TMI Blog1955 (10) TMI 32X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t was dismissed on the ground that the estate was impartible and governed by the rule of lineal promogeniture and the junior members of the family were entitled only to maintenance and had no title to a share in the esiate. Against the decision of the Subordinate Judge the plaintiffs preferred an appeal to the High Court in First Appeal No. 181 of 1925. The appeal was decided by the High Court on 9-7-1928 and it was held by the High Court that the Dhanwar Raj Estate was impartible but the plaintiffs were entitled to a share of the self-acquired properties of Ran Bahadur Narain Deo. The case was, therefore, remanded by the High Court to the learned Subordinate Judge for a finding as to what were the immoveable properties acquired in the name of Ran Bahadur Narain Deo and whether there was incorporation of these properties with the properties comprised in the impartible estate. The learned Subordinate Judge held on enquiry that a number of villages and other immoveable properties were the self-acquired properties of Ran Baha-dur Narain Deo and were not incorporated in the impartible estate. After receipt of the report, the High Court made a direction on 26-9-1931 that these pro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to 8 preferred a civil revision in the High Court against the order of the Subordinate Judge. The civil revision application was admitted on 22-4-1948. Meanwhile the parties entered into a compromise and in title suit No. 9 of 1918 the parties filed a compromise petition on 22-3-1948. By the terms of this compromise, respondent 2, Maharaja Maheshwari Prasad Narain Deo, agreed to make khorposh ' grants in favour of the petitioners in lieu of cash maintenance. The petitioners on their part gave up their claim to-the self-acquisition of the late Raja Ran Bahadur Narain Deo. They also gave up their claim in respect of past maintenance. The petitioner further declared that they would not demand Karta's account to any share in the cash balance of ₹ 36,241 and odd as per the preliminary decree . The petitioners further accepted that the amount of debt found by the pleader commissioner Mr. Nurul Hussain was correct that it would be a charge not on the impartible estate but on self-acquired properties of Raja Ran Bahadur Narain Deo. The compromise petition was recorded in the Court of the Subordinate Judge and a decree was passed in terms thereof. Thereafter, respo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nature of certiorari. The contention put forward on behalf of the petitioners is that there was no material to support the finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer that the khorposh grants were made by respondent 2 with the object of defeating the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act or with the object of obtaining higher compensation. It was submitted by learned Counsel that the finding of the Sub-divisional Officer on this point was entirely speculative. In my opinion, the argument addressed on behalf of the petitioners is well founded. The finding of the Sub-divisional Officer that respondent 2 was actuated with the object of defeating the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act appears to be purely arbitrary and unsupported by any sufficient material. The Sub-divisional Officer has referred to the circumstances that respondent 2 had stopped payment of cash allowance after the Dhanwar Estate was released by the Court of Wards. The Sub-divisional officer pointed out that there was no reason why respondent 2 should execute khorposh grants in favour of the petitioners though they were entitled only to monetary allowance. That is the only circumstance given by the Sub-divis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ressly referred to the compromise of 1937 and also to the letter of the Maharaja dated 23-4-1937 in paras. 9, 10 and 11. My concluded opinion, therefore, is that the compromise petition dated 22-3-1948 between the parties filed in Title Suit No. 9 of 1918 is a bona fide and genuine transaction and that in making the Khorposh grants in pursuance of the compromise respondent 2 had no intention of seeking higher compensation or defeating any of the provisions of the Bihar Land Reforms Act. 5. It was contended by learned Government Pleader on behalf of the respondents that the finding of the Sub-divisional Officer on this point was a finding of fact and it was not open to the petitioners to challenge a finding of this description in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court. I am unable to accept the argument of learned Government Pleader as correct. It is true that the finding of the Sub-divisional Officer is a finding upon an issue of fact, but in my opinion the finding is not upon an issue of pure fact but upon an issue of jurisdictional fact . The reason is that the jurisdiction of the Sub-divisional Officer to act under Section 4(h) and to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it is immaterial whether the decision of the inferior tribunal on the question of the existence or non-existence of its own jurisdiction is founded on law or fact; a Court with jurisdiction confined to the city of London cannot extend such jurisdiction by finding as a fact that Piccadilly Circus is in the ward of Chepe. 6. The same principle is enunciated by the Court of Appeal in -- 'White and Coffins v. Minister of Health', (1939) 2 KB 838 (B). The question debated in that case was whether the High Court had jurisdiction to review the finding of the administrative authority on a question of fact. It appears that Part V of the Housing Act, 1936, enabled the local authority to acquire land compulsorily for the provision of houses for the working classes, but Section 75 of the Act provided that nothing in the Act was to authorise the compulsory acquisition of land which at the date of the compulsory purchase forms part of any part, garden or pleasure ground or is otherwise required for the amenity or convenience of any house . In accordance with the provision of this part of the Act, the Ripon Borough Council made an order for the compulsory purchase of 23 acres of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Collector could not be questioned by the High Court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution. The contention of learned Government Pleader was that the satisfaction of the Collector under Section 4(h) was in the nature of a subjective satisfaction and, therefore, could not be questioned by a Superior Court. I am unable to agree. I think the word satisfied in Section 4(h) must be construed to mean reasonably satisfied , and, therefore, the finding of the Collector under Section 4(h) cannot be a subjective or arbitrary finding but must be based upon adequate material. I also think that the satisfaction of the Collector under Section 4(h) is not a capricious satisfaction but must be capable of being tested in an objective manner. A similar interpretation was placed upon Section 4(h) by a Division Bench of this Court in -- 'Prem Manjari Devi v. State of Bihar', AIR 1954 Pat 550 (C).' A similar question of construction was elaborately discussed by another Division Bench of this Court in -- 'Ramnath Sahani v. Sm. Sukumari Sinha', AIR 1954 Pat 211 (D), with regard to Section 11 (2), Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act (Bihar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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