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TMI Blog1990 (5) TMI 229X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , S.A. Shroff and K.V. Sree Kumar JUDGMENT : K.N. SAIKIA. J. This analogous cluster of seventeen appeals by special leave, and a special leave petition involves a common question of law though they arise out of the following respective facts: c.A. Nos. 324 z-3248 of 1981 These eight appeals by the Land Development and Reclamation Corporation, Chandigarh are from the Judgment and Order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing its writ petitions challenging the Award dated 2.8.1980 of the Labour Court, Chandigarh holding that the respondents were entitled to reinstatement with back wages except Yaspal (C.A. No. 3242 of 1981) who was to get wages up to 10.10.1979, with benefits of continuity of service. The respondents were workmen under the management of the Corporation and their services were terminated on the ground that the Chairman had no power to appoint them. The Labour Court in its Award held that their services were terminated illegally without payment of retrenchment compensation under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act', and that they were entitled to reinstatement. C.A. No. 686 (NL) of 1982 This appeal is from the Judgment date ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion amounted to dismissal and accordingly he set aside the order and directed the corporation to reinstate and pay him his back wages amounting to ₹ 15,97 1.66 within one month. The Corporation having moved the State Industrial Court at Nagpur under s. 16(5) of the Settlement Act, that Court by its order dated 29.9.1973 allowed the application and set aside the Assistant Labour Commissioner's judgment and dismissed the workman's application holding that the acts of misconduct fairly stood proved and he deserved to be dismissed from service. The High Court on being moved by the workman set aside the Labour Court's order and restored that of the Assistant Labour Commissioner. Hence this appeal. CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3025 .......... OF 1990 The services of the workman Sri Pratap Singh, driver respondent No. 3 were terminated with effect from 18.10.1974 under clause 9(a)(i) of the DRTA (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations 1952. As the conciliation efforts failed, the order was placed before the Labour Court, Delhi, who set aside the order on the ground of noncompliance with the provisions of s. 25F of the Act and ordered reinstatement with full back wages and continui ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this Management's appeal. The respective cases were argued with some dexterity by the learned counsel Mr. B.N. Singhvi, Mr. N.B. Shetye, Mr. S.S. Javali, Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Mr. V.A. Bobde, Mr. M.K. Ramamurthy, Mr. M.G. Ramachandran & Mr. R.S. Hegde. On the above diverse facts two rival contentions are raised by the parties. The learned counsel for the employers contend that the word 'retrenchment' as defined in s. 2(00) of the Act means termination of service of a workman only by way of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. The learned counsel representing the workmen counted that 'retrenchment' means termination of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, other than those expressly excluded by the definition in s. 2(00) of the Act. The precise question to be decided, therefore, is whether on a proper construction of the definition of "retrenchment" in s. 2(00) of the Act, it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman as surplus labour for any reason whatsoever, or it means termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action, and those ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on to workmen in the event of their lay-off or retrenchment. The provisions included in the Bill are not new and were discussed at various tripartite meetings. Those relating to lay-off are based on an agreement entered into between the representatives of employers and workers who attended the 13th session of the Standing Labour Committee. In regard to retrenchment, the Bill provides that a workman who has been in continuous employment for not less than one year under an employer shall not be retrenched until he has been given one month's notice in writing or one month's wages in lieu of such notice and also a gratuity calculated at 15 days' average pay for every completed year of service or any part thereof in excess of six months. A similar provision was included in the Labour Relations Bill, 1950, which has since lapsed. Though compensation on the lines provided for in the Bill is given by all progressive employers, it is felt that a common standard should be set for all employers" Clause 2(00) as inserted read as under: "'Retrenchment' means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever otherwise than as a punishment inflicted ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... services of the workmen were duly terminated by the company. The workmen claimed the share of profits on the basis of the offer earlier made by the company and accepted by the workers. The company having declined to pay and the dispute having been referred, the Industrial Tribunal held that the company was bound to pay and accordingly awarded a sum of ₹ 45,000 representing their share of the profits and the award was affirmed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal. Question before this Court in appeal was whether the termination of the workmen on the closure of the industry amounted to retrenchment. It was held that the award was not one for compensation for termination of the services of the workmen on closure of the industry, as such discharge was different from the discharge on retrenchment, which implied the continuance of the industry and discharge only of the surplusage, and the workmen were not entitled either under the law as it stood on the day of their discharge or even on merits to any compensation. The contention of the workmen was that even before the enactment of Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953, the tribunal had acted on the view that the retrenchment inclu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fter giving Railway Company a notice. On December 19, 1952 a notice was given to the Railway Company for and on behalf of the President of India that the undertaking of the Railway Company would be purchased and taken over as from January 1, 1954. On November 11, 1953, the Railway Company served a notice on its workmen intimating that as a result of the talking over, the services of all the workmen of the Railway Company would be terminated with effect from December 31, 1953. The notice further stated that the Government of India intended to employ such of the staff of the company as would be willing to serve on the railway on terms and conditions which were to be notified later. About 77 per cent of the staff of the Railway Company were reemployed on the same scales of pay, about 23 per cent were reemployed on somewhat lower scales of pay and only about 24 per cent of the former employees of the Railway Company declined service under the Government. Applications for compensation having been filed on behalf of the erstwhile workmen of the Railway Company under s. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for payment of retrenchment compensation to the said workmen under clause (b) of s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Act which dealt with 'lay off and retrenchment' in the Amending Act, and analysing s. 25F as it then stood, S.K. Das, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench observed that in the first part of the section both the words 'retrenched' and 'retrenchment' were used and obviously they had the same meaning except that one was verb and the other was a noun and that to appreciate the true scope and effect of s. 25F one must first understand what was meant by the expression 'retrenched' or 'retrenchment'- Analysing the definition of 'retrenchment' in s. 2(00) the Court found in it the following four essential requirements: (a) termination of the service of a workman;, (b) by the employer; (c) for any reason whatsoever; and (d) otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action. The Court then said: "It must be conceded that the definition is in very wide terms. The question, however, before us is does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion it was said: "It is true that an artificial definition may include a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary acceptation of the word which is the subject of definition; but there must then be compelling words to show that such a meaning different from or in excess of the ordinary meaning is intended. Where, within the framework of the ordinary acceptation of the word, every single requirement of the definition clause is fulfilled, it would be wrong to take the definition as destroying the essential meaning of the word defined." The Court in Hariprasad dealt with two other contentions; one was that before the amending Act of 1953 the retrenchment had acquired a special meaning which included the payment of compensation on a closure of business and the legislature gave effect to that meaning in the definition clause and by inserting section 25F. The second was that section 25FF inserted in 1956 by Act 41 of 1956 was 'Parliamentary exposition' of the meaning of the definition clause and of section 25F. Rejecting the contentions the Court held that retrenchment meant the discharge of surplus workmen in an existing or continuing business; it had acquired no s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lead to a large number of workmen being rendered unemployed without any compensation. In order to meet this situation which was causing hardship to workmen, it was considered necessary to take immediate action and the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Ordinance, 1957 (4 of 1957), was promulgated with retrospective effect from 1st December, 1956." "This Ordinance was replaced by an Act of Parliament enacting the provisions contained in sections 25FF and 25FFF. These sections provide that 'compensation would be payable to workmen whose services are terminated on account of the transfer or closure of undertakings.' In the case of transfer of undertakings, however, if the workman is re-employed on terms and conditions which are not less favourable to him, he will not be entitled to any compensation. This was the position which existed prior to the decision of the Supreme Court. In the case of closure of business on account of the circumstances beyond the control of the employer, the maximum compensation payable to workmen has been limited to his average pay for three months. If the undertaking is engaged in any construction work and it is closed down within two years on accou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arly provided that though such termination may not have been retrenchment technically so-called, as decided by this Court, nevertheless the employees in question whose services were terminated by the transfer or closure of the undertaking would be entitled to compensation, as if the said termination was retrenchment. As it has been observed, the words "as if" brought out the legal distinction between retrenchment defined by s. 2(00) as it was interpreted by this Court and termination of services consequent upon transfer of the undertaking. In other words, the provision was that though termination of services on transfer or closure of the undertaking may not be retrenchment, the workmen concerned were entitled to compensation as if the said termination was retrenchment. Thus we find that till then the accepted meaning of retrenchment was ordinary, contextual and narrower meaning of termination of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever. In Anakapalla Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd. v. Workmen, [1963] Suppl. 1 SCR 730, a company running a sugar mill was suffering losses every year due to insufficient supply of sugarcane and wanted to shift the mill. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... renchment' may perhaps have included the termination of services caused by the closure of the concern or by its transfer, these two latter cases could not be held to fall under the definition because of the ordinary accepted connotation of the said word. This decision necessarily meant that the word 'retrenchment' in s. 25FF had to bear a corresponding interpretation." In Workmen of Subong Tea Estate v. The outgoing Management of Subong Tea Estate and Anr., reported in [1964] 5 SCR 602, it was similarly observed at page 613 of the report: "In dealing with the question of retrenchment in the light of the relevant provisions to which we have just referred, it is, however, necessary to bear in mind that the management can retrench its employees only for proper reasons. It is undoubtedly true that it is for the 'management to decide the strength of its labour force, for the number of workmen required to carry out efficiently the work involved in the industrial undertaking of any employer must always be left to be determined by the management in its discretion, and so, occasions may arise when the number of employees may exceed the reasonable and legitimate needs of the under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ra Money, reported [1976] 3 SCR 160, (Y.V. Chandrachud, V.R. Krishna lyer and A.C. Gupta, JJ.). In an application under Article 226, the respondent on automatic extinguishment of his service consequent to the pre-emptive provision as to the temporariness of the period of his employment in his appointment letter claiming to have been deemed to have had continuous service for one year within the meaning of s. 25(B)(2) of the Act, the Single Bench of the High Court having allowed his writ petition and the writ appeal of the appellant having also failed, this Court in appeal found as fact that the appointment was purely temporary one for a period of 9 days but might be terminated earlier, without assigning any reason therefor at the petitioner's discretion; and the employment unless terminated earlier, would automatically cease at the expiry of the period i.e. 18.11.1972. This 9 days' employment added on to what had gone before ripened to a continuous service for a year "on the antecedent arithmetic of 240 days of broken bits of service" and considering the meaning of 'retrenchment' it was held that the expression for any reason whatsoever was very wide and almost admitting o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed in the current context. Moreover, an employer terminates employment not merely by passing an order as the service runs. He can do so by writing a composite order, one giving employment and the other ending or limiting it.. A separate, subsequent determination is not the sole magnetic pull of the provision. A pre-emptive provision to terminate is struck by the same vice as the post-appointment termination. Dexterity of diction cannot defeat the articulated conscience of the provision." The precedents including Hariprasad do not appear to have been brought to the notice of their Lordship in this case. It may be noted that since Delhi Cloth and General Mills (supra) a change in interpretation of retrenchment in s. 2(00) of the Act is clearly discernible. Mr. Venugopal would submit that the Judgment in Sundara Money's case and for that matter the subsequent decisions in the line are per incuriam for two reasons: (i) that they failed t0 apply the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Hariprasad Shukla's case (supra) and (ii) for the reason that they have ignored the impact of two of the provisions introduced by the Amendment Act of 1953 along with th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the industry continued to be a running industry. The question whether the positive content of s. 2(00) restricting the definition of workmen rendered surplus, for any reason, whatsoever, is part of the ratio or not, submits Mr. Venugopal, is wholly an academic question in view of the fact that as many as 9 High Courts have restricted the applicability of s. 25F, 25G and 25H to only cases of termination of services of surplus labour for any reason whatsoever and not to other types of termination, whatever may be the reason for such termination. Even if a Judgment was to be based on two alternative reasons or conclusions, each one of these alternative reasons or basis, would form the ratio of the Judgment. It is also urged that the argument would equally apply to the ratio of Anakapalla's case rendering the Judgments in Sundra Money's case and the later decisions per incuriam, for not having noticed or followed a binding precedent of the Supreme Court itself, as the Judgment of the Constitution Bench binds smaller Divisions of the Court. We now deal with the question of per incuriam by reason of allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions. The Latin expression per incur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the country excluding, as is now being interpreted, the Supreme Court itself. The doctrine of ratio decidendi has also to be interpreted in the same line. In England a decision is said to be given per incuriam when the court has acted in ignorance of a previous decision of its own or of a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction which covered the case before it, or when it has acted in ignorance of a decision of the House of Lords. In the former case it must decide which decision to follow, and in the latter it is bound by the decision of the House of Lords. It has been said that the decision of the House of Lords mentioned above, refers to a decision subsequent to that of the Court of Appeal. However, "a prior decision of the House of Lords inconsistent with the decision of the Court of Appeal, but which was not cited to the Court of Appeal will make the later decision of the Court of Appeal of no value as given per incuriam." But if the prior decision had been cited to the Court of Appeal and that court had misinterpreted a previous decision of the House of Lords, the Court of Appeal must follow its previous decision and leave the House to rectify the mistake. In Halsbury's L ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ratio decidendi of a case and this is almost always to be ascertained by an analysis of the material facts of the case that is, generally, those facts which the tribunal whose decision is in question itself holds, expressly or implicitly, to be material." It has also been analysed: "A judicial decision will often be reached by a process of reasoning which can be reduced into a sort of complex syllogism, with the major premise consisting of a pre-existing rule of law (either statutory or judge-made) and with the minor premise consisting of the material facts of the case under immediate consideration. The conclusion is the decision of the case, which may or may not establish new law--in the vast majority of cases it will be merely the application of existing law to the facts judicially ascertained. Where the decision does consititute new law, this may or may not be expressly stated as a proposition of law: frequently the new law will appear only from subsequent comparison of, on the one hand, the material facts inherent in the major premise with, on the other, the material facts which constitute the minor premise. As a result of this comparison it will often be apparent th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla v. A.D. Divikar, the Supreme Court took the view that the word 'retrenchment' as defined in s. 2(00) did not include termination of services of all workmen on a bona fide closure of an industry or on change of ownership or management of the industry. In order to provide for the situations which the Supreme Court held were not covered by the definition of the expression 'retrenchment', the Parliament added s. 25FF and s. 25FFF providing for the payment of compensation to the workmen in case of transfer of undertakings and in case of closure of undertakings respectively." In Hariprasad (supra) the learned Judges themselves formulated the question before them as follows: "The question, however, before us is--does this definition merely give effect to the ordinary, accepted notion of retrenchment in an existing or running industry by embodying the notion in apt and readily intelligible words or does it go so far beyond the accepted notion of retrenchment as to include the termination of services of all workmen in an industry when the industry itself ceases t0 exist on a bona fide closure or discontinuance of his business by the employer." ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ental question at issue is, does the definition clause cover cases of closure of business when the closure is real and bona fide?" The reasons for arriving at the conclusion are given as "it would be against the entire scheme of the Act to give the definition clause relating to retrenchment such a meaning as would include within the definition termination of service of all workmen by the employer when the business itself ceases to exist and that the industrial dispute to which the provisions of the Act applies is only one which arises out of an existing industry". Thus, the Court was neither called upon to decide nor did it decide whether in a continuing business, retrenchment was confined only to discharge of surplus staff and the reference to discharge of surplusage was for the purpose of contrasting the situation in that case, i.e. workmen were being retrenched because of cessation of business and those observations did not constitute reasons for the decision. What was decided was that if there was no continuing industry the provision could not apply. In fact the question whether retrenchment did or did not include other terminations was never required to be decid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nsalves, [1962] 1 L.L.J. 56; Goodlas Nerolac Paints v. Chief Commissioner, Delhi, [1967] 1 L.L.J. 545 and Rajasthan State Electricity Board v. Labour Court, [1966] 1 L.L.J. 381, in which contrary view was taken, were overruled in Santosh Gupta holding that the discharge of the workman on the ground that she did not pass the test which would have enabled her to be confirmed was 'retrenchment' within the meaning of section 2(oo) and therefore, the requirement of section 25F had to be complied with. The workman was employed in the State Bank of Patiala from July 13, 1973 till August, 1974 when her services were terminated. According to the workman she. had worked for 240 days in the year preceding August 21, 1974 and the termination of her services was retrenchment as it did not fall within any of the three accepted cases. The management's contention was that termination was not due to discharge of surplus labour but due to failure of the workman to pass the test which could have enabled her to be confirmed in the service and as such it was not retrenchment. This contention was repelled. Both Mr. Shetye and Mr. Venugopal submit that judicial discipline required the smaller benches to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... td. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Orissa; Santosh Gupta v. State Bank of Patiala; Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Shambhu Nath Mukherjee; Mohan Lal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd. and L. Robert D'Souza v. Executive Engineer, Southern Railway. The recitals and averments in the notice leave no room for doubt that the service of the respondent was terminated for the reason that on account of recession and reduction in the volume of work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service for the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of s. 2(00) which defines retrenchment and it is by now well settled that where the termination of service does not fall within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is therefore indisputably a case of retrenchment." (Emphasis supplied) In a fast developing branch of Industrial and Labour law it may not always be of particular importance to rigidly adhere to a precedent, an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "is that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver." In Mutto v. T.K. Nandi, reported in [1979] 2 SCR 409 (418) it was similarly said: "The Court has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. If the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous then no more can be necessary then to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the lawgiver." As was stated in Thompson v. Gould, reported in [1910] A.C. 409 (420) "it is a wrong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong thing to do so." "The cardinal rule of construction of statute is to read statutes literally, that is, by giving to the words their ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning." [Jugalkishore v. Ra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e subject of interpretation. The Heydon's Rule requires that the court will look at the Act to see what was its purpose and what mischief in the earlier law it was designed to prevent. Four things are to be considered: (i) What was the law before the making of the Act? (ii) What was the mischief and defect for which the earlier law did not provide? (iii) What remedy the Parliament had resolved to cure? (iv) What is the true reason for the remedy? The Court shall make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy. Where the statute has been passed to remedy a weakness in the law, it is to be interpreted in such a way as well to bring about that remedy. The literal rules of construction require the wording of the Act to be construed according to its literal and grammatical meaning whatever the result may be. Unless otherwise provided, the same word must normally be construed throughout the Act in the same sense, and in the case of old statutes regard must be had to its contemporary meaning if there has been no change with the passage of time. However, the Law Commission 21 of England has struck a note of caution that "to place undue emphasis on the l ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... iler' within the interpretation clause of the Boiler Explosions Act, 1882. Lord M.R. Esher said; "If the Act had dealt with the explosion of a boiler and in some other' section with an explosion in pipes or in any other specified thing, the matter would be easy; but the draftsman has gone upon that which to my mind is a dangerous method of drawing Acts of Parliament. He has put in a section which says that a boiler shall mean something which is in reality not a boiler. This third section of the Act of 1882 that is the Boiler Explosions Act 1882 is a 'peculiarly bad specimen' of the method of drafting, which enacts that a word shall mean something which in fact it does not mean." However, a judge facing such a problem of interpretation can not simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. Lord Denning in his Discipline of Law says at p. 12: "Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our lite ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tation of a term. Mr. Venugopal submits that the definition clause cannot be interpreted in isolation and the scope of the exception to the main provision would also have to be looked into and when so interpreted, it is obvious that a restrictive meaning has to be given to s. 2(00). It is also pointed out that s. 25G deals with the principle of 'last come, first go', a principle which existed prior to the Amendment Act of 1953 only in relation to termination of workmen rendered surplus for any reasons whatsoever and that was followed in Vishwamitra Press, Kanpur v. Workers of Vishwamitra Press, [1952] L.A.C. 20 at p.33/41; Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Presidency Jute Mills Co.Employees Union, [1952] L.A.C. 62; Iron and Steel Mazdoor Union,Kanpur v. J.K. Iron and Steel Co. Ltd., [1952] L.A.C. 467; Halar Sali and Chemical Works, Jamnagar v. Workmen, [1953] L.A.C. 134;Prakriti Bhushan Gupta v. Chief Mining Engineer Railway Board,[1953] L.A.C. 373; Sudarshan Banerjee v. Mcleod and Co. Ltd., [1953] L.A.C. 702 (7 11). Besides, it is submitted, by its very nature the wide definition of retrenchment would be wholly inapplicable to termination simpliciter. The question of picking out ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mployment in the circumstances stated therein. According to counsel, the argument is misconceived firstly for the reasons that s. 2 itself says that retrenchment will be understood as defined in s. 2(00) unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context; secondly s. 25F clearly applies to retrenchment as plainly defined by s. 2(00); thirdly s. 25G does not incorporate in absolute terms--the principle of 'last come, first go' and provides that ordinarily last employee is to be retrenched, and fourthly ss. 25H upon its true construction should be held to be applicable when the retrenchment has occurred on the ground of the workman becoming surplus to the establishment and he has been retrenched under ss. 25F and 25G on the principle 'last come, first go'. Only then should he be given an opportunity to offer himself for re-employment- In substance it is submitted that there is no conflict between the definition of s. 2(00) and the provisions of ss. 25F, 25G and 25H. We find that though there are apparent incongruities in the provisions, there is room for harmonious construction in this regard. For the purpose of harmonious construction, it can be seen that the definitions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... such cases, as specifically provided in the relevant sections the workmen concerned would only be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with section 25-F. It is significant that in a case of transfer of an undertaking or closure of an undertaking in accordance with the aforesaid provisions, the benefit specifically given to the workmen is "as if the workmen had been retrenched" and this benefit is restricted to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F. The last submission is that if retrenchment is understood in its wider sense what would happen to the rights of the employer under the Standing Orders and under the contracts of employment in respect of the workmen whose service has been terminated. There may be two answers to this question. Firstly, those rights may have been affected by introduction of ss. 2(00), 25F and the other relevant sections. Secondly, it may be said, the rights as such are not affected or taken away, but only an additional social obligation has been imposed on the employer so as to give the retrenchment benefit to the affected workmen, perhaps for immediate tiding over of the financial difficulty. Look ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re open to the application of law." The traditional theory believes that the statute, applied to a concrete case, can always supply only one correct decision and that the positive--legal 'correctness' of this decision is based on the statute itself. This theory describes the interpretive procedure as if it consisted merely in an intellectual act of clarifying or understanding; as if the law-applying organ had to use only his reason but not his will, and as if by a purely intellectual activity, among the various existing possibilities only one correct choice could be made in accordance with positive law. According to the author: "The legal act applying a legal norm may be performed in such a way that it conforms (a) with the one or the other of the different meanings of the legal norm, (b) with the will of the norm creating authority that is to be determined somehow', (c) with the expression which the norm-creating authority has chosen, (d) with the one or the other of the contradictory norms; or (e) the concrete case to which the two contradictory norms refer may be decided under the assumption that the two contradictory norms annul each other. In all these cases, the law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed to remedy what is perceived by Parliament to be a defect in the existing law may in actual operation turn out t0 have injurious consequences that Parliament did not anticipate at the time the statute was passed; if it had, it would have made some provision in the Act in order to prevent them ..... But if this be the case it is for Parliament. not for the judiciary, to decide whether any changes should be made to the law as stated in the Acts Applying the above reasonings; principles and precedents, t0 the definition in s. 2(00) of the Act, we hold that "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever except those expressly excluded in the section. The result is that C.A. Nos. 3241-48 of 1981, 686(NL) of 1982, 18 17 of 1982, 1898 of 1982, 3261 of 1982, 1866 of 1982, 1868 of 1982, 8456 of 1983, 10828 of 1983 and the appeal arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 3149 of 1983 are dismissed with costs quantified at ₹ 3,000 in each appeal. It is stated that in C.A. No. 686 of 1982 the respondent has already been reinstated pursuant to the order dated 24.10.1983 passed by this Court, having regard to the fact that he has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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