TMI Blog1964 (2) TMI 82X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ct, No. 1 of 1894 (hereinafter called the Act), stating that the land in dispute was required for a company for the construction of textile machinery parts factory by Lakshmi Ratan Engineering Works Limited, Kanpur. This order was followed on July 5, 1956, by a notification under s. 6 of the Act, which was in similar terms. This notification also provided for the Collector to take possession of any waste or parade land forming part of the land in the Schedule to the notification immediately under the powers conferred by s. 17(1) of the Act. On July 31, 1956, the Collector took possession of the land and handed it over to the company along with some constructions standing on it. In the meantime, the petitioner filed a writ petition in the High Court on July 31, 1956, praying that the notification under s. 6 of July 1956 be quashed and also applied for interim stay. As however possession had already been taken on July 31. 1956, the application for interim stay became in fructuous. One of the main grounds in support of the writ petition of July 31, 1956 was that ss. 38 to 42 of the Act had not been complied with. Thereafter steps were taken by the State Government to comply with the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... decree or order of any court. The Ordinance was replaced by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, No. 31 of 1962, (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act), which was made retrospective from July 20, 1962, the date on which the Ordinance was promulgated. This Act made certain amendments in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act and validated certain acquisitions. The present petition challenges the validity of the amendments to ss. 40 and 41 and also the validity of s. 7 of the Amendment Act by which certain acquisitions made before July 20, 1962 were validated. It is therefore necessary to read the amendments made in ss. 40 and 41 of the Act as well as s. 7 of the Amendment Act. In s. 40(1) of the Act a new clause was inserted in these terms:- (aa) that such acquisition is needed for the construction of some building or work for a company which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose; Section 41 was amended to read as below:- 41. If the appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, of the Collector, under section 5A, subsection (2), or on the report of the officer making an inquiry unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt is that on a construction of the amendment to s. 40 by which cl. (aa) has been introduced therein, it is provided that all acquisitions made for a company for construction of some building or work are permissible even though the building or work for the construction of which the acquisition is made may not be for a public purpose, as the new cl. (aa) merely requires that the company which is applying for acquisition is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work, which is for a public purpose. It is urged that all that this clause requires is that the company for which the acquisition is being, made should be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and in that case it can acquire land under this clause even though the particular building or work for the construction of which land is acquired may not be for a public purpose. Therefore the new clause (ad) which permits such acquisition contravenes Art. 31(2) which lays down that no property shall be compulsorily acquired save for a public purpose, and also Art. 19(1)(f), as such acquisition would amount ;to an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to hold property. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ompulsory acquisition of land for a purpose other than a public purpose and is hit by Art. 31(2) of the Constitution, whereunder land can be compulsorily acquired only for a public purpose. It may be conceded that on a literal construction the adjectival clause, namely, which is engaged or is taking steps for engaging itself in any industry or work which is for a public purpose , qualifies the word company and not the words building or work for the construction of which the land is needed, So prima facie it can be argued with some force that all that cl. (aa) requires is that the company for which land, is being acquired should be engaged or about to be engaged in any industry or work which is for a public purpose and it is not required that the building or work, for the construction of which land is acquired should be for such public purpose. In approaching the question of construction of this clause, it cannot be forgotten that the amendment was made in consequence of the decision of this Court in R. L. Arora s case([1962] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 149. ) and the intention of Parliament was to fill the lacuna, which, according to that decision, existed in the Act in the matter of ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rcumstances in which the amendment came to be made have already been mentioned by us and the intention of Parliament clearly was to fill up the lacuna in the Act which became evident on the decision of this court in R. L. Arora s case((1962) Supp. 2 S.C.R.). Parliament must also be well aware of the provision of Art. 31(2) which lays down that compulsory acquisition of property can only be made for a public purpose. Clause (aa) was inserted between cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1). Section 40(1) as it stood before the amendment prohibited consent being given to acquisition of land by a company unless the acquisition was for one of the two reasons mentioned in cls. (a) and (b). Those two clauses clearly showed that acquisition for a company was for a public purpose and such acquisition could not be made for any purpose other than public purpose. Between the existing cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40 (1), we find cl. (aa) being inserted. We also find that cl. (aa) specifically uses the words public purpose and indicates that the company for which land is required should be engaged or about to be engaged in so-me industry or work of a public purpose. It was only for such a company that la ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the same nature, namely, that it is a building or work which is meant to subserve the public purpose of the industry or work for which it is being constructed. It is only in these cases where the company is engaged in an industry or work of that kind and where the building or work is also constructed for a purpose of that kind, which is a public purpose, that acquisition can be made under cl. (aa). As we read the clause we are of opinion that the public purpose of the company for which acquisition is to be made cannot be divorced from the purpose of the building or work and it is not open for such a company to acquire land under cl. (aa) for a building or work which will not subserve the public purpose of the company. We are therefore of opinion that in the setting in which cl, (aa) appears and in the circumstances in which it came to be enacted, a literal and mechanical construction for which the petitioner contends is not the only construction of this clause and that there is another construction which in our opinion is a better construction, and which is that the public purpose of the company is also implicit in the purpose of the building or work which is to be constructed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... l. (aa) in s. 40(1) and would therefore be equally valid and constitutional. We now come to the constitutionality of s. 7 of the Amendment Act, which is attacked on the ground that it contravenes Art. 31(2) and Art. 14 of the Constitution. Let us therefore see what exactly s. 7 validates and under what conditions. It first provides that the acquisition to be validated must have been made before July 20, 1962. Secondly it provides where such acquisition is not for any of the purposes mentioned in cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) of the Act, it shall be deemed to be for the purpose mentioned in cl. (aa) introduced by the Amendment Act. Thirdly it provides that every such acquisition shall be, and shall be deemed always to have been as valid as if the provisions of ss. 40 and 41 of the Act, as amended by the Amendment Act, were in force at all material times when such acquisition was made or proceeding was held or order was made or agreement was entered into or action was taken. Lastly, it provides that such acquisition shall be valid notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any court. Terefore before s. 7 can validate an acquisition made before July 20, 1962, it must first b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... deeming provision lays down is that where the public purpose does not come within cl. (a) or cl. (b) it should be deemed to come within cl. (aa), provided it is of a kind which can come within this clause. The intention behind this deeming provision clearly is to make the purpose of an acquisition made before July 20, 1962 which does not fall within cl. (a) or cl. (b) of s. 40(1) to be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa). On a reasonable interpretation, this deeming provision therefore only provides that where the purpose does not fall within cls. (a) and (b), it shall be deemed to fall under cl. (aa) and to be judged in accordance therewith. If in fact the purpose of any acquisition made before July 20, 1962, is such as does not fall within cl. (aa), the deeming provision would be of no avail. Thus the first of the two fictions introduced by s. 7 of the Amendment Act merely lays down that where a notification under s. 6 of the Act cannot be justified under cl. (a) and cl. (b) of s. 40(1), it will be judged in accordance with the provisions contained in cl. (aa) and if it satisfies those provisions, the acquisition will be deemed for the purpose of that c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as amended by the Amendment Act were in force at all material times. The force of the words as valid as if clearly is that the validity of acquisitions made before July 20, 1962, has to be judged on the basis that cl. (aa) was in force at the material time and in accordance therewith. The validity therefore is not absolute; it is conditioned by the fact that it will be as valid as if cl. (aa) was in force; so that if it could not be valid even if cl. (aa) was in force and could not be justified under the terms of that clause, the validity conferred by s. 7 of the Amendment Act will not attach to it. This in our opinion is the force of the words as valid as if and the validity it has conferred is not absolute as contended on behalf of the petitioner and will not apply to those acquisitions which would not be valid if they could not be justified on the basis of cl. (aa) assuming it to be in force at the material time. In this view the attack under Art. 14 as well as Art. 31(2) fails, for in neither case can acquisition be valid whether made before July 20, 1962 or thereafter unless the conditions of cl. (aa) are satisfied. Next it is urged that even if s. 7 is intra vires, it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... parts and that such work is likely to prove useful to the public. One term of the agreement is that the company, its successors and assignees will use the said land for the aforesaid purpose and for no other purpose without the previous sanction in writing of the State Government. Another term provides that if the said land or any part or parts thereof shall no longer be required by the company, then the company will forthwith relinquish and restore the same, after removing all buildings and structures, to the Governor at a price equal to the amount paid by it under the Act. It is clear therefore that the land cannot be used for any other purpose and it will have to be restored to the Government if it is not used for the purpose for which it was acquired. In this connection reference may be made to s. 44-A introduced by the Amendment Act which lays down that no company for which any land is acquired under this Part shall be entitled to transfer the said land or any part thereof by sale, mortgage, gift, lease or otherwise except with the previous sanction of the appropriate Government . This provision also provides a safeguard that the land will only be used for the public purpo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecide whether the objection should be allowed or rejected. Once the Government decides that the objection should be rejected and that the acquisition is needed for a public purpose the validity of the notification under s. 6 and the subsequent action thereafter cannot be challenged on the ground that the-previous owner himself intended to use the land for some public purpose. In this connection our attention is invited to the observations of this Court in Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani([1950] S.C.R. 621. 687.), where it was observed that under certain circumstances even securing a house for an individual may be in the interests of the community, but it cannot be to the general interest of the community to requisition the property of one refugee for the benefit of another refugee . These observations in our opinion have no relevance to the matter under consideration. We are concerned here with acquisition for a public purpose, which is undisputed. This is not a case of a house of one person being requisitioned for another; this is a case of constructing some work which will be useful to the public and will subserve the public purpose of the production of textile machinery ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e legal entity. Thus in one case the acquisition results in private enrichment while in the other it is the public which gains in every way. Therefore a distinction in the matter of acquisition of land between public companies and Government companies on the one hand and private individuals and private companies on the other is in our opinion justified, considering the object behind cl. (aa) as introduced into the Act. The contention under this head must therefore also fail. The petition therefore fails and is hereby dismissed. In the circumstances we pass no order as to costs. AYYANGAR J. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared by Wanchoo, J. but regret my inability to agree with it. In my opinion this writ petition has to be allowed. The facts of the case and the relevant statutory provisions whose construction is involved in the petition, have been set out in full in the judgment just now pronounced and it is therefore unnecessary for me to recapitulate them. The principal points on which learned counsel for the petitioner rested his case were mainly two: (1) that s. 40(1)(aa) introduced by s. 3 of the Land Acquisition Amending Act (Act XXXI of 1962) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the land is needed for the construction of a building or work , and (2) that building or work is for a company which is engaged (omitting the immaterial words) in an industry or work which is for a public purpose. Therefore, if a company which is engaged in an industry which industry is invested with a public purpose i.e., if the industry itself serves a public purpose, that the land is needed for the construction of a building or work for such a company is made sufficient to enable the acquisition to be made. In other words, the criterion of the justification for the acquisition is, that it is for a company of a designated nature, not that the land acquired is needed for a building or work which is essential for the carrying on of an industry which serves a public purpose. The company might be engaged in an industry which might be informed by a public purpose or whose products might be essential for the needs of the community. but under the clause as enacted it is not necessary that the land acquired is needed for being used for the purpose of that industry but may be needed for any purpose of the company, the only qualification being that the company answers the descripti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s essential for that industry to be commenced or carried on. I feel unable to accept this as a possible construction of the words used. For that construction to be adopted even the transposition of the words for a public purpose to an earlier point after the words for a company would not be sufficient assuming the rules of grimmer permitted such a course; for, then it would leave out the description or categorisation of the company for which the land is needed, and in such a situation the entire object of the amendment would be frustrated, as- it would not be a condition that the industry in which the company is engaged is one which is required in public interest. Even if the clause were rewritten so as to introduce the words for a public purpose earlier and also retain them where it occurs now, the construction for which Mr. Setalvad contends cannot result, for then it would not make much sense, for the words for a public purpose if transposed earlier would not convey the meaning which Mr. Setalvad says they convey, because the construction which learned counsel suggests is that the clause means that the land is needed for the construction of the factory and other essentia ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... other which even though it be a little strained, would make it constitutional. then the Court would lean in favour of the latter construction. The question therefore is whether the clause is capable of more than one interpretation. I would be stating only a truism if I said that there is no scope for interpretation here. With profound respect for my learned brethren, I consider that the words are capable only of one meaning. Rules of construction are merely aids to resolving ambiguity. if any exists. The first and primary rule, if those rules have to be invoked, is to take the words themselves and then arrive at their true meaning. for if they disclose an intelligible meaning, then the process of interpretation stops unless the words are reasonably capable of being understood in more than one way and rules of interpretation are then invoked to resolve that ambiguity. It was not suggested that the words do not, as they stand, make sense. They do, only the sense which they convey makes the clause unconstitutional. No doubt, the meaning of a word may vary with the setting or context, but that is not the position here. One asks in vain which is the word which is said to bear a di ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it was not in the contemplation of the legislature. The only way in which I am able to read the clause is to relate the words public purpose to the nature of the industry carried on by the company and by no rule of construction with or without extrinsic aids or with reference to the context, not to speak of rules of grammar, can the reference to public purpose be related to the building or work for which the acquisition is permitted to be made. The learned Attorney-General submitted that the provision could and ought to be read down and confined in its operation to acquisition for public purposes as properly understood; in other words, to sever the constitutional from the unconstitutional portions and uphold the former. I do not find it possible to adopt this approach in a clause worded like the one before us. On the construction of the clause which I hold is the only possible one to adopt, it means the State is empowered to compulsorily acquire land for companies which satisfy the description of being engaged in an industry which is essential for the life of the community whether or not the purpose for which the company proposes to use the land. acquired is a public purpo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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