TMI Blog2007 (7) TMI 5X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) of Section 253: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, after considering the merits of the application made by the assessee, pass an order of stay in any proceedings relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of section 253, for a period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order and the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the said period of stay specified in that order. Provided further that where such appeal is not so disposed of within the said period of stay as specified in the order of stay, the Appellate Tribunal may, on an application made in this behalf by the assessee and on being satisfied that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee, extend the period of stay, or pass an order of stay for a further period or periods as it thinks fit; so, however, that the aggregate of the period originally allowed and the period or periods so extended or allowed shall not, in any case, exceed three hundred and sixty days and the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose of the appeal within the period or periods of stay so extended or allowed. Provided also th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... fuse to entertain any further extension. The Application of the assessee should be taken to have been dismissed as it seeks extension of the stay beyond the aggregate period of 365 days. It is, therefore, clear and as can be further seen from the discussion in the order of the Tribunal, that the Appeal could not be disposed of within the period set out in the second proviso, when the stay was in operation, because of the inability of the Tribunal to dispose of the Appeal and not on account of any act or omission on the part of the assessee. 5. How to Interpret a statute including tax legislation has been settled by a catena of judgments of the Honourable Supreme Court. Most Judges, in dealing with tax legislation, have refused to engage in what Megarry J. calls a bount of speculative judicial legislation to cut down the wide words of the statute . IRC v. Brown (1971) 2 All ER 33 quoted with approval in Additional Commissioner of Income-tax, Gujarat vs. Surat Art Silk Cloth Manufacturers Association, 121 ITR 1. The ordinary approach to the question of verbal interpretation is to give words used by Parliament their ordinary meaning in the language used and if ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sumptions or assumptions. The court must look squarely at the words of the statute and interpret them. It must interpret a taxing statute in the light of what is clearly expressed; it cannot imply anything which is not expressed, it cannot import provisions in the statutes so as to supply any assumed deficiency. (See AIR 1961 SC 1047). But while construing a word which occurs in a statute or a statutory instrument in the absence of any definition in that very document it must be given the same meaning which it receives in ordinary parlance or understood in the sense in which people conversant with the subject matter of the statute or statutory instrument understand it. It is hazardous to interpret a word in accordance with its definition in another statute or statutory instrument and more so when such statute or statutory instrument is not dealing with any cognate subject. When the word to be construed is used in a taxing statute or a notification issued thereunder it should be understood in its commercial sense. See M/s. Mesco Pvt. Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR 1985 SC 76. 7. Considering these principles of statutory interpretation, we may now consider the language of Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he assessee and secondly a duty imposed on the Tribunal to dispose of the Appeal as far as possible within the period of the stay as granted. If these twin objects are seen, it would be clear that the intention of the Parliament was that, wherever a stay is granted there is a corresponding duty on the Tribunal to dispose of the Appeals at any rate not later than 360 days and if disposal is delayed on account of the act of the assessee then to vacate the stay by operation of law. Parliament obvious of the rigour of the period of stay as earlier provided, extended the period whilst casting a duty on the Tribunal as far as possible to dispose of the Appeal when stay was granted, within the time frame as provided in the second proviso. A literal reading of the third proviso would mean that if the Tribunal does not dispose of the appeal within the period and the assessee is not at fault the stay stands vacated by operation of law. Would that mean that after the period provided by the proviso exhausts itself the power to continue the interim relief stands exhausted. 9. We have considered the object of the amendment and before answering the issue, let us consider the position of law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to the court of last instance before the hearing of the final appeal. It would, therefore, be clear that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as co-extensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. 10. Did the Section as it stood before the Finance Act of 2007, and after the Finance Act of 2007, exclude the power of the Tribunal to grant interim relief after the period provided in the proviso. Was it the intendement of Parliament that the Tribunal even in a case where the assessee was not at fault should be denuded of its incidental power to continue the interim relief granted and if so what mischief was it seeking to avoid. The mischief if and at all was the long delay in disposing of proceedings where interim relief had been obtained by the Assessee. The second proviso as it earlier stood, in a case when in an appeal interim relief was granted, if the appeal was not disposed off within 180 days provided that the stay shall stand vacated. The proviso as it stood could really have not have stood the test of non-arbtrariness as it would result in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... toms Central Excise vs. Kumar Cotton Mills Pvt. Ltd. 2005 (180) E.L.T. 434 (S.C.). In that case the Supreme Court noted the judgment of the Tribunal from which an Appeal had come before it and also noted the judgment of a larger bench of the CEGAT in the case of IPCL v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Vadodara 2004(169) E.L.T. 267. On consideration of a similar language in Section 35C of the Central Excise Act the Tribunal had quoted the judgment in the case of Income-tax Officer, Cannanore vs. M.K. Mohammed Kunhi (supra) and held that the power conferred on the Tribunal to grant interim relief is not excluded by insertion of the proviso. The relevant provision of sub-section (2A) of Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 read as under:- (2A) The Appellate Tribunal shall, where it is possible to do so, hear and decide every appeal within a period of three years from the date on which such appeal is filed; Provided that where an order of stay is made in any proceeding relating to an appeal filed under sub-section (1) of Section 35B, the Appellate Tribunal shall dispose off the appeal within a period of one hundred and eighty days from the date of such order; Provided fur ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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