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TMI Blog1994 (11) TMI 423X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... family and was residing therein since then. According to the appellants such claim of the respondent was a false one as Mrs Menan had all along lived in the flat alone and the respondent was never seen to visit her, much less live therein. By filing the suit the appellants, therefore, prayed for recovery of the flat on a declaration that the respondent was a rank trespasser and liable to be evicted there from. 3. In contesting the suit the respondent asserted that she was the daughter of the deceased tenant and had been living in the flat since the inception of the tenancy. Consequently, she claimed, that upon her mother's death she, as her sole heir, became a tenant under the appellants. 4. In the context of the respective stands of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the appellants submitted that from the definition of 'tenant' as appearing in Section 2(h) of the Act it would be patently clear that only those heirs of the tenant whether contractual or statutory who were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death would only succeed as a tenant and not all the heirs. According to Dr Ghosh the words "in the event of such person's death" in Section 2(h) relate not only to persons whose tenancy subsists but also to those who are continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Dr Ghosh contended that once Section 2(h) was so interpreted as it should be the appellant was bound to succeed for the finding of the High Court that the respondent was ordinarily re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... contract would be, payable and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy but shall not include any person against whom any decree or order for eviction has been made by a Court of competent jurisdiction." (emphasis supplied) 9. Under the above definition therefore there were only two classes of tenants, namely, person occupying any premises under a subsisting tenancy and person continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy. While the former is called a "contractual tenant" the latter is commonly called taking a cue from English Rent Acts a "statutory tenant". In Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. v. Anandji Kalyanji Pedhil the question of heritability of a "statutory tenancy&q ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... supplied) 10. Indisputably a contractual tenant has an estate or interest in the subject-matter of the tenancy and heritability is an incidence of such tenancy. In the absence of any provision in the Act to the contrary, all the heirs of such a tenant would therefore, on his death, step into his shoes. The same could not however be said about the statutory tenant in view of the law laid down in Anand Nivas (P) Ltd.1 as quoted above and the plain and unambiguous language of Section 2(h), as it then stood. In other words, the heirs of a statutory tenant had no right to the tenancy as such a right was personal and the Act did not make any provision regarding the manner in which such right was to devolve. 11. It appears that following Anand ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s been framed with the above object in view." 13. It is undoubtedly true that the Statement of Objects and Reasons accompanying a legislative bill cannot be used to ascertain the true meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the legislation, but it can certainly be pressed into service for the limited purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent state of affairs and the object the legislation sought to achieve. If the substitution of the words "includes any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy or in the event of such person's death, such of his heirs as were ordinarily residing with him at the time of his death" in the amended definition of 'tenant' in Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... erefore be held that the respondent inherited the tenancy as her heir. Consequently, the question as to whether she was ordinarily residing with her mother at the time of her death becomes redundant. We therefore dismiss the appeal but without any order as to costs.
16. Before parting with this judgment we would like to keep on record that our reference to and reliance upon Anand Nivas (P) Ltd. case1 was for the limited purpose of interpreting Section 2(h) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 for, the principle enunciated therein relating to inheritance of "statutory tenancy" stands overruled by a Bench of five learned Judges in Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar (1985) 2 SCC 683 : AIR 1985 SC 796. X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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