TMI Blog2010 (8) TMI 943X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 77; 10,000/- by the appellant in terms of a judgment and decree dated 4th May, 2006 passed by the High Court in FA No.108/2003 has been dismissed. 3. The respondent Smt. Manisha Lalwani filed a suit for eviction of the appellant under the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 before the Additional District Judge, Fast Track Katni, alleging nuisance within the meaning of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, for default in payment of rent contrary to Section 12(1)(a), damage to the premises contrary to Section 12(1)(k) and material alteration of the accommodation to the detriment of the landlord's interest diminishing the value of the property contrary to Section 12(1)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as grounds for eviction. The suit was contested by the appellant and eventually dismissed by the Trial Court holding that none of the allegations made by the respondent had been proved by her. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, the respondent appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Jabalpur. The High Court passed an order dated 4th May, 2006 holding that the appellant was not in default of payment of rent so as to justify an order of his eviction under Section 12(1)(a) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by the appellant in support of his version that a demand draft was indeed prepared in the name of the respondent for a sum of ₹ 10,000/- from the Bank aforementioned. The appellant's further case is that the demand draft was then sent by Registered Post A.D. No.6868 through the Katni Branch Post Office to the address of the respondent at Jabalpur. The registered envelop was received at the respondent's house by her maid servant Durga who made an endorsement on the receiving slip, a true copy whereof has also been enclosed as Annexure P3 to the petition. According to the appellant even in the past he had sent demand drafts to the respondent for payment of rent due to her which drafts were received by her maid servant. 5. The appellant alleges that although the respondent had received the bank draft sent to her, the same was not encashed nor any acknowledgement sent to the appellant. He did not even receive any communication from the landlady pointing out that the amount had to be deposited in the Trial Court and not to be paid directly to her. The silence and inaction on the part of the respondent was according to the appellant deliberate and under the advice of h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... at view considered it necessary to direct an inquiry in to the matter particularly whether the maid servant of the respondent had received the bank draft on behalf of the decree holder and whether the draft is being retained by the decree holder. The Executing Court was directed to record evidence to be led by the parties within a period of six weeks. 8. The above order was challenged by the respondent before this Court in C.A. Nos.3234-35 of 2009 which were disposed of by order dated 5th May, 2009. This Court held that execution of the decree passed by the Trial Court need not be held up only because of the inquiry which the High Court had directed into the question of deposit of the amount by the appellant. This Court felt that since no deposit had been made in terms of the decree passed by the High Court, the Executing Court could proceed with the execution of decree passed on 4th May, 2006. At the same time this Court left it open to the Executing Court to proceed with the inquiry as directed by the High Court. The operative portion of the order passed by this Court reads as under: We have heard Mr. Ravindra Shrivastava, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pointed out that since the High Court had disposed of MCC No.1876 of 2007 by its order dated 17th June, 2009, there was no need for conducting any inquiry. Both these applications were disposed of by the Executing Court on 7th July, 2009. The Executing Court held that since there was no need for any inquiry for the execution of the decree, it was unnecessary to go on with any such inquiry especially when the decree holder was no longer demanding any such inquiry. All the applications filed before the Executing Court were accordingly disposed of. 11. Aggrieved by the above order, the appellant preferred MCC No.7148 of 2009, which was dismissed by the High Court on 30th July, 2009, relying upon the order passed by this Court on 5th May, 2009 and that passed by the High Court on 17th June, 2009. The present appeals assail the correctness of the said two orders. 12. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. An inadvertent mistake in the deposit of the amount directed by the High Court has turned out to be a fertile ground for time consuming and expensive litigation before this Court and the Courts below. The essence of the matter is that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... red by this Court and the Executing Court was directed to go on with the execution, nothing really survived for consideration in MCC No.7148 of 2007. That was, in our opinion, not wholly correct. This Court was only dealing with the interim order passed in MCC 7148 of 2007 on 30th July, 2007. Even if the said order was set aside, the question whether the appellant was entitled to extension of time for making of the deposit would have continued to remain relevant and had to be answered by the High Court on its own merits. The High Court failed to do so while disposing of MCC No.1876 of 2007, which was not correct. 14. The Trial Court was, however, correct in holding that it could not extend time for making the deposit as the same had been stipulated by the High Court nor could the Executing Court go behind the decree. Holding of an inquiry into the question whether the appellant had made the payment directly to the respondent was also correctly found to be unnecessary by the Trial Court, no matter this Court had left the conduct of such an inquiry open to the Executing Court. The fact of the matter was that the appellant had not made the deposit in the manner required in the decr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the above would show that when any period or time is granted by the Court for doing any act, the Court has the discretion from time to time to enlarge such period even if the time originally fixed or granted by the Court has expired. It is evident from the language employed in the provision that the power given to the Court is discretionary and intended to be exercised only to meet the ends of justice. Several decisions of this Court have explained the ambit and scope of the powers exercisable under Section 148 of the CPC. In Mahanth Ram Das v. Ganga Das, 1961 (3) SCR 763, this Court observed: Section 148 of the Code, in terms, allows extension of time, even if the original period fixed has expired, and Section 149 is equally liberal. A fortiori, those sections could be invoked by the applicant, when the time had not actually expired. That the application was filed in the vacation when a Division Bench was not sitting should have been considered in dealing with it even on 13.7.1954, when it was actually heard. The order, though passed after the expiry of the time fixed by the original judgment, would have operated from 8.7.1954. How undesirable it is to fix time peremptoril ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o extend time initially fixed by it. Passing a composite order would be acting in disregard of the jurisdiction in that while granting time simultaneously the Court denies to itself the jurisdiction to extend time. The principle of equity is that when some circumstances are to be taken into account for fixing a length of time within which a certain action is to be taken, the Court retains to itself the jurisdiction to re- examine the alteration or modification of circumstances which may necessitate extension of time. If the Court by its own act denies itself the jurisdiction to do so, it would be denying to itself the jurisdiction which in the absence of a negative provision, it undoubtedly enjoys. 19. Reference may also be made to the decisions of this Court in Jogdhayan v. Babu Ram, 1983 (1) SCC 26, Johri Singh v. Sukh Pal Singh, 1989 (4) SCC 403 and Ganesh Prasad Sah Kesari v. Lakshmi Narayan Gupta, 1985 (3) SCC 53. 20. In Salem Advocate Bar Association, T.N. v. Union of India, 2005 (6) SCC 344, this Court had an occasion to examine whether the restriction placed by the amendment of Section 148 on the power of the Court to grant extension of time beyond 30 days was reason ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t in question is stipulated in a conditional decree has not impressed us. We see no reason to draw a distinction depending on whether the prayer for extension is in regard to a conditional order or a conditional decree. The heart of the matter is that where the Court has the power to fix time and that power is not regulated by any statutory limits, it has in appropriate cases the power to extend the time fixed by it. It is common ground that neither the CPC nor the provisions of M.P. Accommodation Control Act places any limitation on the power of the Court in case like the one in hand. 22. Coming then to the second aspect, namely, whether the appellant has made out a case for extension, our answer is in the affirmative. That the appellant had misunderstood the order of the High Court leading to the preparation of the bank draft of ₹ 10,000/- in the name of the respondent and its dispatch under Registered AD cover to the respondent has not been seriously disputed before us. We are satisfied that the appellant did get a bank draft prepared and dispatched to the address of the respondent. This may not have been a strict compliance with the direction issued by the High Court r ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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