TMI Blog1960 (5) TMI 27X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n. Sukhdei gifted certain agricultural lands inherited by her from her father to Dulari. The lands gifted to Dulari and the lands of Sukhdei were cultivated by Mahabir, uncle of Deoman. Mahabir and Deoman entered into negotiations for the sale of some of these lands situated at village Anandadih, but Sukhdei refused to agree to the proposed sale. According to the case of the prosecution, in the evening of June 18, 1958, there was an altercation between Deoman and Sukhdei. Deoman slapped Sukhdei on her face and threatened that he would smash her face. Early in the morning of June 19, Deoman made a murderous assault with a gandasa (which was borrowed by him from one Mahesh) upon Sukhdei who was sleeping in the courtyard near her house and killed her on the spot and thereafter, he threw the gandasa into the village tank, washed himself and absconded from the village. He was arrested in the afternoon of the 20th near the village Manapur. On June 21, he offered to hand over the gandasa which he said, he had thrown in the village tank, and in the presence of the investigating officer and certain witnesses, he waded into the tank and took out a gandasa, which, on examination by the Serolo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n Evidence Act which rendered such a statement admissible, discriminated between persons in custody and persons not in custody and was therefore void as violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The Division Bench hearing the appeal referred the following two questions for opinion of a Full Bench of the court:- 1. Whether s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void because it offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution ? and 2. Whether sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void ? The reference was heard by M. C. Desai, B. Mukherjee and A. P. Srivastava, JJ. Mukherjee, J., and Srivastava, J., opined on the first question, that s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act creates an unjustifiable discrimination between persons in custody and persons out of custody , and in that it offends against Art. 14 of the Constitution and is unenforceable in its present form , and on the second question, they held that sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as it relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is void . Desai, J., answered the two questions in the negat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t to be led in a criminal proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan Swamy v. Emperor((1939) L.R. 66 I.A. 66), by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, s. 25 covers a confession made to a police officer before any investigation has begun or otherwise not in the course of an investigation . The adjectival clause accused of any offence is therefore descriptive of the person against whom a confessional statement made by him is declared not provable, and does not predicate a condition of that person ,at the time of making the statement for the applicability of the ban. Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act by its first paragraph provides No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate prosence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against a per. son accused of any offence. By this section, a confession made by a person who is in custody is declared not provable unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. Whereas s. 25 prohibits proof .of a confession made by a person to a police officer whether or not at the time of making the confession, he was in custody, s. 26 prohibits proof of a con ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ence Act, and s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the following material propositions emerge:- (a) Whether a person is in custody or outside, a confession made by him to a police officer or the making of which is procured by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him and proceeding from a person in authority, is not provable against him in any proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (b) A confession made by a person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer to a person other than a police officer is not provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. (c) That part of the information given by a person whilst in police custody whether the information is confessional or otherwise, which distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered but no more, is provable in a proceeding in which he is charged with the commission of an offence. (d) A statement whether it amounts to a confession or not made by a person when he is not in custody, to another person such latter person not being a .police officer may be proved if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ction of the laws guaranteed by Art. 14 'of the Constitution, it is not predicated that all laws must be uniform and universally applicable; the guarantee merely forbids improper or invidious distinctions by conferring rights or privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily selected from out of a larger group who are similarly circumstanced, and between whom and others not so favoured, no distinction reasonably justifying different treatment exists: it does not give a guarantee of the same or similar treatment to all persons without reference to the relevant differences. The State has a wide discretion in the selection of classes amongst persons, things or transactions for purposes of legislation. Between persons in custody and persons not in custody, distinction has evidently been made by the Evidence Act in some matters and they are differently treated. Persons who were, at the time when the statements sought to be proved were made, in custody have been given in some matters greater protection compared to persons not in custody. Confessional or other statements made by persons not in custody may be admitted in evidence, unless such statements fall within ss. 24 and 25 wherea ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... write a letter and give such information or may send a telephonic or other message to the police officer. But in considering whether a statute is unconstitutional on the ground that the law has given equal treatment to all persons similarly circumstanced, it must be remembered that the legislature has to deal with practical problems; the question is not to be judged by merely enumerating other theoretically possible situations to which the statute might have been but is not applied. As has often been said in considering whether there has been a denial of the equal protection of the laws, a doctrinaire approach is to be avoided. A person who has committed an offence, but who is not in custody. normally would not without surrendering himself to the police give information voluntarily to a police officer investigating the commission of that offence leading to the discovery of material evidence supporting a charge against him for the commission of the offence. The Parliament enacts laws to deal with practical problems which are likely to arise in the affairs of men. Theoretical possibility of an offender not in custody because the police officer investigating the offence has not been a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... we would not therefore be incorporating principles foreign to our Constitution, or be proceeding upon the slippery ground of apparent similarity of expressions or concepts in an alien jurisprudence developed by a society whose approach to similar problems on account of historical or other reasons differs from ours. In West Coast Hotel Company v. Parrish ((1937) 300 U.S. 379: 81 L. Ed. 703.), in dealing with the content of the guarantee of the equal protection of the laws, Hughes, C. J., observed at p. 400:- This court has frequently held that the legislative authority, acting within its proper field, is not bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly reach. The legislature is free to recognise degree of harm and it may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest . If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other instances to which it might have been applied . There is no doctrinaire requirement that the legislation should be couched in all embracing terms . Holmes, J., in Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co. ((1926) 270 U.S. 402 : 70 L. Ed. 65 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ifestly reasonable. The fact that the principle is restricted to persons in custody will Dot by itself be a ground for holding that there is an attempted hostile discrimination because the rule of admissibility of evidence is not extended to a possible, but an uncommon or abnormal class of cases. Counsel for the defence contended that in any event Deoman was not at the time when he made the statement attributed to him, accused of any offence and on that account also apart from the constitutional plea, the statement was not provable. This contention is unsound. As we have already observed, the expression accused of any offence is descriptive of the person against whom evidence relating to information alleged to be given by him is made provable by s. 27 of the Evidence Act. It does not predicate a formal accusation against him at the time of making the statement sought to be proved, as a condition of its applicability. In that view, the High Court was in error in holding that s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act and s. 162, sub-s. (2), of the Code of Criminal Procedure in so far as ' that section relates to s. 27 of the Indian Evidence Act' are void as offending Art. 14 of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he stood to gain nothing as the properties which belonged to Sukhdei could not devolve upon his wife Dulari in the normal course of inheritance. But the quarrels between Deoman and Sukhdei arose not because the former was claiming that Dulari was heir presumptive to Sukhdei's estate, but because Sukhdei resisted attempts on Deoman's part to dispose of the property belonging to her and to Dulari. The evidence that Deoman slapped Sukhdei and threatened her that he would smash her face coupled with the circumstances that on the morning of the murder of Sukhdei, Deoman absconded from the village after washing himself in the village tank and after his arrest made a statement in the presence of witnesses that he had thrown the gandasa in the village tank and produced the same, establishes a strong chain of circumstances leading to the irresistible inference that Deoman killed Sukhdei early in the morning of June 19, 1958. The learned trial Judge held on the evidence that Deoman was proved to be the offender. That conclusion is, in our view, not weakened because the evidence relating to the borrowing of the gandasa from witness Mahesh in the evening of June 18, 1958, may not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is made out for not restoring the order imposing the death sentence. We accordingly set aside the order passed by the High Court and restore the order passed by the Court of Session. It may be observed that the sentence of death cannot be executed unless it is confirmed by the High Court. The High Court has not confirmed the sentence, but in exercise of our powers under Art. 136 of the Constitution, we may pass the same order of confirmation of sentence as the High Court is, by the Code of Criminal Procedure, competent to pass. 'We accordingly confirm the sentence of death. SUBBA RAO J.-I have had the advantage of, perusing the judgment of my learned brother, Shah, J. I regret my inability to agree with his reasoning or conclusion in respect of the application of Art. 14 of the Constitution to the facts of the case. The facts have been fully stated in the judgment of my learned brother and they need not be restated here. Article 14 of the Constitution reads: The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or equal protection of the laws within the territories of India. Das, C. J., in Basheshar Nath v. The Commissioner of Income- tax([1959] Supp. (1) S ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lassification from the various decisions of this Court and those of the Supreme Court of the United States of America and restated the settled law in the form of the following propositions at pp. 297298: (a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself; (b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles; (c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discriminations are based on adequate grounds; (d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest; (e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into consideration matters of co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... outset to refer to the relevant sections. Under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, no confession made to a police-officer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence. Section 26 says that no confession made by any person while he is in the custody of a police- officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a 'Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. Section 27, which is in the form of a proviso, enacts that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police- officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure lays down that no statement made by any person to a police-officer in the course of an investigation shall be used for any purpose at any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time when such' statement was made. Sub-s. (2) of s. 162 of the said Code which was amended by s. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Second Amendment) Act, 1941 (Act XV of 1941), provides that the s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lose his life or liberty and the other would be set free. This illustration establishes that prima facie the provisions of s. 27 of the Evidence Act accord unequal and uneven treatment to persons under like circumstances. Learned Additional Solicitor General tries to efface this apparent vice in the sections by attempting to forge a reasonable basis to sustain the different treatment given to the two groups of accused. His argument may be summarized thus: Accused are put in two categories, namely, (1) accused in custody ; and (2) accused not in custody. There are intelligible differentia between these two categories which have reasonable relation to the objects sought to be achie- ved by the legislature in enacting the said provisions. The legislature has two objects, viz., (i) to make available to the Court important evidence in the nature of confessions to enable it to ascertain the truth ; and (ii) to protect the accused in the interest of justice against coercive methods that may be adopted by the police. The differences between the two categories relating to the objects sought to be achieved are the following: (a)while extra-judicial confessions in the case of an accused n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts with great caution. That apart, it is a pure surmise that the legislature should have thought that the confession of an accused in custody to a police-officer with a condition attached would be a substitute for an extra-judicial confession that he might have made if he was free. Broadly speaking, therefore, there is no justification for the suggestion that the prosecution is in a better position in the matter of establishing its case when the accused is out of custody than when he is in custody. Moreover, this circumstance has not been relied upon by the State in the High Court but is relied upon for the first time by learned counsel during his arguments. In my view, there is no practical difference at all in the matter of collecting evidence between the two categories of persons and that the alleged difference cannot reasonably sustain a classification. Re. (b): The second circumstance relied upon by the learned counsel leads us to realms of fancy and imagination. It is said that the number of persons not in custody making confessions to the police is insignificant compared with those in custody and, therefore, the legislature may have left that category out of consideration ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t wherein the question of admissibility of a confession made by a person to a police officer before he came into his custody was considered. I have cited the cases not for considering the validity of the questions decided therein, namely, when a person can be described as an accused and when he can be considered to have come into the custody of the police, but only to controvert the argument that such confessions are in practice non-existent. I have given only the representative decisions of various High Courts and I am sure if a research is made further instances will be forthcoming. The historical background of s. 27 also does not warrant any assumption that the legislature thought that cases of persons not in custody of a police-officer making confessions before him would be very few and, therefore, need not be provided for. Sections 25, 26 and 27 of the Indian Evidence Act correspond to ss. 148, 149 and 150 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1861. Section 148 of the Code prohibited the use as evidence of confessions or admissions of guilt made to a police-officer. Section 149 provided: No confession or admission of guilt made by any person while he is in the custod ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ntion of the legislature, why did it enact s. 25 of the Evidence Act imposing a general ban on the admissibility of all confessions made by accused to a police-officer ? Section 27 alone would have served its purpose. On the other hand, s. 25 in express terms provides for the genus, i.e., accused in general, and s. 27 provides for the species out of the genus, namely, accused who are in custody. A general ban is imposed by one section and it is lifted only in favour of a section of accused of the same class. The omission appears to be rather by accident than by design. In the circumstances it is not right to speculate and hold that the legislature consciously excluded from the operation of s. 27 of the Act accused not in custody on the ground that they were a few in number. During the course of the arguments of the learned counsel for the respondent, to the question put from the Bench whether an accused who makes a confession of his guilt to a police-officer would not by the act of confession submit himself to his custody, the learned counsel answered that the finding of the High Court was in his favour, namely, that such a confession would not bring about that result. Learned Addi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nited States of America. The decision of this Court relied upon is that in Sakhawat Ali v. The State of Orissa ([1955] 1 S.C.R. 1004.). In that case, Bhagwati, J., observed at p. 1010 thus: The simple answer to this contention is that legislation enacted for the achievement of a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for the Legislature to determine what categories it would embrace within the scope of legislation and merely because certain categories which would stand on the same footing as those which are covered by the legislation are left out would not render legislation which has been enacted in any manner discriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteed by article 14 of the Constitution. These observations, though at' first sight appear to support the appellant, if understood in the context of the facts and the points decided in that case, would not in any way help him. By the provisions of s. 16(1)(x) of the Orissa Municipal Act, 1950, a paid legal practitioner on behalf of or against the Municipality is disqualified for election to a seat in such Municipality. One of the questions raised was that the said section violates the f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t duties. Then the learned Judge proceeded to state Such exceptions proceeds upon the theory that those who have acceptably followed the profession in the community for a period of years may be assumed to have the qualifications which others are required to manifest as a result of an examination before a board of medical experts. The classification is, therefore, not sustained upon any mathematical calculation but upon the circumstance that the groups excluded were experienced doctors whereas those included were not. In Jeffrey Manufacturing Company v. Harry O. Blagg ((1915) 235 U.S. 571: 59 L. Ed. 364.) the Supreme Court of America justified a classification under Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act which made a distinction between employers of shops with five or more employees and employers of shops having a lesser number of employees. Employers of the former class had to pay certain premiums for the purpose of establishing a fund to provide for compensation payable under the said Act. If an employer did not pay the premium, he would be deprived of certain defences in a suit filed by his employee for compensation. It was contended that this discrimination offended the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rs. McKenna, J., sustained its constitutional validity holding that the classification was not arbitrary. The observations cited do not in any way detract from the well-established doctrine of classification, but only lay down that the validity of a classification must be judged not on abstract theories but on practical considerations. Where the legislature prohibited the use of shoddy, new or old, even when sterilized, in the manufacture of comfortables for beds, the Supreme Court of America held in Weaver v. Palmer Brothers Co. ((1926) 270 U. S. 402 ; 70L. Ed. 654.) that the prohibition was not reasonable. It was held that constitutional guaranties may not be made to yield to mere convenience. Holmes, J., in his dissenting judgment observed at p. 659 thus: A classification is not to be pronounced arbitrary because it goes on practical grounds and attacks only those objects that exhibit or foster an evil on a large scale. It is not required to be mathematically precise and to embrace every case that theoretically is capable of doing the same harm. Even this dissenting opinion says nothing more than that, in ascertaining the reasonableness of a classification, it shall be test ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... imilar decisions do not justify classification on the basis of numbers or enable the legislature to include the many in and exclude the few from the operation of law without there being an intelligible differentia between them. Nor do they support the broad contention that a legislature in its absolute discretion may exclude some instances of identical characteristics from an Act on alleged practical considerations. Even to exclude one arbitrarily out of a class is to offend against Art. 14 of the Constitution. Let us now apply the said principles to the facts of the present case. Assuming for a moment that the ratio between the accused in the context of confessions is 1000 in custody and 5 out of custody, how could that be conceivably an intelligible ground for classification ? Assuming again that the legislature thought such an exemption is unwarranted- that such cases would not arise at all and need not be provided for, could that be a reasonable assumption having regard to the historical background of S. 27 of the Evidence Act and factual existence of such instances disclosed by decisions cited supra ? As I have already stated that such an exemption is an unwarranted flight ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e vice lies not in the condition imposed, but in the distinction made between these two in the matter of admissibility of a confession. The distinction can be wiped out only when confessions made by all accused are made admissible subject to the protective condition imposed. Not only the alleged differentia are not intelligible or germane to the object sought to be achieved, the basis for the distinction is also extremely arbitrary. There is no acceptable reason why a confession made by an accused in custody to a police-officer is to be admitted when that made by an accused not in custody has to be rejected. The condition imposed in the case of the former may, to some extent, soften the rigour of the rule, but it is irrelevant in considering the question of reasonableness of the classification. Rankin, J., in Durlav Namasudra v. Emperor (1) in a strongly worded passage criticised the anomaly underlying s. 27 thus at p. 1045: ............ in a case like the present where the confession was made to the police, if the man was at liberty at the time he was speaking, what he said should not be admitted in evidence even though something was discovered as a result of it............... ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e. The finding is purely one of fact and there are no exceptional circumstances in the case to disturb the same. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. HIDAYATULLAH J.-The facts of the case have been stated in full by Shah, J., in the judgment which he has delivered, and which I had the advantage of reading. I have also had the advantage of reading the judgment of Subba Rao, J. I respectfully agree generally with the conclusions and the reasons, therefor, of Shah, J. I wish, however, to make a few observations. Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act is in the Chapter on admissions, and forms part of a group of sections which are numbered 24 to 30, and these sections deal with confessions of persons accused of an offence. They have to be read with ss. 46 and 161164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section 24 makes a confession irrelevant if the making of it appears to the Court to have been caused by inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, from a person in authority and by which the accused person hopes that he would gain some advantage or avoid some evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... collection of information, and the second is the finding of the offender. In this process, the police question a number of persons, some of whom may be only witnesses and some who may later figure as the person or persons charged. While questioning such persons, the police may not caution them and the police must leave the persons free to make whatever statements they wish to make. There are two checks at this stage. What the witnesses or the suspects say is not be used at the trial, and a person cannot be compelled to answer a question, which answer may incriminate him. It is to be noticed that at that stage though the police may have suspicion against the offender, there is no difference between him and other witnesses, who are questioned. Those who turn out to be witnesses and not accused are expected to give evidence at the trial and their former statements are not evidence. In so far as those ultimately charged are concerned, they cannot be witnesses, save exceptionally, and their statements are barred under s. 162 of the Code and their confessions, under s. 24 of the Indian Evidence Act. Their confessions are only relevant and admissible, if they are recorded as laid down in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hen hope or fear were not in question, such statements were long regularly admitted as relevant, though with some reluctance, and subject to strong warnings as to their weight. Even so, in the judgment referred to by Lord Sumner, Parke, B., bewailed that the rule had been carried too far out of too much tenderness towards prisoners in this matter , and observed : I confess that I cannot look at the decisions without some shame, when I consider what objections have prevailed to prevent the reception of confessions in evidence Justice and commonsense have too frequently been sacrificed at the shrine of mercy. Whatever the views of Parke, B., Lord Sumner points out that when Judges excluded such evidence, it was rather explained by their observations on the duties of policemen than justified by their reliance on rules of law. Lord Sumner has then traced the history of the law in subsequent years. In 1905, Channel, J., in Beg v. Knight and Thavre ((1905) 20 Cox C.C. 711) referred to the position of an accused in custody thus: When he has taken any one into custody he ought not to question the prisoner I am not aware of any distinct rule of evidence that, if such ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his custody unless he respectively did so in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, or his confession was recorded by a Magistrate. In either event, the confession had to be voluntary and free from taint of threat, promise, fear, etc. The law was framed to protect a suspect against too much garrulity before he know that he was in danger which sense would dawn on him when arrested and yet left the door open to voluntary statements which might clear him if made but which might not be made if a caution was administered. Without the caution an innocent suspect is not in a position to know his danger, while a person arrested knows his position only too well. Without the caution, the line of distinction ceased, and the law very sensibly left out the statements altogether. Thus, before arrest all suspects, whether rightly suspected or wrongly, were on par. Neither the statements of the one nor of the other were provable, and there was no caution at all. The English law then was taken as a model for accused in custody. Section 27 which is framed as an exception has rightly been hold as an exception to ss. 24-26 and not only to s. 26. The words of the section were taken bodily from The Ki ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was not evidence, yet that any facts arising afterwards may be given in evidence, though they were done in consequence of the confession. This point, though it did not affect the prisoner at the bar, was stated to all the Judges: and the line drawn was, that although confessions improperly obtained cannot be received in evidence, yet that the acts done after- wards may be given in evidence, though they were done in consequence of the confession. Where, however, no fact was discovered, the statement was not held admissible. See Rex v. Richard Griffin (1) and Rex v. Francis Jones (2). In Rex v. David Jenkins(1), the prisoner was con victed before Bayley, J., (present Park, J.), of stealing certain gowns and other articles. He was induced by a promise from the prosecutor to confess his guilt, and after that confession, he carried the officer to a particular house, but the property was not found. The evidence of the confession was not received; the evidence of his carrying the officer to the house as abovementioned was. But Bayley, J., referred the point for consideration of the Judges. The Judges were of opinion that, the evidence was not admissible and the conviction was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... has thus made a classification of accused persons into two: (1) those who have the danger brought home to them by detention on a charge; and (2) those who are yet free. In the former category are also those persons who surrender to the custody by words or action. The protection given to these two classes is different. In the case of persons belonging to the second category the law has ruled that their statements are not admissible, and in the case of the first category, only that portion of the statement is admissible as is guaranteed by the discovery of a relevant fact unknown before the statement to the investigating authority. That statement may even be confessional in nature, as when the person in custody says ; I pushed him down such and such mineshaft , and the body of the victim is found as a result, and it can be proved that his death was due to injuries received by a fall down the mineshaft. It is argued that there is denial of equal protection of the law, because if the statement were made before custody began, it would be inadmissible. of course, the making of the statement as also the stage at which it is made, depends upon the person making it. The law is concerned i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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