TMI Blog1991 (9) TMI 347X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... than six months could not be condoned. The application was accordingly dismissed. The appellant unsuccessfully challenged the decision before the High Court. 3. It has been contended that since the accident took place when the old Motor Vehicles Act was in force, the proceeding before the Accident Claims Tribunal must be held to be governed by the old Act, and his petition cannot be dismissed on the basis of the provisions in the new Act. 4. The period of limitation for filing a claim petition both under the old Act and the new Act is six months from the date of the accident. The difference in the two Acts, which is relevant in the present case, is in regard to the provisions relating to condonation of delay. In view of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 166 of the new Act, the maximum period of delay which can be condoned is six months, which expired on 22.1.1990. If the new Act is held to be applicable, the appellant's petition filed in March had to be dismissed. The case of the appellant is that the accident having taken place before the new Act came into force, the proceeding is governed by the old Act, where there was no such restriction as in the new Act. The ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ue that the appellant earlier could file an application even more than six months after the expiry of the period of limitation, but can this be treated to be a right which the appellant had acquired. The answer is in the negative. The claim to compensation which the appellant was entitled to, by reason of the accident was certainly enforceable as a right. So far the period of limitation for commencing a legal proceeding is concerned, it is adjectival in nature, and has to be governed by the new Act-subject to two, conditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it impractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Shanti Misra, [1976] 2 SCR 266. The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... finally issued, the relevant provision of the Ordinance entitling the lessee to recover vacant possession of the premises was repealed. The lessee claimed the right to vacant possession by relying on certain provisions dealing with rules of interpretation similar in terms to section 6 of our General Clauses Act. The plea was rejected on the ground that although the lessee was entitled to make an application for vacant possession before the Ordinance was repealed, it did not amount to an accrued right or privilege, capable of being preserved after the repeal of the Ordinance, as the right was dependent on the actual issuance of a certificate. In an earlier case of Abbott v. Minister of Lands, [1895] AC 425 the appellant was entitled to make purchases of Crown land adjoining his holding by virtue of certain statutory provisions, which were repealed before he could effectively enforce his right. Besides raising other grounds in respect of his claim, he argued that the right which he had under the repealed enactment was a right accrued and of which he could not be deprived of by the repeal. Rejecting the plea, it was observed that the mere right existing in a class of persons to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not applicable to the State of Madhya Bharat. Subsequently the Code was extended to that area which had become a part of the State of Madhya Pradesh and a fresh order was passed by the West Bengal Court transferring the decree to Morena Court. The judgment debtors challenged the jurisdiction of the court on various grounds. One of the points which was urged was that in view of section 20 clause (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure (amendment) Act, 1951 by which the Code was extended to Madhya Bharat and other areas, the Judgment debtors' right to resist the execution was protected. Reliance was placed on the proviso to the repeal clause in the section which declared that the repeal would not affect any fight, privilege, obligation or liability acquired accrued or incurred under the repealed clause. The judgment debtors objection was over-ruled by this Court. Relying on several English decisions including that in Abbott v. Minister for Lands, [1895] AC 425, it was observed that the mere right existing at the date of the repeal of statute, to take advantage of provisions of the statute repealed is not a right accrued within the meaning of the usual saving clause. 11. In th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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