TMI Blog1961 (2) TMI 66X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e colliery that a court of enquiry was being constituted under cl. (a) of the Regulation 48 to hold an inquiry into their conduct. Criminal proceedings were also instituted against 14 persons including the manager and the agent of the colliery, all the directors of the company which was the owner of the colliery and the directors of the managing agents of that company. The complaints alleged violation by the 14 accused of several regulations out of the Indian Coal Mines Regulations, 1926. There were two separate complaints in respect of the violation of different regulations. It was alleged in one of the complaints that the accused persons had by the violation of the regulations mentioned therein committed offenses under s. 73 of the Mines Act, 1952; the other complaint alleged that by the violation of the regulations mentioned therein the accused persons had committed offenses under as. 73 and 74 of the Mines Act, 1952. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate took cognizance of the offenses, and issued processes against all the 14 persons on May 23, 1956. Six of the accused persons, Lala Karam Chand Thaper, H. P. Poddar, Jagat Ram Sharma, Kumud Ranjan Dutt, H. V. Varma and U. Mehta filed ap ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed appeals against the order rejecting their applications after having obtained special leave from this Court. These two appeals are now numbered as Cr. Appeals Nos. 105 and 106 of 1959. The Chief Inspector of Mines and others who are made respondents in the application under Art. 226 have also filed appeals on special leave granted by this Court against the High Court s order in the applications of the directors of the managing agents allowing the same and also against the High Court s orders in the application of the two directors of the company asking the Chief Inspector of Mines and the Regional Inspector of Mines to choose one only of the directors for prosecution; their appeals in the application of the directors of the managing agents before us have been numbered as Criminal Appeals Nos. 100 and 101. Their appeals in the applications of the directors of the colliery company are numbered 98 and 99 of 1957. It will be convenient to refer to the appellants in these four appeals as government-appellants. At about the same time these several applications were made before the High Court, the agent and the manager of the colliery company also made applications to the High Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he colliery company, possession over the mine; and so occupy the mine. Though the word occupier is not defined in the Act it is patently absurd to suppose that any and every person exercising possession over the mine, is an occupier and thus an owner of the mine, for the purpose of the Mines Act. From the very collocation of the words immediate proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the mine , it is abundantly clear that only a person whose occupation is of the same character, that is, occupation by a proprietor or a lessee-by way of possession on his behalf and not on behalf of somebody else is meant by the word occupier in the definition. Thus, a trespasser in wrongful possession to the exclusion of the rightful owner would be an occupier of the mine, and so be an owner for the purposes of the Act. When however a servant or agent of the proprietor or lessee of a mine is in possession of a mine, he is in possession on behalf of his master or his principal, and not on his own behalf. It would be unreasonable to think that the legislature intended such servants or agents liable and responsible as owner of the mine. possession on behalf of another was sufficient to make a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... section of a. 31 provides that the power to make regulations and rules conferred by ss. 29, 30 and 30A is subject to the condition of the regulation and rules being made after previous publication. The fourth sub-section of that section lays down that regulations and rules shall be published in the official gazette and on such publication shall have effect as if enacted in this Act . The regulations, which are alleged to have been contravened were all made under s. 29 of the 1923 Act, and admittedly they were duly published in the official gazette. As a result of such publication, these regulations from the date of the publication, commenced having effect as if enacted in the Mines Act, 1923. The question we have to answer is: Did the regulations stand repealed, when the Mines Act, 1923, was repealed? Before endeavoring to answer the question, we have to take note of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The relevant portion of this clause is in these words:- When any Central Act is after the commencement of this Act repealed and reenacted with or without modification, then, unless it is otherwise expressly provided, any rule made or issued under the repealed Act shall so far as ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the purpose of the General Clauses Act is to place in one single statute different provisions as regards interpretations of words and legal principles which would otherwise have to be specified separately a many different acts and regulations. Whatever the General Clauses Act says, whether as regards the meanings of words or as regards legal principles, has to be read into every statute to which it applies. The Mines Act, 1923, being a Central Act, s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies to it, so that we have to read in the Mines Act, 1923, an additional provision embodying the words of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The result is that we have in this Mines Act of 1923 on the one hand the provision that the regulations made under s. 29 of the Act will have effect as if enacted in the Act and on the other, the further provision, that regulations made under s. 29 shall continue to remain in force when this Act is repealed and reenacted and be deemed to have been made under the reenacted provisions, it is otherwise expressly provided, unless and until superseded by regulations made under the reenacted provisions. If the words of s. 31(4) are construed to mean that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t there will be some time lag between the reenacted statute coming into force, and regulations being framed under the reenacted statute. However efficient the rule making authority may be it is impossible to avoid some hiatus between the coming into force of the reenacted statute and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and the making of regulations. Often, the time lag would be considerable. Is it conceivable that any legislature, in providing that regulations made under its statute will have effect as if enacted in the Act, could have intended by those words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and reenacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later), the regulations will have no existence for the purpose of the reenacted statute, and thus the reenacted statute, for some time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter. The answer must be in the negative. Whatever the purpose be which induced the, draftsmen to adopt this legislative form as regards the rules and regulations that they will have effect case if enacted in the Act , it will be strange indeed if the result of the language used, be that by becoming part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f. they were in the Act . Mr. Pathak fastens on the phrase for all purposes of construction, or obligation or otherwise and submits that this is a good authority for holding that for the purpose of deciding whether the rules were part of the Act, so as to attract the consequence of repeal, along with the repeal of the Act, the rules should be treated as if they were in the Act and so stood repealed. We are bound however to take notice of the .fact that the question whether the rules were to be treated as part of the Act to ascertain the effect on them of the repeal of the Act was not even remotely. before the House of Lords. The sole question before them was how far, if at all, the courts could consider the question of validity of the rules, in view of the above provisions as regards their having the same effect as if they were contained in the Act . That the Lord Chancellor was not concerning himself with the effect of this provision in other aspects is further clear from what he said immediately after the observations quoted above: No doubt , said he, there might be some conflict between a rule and a provision-of the Act. Well there is a conflict sometimes between two ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... even though they are to be of the same effect as if contained in the Act. They continue to be rules subordinate to the Act, and though for certain purposes, including the purpose of construction, they are to be treated as if contained in the Act, their true nature as subordinate rule is not lost. Therefore, with regard to the effect of a repeal of the Act, they continue to be subject to the operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act. For the reasons given above, we have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of s. 31, sub-s. 4, of the Mines Act, 1923, do not stand in the way of the full operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, and that in consequence of these provisions the Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the relevant date and have to be deemed to be regulations; made under the Mines Act, 1952. Mention has to be made here of an argument rather faintly made by Mr. Pathak that even if the regulations are deemed to be regulations made under the Mines Act of 1952, s. 73 or s. 74 of that Act can have no application. He pointed out that what these sections made punishable is a contravention of a provision of the Act or of any regulations, ru ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t the date of commission, no future law can make it an offence. But how, on the facts of this case the accused can claim benefit of this principle embodied in Art. 20(1) it is difficult to see. They are being charged under s. 73 and s. 74 of the Mines Act, 1952, for the contravention of some regulations. Were these regulations in force on the alleged date of contravention? Certainly, they were in consequence of the provisions of S. 24 of the General Clauses Act. The fact that these regulations were deemed to be regulations made under the 1952 Act does not in any way affect the position that they were laws in force on the alleged date of contravention. The argument that as they were regulations under the 1952 Act in consequence of a deeming provision, they were not laws in force on the alleged date of contravention is entirely misconceived. Equally misconceived is the submission that this Court s decision in Shiv Bahadur Singh s Case ([1953] S.C.R. 1188) supports the argument. In that case, dealing with a suggestion that as the Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949 though enacted on September 11, 1947, i.e., after the alleged offenses were committed, was in terms made retrospective ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s Act for any offence for which the owner of a mine is punishable:- Provided that where a firm, association or company has given notice in writing to the Chief Inspector that it has nominated, (a) in the case of a firm, any of its partners, (b) in the case of an association, any of its members, (c) in the case of a public company, any of its directors, or (d) in the case of a, private company, any of its shareholders, who is resident in each case in any place to which this Act extends to assume the responsibilities of the owner of the mine for the purposes of this Act, such partner, member, director or shareholder as the case may be, shall so long as he continues to be the owner of the mine for the purpose of this Act, unless notice in writing canceling his nomination or stating that he has ceased to be a partner, member, director or shareholder, as the case may be, is received by the Chief Inspector . It is on the basis of this section, that prosecution has been launched against all the directors. If any one in the section is interpreted to mean every one as was unsuccessfully contended on behalf of the Governmentappellant in the High Court-the section justif ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich, and thus collectively of every one of them . One of the illustration given is I challenge anyone to contradict my assertions. Certainly, this does not mean that one only is challenged; but that all are challenged. It is abundantly clear therefore that any one is not infrequently used to mean every one . But, argues Mr. Pathak, granting that this is so, it must be held that when the phrase any one is used with the preposition of , followed by a word denoting a number of persons, it never means every one . The extract from the Oxford Dictionary, it is interesting to notice, speaks of an assertion concerning a being or thing of the sort named ; it is not unreasonable to say that, the word of followed by a word denoting a number of persons or things is just such naming of a sort as mentioned there. Suppose, the illustration I challenge any one to contradict my assertions was changed to I challenge any one of my opponents to contradict my assertion. Any one of my opponents here would mean all my opponents -not one only of the opponents. While the phrase any one of them or any similar phrase consisting of any one , followed by of which is followed i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mine is owned not by an individual, but by a firm or other association of individuals, or a public company or a private company. It provides that where the owner of the mine is a firm or other association of individuals, any one of the partners or members thereof may be punished; where the owner is a private company, any one of the shareholders may be prosecuted and punished and where the owner is a public company not any one of the shareholders but any one of the directors may be prosecuted and punished. There is a proviso under which on notice being given of nomination of any of the partners of the firm, or in the case of association any of the members; in the case of the public company any of its directors, and in the case of a private company any of its shareholders, the ownership of the mine shall be determined only in accordance with the nomination. There can be no question that where a mine is owned by one individual A-the one and complete owner-would be liable to all penalties which ownership entails. When the legislature thought it desirable to make special provision where the mine is owned by a firm, or an association of individuals, or a company, it does not stand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... void and so the accused escapes. One of the two possible constructions, thus being in favour of the accused, should therefore be adopted. In our opinion, there is no sub. stance in this contention. The rule of strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused is not of universal application, and must be considered along with other will established rules of interpretation. We have already seen that the scheme and object of the statute makes it reasonable to think that the legislature intended to subject all the directors of a company owning coal mines to prosecution and penalties, and not one only of the directors. In the face of these considerations there is no scope here of the application of the rule for strict interpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused. The High Court appears to have been greatly impressed by the fact that in other statutes where the legislature wanted to make every one out of a group or a class of persons liable it used clear language expressing the intention; and that the phrase any one has not been used in any other statute in this country to express every one . It will be unreasonable, in our opinion, to attach too much weig ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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