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2015 (8) TMI 1106

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..... urred before the High Court, and not the Arbitral Tribunal. Case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (2003 (8) TMI 534 - MADHYA PRADESH HIGH COURT) was decided erroneously. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to Section 19 of the Act of 1983. No express exclusion has been incorporated therein, and there is neither any evidence to suggest that the legislative intent was to bar the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act on Section 19 of the Act of 1983. The cases which were relied upon to dismiss the Special Leave Petition, namely Nasiruddin (2003 (1) TMI 693 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) and Popular Construction (2001 (10) TMI 1044 - SUPREME COURT OF INDIA) can be distinguished both in terms of the facts as well as the law applicable, and thus, have no bearing on the facts of the present case. - The impugned judgments and orders are set aside - Decided in favour of appellant. - CIVIL APPEAL NO.3498 OF 2008, 1145 OF 2009 - - - Dated:- 6-8-2014 - T.S. Thakur, V. Gopala Gowda, C. Nagappan, JJ. ORDER V.GOPALA GOWDA, J. Civil Appeal No.3498 of 2008 arises out of order dated 30.6.2005 in C.R.No.1330 of 2003 passed by the Division Bench of the Madhya Prades .....

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..... e petition at the threshold, it was observed in an order dated 27.08.2004 2004(II) MPJR SN 374: In our view there is no infirmity in the impugned judgment. The authority in the case of Nasiruddin and Ors. v. Sita Ram Agarwal (2003) 2 SCC 577 has been correctly followed. Same view has also been taken by this Court in the case of Union of India v. Popular Construction Co. (2001) 8 SCC 470. The Special Leave Petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs. 7. The full bench of the High Court in the order dated 13.04.2005, held that the dismissal of a special leave petition at the threshold stage by the Supreme Court is a binding precedent, and must be followed by the courts below. It was however also observed that no specific time limit can be fixed for exercising the suo motu revisional power under Section 19 of the Act of 1983. It was further held that the power has to be exercised within reasonable time which depends upon the nature of the order to be revised and other facts and circumstances of the case. The full bench of the High Court directed to place the revision petition before the appropriate bench for consideration in accordance with law. 8. The Civil .....

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..... for the parties in support of their claim. 12. Learned counsel on behalf of the appellants contended that the High Court failed to consider that the revision petition has been preferred under Section 19 of the Act of 1983 and the delay of 80 days should have been condoned by it. 13. It was further contended by the learned counsel on behalf of the appellants that the High Court should have considered that provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, would be applicable while entertaining a revision petition under Section 19 of the Act of 1983. There was also failure on the part of the High Court for having not exercised the suo motu revisionary powers under the Act in the circumstances of the case. 14. It was further contended that the judgments referred in the Full Bench order before the High Court are not applicable in the circumstance of the case. 15. Regarding Section 19 of the Act of 1983, it was contended by the learned counsel that the proviso to Section 19 was added only in the year 2005 though the issue is concerned with the pre-amendment provision, when such proviso, specifically conferring power to condone delay was not there. 16. It was also contended th .....

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..... came into force with effect from 01.03.1985. It was enacted to provide for the establishment of a Tribunal to arbitrate on disputes to which the State Government or a Public Undertaking (wholly or substantially owned or controlled by the State Government), is a party and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith. 21. The Arbitral Tribunal is constituted in terms of Section 3 of the Act of 1983, for resolving all disputes and differences pertaining to works contract or arising out of or connected with execution, discharge or satisfaction of any such works contract. 22. Section 7 of the Act provides for reference to Tribunal. Such reference may be made irrespective of whether the agreement contains an arbitration clause or not. Section 7-A of the Act provides for the particulars on the basis whereof the reference petition is to be filed. 23. Section 19 of the Act confers the power of revision on the High Court. It provides that the aggrieved party may make an application for revision before the High Court within three months of the date of the award. This Section was amended in 2005, to confer the power on the High Court to condone the delay. Since this dispute .....

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..... with any suit, appeal or application. (ii) The said prescription of period of limitation under such special or local law should be different from the period prescribed by the schedule to the Limitation Act. 28. It was further held that if the two above conditions are satisfied, then the following implications would follow: 9. If the aforesaid two requirements are satisfied the consequences contemplated by Section 29(2) would automatically follow. These consequences are as under: (i) In such a case Section 3 of the Limitation Act would apply as if the period prescribed by the special or local law was the period prescribed by the schedule. (ii) For determining any period of limitation prescribed by such special or local law for a suit, appeal or application all the provisions containing Sections 4 to 24(inclusive) would apply insofar as and to the extent to which they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. [emphasis laid by this Court] 29. Further, in the case of Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. Lalit Narain Mishra(1974)2 SCC 133, a three judge Bench of this court, while examining whether the Limitation Act would be applicable to the provisions of Re .....

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..... to why Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable, the Court observed: The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any special statute a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. On failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences are provided for under the statute. The Court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the instant case. [emphasis laid by this Court] It is evident on a plain reading of the judgment in that case, that the reason why Section 5 of the Limitation Act was said to be inapplicable to the Rajasthan Act, Section 13(4), was because of the nature of the specific provision in question. It was held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to Section 13(4), as the depo .....

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..... of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase 'but not thereafter' wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. (Emphasis laid down by the Court) 37. Section 19 of the Act of 1983, does not contain any express rider on the power of the High Court to entertain an application for revision after the expiry of the prescribed period of three months. On the contrary, the High Court is conferred with suo moto power, to call for the record of an award at any time. It cannot, therefore, be said that the legislative intent was to exclude the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act to Section 19 of the Act of 1983. 38. In our opinion, it is unnecessary to delve into the question of whether the Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the Act is a Court or not for answering the issue in the present case, as the delay in filing the revision has occurred before the High Court, and not the Arbitral Tri .....

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