TMI Blog1987 (8) TMI 443X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... blished his bona fide requirement and on these findings the order of eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement under Sec. 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 has been maintained. Before the Tribunal a contention was advanced that the appellant-tenant had come to know that the Delhi Development Authority ('DDA' for short) has cancelled the lease in favour of the respondent-landlord and therefore the respondent ceased to be the owner of the property and as such is not entitled to a decree for eviction under Sec. 14(1)(e). The landlord-respondent, on the other hand, contended that as a small portion of the premises in occupation of the appellant-tenant is on another plot which under the conditions of the DDA was meant for non-residential purposes and in this view of the matter a notice for cancellation of the lease was given but on representation made by the respondent-landlord the DDA has stayed further action and it there- fore could not be contended that the lease has been terminated by the DDA or that the respondent has ceased to be the owner of the property in question. The learned Tribunal therefore repelled the contention advanced by the tenant- appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... opportunity to lead evidence. It is only based on two papers and an affidavit which has been considered by the High Court. On the basis of these papers what appears to be, is that notice was issued to the landlord for cancellation of the lease and later on their representation the further proceedings have been stayed and it has been further observed in the subsequent paper from the DDA that the Authority is considering the restoration of the lease on the basis of payment of penalty or other dues that may ultimately be settled. It is nobody's case that ultimately the matter has been disposed of and it is also not in dispute that the landlord-respondent's possession has not been taken by the DDA. It is also. not in dispute that although the land beneath the property is of the DDA given on lease to the landlord but the structure thereupon is of the ownership of the respondent-landlord. It is also not in dispute that the portion of the premises only stands on the plot of land the lease of which is alleged to have been cancelled but later on the proceedings for resto- ration are pending and the matter has been stayed. Nothing further has taken place. Arguments were advanced a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , may, on an application made to him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery of possession of the premises on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- (a) to (d) xxx xxx xxx (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the land- lord for occupation as a residence for himself or for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation; Explanation --For the purposes of this clause premises let for residential purposes include any premises which having been let for use as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes; xx xxx xxx ' ' The phrase used in this provision is if he is the owner thereof and it is on the basis of these words that the present controversy has been raised and it appears to be the only point on the basis of which the learned counsel for the appellant had argued this appeal. As regards the first contention that the word 'owner' thereof indic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vided that the landlord under certain circumstances will be entitled to eviction and bona fide requirement is one of such grounds on the basis of which landlords have been permitted to have eviction of a tenant. In this con- text, the phrase 'owner' thereof has to be understood, and it is clear that what is contemplated is that where the person builds up his property and lets out to the tenant and subsequently needs it for his own use, he should be entitled to an order or decree for eviction, the only thing necessary for him to prove is bona fide requirement and that he is the owner thereof, In this context, what appears to be the meaning of the term 'owner' is vis-a-vis the tenant i.e. the owner should be something more than the tenant. Admittedly in these cases where the plot of land is taken on lease the structure is built by the landlord and admittedly he is the owner of the structure. So far as the land is concerned he holds a long lease and in view of the matter as against the tenant it could not be doubted that he will fall within the ambit of the meaning of the term 'owner' as is contemplated under this Section. This term came up for consideration be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion on which and the circumstances with reference to which they are used. They call for construction in the light of their context rather than in what may be either their strict etymological sense or their popular meaning part from the context (See Halsbury's Laws of England Third Edition Vol. 36 Paragraph 843 P. 394). The meaning of the word owner in clause (e) is influenced and controlled by its context and the appellant's construction is unacceptable because it seems to be quite clearly contrary to the reasonable operation of the statutory provision. Learned counsel for the appellant also frankly conceded that it will not be possible for him to contend that the term 'owner' should be so construed that all those persons who have their houses standing on the leasehold plots will be deprived of the benefit of Section 14(1)(e). The next contention advanced on behalf of the appellant is that as there is a notice addressed to the respondent- landlord about the cancellation of the lease of a plot over which a small portion of the premises stands he ceases to be an owner thereof and therefore will not be entitled to the decree for eviction. In this connection t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as happened and therefore it could not be said that the lease has come to an end even what is attempted to be contended on the basis of the first document that the lease is cancelled. The second document, reference to which has been made above, clearly goes to show that has been suspended and at present it could not be said that the lease has come to an end. Admittedly nothing has been start- ed for taking possession. Under these circumstances there- fore it is only on these facts that all these contentions have been advanced by learned counsel for the appellant. Before going into the legal questions as to whether this question could be raised at this stage and also as to the question of estoppel or whether the tenant has a right to challenge the title of the landlord, as quoted above from the two documents which are the basis of all this controversy if are carefully examined, it appears to be certain that a notice for determination of the lease appears to have been issued by the DDA sometime before 198 1. The document which is purporting to be a notice in 1981 shows that this notice is issued showing the cancellation of the lease and the subsequent letter from the DDA addressed to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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