TMI Blog2001 (8) TMI 1371X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cation was filed under Order XXI Rule 89 C.P.C. and the prescribed amount was also deposited. 5. On 11th March, 1983 the executing Court dismissed the application on the ground that the deposit was not made within 30 days as prescribed under Order XXI Rule 92(2) C.P.C. The Judgment-debtor filed an Appeal which was allowed on 3rd September, 1983. The Order of the executing Court was set aside. The application of the Judgment-debtor was allowed and the sale was set aside. 6. The Civil Revision Petition filed by the Auction Purchaser was dismissed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh on 1st February, 1990. It was held that Courts had to harmonise the two provisions and interpret the same having regard to the intention of the legislature. It was held that the Judgment Debtor should be given the benefit of the enlarged period of limitation under Art. 127 of the Limitation Act. 7. It must be mentioned that in coming to the above conclusion the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied upon a Judgment of this Court in the case of Basavantappa v Gangadhar Narayan Dharwadkar Anr. reported in (1986) 4 S.C.C. 273. In that case it was held that the two provisions had to be harmoniously constr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ime allowed for making a deposit. This Court held as follows: 15. The court must indeed proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it intended to say what it said: See Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sunder Haldar [1953 SCR 533, 545 : AIR 1953 SC 148]. Assuming there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal reading produces an intelligible result. No case can be found to authorise any court to alter a word so as to produce a casus omissus: Per Lord Halsbury, Mersey Docks and Harbour Board v. Henderson Brothers. [(1888) 13 AC 595, 602: 4 TLR 703]. We cannot aid the legislature s defective phrasing of an Act, we cannot add and mend, and, by construction, make up deficiencies which are left there : Crawford v. Spooner [(1846) 6 Moore PC 1, 8, 9: 4 MIA 179]. 16. Where the language of the statute leads to manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, the court can, of course, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... That Bench, therefore, referred the matter to a five Judge Bench for considering the correctness of the view taken in P.K. Unni s case. The Order dated 8th September, 1995 reads as follows: A three-member bench of this Court in P. K. Unni vs. Nirmala Industries others 1990(2) SCC 378 has held that time for making a deposit in terms of Rule 89 Order XXI C.P.C. is 30 days and Article 127 of the Limitation Act, 1963 prescribing a period of sixty days for making an application under Rule 89 has no relevance to the prescribed time for making the deposit, and that neither provision has any effect on the other as to time. It appears to us however that these two periods of limitation are two facets of the same coin. The difference, even though artificial, has to be resolved in permitting the larger period of time to achieve the objective. We, on our part, find it difficult to bypass this three-judge bench decision. We, therefore, refer this matter to a five-judge bench for considering the correctness of the view taken in that case and for the purpose direct that the papers of this case be laid before Hon ble the C.J.I. for constituting a five-judge bench. It may be mentioned that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Liquidator vs. Bimalendu Das and others reported in AIR (1985) Calcutta 382. 12. Mr. Bisaria further submitted that Order XXI Rule 92(2) C.P.C. does not prescribe any period for deposit of monies but only provides that if the deposit is made within 30 days and an application filed then the Court would have no discretion to refuse to set aside sale. He submits that by extending the period of time to file an application the legislature has now left it to the discretion of the Court, to allow or disallow, the application if the deposit is not made within 30 days. 13. We have considered the submissions made by the parties. The settled principles of interpretation are that the Court must proceed on the assumption that the legislature did not make a mistake and that it did what it intended to do. The Court must, as far as possible, adopt a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature. Undoubtedly if there is a defect or an omission in the words used by the legislature, the Court would not go to its aid to correct or make up the deficiency. The Court could not add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there, especially when the literal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... under Rule 89, the deposit required by that rule is made within 30 days from the date of sale the Court shall make an order setting aside the sale. Thus Order XXI Rule 92(2) C.P.C. is only taking away discretion of the Court to refuse to set aside the sale where an application is made and allowed and the deposit has been made within 30 days from date of sale. It is thus clear that Order XXI Rule 92(2) C.P.C. is not prescribing any period of limitation within which a deposit has to be made. 17. Viewed in this context the intention of the legislature in extending the period under Article 127 Limitation Act may be seen. It is very clear from the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which have been set out hereinabove, that the period under Article 127 Limitation Act was extended from 30 days to 60 days in order to give more time to persons to make deposits. The legislature has noted that the period of 30 days from the date of sale was too short and often caused hardships because Judgment-debtors usually failed to arrange for moneys within that period. The question then would be whether by merely amending Article 127 Limitation Act the legislature has achieved the object for which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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