TMI Blog2007 (1) TMI 551X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in dispute that at one point of time the management of the said temple was taken over by the Maharana of Mewar. We need not go into the history of the said temple, as the same has been noticed by this Court in the earlier round of litigations,. The properties of the said temple vested in the State of Rajasthan as the State of Mewar merged with other princely States forming the United State of Rajasthan on 18.04.1948. Various directions were issued by the Government of Rajasthan in relation to the management of the said temple from time to time. The legislature of the State of Rajasthan enacted Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959 (for short the Act ). Chapter I to IV thereof came into force on 22.10.1959. In exercise of its rule making power contained in Section 76 of the Act, the State of Rajasthan framed Rules known as the Rajasthan Public Trusts Rules, 1962 which came into force on and from 11.06.1962. Chapter V to X and XII of the Act as also the Rules applicable in relation thereto were brought into operation with effect from 1.07.1962. Questioning the validity of some of the provisions of the Act including Sections 52(1)(d) and 53 thereof, some members belonging to Swetambers ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anagement set aside. When the Committee of Management, however, was not constituted within a reasonable time, Swetambers again filed a writ petition bearing No. S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 21 of 1981 before the Rajasthan High Court inter alia contending that as the State having regard to the provisions contained in Sections 52 and 53 of the Act exercises power coupled with duties, the failure to publish the list and to constitute a Committee would amount to dereliction of duties on its part. In the said writ petition it was prayed for: (i) To issue a Mandamus directing the State Government to issue a list of public trusts under Section 52(2) of the Act and to constitute a Committee for management in terms of Section 53 of the Act. (ii) To issue a suitable writ or direction to quash the order dated 29.9.1979 restraining the State from changing the denominational character of the temple. The State in its affidavit in opposition filed in the said proceedings reiterated its position that the temple was a Hindu temple. Although it had not been brought to the notice of the High Court but now it stands admitted that the State in exercise of its power conferred upon it unde ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the State: (i) to publish list of trusts under 52(2) of the Act. (ii) to hold inquiry under Rule 36 to determine denominational character of the temple. (iii) after completion of inquiry within 3 months, to constitute Committee for management under Section 53 of the Act. The Division Bench of the High Court by reason of the impugned judgment dated 18.09.1997 while affirming the said directions made certain modifications in regard to constitution of Committee leaving the matter at the discretion of the State Government opining Sections 52 and 53 of the Act confers such discretion to it. Review petitions filed thereagainst have been dismissed by judgment and order dated 06.02.2002. There are four sets of appeals before us. The first set of appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4092-4095, has been filed by the Swetamber Jain sect and is directed against the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court dated 18.09.1997. The second set of appeals, viz., Civil Appeal Nos. 4086-4089 of 2002, has also been filed by the Swetamber Jain sect and is directed against the order of the Division Bench of the High Court dismissing the review petitions filed against the judgment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ho, in addition to other duties and functions imposed on him by or under the provisions of this Act or any other law for the time being in force, shall, subject to the general and special orders of the State Government, superintend the administration and carry out the provisions of this Act throughout the territories to which this Act extends. (2) The Commissioner shall be a corporation sole by the name of Devasthan Commissioner of the State of Rajasthan , shall as such have perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue and be sued in his corporate name. Section 17 provides for registration of public trusts. Section 18 provides for inquiry about registration. Sections 52 and 53 of the Act read as under: 52. Application of chapter.-(1) The provisions contained in this Chapter shall apply to every public trust- (a) which vests in the State Government, or (b) which is maintained at the expense of the State Government, or (c) which is managed directly by the State Government, or (d) which is under the superintendence of the Court of Wards, or (e) of which the gross annual income is ten thousand rupees or more. (2) The State Government shall, as soon as m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the benefit of whom the trust was founded, in accordance with the general wishes of the persons so interested so far as such wishes can be ascertained in the prescribed manner : Provided that in the case of a public trust having a hereditary trustee, such trustee, and in the case of a math, the head thereof, shall be the Chairman of the committee of management, if he is willing to serve as such. Section 77 provides for exemption from the application of the provisions of the Act in the following terms: Exemption-(1) Nothing contained in this Act shall apply to a public trust administered by any agency acting under the control of the State Government or by any local authority. (2) The State Government may exempt, by notification specifying the reasons for such exemption, any public trust or class of public trusts from all or any of the provisions of this Act, subject to such conditions, if any, as the State Government may deem fit to impose. Rule 36 of the said Rules reads as under: 36. Manner of ascertaining the wishes of persons interested \026 (1) For the purpose of ascertaining the wishes under sub-section (5) of Section 53, of the persons interested, t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rust in the State Government. Different dates may be appointed for different purposes. Once Chapter X is found to be applicable, subject to fixation of an appointed date, the management vests in a committee. Such a committee of management is to be constituted by the State Government in the manner provided therein. The said provision contains a non-obstante clause and, therefore, the same would prevail over anything contained in any provision of the Act or in any law, custom or usage in force. The State Government, in our opinion, does not have any discretionary jurisdiction to exercise in the matter of appointment of a committee of management. It is imperative in nature. The expression shall used in Sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 53 of the Act indicates that the natural and ordinary meaning of the words used by the legislature require that a committee of management must be constituted. The expression shall ordinarily implies the imperative character of the law. Even if the expression shall is read as may although there does not exist any reason therefor, the statute provides for a power coupled with a duty. It is a well-settled principle of interpretation of statute ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o refer their cases to the Tribunal that the rule-making authority wanted to make a special provision in respect of them as distinguished from other government servants falling under rule 4(1) and rule 4(2) has been prescribed, otherwise rule 4(2) would be wholly redundant. In other words, the plain and unambiguous object of enacting rule 4(2) is to provide an option to the gazetted government servants to request the Governor that their cases should be tried by a Tribunal and not otherwise. The rule-making authority presumably thought that having regard to the status of the gazetted government servants, it would be legitimate to give such an opinion to them\005 In State (Delhi Admn.) v. I.K. Nangia and Another [(1980) 1 SCC 258], this Court opined: We are clear that the Explanation to Section 17(2), although in terms permissive, imposes a duty upon such a company to nominate a person in relation to different establishments or branches or units. There can be no doubt that this implies the performance of a public duty, as otherwise, the scheme underlying the section would be unworkable. The case, in our opinion, comes within the dictum of Lord Cairns in Julius v. Lord Bish ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or a set of provisions in regard to the management of trust. There does not exist any other provisions providing for the same. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, however, would submit that in view of the fact that the management of the temple is vested in the Devasthan Commissioner, the provisions of the Act, far less Chapter X, will apply to the temple in question. An exemption provision, as is well-known, must be strictly construed. Sub-section (1) of Section 77 of the Act exempts only those trusts which are administered by any agency under the control of the State Government or by any local authority. Whether the Devasthan Commissioner would be the agency of the State is, therefore, the question. Devasthan Commissioner is a statutory authority. He is an officer of the State. He exercises various functions under the Act. The Act postulates constitution of Advisory Boards and Advisory Committee. Their duties and functions are prescribed. In regard to various provisions of the Act, Devasthan Commissioner indisputably has statutory duties to perform. The Act does not provide that he may be put in charge of the management of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urdity, the same should be avoided. [See Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) 5 SCC 598 and M.P. Gopalakrishnan Nair v. State of Kerala,(2005) 11 SCC 45] It is also well-settled that the entire statute must be first read as a whole then section by section, clause by clause, phrase by phrase and word by word. [See Reserve Bank of India v. Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. and Others, (1987) 1 SCC 424] The relevant provisions of the statute must, thus, be read harmoniously. [See Bombay Dyeing (supra) and Secretary, Department of Excise Commercial Taxes and Others v. Sun Bright Marketing (P) Ltd., Chhattisgarh and Another [(2004) 3 SCC 185]. It would, therefore, not be possible to give literal interpretation to Section 77 of the Act. Different provisions contained in different Chapters of the Act must, as far as possible, receive harmonious construction. With a view to give harmonious construction, the effect of an exemption clause must be borne in mind. It has not been denied or disputed that keeping in view the different clauses contained in Section 52 of the Act, public trusts which had vested in the State would come within the purview of the Chapter X. Once it is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... utory interdict. It was further held : The doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence was not restricted to cases where the representor was aware both of what his strict rights were and that the representee was acting on the belief that those rights would not be enforced against him. Instead, the court was required to ascertain whether in the particular circumstances, it would be unconscionable for a party to be permitted to deny that which, knowingly or unknowingly, he had allowed or encouraged another to assume to his detriment. Accordingly, the principle would apply if at the time the expectation was encouraged. The stand of the State in the earlier round of ligitation was that the temple in question was a Hindu temple. This Court categorically opined that it is a Jain temple. The principles of res judicata, thus, would come into play. The State, therefore, cannot still contend that the temple in question is a Hindu temple. Before us, the Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 in Civil Appeal No. 4086-4089 of 2002 have raised a contention that it is a Hindu temple but we cannot permit the State or the said respondents to raise such a contention before us. We are bound by the earlier judgment ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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