their service were null and void and that they should be reinstated with back-wages. A mandatory injunction to that effect was sought for. It was urged before the trial court that the defendants-appellants have not maintained a proper seniority list and that had resulted in the breach of the principle of last come first go and, therefore, their termination was bad in law. In short, the original plaintiffsrespondents had averred the breach of Section 25-G of the Industrial Dispute Act, in that, they had alleged that the emplo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... payment of necessary gratuity etc., they have no cause of action and that the present suit is not maintainable in the present form and is also not competent without notice under Section 80 CPC besides being barred by limitation\024. The tenability of the suit was, therefore, raised and vide Issue No.3, the trial court also considered the tenability of the suit in the present form. The trial court has not, however, adverted to the jurisdiction aspect as is being presently highlighted before us. Same is the story about the First Appellate Court and the Second Appellate Court. However, it is not as if this issue was not raised altogether. Atleast a notice of this issue was given to the respondents in SLP (C) 11086 of 1992 which was filed on behalf of the appellants to challenge the dismissal of the said application by the High Court. It is very specifically raised therein in Ground No.8, which is reproduced as under: \023Because the civil court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The relief of reinstatement in the present case was available only under the Industrial Disputes Act and therefore the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was expressly barred. [(1991) 1 RSJ 770]. The dec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity.\024 The Court then proceeded to rely on the case in Bahrein Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. P.J. Pappu [(1966) 1 SCR 461:AIR1966 SC 634] and observed in para 32 that neither consent nor waiver nor acquiescence can confer jurisdiction upon a court, otherwise incompetent to try the suit. The Court further observed that\024 \023It is well settled and needs no authority that \021where a court takes upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing\022. A decree passed by a court having no jurisdiction is non est and its invalidity can be set up whenever it is sought to be enforced as a foundation for a right, even at the stage execution or in collateral proceedings. A decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a coram non judice.\024 The Court also relied upon the decision in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Pawan [(1955) 1 SCR 117: AIR 1954 SC 340] and quoted t ..... 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