TMI Blog2008 (2) TMI 7X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "Act"). 2. Undisputedly, in all these cases the reference applications were filed beyond the period provided for filing an application seeking reference. Section 35-H of the Act reads as follows: "35-H. The Commissioner of Central Excise or the other party may, within one hundred and eighty days of the date upon which he is served with notice of an order under Section 35-C passed on or after the 1st day of July, 1999 (not being an order relating, among other things, to the determination of any question having a relation to the rate of duty of excise or to the value of goods for purpose of assessment), by application in the prescribed form accompanied, where the application is made by the other party, by a fee of two hundred rupee ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ted that under Section 35-E(3) provision for limitation has been provided. Here again, the outer limit for condonation has been indicated. 8. Recently in M/s Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur and Ors. (2007 (14) SCALE 610) the scope for condonation of delay beyond the prescribed period was considered. It was inter-alia noted as follows: "6. At this juncture, it is relevant to take note of Section 35 of the Act which reads as follows: "35. APPEALS TO COMMISSIONER (APPEALS). (1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act by a Central Excise Officer, lower in rank than a Commissioner of Central Excise, may appeal to the Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) [here ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ays, he can allow it to be presented within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days but in terms of the proviso further 30 days time can be granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal. The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain the appeal by condoning delay only upto 30 days after the expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ditions. If under the repealing Act the remedy suddenly stands barred as a result of a shorter period of limitation, the same cannot be held to govern the case, otherwise the result will be to deprive the suitor of an accrued right. The second exception is where the new enactment leaves the claimant with such a short period for commencing the legal proceeding so as to make it unpractical for him to avail of the remedy. This principle has been followed by this Court in many cases and by way of illustration we would like to mention New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt Shanti Misra (1975 (2) SCC 840). The husband of the respondent in that case died in an accident in 1966. A period of two years was available to the respondent for institu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ustrate the point, we may refer to some cases. xx xx xx 13. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by July 22, 1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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