TMI Blog2005 (10) TMI 543X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ), the appellant herein, to issue possession certificate to the writ petitioner i.e. the 1st respondent herein in respect of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land as per its Resolution dated 19.4.1972 and to allot alternative plots/sites of equal size to the persons who had been allotted sites carved out of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was enacted by the then Government of Mysore. Under Section 3 of the said Act a Board of Trustees was constituted to implement the purposes of the Act. The Board (commonly known as CITB) was given the power to draw the improvement scheme and for undertaking any work for improvement or development of any area in or around the city of Bangalore. The Board was also given the power to acquire land by agreement and was deemed to be a local authority for the purposes of Section 50(2) of the Mysore Land Acquisition Act which was in pari materia with the Land Acquisition Act of 1894. On 28.1.1960 a preliminary notification dated 26.11.1959 was published in the official Gazette proposing to acquire the land of the 1st respondent for formation of a scheme to set up a layout called the Koramangala Layout. Final notificati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by him whereupon the amounts in question were ultimately re-claimed by the authority. He withdrew his reference applications filed under Section 18 of the Act. On 10.7.1974 layout plan was approved by the CITB in respect of the land which had been acquired for the development of the area. In the layout plan the land to the extent of 6 acres and 20 guntas was shown separately being reserved for reconveyance. In the year 1976, The City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 was repealed and in its place Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 was enacted. Bangalore Development Authority constituted under the 1976 Act succeeded to the City Improvement Trust Board. The resolution passed by the CITB to re-convey 6 acres and 20 guntas of land was not given effect to as the High Court of Karnataka in a series of judgment held that the land acquired for the development scheme could not be returned or reconveyed to the owner and that it must be applied for the purpose for which it was acquired and the sites formed therein should be distributed according to the allotment rules. In view of the declaration of law made by the High Court the resolution was not given effect to by the BDA ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... pursuance to the resolution passed had acted prejudicially to his interest. That the decision of the CITB was binding on the BDA being a successor. It was further held that land which was the subject matter of the resolution of reconveyance could not and should not have allotted at all. That the acquisition proceedings in the process of vesting of the land had not reached finality in respect of 6 acres and 20 guntas of land as 1st respondent had re-deposited the amount of compensation as per resolution dated 19.4.1972 and thus had not received the amount of compensation. In view of the above findings the Division Bench held that there was no necessity to give a direction to re-convey the land but the proper direction would be to direct the BDA to issue the possession certificate to 1st respondent in respect of the land which is the subject matter of the writ petition. It was further held that since the allottees of the sites out of 6 acres and 20 guntas were likely/bound to be affected by the order a direction was required to be issued to BDA to allot equivalent sites/plots of land to such allottees within 4 months of the passing of the order. Learned counsels for the parties ha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t was also held that it was not possible to apply the rule of promissory estoppel on the facts of the case as there was no provision in the Act, or in the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to allot or re-convey the sites in the manner proposed to be done by the Notification. Therefore, the BDA could not be directed to allot or re-convey the sites on the ground that it had promised to allot or re-convey the sites. It was observed in para 4: Learned Counsel for the petitioner has not been able to place reliance on any of the provisions in the Act or on the Rules framed thereunder which enable the B.D.A. to re-convey the site. Re-conveyance in a way is opposed to the scheme itself. Scheme is formed for the purpose of forming site for allotting them as per the Rules. The rules do not provide for re-conveyance. Therefore it is not possible to hold that the petitioners have a right to seek re-conveyance. Plea of promissory estoppel noticed in para 5 of the order to the effect: However, the learned Counsel for the petitioners has tried to take refuge under the equitable doctrine of promissory estoppel on the basis of the notification issued by the then Chairman of the B ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he writ petitioner. Aggrieved against the order passed by the Single Judge the writ petitioner filed the appeal which was accepted. It was held that no material had been placed on record to hold that the land in question had in fact been acquired for a scheme or that the allotment of site contravened the scheme. The Division Bench expressed its agreement with the proposition that BDA which is a statutory body working under the Act had no power under the Act or the Rules framed thereunder to re-convey the lands which had been acquired for implementation of the scheme. The agreement was expressed in para 3 of the judgment in the following words:- The learned Single Judge has pointed out that the B.D.A. had or has no power to re-convey the lands acquired to implement a scheme relying upon the decisions of this Court in B.N. Sathyanarayan Rao Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 87 Kar. 790, and in B. Venkataswamy Reddy Vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 1989 Kar. 75. This proposition is absolutely unexceptionable having regard to the provisions of the B.D.A. Act as also the Rules of Allotment of Sites framed under the said Act. [Emphasis supplied] The Bench after going through the pleading ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Muniyappa s case (supra) judgment to come to the conclusion that there was a shift in the judicial thinking and that the land acquired could be reconveyed to the owners. The findings recorded which are based on misreading of the Muniyappa s case (supra) are unsustainable and therefore set aside. State of Karnataka amended the Bangalore Development Authority Act, 1976 by the Bangalore Development Authorities (3rd Amendment) Act, 1993 (for short the Amendment Act ) which came into force with effect from 31st March, 1994. Section 5 of the Amendment Act introduced Section 38-C in the Act and Section 9 of the Amendment Act validated the allotments made between 20.12.1973 to 8.5.1986 retrospectively. Although the Division Bench in the impugned judgment held that though the issue regarding applicability of Section 38-C after its incorporation in the BDA Act lifting the ban on reconveyance was irrelevant because the 1st respondent did not contend that he was entitled to any relief under this provision but indirectly relying upon it the Division Bench held that in a given case for good reasons it would be permissible for the authority to alter the terms of the acquisition and restor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lidity of any action or things taken or done under Section 38-C of the Principle Act as amended by this Act, and no court shall enforce or recognize any decree or order declaring such allotment made or any action taken or things done under the Principle Act as invalid. Section 38-C commences with non obstante clause. It provides that irrespective of anything contained in any law or any judgment, decree or order of any Court where in pursuance of any resolution passed by the authority or the erstwhile City Improvement Trust Board, Bangalore in favour of any person re-conveying the site formed in the land which belong to them or vested in or acquired by them for the purpose of any development scheme and on the ground that it is not practicable to include such site for the purpose of any development scheme, the Authority allot such site for the purpose of development scheme by way of sale or lease in favour of such persons subject to the allottee paying such charges which the authority may levy from time to time and the extent of site allotted under this provision together with the land already held by the allottee shall not exceed ceiling limit specified under Section 4 of the Ur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1986 which are saved by Section 9 of the Amendment Act. The resolution of CITB of 1972 agreeing to re-convey the part of the land acquired is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 of the Amendment Act. In the present case, the resolution of the CITB predecessor-in-interest is dated 19.4.1972 and it would not be deemed to be validated by the deemed fiction created by Section 9 of the Amendment Act to bring it within the provisions of Section 38 -C. We may here notice the judgment of this Court in H.C. Venkataswamy Vs. Bangalore Development Authority , 2001 (9) SCC 204, on which reliance has been placed by the counsel for the respondent to contend that Section 38-C would be applicable to the present case. In this case the BDA had acquired land for the development of the scheme called Rajamahal Vilas II Stage. BDA passed a Resolution on 26.6.1984 whereunder it was decided that each of the owners of the land whose land had been acquired would be given a site measuring 40 x 60 free of cost. BDA did not implement the decision on the ground that the Resolution was not approved by the State Government. The appellants challenged the decision of the State Government by way of a w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... promise held out to him to his prejudice and altered his position to his detriment in not pressing his claim for higher compensation and withdrawing the legal proceedings. That the respondent had also not claimed the compensation that was offered to him, which was re-deposited by him with the authority. That the appellant could not be permitted to resile from the representation or promise made by it to the respondent as the respondent had acted on the representation and altered his position to its prejudice. Plea taken by the appellant that rule of promissory estoppel shall not apply to do or perform an act prohibited by law or not authorised by law was rejected by observing that Act to reconvey the land was not prohibited as there was a shift in the judicial thinking in Muniyappa s case (supra). It was held that the appellant was bound to re-convey the land to the petitioner as per its resolution. That the appellant was debarred from resiling from the promise/representation made especially in view of the fact that the respondent acting on the promise made to him had altered his position to his prejudice. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not based on the principle of e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion by resort to the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Vide State of Kerala Vs. Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 1973 (2) SCC 713. In A. P. Pollution Control Board II Vs. Prof. M.V. Nayudu (Retd.) , 2001 (2) SCC 62, it was held that there can be no estoppel against the statute. Rejecting the plea for applying the principle of promissory estoppel, it was observed in para 69 as under:- The learned Appellate Authority erred in thinking that because of the approval of plan by the Panchayat, or conversion of land use by the Collector or grant of letter of intent by the Central Government, a case for applying principle of promissory estoppel applied to the facts of this case. There could be no estoppel against the statute. The Industry could not therefore seek an NOC after violating the policy decision of the Government. Point 4 is decided against the 7th respondent accordingly. [Emphasis supplied] Similarly, in Sharma Transport represented by D.P. Sharma Vs. Government of A.P. , 2002 (2) SCC 188, it was held that the Government as a public authority cannot be compelled to carry out a representation or promise which is prohibited by law or which was devoid of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 3 to 24.) Therefore, the High Court again went wrong by invoking the principle of promissory estoppel to allow the petition filed by the respondents herein. [Emphasis supplied] Reliance placed by the counsel for the respondent on the decision in State of Punjab Vs. Nestle India Ltd. , 2004 (6) SCC 465, to contend that the principle of promissory estoppel would be applicable to the present case cannot be accepted. In the aforesaid case, the State of Punjab had come up in appeal against the order passed by the High Court quashing the demand raised by the State of Punjab for purchase tax on milk for the period 1996-97. The High Court quashed the demand raised by the State of Punjab on the principle of promissory estoppel as the State of Punjab had promised to abolish the purchase tax on milk for the period in question and was estopped from contending to the contrary. The respondent writ petitioners were the factories producing various milk products. As registered dealers under the Punjab General Sales Tax Act, 1958 the respondent writ petitioners had been paying purchase tax on milk in terms of Section 4-B of the Act however for one year i.e. from the period 1.4.1996 to 4. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd a fraud on the Constitution and a breach of faith of the people . This principle would also not be applicable in these appeals. No one is being asked to act contrary to the statute. What is being sought is a direction on the Government to grant the necessary exemption. The grant of exemption cannot be said to be contrary to the statute. The statute does not debar the grant. It envisages it. There is no provision in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder enabling the BDA to re-convey the land acquired to implement a scheme for forming of sites and their allotment as per rules. The rules do not provide for re-conveyane. In the absence of any provision in the Act or the Rules framed thereunder authorizing the BDA to re-convey the land direction cannot be issued to the BDA to reconvey a part of the land on the ground that it had promised to do so. The rule of promissory estoppel cannot be availed to permit or condone a breach of law. It cannot be invoked to compel the Government to do an act prohibited by law. It would be going against the statute. The principle of promissory estoppel would under the circumstances be not applicable to the case in hand. It is well-settled th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the date of commencement of the Act, the Government may acquire the land under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the purpose of improvement, expansion or development of the City of Bangalore or any area to which this Act extends, and any land so acquired after it has vested in the Government, stand transferred to the Board and such land may be dealt with under the provisions of Sections 28 and 29, or in such manner as the Government may direct. Section 29 of the said Act reads as under:- Section 29. Power of Board to acquire, hold and dispose of property. (1) The Board shall for the purposes of this Act, have power to acquire and hold movable and immovable property, whether within or outside City. (2) Subject to such restrictions, conditions and limitations as may be prescribed by rules made by the Government, the Board shall have power to lease, sell or otherwise transfer any movable or immovable property which belongs to it, and to appropriate or apply any land vested in or acquired by it for the formation of open spaces or for building purposes or in any other manner for the purpose of any improvement scheme. (3) The restrictions, conditions and limitations ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the City of Bangalore Improvement Act, 1945 and Section 38 of the Amendment Act we do not find any material difference between these two sections. In fact both these sections are pari materia with each other. The arguments raised, based on Section 76(3) of the BDA Act, therefore, has no force and hence rejected. Notification under Section 4 was issued under the Mysore Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which is pari materia with the Central Act i.e. Land Acquisition Act. By the Land Acquisition (Karnataka Extension Amendment) Act, 1961 (Karnataka Act No.17 of 1961) the earlier Act of Mysore State was repealed and the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) was extended to the whole of the State of Karnataka in its application to the State of Karnataka. It was specifically provided that all amendments made by the Act repealed shall cease to continue and shall be omitted from the Land Acquisition Act of 1894 and such of the provisions thereof as were affected by the repealed Act shall stand revived to the extent to which they would have otherwise continued in operation but for the passing of the repealed Act. Preliminary notification under Section 4 dated 26.11.1959 was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t once the possession is taken and the land vests in the Government then the Government cannot withdraw from acquisition under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Same view was reiterated by this Court in Mohan Singh Vs. International Airport Authority of India , 1997 (9) SCC 132, and in Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed , 2004 (4) SCC 460. The possession of the land in question was taken in the year 1966 after the passing of the award by the Land Acquisition Officer. Thereafter, the land vested in the Government which was then transferred to CITB, predecessor-in-interest of the appellant. After the vesting of the land and taking possession thereof, the notification for acquiring the land could not be withdrawn or cancelled in exercise of powers under Section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act. Power under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be exercised after vesting of the land statutorily in the State Government. The High Court also erred in holding that land acquisition process and the vesting process became incomplete since the land owners were asked to redeposit the amount of compensation. High Court failed to take notice of Section 31 of the Land Acquisi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Government s power to give directions to the Authority. The Government may give such directions to the authority as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purposes of this Act, and it shall be the duty of the authority to comply with such directions. We do not agree with the contention raised by the counsel for the respondent that the directions issued by the Chief Minister through his note were binding on the BDA or that the BDA was bound in law to re-convey the land in terms of the directions issued in the impugned judgment. It has not been shown that the Chief Minister was authorised to issue the directions to the BDA to re-convey the land. Under Section 65 the Government can give such directions to the authority which in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act. It is the duty of the BDA to comply with such directions. Contention that BDA is bound by all directions of the Government irrespective of the nature and purpose of the directions cannot be accepted. Power of the Government under Section 65 is not unrestricted. Directions have to be to carry out the objective of the Act and not contrary to the provisions ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he property. It has been accepted before us that Section 21 of the General Clauses Act has no application but reliance has been sought to be placed on Section 65 of the 1976 Act which empowers the Government to issue such directions to the authority as in its opinion are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The power of the State Government being circumscribed by the conditions precedent laid down therein and, thus, the directions can be issued only when the same are necessary or expedient for carrying out the purpose of the Act. In a case of this nature, the State Government did not have any such jurisdiction and, thus, the Bangalore Development Authority has rightly refused to comply therewith. Recently in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. Vs. Darius Shapur Chenai Ors. [2005 (7) SCALE 386], this Court noticed: In Commissioner of Police, Bombay vs. Gordhandas Bhanji [AIR 1952 SC 16], it is stated : We are clear that public orders, publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind; or what he int ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st and statutory allowances. On adding of interest and statutory allowances the amount would come approximately to ₹ 19,000/- per acre. But for the promise made by the appellant, the 1st respondent would have been entitled to compensation at the said rate for the extent of 6 acres 21 guntas 42 square yards as well. In equity we deem it appropriate to direct the appellant to pay the amount of compensation which was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer along with enhanced compensation which may have been granted by the High Court in any of the reference filed either by the 1st respondent or any other land owner inclusive of statutory benefits with interest @ 9% per annum with effect from the date on which it became due till its payment. As the 1st respondent has been deprived of the amount due for quite some time we direct the appellant to re-deposit the entire amount within three months from today. In case the amount is not deposited within three months then the 1st respondent would be entitled to interest @ 12% per annum. On deposit of the amount the first respondent would be entitled to withdraw the same. We accept this appeal and set aside the judgment of the Hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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