TMI Blog2004 (1) TMI 684X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the matter is that the forest-produce belonging to the State and/or the vehicles carrying the same were seized by the Forest Officer. The report of such seizure was made to the authorized officer. Except Criminal Appeal No.453 of 1997-State of West Bengal and Ors. v. Sujit Kumar Rana, show cause notices issued by the forest authority purported to be issued under the provision of Section 59-B of the Act, as amended by the State of West Bengal or the seizure of the forest-produce or the vehicles carrying the same, came to be questioned by the respondents before the Calcutta High Court invoking its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Sujit Kumar Rana's case, however, an order of confiscation was passed by the authorized officer. The factual matrix, for appreciating the points involved herein is being noticed from Criminal Appeal No. 453 of 1997 : The truck of the respondent carrying forest-produce and said to be without transit permit was detained and seized. Upon a report of the said seizure, show cause notice was issued to the respondent by the authorized officer as to why vehicle shall not be confiscated. The owner of the truck ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to follow was decided, the learned Judge misdirected himself in ignoring the binding precedent of this Court. The learned counsel would contend that in terms of the amendments made by the State of West Bengal in the Forest Act whereby and where under Sections 50-A to 59-G were inserted, a complete Code was laid down not only as regard initiation of proceeding but also for confiscation and appeal against an order of confiscation as also ouster jurisdiction of the court. Mr. Ray would argue that a criminal trial before a Magistrate in relation to an offence made under the provisions of the Act stands on a different footing than a proceeding for confiscation before the authorized officer.. Mr. U.U. Lalit, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in Criminal Appeal No.459 of 1997 and Mr. Sanjoy Kr. Ghosh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents in Criminal Appeal No.453, 457 and 458 of 1997 would contend that in the facts and circumstances obtaining in these cases, this Court should not exercise its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. The learned counsel would contend that it may be true that the High Court s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s and cattle used in committing any forest-offence, shall be liable to confiscation. (2) Such confiscation may be in addition to any other punishment prescribed for such offence. The State of West Bengal inserted Sections 59-A to 59-G in the Principal Act. Sub-section (1) of Section 59-A reads thus : 59-A. Confiscation by Forest Officer of forest produce in the case of forest offence believed to have been committed. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this Chapter or in any other law for the time being in force, where a forest offence is believed to have been committed in respect of the timber or other forest produce which is the property of the State Government, the Forest Officer or the Police Officer seizing the timber or other forest produce under sub-section (I) of Section 52, shall, without any unreasonable delay, produce the same, together with all tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles and cattle used in committing the offence, before an officer of a rank not inferior to that of an Assistant Conservator of Forests, authorized by the State Government in this behalf by notification in the official Gazette (hereinafter referred ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nment. Section 59-G of the Act creates a bar on the jurisdiction of court in certain cases, which is in the following terms: 59-G. Bar of jurisdiction in certain cases. - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in this Act or in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or in any other law for the time being in force, the officer authorized under Section 59-A or the Forest officer specially empowered under Section 59-C or the District Judge to whom an appeal may be preferred under Section 59-D shall have and any other officer or Forest Officer or court, tribunal or authority shall not have jurisdiction to make orders with regard to the custody, possession, delivery, disposal or distribution of any property or tools, ropes, chains, boats, vehicles or cattle seized under Section 52 Sections 67. and 68 read as under :- 67. Power to try offences summarily. - The District Magistrate or any Magistrate of the first class specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government may try summarily, under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1893 (5 of 1898), any forest-offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or fine not exc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovide for protection of forests to maintain ecological balance should receive liberal construction at the hands of the superior courts. Interpretive exercise of such power should be in consonance with the provisions of such statutes not only having regard to the principle of purposive construction so as to give effect to the aim and object of the legislature; keeping the principles contained in Article 48-A and 51-A(g) of the Constitution of India in mind. The provisions for confiscation have been made as a deterrent object so that felling of trees and deforestation is not made. In Indian Handicrafts Emporium and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors., [2003] 7 SCC 589, this Court was dealing with a situation where initially 'ivory' was legally imported, but the trade or possession thereof became subsequently barred by amendment made in the Wild Life (Protection) Act except for bona fide personal use. By reason of the provisions of the said Act, however, such imported ivory did not vest in the Government. This Court despite aforementioned situation applying the rule of purposive construction so as to give effect to the intent and purport of the statute held: A trader in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... but it must also be borne in mind that illegal seizure amounts to deprivation of property and by reason of an order of confiscation, the owner thereof is deprived of his right of property as contained in Article 300-A of the Constitution of India. The rights of the parties are, therefore, required to be delicately balanced. An order of confiscation of forest-produce in a proceeding under Section 59-A of the Act would not amount either to penalty or punishment. Such an order, however, can be passed only in the event a valid seizure is made and the authorized officer satisfies himself as regard ownership of the forest- produce in the State as also commission of a forest-offence. An order of confiscation is not to be passed automatically, and in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 59-A a discretionary power has been conferred upon the authorized officer in relation to a vehicle. Apart from the ingredients which are required to be proved in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 59-A by reason of the proviso appended to Section 59-B, a notice is also required to be issued to the owner of the vehicle and furthermore in terms of sub-section (2) thereof an opportunity has to be granted t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The High Court cannot, thus, in such a situation exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The said provisions reads thus : 482. Saving of inherent power of High Court. - Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. From a bare perusal of the aforementioned provision, it would be evident that the inherent power of the High Court is saved only in a case where an order has been passed by the criminal court which is required to be set aside to secure the ends of justice or where the proceeding pending before a court amounts to abuse of the process of court. It is, therefore, evident that power under Section 482 of the Code can be exercised by the High Court in relation to a matter pending before a court; which in the context of Code of Criminal Procedure would mean 'a criminal court' or whence a power is exercised by the court under the Code of Criminal procedure. Once it is held that the criminal court had no p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... i, (1980) 1 Andh LT 8 approved of the view expressed by Jeewan Reddy, J. in P.K. Mohammad's case, (supra), and held that the Act contemplates two procedures, one for confiscation of goods forming the subject-matter of the offence by the Authorized Officer under sub-s. (2A) of S. 44 of the Act, and the other for trial of the person accused of the offence so committed under S. 20 or 29 of the Act. The learned Judges held that the Act provides for a special machinery for confiscation of illicitly felled timber or forest produce by the Authorized Officer under sub-s. (2A) of S. 44 enacted in the general public interest to suppress the mischief of ruthless exploitation of Government forests by illicit felling and removal of teak and other valuable forest produce. They further held that merely because there was an acquittal of the accused in the trial before the Magistrate due to paucity of evidence or otherwise did not necessarily entail in nullifying the order of confiscation of the seized timber or forest produce by the Authorized Officer under sub-s. (2A) of S. 44 of the Act based on his satisfaction that a forest offence had been committed in respect thereof. We affirm the view ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t should examine whether the power to confiscate the seized forest produce is vested in the authorised officer under the Act and if he finds that such power is vested in the authorised officer then he has no power to pass an order dealing with interim custody/release of the seized material. This, in our view, will help in proper implementation of provisions of the special Act and will help in advancing the purpose and object of the statute. If in such cases power to grant interim custody/release of the seized forest produce is vested in the Magistrate then it will be defeating the very scheme of the Act. Such a consequence is to be avoided. From the statutory provisions and the analysis made in the foregoing paragraphs the position that emerges is that the learned Magistrate and the learned Sessions Judge were right in holding that on facts and in the circumstances of the case it is the authorised officer who is vested with the power to pass order of interim custody of the vehicle and not the Magistrate. The High Court was in error in taking a view to the contrary and in setting aside the orders passed by the Magistrate and the Sessions Judge on that basis. We may notice t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se of vehicle would be possible on easier terms, when such vehicle is alleged to have been involved in commission of a forest offence. Any such easy release would tempt the forest offenders to repeat commission of such offences. Its casualty will be the forests as the same cannot be replenished for years to come. 8. From the above dictum of this Court, we find when a vehicle is involved in a forest offence the same is not to be released to the offender or the claimant as a matter of routine till the culmination of the proceedings which may include confiscation of such vehicle. In Shambhu Dayal Agarwala v. Stale of West Bengal and Anr., [1990] 3 SCC 549, this Court interpreting sub-section (2) of Section 6A of the Essential Commodities Act vis-a-vis Section 6E thereof, held that there could be no question of releasing the commodity in the sense of returning it to the owner or person from whom it was seized even before the proceeding for confiscation stood completed and before the termination of the prosecution in the acquittal of the offender. This Court observed that such a view would render clause (b) of Section 7(1) totally nugatory. It was opined: ...It seems to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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