TMI Blog1963 (9) TMI 55X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ry to detain the petitioner with a view to prevent him from acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. This order was served on the petitioner on the 15th February, 1963, in Burdwan Jail where he had been kept as a result of a remand order passed by a court of competent. Jurisdiction which had taken cognizance of a criminal complaint against him. As required by s. 7(1) of the Act, the grounds on which the petitioner's detention had been ordered by the detaining authority were communicated to him on the same day. In due course, the State Government approved of the said Order on the 16th February, 1963. The case of the detenu was then placed before the Advisory Board which recommended the continuance of the petitioner's detention. Thereafter, the State Government by its Order passed on the 23rd April, 1963 confirmed the detention of the petitioner under s. 11 of the Act. This Order of the State Government was ultimately served on the petitioner in the Burdwan Jail on the 29th April, 1963. The grounds for the petitioner's detention which have been served on him indicate that material had been placed before the detaining authority which showed tha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rder of detention invalid. It has also been suggested that the petitioner was in fact denied an opportunity to make his representation to the Advisory Board and that also introduces an infirmity in the order. Since we have come to the conclusion that the first contention raised by Mr. Garg is well-founded, we do not propose to consider the merits of the other arguments urged by him in support of his petition. Let us then read section 3(1) to determine the true scope and effect of the relevant clause on which Mr. Garg's argument is founded. Section 3(1) provides inter alia, that the Central Government or the State Government may-(a) if satisfied with respect of any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to........ (ii) the security of the State or the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained. It will be noticed that before an order of detention can be validly made by the detaining authorities specified by s. 3(2), the authority must be satisfied that the detention of the person is necessary in order to prevent him from acting in any prejudicial manner as indicated in cl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ulge in prejudicial activities. The reasonableness of the satisfaction of the detaining authority cannot be questioned in a Court of law; the adequacy of the material on which the said satisfaction purports to rest also cannot be examined in a Court of law. That is the effect of the true legal position in regard to the satisfaction contemplated by section 3(1)(a), vide The State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Sridhar Vaidya([1951] S.C.R. 167, 176.). There is also no doubt that if any of the grounds furnished to the detenu are found to be irrelevant while considering the application of clauses (i) to (iii) of s. 3(1) (a) and in that sense are foreign to the Act, the satisfaction of the detaining authority on which the order of detention is based is open to challenge and the detention order liable to be quashed. Similarly, if some of the grounds supplied to the detenu are so vague that they would virtually deprive the detenu of his statutory right of making a representation, that again may introduce a serious infirmity in the order of his detention. If however, the grounds on which the order of detention proceeds are relevant and germane to the matters which fall to be considered under s. 3(1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the detention of the person is necessary. It would, for instance, be irrational to take into account the conduct of the person which took plate ten years before the date of his detention and say that even though after the said incident took place nothing is known against the person indicating his tendency to act in a prejudicial manner, even so on the strength of the said incident which is ten years old, the authority is satisfied that his detention is necessary. Inother words, where an authority is acting bona fide andconsidering the question as to whether a person should be detained, he would naturally expect that evidence on which the said conclusion is ultimately going to rest must be evidence of his past conduct or antecedent history which reasonably and rationally justifies the conclusion that if the said person is not detained, he may indulge in prejudicial activities. We ought to add that it is both inexpedient and undesirable to lay down any inflexible test. The question about the validity of the satisfaction of the authority will have to be considered on the facts of each case. The detention of a person without a trial is a very serious encroachment on his personal freedo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wo or so, and it is known that he would soon be released from jail, it may be possible for the authority to consider the antecedent history of the said person and decide whether the detention of the said person would be necessary after he is released from jail, and if the authority is bona fide satisfied that such detention is necessary, he can make a valid ,order of detention a few days before the person is likely to be released. The antecedent history and the past conduct on which the order of detention would be based would, in such a case, be proximate in point of time and would have a rational connection with the conclusion ,drawn by the authority that the detention of the person after his release is necessary. It may not be easy to discover such rational connection between the antecedent history of the person who has been sentenced to ten years' rigorous imprisonment and the view that his detention should be ordered after he is released after running the whole of his sentence. Therefore, we are satisfied that the question as to whether an order of detention can be passed against a person who is in detention or in jail, will always have to be determined in the circumstances ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e case of the petitioner. Therefore, we see no escape from the conclusion that the detention of the petitioner in the circumstances of this case, is not justified by s. 3(1)(a) and is outside its purview. The District Magistrate, Burdwan who ordered the detention of the detenu acted outside his powers conferred on him by s. 3(1)(a) when he held that it was necessary to detain the petitioner in order to prevent him from acting in a prejudicial manner. That being so, we must hold that Mr. Garg is right when he contends that the detention of the petitioner is not justified by s. 3 (1) (a). In this con- nection, we may add that the Assam High Court in two of its decisions appears to have taken the same view about the scope and effect of the relevant provisions of s. 3(1)(a) of the Act, vide Labaram Deka Barua Anr. v. The State (A.I.R. 1951 Assam 43), and Haridas Deka v. State (A.I.R. 1952 Assam 175.). Mr. Sen has, however, relied on the decision of the Assam High Court in Sahadat Ali v. The State of Assam Ors.( A.I.R. 1953 Assam 97.). In that case it appeared that the Government had decided in public interest to abandon the prosecution which was pending against the detenu. The s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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