TMI Blog1989 (11) TMI 307X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion Act, 1894 (the 'Act') published in the Government Gazette on 26 October 1967, the State Government declared its intention to acquire the land belonging to the respondent for estab- lishing Naval Air Station Dabolim. On 23 February 1968, notification under section 6 was published in the Gazette. On 5 March 1969 the Land Acquisition Officer declared award determining compensation at the rate of 40 paise per square meter with solatium at 15 per cent. The claimant had sought reference under section 18 of the Act and reference was duly made to the Civil Court (District Judge). On 28th May 1985, the Court after investigation of the claim awarded compensation at ₹ 3 per square meter. The Court also awarded solatium at 15 per cent and interest at 6 per cent from the date of taking possession till payment of compensation. Not being satisfied, the claimant preferred an appeal to the High Court seeking further enhancement of compensation and also solatium at 30 per cent. This claim was apparently based on the new provisions introduced by the Amending Act 68 of 1984. The High Court accepted the appeal and granted the reliefs in the following terms: The impugned award d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . Section 30(2) reads: 30. Transitional provisions: (1) xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (2) The provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 23 of the principal Act, as amended by clause (b) of Section 15 and Section 18 of this Act respectively, shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the Collector or Court or to any order passed by the High Court or Supreme Court in appeal against any such award under the provisions of the princi- pal Act after the 30th day of April, 1982 (the date of introduction of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Bill, 1984, in the House of the People) and before the commence- ment of this Act. The scope of retrospective operation of Section 23(2) was first explained in Kamalajammaniavaru v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [1985] 1 SCC 582. A two Judge Bench held that the award of 30 per cent solatium will apply only where the award appealed against was made by the Collector of Court during the period between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984. This decision was rendered on 14 February 1985. Shortly thereafter there was another decision by a three-Judge Bench in Bhag Singh v. Union Territory of Chand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y the High Court or the Supreme Court in appeals against such award. But these decisions do not solve the problem presented here. The award with which we are concerned does not fall within the interregnum i.e. between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984. To repeat the facts: The acquisition com- menced on 26 October 1967 when the notification under sec- tion 4(1) of the Act was published. On 5 March 1969 the Collector made the award and on 28 May 1985 the reference court made the award. Both the awards, thus appar- ently fall outside the period prescribed under section 30(2). Counsel for the appellant on the aforesaid facts rules out the applicability of section 30(2) in the first place. Secondly, he also ruled out the applicability of section 23(2). The first contention was based on the plain terms of Section 30(2) and the second on the ground that section 23(2) with its isolated splendour is not retrospective in operation. He thus submitted that the claimant's case could not be saved for higher solatium either under Transitional Provisions or by amended Section 23(2) of the Act and it was gone both ways. This submission reminds us of the words of Shakespeare in the M ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... required to draw such inferences as to the intended tran- sitional arrangements as, in the light of the interpretative criteria, it considers Parlia- ment to have intended. The paramount object in statutory interpretation is to discover what the legislature intended. This intention is primarily to be ascertained from the text of enactment in question. That does not mean the text is to be construed merely as a piece of prose, without reference to its nature or purpose. A statute is neither a literary text nor a devine revelation Words are certainly not crystals, trans- parent and unchanged as Mr. Justice Holmes has wisely and properly warned. (Town v. Eisher, 245, U.S. 418, 425, 1918). Learned Hand, J., was equally emphatic when he said. Stat- utes should be construed, not as theorems of Euclid, but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them. (Lenigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, 2 18 F.R. 547 at 553.) Section 30(2) provides that amended provisions of Sec- tion 23(2) shall apply, and shall be deemed to have applied, also to, and in relation to, any award made by the collector or Court between 30 April 1982 and 24 September 1984, or to an appellate order the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... um. Such a construction of Section 30(2) would be vulnerable to attack under Article 14 of the Constitution and it should be avoided. We, therefore, hold that benefit of higher solatium under section 23(2) should be available also to the present case. This would be the only reasonable view to be taken in the circumstances of the case and in the light of the pur- pose of Section 30(2). In this view of the matter, the higher solutium allowed by the High Court is kept undis- turbed. This takes us to the second question which we have formulated at the beginning of the judgment: Whether the claimant is entitled to additional amount of compensation provided under Section 23(IA) of the Act? This is equally a fundamental question and seemingly not covered by any of the previous decisions of this Court. Section 23(IA) reads as follows: In addition to the market value of the land, as above provided, the court shall in every case award an amount calculated at the rate of twelve per centum per annum on such market value for the period commencing on and from the date of the publication of the notifica- tion under Section 4, sub-section (!), in respect of such land to the date of award ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 30 sub-section (1)(b) provides that section 23(l-A) shall be applicable to every acquisition proceedings commenced after 30 April 1982 irrespective of the fact whether the Collector has made an award or not before 24 September 1984. The final point to note is that Section 30 sub-section (1) does not refer to Court award and the Court award is used only in section 30 sub-section (2). In the case before us, on 26 October 1967, the notifica- tion under section 4 was issued. On 5 March 1969 the Collec- tor made the award. The result is that on 30 April 1982 there was no proceedings pending before the Collector. Therefore, section 30 sub-section (1)(a) is not attracted to the case. Since the proceedings for acquisition commenced before 30 April 1982, section 30 sub-section (1)(b) is also not applicable to the case. Here, the case is really gone by both ways. It cannot be saved from Scylla or Charybdis. The claimant is, therefore, not entitled to additional amount provided under Section 23( I-A). Before we part with the case, it is important that we should refer to two authorities of the High Courts which have taken contrary view. As to the applicability of Section 23(IA) t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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