TMI Blog2010 (11) TMI 936X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... He purchased land measuring about 1800 bighas in villages Chowkri Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd, which now form part of NCR Delhi from his own resources and by collecting money in the form of donations from other philanthropists. In a public function held on 25.12.1916 in Ramjas School, Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandani Chowk, Rai Sahib Kedar Nath is said to have made an announcement that he had created a Wakf and dedicated and donated all his movable and immovable properties including the land in villages Chowki Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd to the said school for charitable purposes, namely, advancement and promotion of education to the public and poor students. In 1917, he formed Ramjas College Society and got the same registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as a charitable institution. The objects of the Society were as under: i) To provide school and university education for boys and girls. ii) To maintain schools, colleges, boarding houses and training institutes for training of teachers. iii) To provide means for imparting technical and industrial education in connection with the institutions under the control of foundation. iv) To provide means for impar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... peals filed against the orders of the Delhi High Court were dismissed by this Court in Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (1975) 4 SCC 285 and Lila Ram v. Union of India (1975) 2 SCC 547. 7. Appellant No.1 also filed several cases in the Delhi High Court and this Court questioning the acquisition of its land and consequential actions taken by the respondents. The particulars of the cases filed by appellant No.1 and their result are detailed below: Chowkri Mubarikabad (i) The first writ petition bearing No.409/1968 was filed by appellant No.1 in the Delhi High Court for quashing notifications dated 13.11.1959 and 28.2.1968 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively mainly on the ground that its land is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 because it was a Wakf property. This assertion was contested by the respondents. They pleaded that the property in dispute is neither a Wakf nor it can be treated as Wakf because it had not been created by a Muslim. The learned Single Judge was of the view that the adjudication of the writ petition would need determination of complicated questions of fact and such questions cannot b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... India (1993) Supp 2 SCC 20. (iv) After dismissal of the civil appeal, the Land Acquisition Collector passed Award No.10/94-95 dated 7.6.1994 and supplementary Award Nos.10-A/94-95, 10-B/94-95, 10-C/94-95 and 10-D/94-95 all dated 11.11.1994 in respect of 718 bighas 14 biswas land situated at Sadhora Khurd and took possession of 676 bighas and 8 biswas of land. (v) Appellant No.1 challenged the awards in CWP No.4343/1997 and prayed for quashing the action of the respondents to take possession of the acquired land. It further prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondents to release land by issuing notification under Section 48 of the Act. Appellant No.1 filed another writ petition (CWP No.5493/1999) for grant of a declaration that land situated in village Sadhora Khurd continues to be in its possession. By an order dated 26.4.2000, the Division Bench of the High Court dismissed CWP No. 4343/1997 but gave a direction to the Lt. Governor to pass appropriate order on the application made by appellant No.1 for denotification of the acquired land. Similar order appears to have been passed in CWP No. 5493/1999. (vi) In the meanwhile, Bhagwan Dass filed CWP No.1811/1995 by way of pu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isposed of within a period of six weeks from today. (ix) In compliance of the direction given by the High Court and this Court Lt. Governor, Delhi passed order dated 18.6.2002 and rejected the prayer of appellant No.1 for denotification of its land by recording the following reasons: I have gone through all the papers on record and have considered the matter at length. Possession of area admeasuring 563 bighas 07 biswas was taken by DDA on as is where is basis as land was not physically vacant. The said area is replete with factories. The Anand Parbat Industrial Area as it has come to be popularly known, has come up in a haphazard and unplanned manner and has over the years, also become degraded and decrepit. The congested and unsystematic growth of factories in the area has turned it into a veritable public hazard. Safety considerations are wanting. Most of the lanes are too narrow for a fire tender to enter. The electricity distribution system is problematic. The other infrastructure and basic services are also inadequate. Apart from being a congested and degraded cluster of factories operating in sub- optimal conditions, the area is also hazardous where public safety r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the same could not be acquired in the name of planned development of Delhi. Learned counsel invited the Court's attention to the amended definition of `Wakf' contained in Section 3(1) of the Wakf Act, 1954 and argued that a non-Muslim can also create Wakf. Learned senior counsel submitted that there is no injunction under the uncodified or codified Muslim Law against dedication of property to a charitable purpose recognized by Muslim Law by a non-Muslim or a person not professing the Islamic faith. He further submitted that merely because Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a Hindu and had performed havan etc. before renouncing the property in favour of the Society for a charitable purpose is not sufficient to deny benefit of exemption to appellant No.1 in terms of clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959. Learned counsel further argued that exemption clause contained in notification dated 13.11.1959 should be liberally construed in a manner which will benefit dedication made for charitable purpose irrespective of caste and/or religion, else the impugned notification will become discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. In support of his argument ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... transferred to the Society became a Wakf property. Shri Amarendra Sharan emphasized that renouncement of property by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath in favour of the Society formed by him for educational purposes did not result in creation of a Wakf and the property did not become Wakf property because the dedication made by him was preceded by Samarpan and Sankalp which are well known concepts of Hindu Law. Another argument of the learned senior counsel is that clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 cannot be interpreted as including every dedication of property for charitable purpose and the expression `Wakf property' must be given a restricted interpretation so as to include the property attached to the Wakf created by Muslims only. 10. We have considered the respective submissions. In our view, the appeal deserves to be dismissed because the appellants have not approached the Court with clean hands. In Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India, acquisition of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the ground of violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property. Another plea t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ward on behalf of the appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants in respect of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is reprehensible. It is well settled that a person invoking an equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands and should not conceal the material facts. The objection regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was one of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special leave petition was filed in 1978 itself. It may be further noted that a common objection petition under Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... espect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to the acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned counsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of such conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In case, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior counsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the result of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in Mubarikabad there was no justification for filing the Writ Petition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in fact dismissed on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for filing the writ petition in respect of the land situated in Sadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ petition on March 30, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh suit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7, 1978 instead of suit. (emphasis supplied) 11. In S.L.P.(C) No. 15017/2000 and connected matters, appellant No.1 had specifically raised a plea that its property is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property, but failed to conv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... could be the possible reason for these omissions? Any person of reasonable prudence will at once respond to this question by saying that sole object of not disclosing the facts relating to other cases was to keep the Court in dark about rejection of challenge to the acquisition of a portion of land which the appellants are claiming to be Wakf property. We have no doubt that the appellants did so for the purpose of persuading this Court to pass an interim order and they succeeded in this venture because while issuing notice on 26.11.2001, this Court directed that there shall be stay of dispossession. 14. The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums. The object underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Kingdom, except for temporary purposes, nor with any view or intent of establishing her residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in any one year. In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the applicant stated that she was a French subject and resident in France and was not and had not been a subject of the United Kingdom nor a resident in the United Kingdom; that during the year ending April 5, 1913, she was in the United Kingdom for temporary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she spent about twenty of these days in London at her brother's house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other guests of her brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at 213, King's Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914, she had not been in the United Kingdom. From the affidavits filed on behalf of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes, who showed cause against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit of the applicant in reply, it appeared that in February, 1909, a leasehold house, 213, King's Road, Chelsea, h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rt lamented on the increase in the number of cases in which the parties have tried to misuse the process of Court by making false and/or misleading statements or by suppressing the relevant facts or by trying to mislead the Court in passing order in their favour and observed: For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. satya (truth) and ahimsa (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings. In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for truth. They shamelessly resort ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... documents produced by the parties, referred to the concept of `Wakf' propounded by Ammer Ali, outlines of Mohammadan Law by Prof. A.A.A. Fayzee (Chapter IX pg.274- 275), the judgments of the Privy Council and various High Courts in Vidya Viruthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123, Mami v. Kallandar Ammal 54 I.A. 23, Motishah v. Abdul Gaffar AIR 1956 Nagpur 38, Arur Singh v. Badar Din AIR 1940 Lahore 119, Fuzlur Rahaman v. Anath Bandhu Pal (1911) 16 Cal. WN 114, Misra Hidavat Beg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941 All. 225 and Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore 686 and observed: I cannot read the term `wakf' property as embracing property impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus. A property burdened with the obligation of a charitable trust as understood in Hindu law cannot be called a wakf property in a legal sense. In a non-legal, popular sense it may be possible to use the expression wakf indiscriminately for and in relation to any property set apart for charity. But in legal technology the word `wakf' has a definite and accepted connotation. It is in that sense that the word has to be understood. For the true interpretation of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... statutory instrument. It uses the expression `wakf property'. How do we interpret those words? I think these words must be construed according to the legal and technical meaning given to them by Muslim Law. They are not to be given the more popular, non-legal or ordinary dictionary meaning of the words. These words must be taken in their legal sense. The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge and observed: In view of the aforesaid legal exposition of the `waqf' it cannot be said that the property of appellants, which may be Hindu charitable trust, would be termed as `waqf property'. The learned Single Judge, to our mind, rightly held that while using his expression in the impugned Notification issued by the statutory authority under Section 4 of the Act the statutory authority would be presumed to be aware of the legal implication of the term `waqf property'. Therefore, this term cannot be read as to embrace property impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus. Once the meaning of the words `waqf property' is clear, it is difficult to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that `popular' m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urposes but no evidence was produced before the learned Single Judge to prove this. Rather, the evidence produced before the learned Single Judge shows that even after the so called dedication of land for charitable purposes, the same continued in the name of Rai Sahib Kedar Nath till 1936 when he executed the release deed in favour of the Trust of which he himself was the founder trustee apart from being the Manager of the school and the President of the Society. The hawan ceremony performed by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath which was preceded by Samarpan and Sankalp also shows that he did not intend to create a Wakf. This is the reason why the objects of Ramjas College Society formed in 1917 do not make a mention of the Wakf allegedly created by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath. In the deed of settlement executed by the British Government, the institution was described as a public educational charity and not as a Wakf. Therefore, the concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that what was created by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a public charitable trust and not a Wakf and the property acquired vide notification dated 13.11.1959 was not a Wakf property does not call for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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