TMI Blog1973 (1) TMI 96X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... B. Nambiyar, for the appellants in C.As. Nos. 722-728, 1057.1062 1200. K. K. Venugopal and A. S. Nambiyar for the appellants in C.As. Nos. 1120.1125. Vineet Kumar for the appellant in C.A. No. 1224. S. Govind Swaiminadhan, S. Mohan, A. V. Aangam and A. Subhashini for the Respondents in C.As. Nos. 672-676, 678 for Respondents Nos. 1, 3 4 (In C.As. Nos. 677, 679, 680, 697, 702. 704-710, 722-728 and 776-781. S. Gobind Swaminadhan, A. V. Rangam, N. S. Sivam and A. Subhashini for the respondents in C.As. Nos. 1057, 1062, 11201125, 1200 and 2301 and all the respondents in C.A. Nos. 1224 and 1298-1300. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by- GROVER. J. These appeals by certificate arise out of a common judgment of the Madras High Court given in a number of writ petitions filed before it by various stage carriage operators. The facts have been set out in detail in the judgment of the High Court and need be stated only briefly. The policy of nationalisation of passenger bus Transport in the State of Madras (now Tamil Nadu) was laid down by the Government Order dated June 7. 1967. Under that order all routes of 75 miles and above, all routes radiating or ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... out in that judgment that in the State of Tamil Nadu the State Transport Undertaking is a Department of the State Government. Therefore the necessary opinion had to be formed by that Government. It was held that the function under the Act had been allocated by the Governor to the Transport Minister under the Rules and the Secretary of that Ministry had been validly authorised under rule 23-A to take action under s. 68 (c) of the Act. The validity of the provisions of the Madras Act 18 of 1968 which amended the Act had been canvassed before this Court but it was observed that it was not necessary to decide that matter while deciding the question of the validity of the impugned scheme. As pointed out by the High Court a third attempt was made by way of filing writ petitions in the High Court out of which the present appeals have arisen to impugn the validity of Chapter IV A of the Act as amended by Madras Act 18 of 1968. We shall first state the allegations which are relevant for deciding the constitutionality of the impugned provisions. In this connection we may refer to writ petition No. 780 of 1970 in which the petitioner V. Krishnamurthy was one of those who had challenged th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on for compensation where as a result of the approved scheme renewal of the permit was refused. In the return which was filed on behalf of the respondents an objection was raised that the writ petition was liable to be dismissed on the ground of constructive res judicata. A writ petition had been filed on previous occasion and the points now sought to be agitated had not been taken. It was further maintained that according to the scheme it was only on the expiry of the existing permits, of operators that the State Transport Undertaking would commence its services under the scheme of nationalisation. Other allegations made were denied. The High Court first considered the question whether Chapter IV-A of the Act is violative of Art. 19(1) (f) of the Constitution and the same has been canvassed before us strenuously. The High Court was of the view that a route permit is property and that although the validity of That Chapter had corn up for consideration before this Court earlier and had been upheld but the decision in those cases was confined to the attack under clause (g) of Article 19 and not clause (f). Now was it open to challenge before the decision of this Court in what is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 19 (1) (f) and 31(2) had been violated. If the permits held under the Act were prematurely terminated or cancelled compensation was provided by the Orissa Act under which the nationalisation had been done. If there was no renewal of the permits on their expiration after they had run for their normal period no claim could be made by the pen-nit holders on the score of such nonrenewal because renewal was not a matter of right. The concerned transport authority would be well within its right to refuse such renewal having regard to the provisions of the amended sections 47 and 55 of the Act. If at all there was any deprivation of proprietary rights it would be by authority of law. in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao Others, v. Andhra Pradesh State Transport Corporation Anr. (2 ) the validity of the 'provisions contained in Chapter IV-A of the Act was directly assailed. The Court refused to draw inferences from the provisions contained in s. 68-G for payment of compensation to the holder of a permit that the legislature had assumed that a transfer of the business was involved in the process laid down in Chapter IV-A. Article 31 of the Constitution was held not to having been attracted. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... son why this Court in all the previous decisions relating to the validity of Chapter IV-A proceeded on an examination of the argument whether there was infringement of Art. 19(1) (g), and clause (f) of that Article could not possibly be invoked. We are unable to hold that there is much substance in this argument. Bhanji Munji and other decisions which followed it were based mainly on an examination of the inter-relationship between Article 19(1) (f) and Art. 31(2). There is no question of any acquisition or requisition in Chapter IV-A of the Act. The relevant decision for the purpose of these cases was only the one given in Kochuni's case after which no doubt was left that the authority of law seeking to deprive a person of his property other Wise than by way of acquisition or requisition was open to challenge on the ground that it constituted infringement of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (f ). It was, therefore, open to those affected by the provisions of Chapter IV-A to have agitated before this Court the question which is being raised now based on the guarantee embodied in Art. 19(1) (f) which was never done. It is apparently too late in the day now to pur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ule prescribed by the first part of Art. 19(6). On the other hand it was contended by the State that the object of the amendment was to put the monopoly laws beyond the pale of challenge under Art. 19(1) (f) and (g). The scope and effect of Art. 19 (6) after its amendment was fully considered. The Court felt no difficulty in rejecting the argument that the creation of a State monopoly must be justified by showing that the restrictions imposed by it were reasonable and were in the interest of the general public. It was stated emphatically that the amendment clearly indicated that the State monopoly in respect of any trade or business must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of general public so far as Art. 19(1) (g) was concerned. The Court proceeded to hold that the effect of the amendment made in Art., 19(6) was to protect the law relating to the creation of monopoly and that meant it were only these provisions of that law which were integrally and essentially connected with the creation of the monopoly which were protected The rest of the provisions which might be incidental did not fall, under the later part of Art. 19(6) and would inevitably have to satisfy the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... freedom guaranteed by Art. 19 (1 ) (f) is not infringed. The primary object of the Act is to give a monopoly to the State to hold cattle fairs. As a necessary concomitant of that monopoly, holding of cattle fairs by local authorities and individuals is prohibited. The prohibition flows directly from the assumption of monopoly by the State and falls within the terms of Art. 19(6) of the Constitution. It is a provision of the law creating monopoly basically and essentially necessary for creating the State monopoly to prevent other persons from conducting the same business . The learned Advocate General maintains that it follows from the above decisions that when nationalisation of a transport service is made which is fully protected by Art. 19(6) no question arises of any deprivation of property. It is possible and likely that the value of the buses owned by the operators may be prejudicially affected or that they may not be able to carry on trade or business on the nationalised routes. According to the clear instance given in Akadshi Padhan's case to which reference has already been made a law relating to such a monopoly would not normally infringe the citizens' fundamenta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... passengers transport in the State. In modification of the existing policy the Government had decided that the types of routes set out should be nationalised. The Government proceeded to direct that the routes in the categories mentioned should be nationalised as and when the permits of the private operators expired. On the same day by another Government Order the Government constituted an ad hoc committee to work out the details in all aspects for implementing the policy decision. One of the members of that committee was the Secretary to the Government, Home Department. The Committee was to submit its report within a fortnight. After the report had been submitted schemes were published under s. 68-C by the Secretary, Industries, Labour and Housing Department, hereinafter referred to as the Secretary industries. He purported to do so under rule 23A of the Rules of business. Objections which were fixed by the operators were heard and the schemes considered by the Secretary Home, under s. 68-D who had been so authorised under s. 23A. According to the appellants the Secretary, Home, while hearing the objections under s. 68-D of the Act was acting as a quasi-judicial tribunal. Since ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y they should be struck down on the only ground that routes were to be nationalised as and when permits of private operators on those routes expired. Section 68-C permits the State Transport undertaking to operate a service in relation to any area or route or even a portion thereof and to the exclusion complete or partial, of other persons. The decision in Shrinivasa Reddy Others v. The State of Mysore Others (1960) 2 S.C.R. 130 can be of no avail to the appellants because no question arose of coordination of service on the various routes which were to be nationalised and in respect of which the nationalisation was to become effective from different dates. In that case it was pointed out that piecemeal nationalisation of a particular route is not permissible. It is quite clear that each route can be nationalised and it is difficult to comprehend that when the law empowers that to be done any further conditions should be superimposed of coordinating the services on all the routes which are proposed to be nationalised. The following observations with regard to the above decision in Dosa Satyanarayanamurthy's case explain the law on the point: This Court did not lay down t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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