TMI Blog1994 (11) TMI 432X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... taking cognizance were quashed. The challenge to the Act was not gone into since the same was pending at the relevant time before this Court. 4.To highlight the issue involved, it is enough if we advert to the facts in Criminal Appeal No. 328 of 1994 since CO No. 8377(W) of 1993, against which this appeal has been preferred, is the main case. The same decision was applied to Criminal Appeals Nos. 327 and 329 of 1994. The short facts are as under. 5.On the evening of 16-3-1993, an explosion occurred at or near Premises No. 267, B.B. Ganguly Street, Calcutta. 69 persons died, 5 of them died as a result of direct blast and 46 others were injured. The said premises and some other buildings adjoining it collapsed and/or were badly damaged. 6.A complaint was lodged on 17-3-1993 regarding this incident by Mr B.K. Chattopadhaya, Sub-Inspector attached to Bowbazar Police Station. This complaint was treated as first information report. On that basis, Case No. 84 dated 17-3-1993 was registered in the police station under Sections 120-B/436/326/307/302 Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act. Having regard to the gravity of the offence, the Commissioner ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... used was to strike terror in the people and/or to strike terror in a particular section of the people and/or to adversely affect the harmony amongst the Hindus and the Muslims. It was also mentioned the accused had conspired and prepared to commit disruptive activities. In the charge-sheet all the necessary ingredients under Sections 3(1) and 4 of TADA had been mentioned. 9.The first respondent, Mohammed Rashid Khan moved a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India making inter alia the following prayers: That the cognizance taken by learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta, Respondent 7, in TADA Case No. 1 of 1993 arising out of Section 'H' (Bowbazar Police Station) Case No. 84 dated 17-3-1993 and all subsequent proceedings thereto are illegal, void and inoperative in law; A writ in the nature of certiorari and/or an order of direction in the like nature commanding the respondents to transmit the records relating to TADA case pending before the said respondent to this Court; A writ in the nature of prohibition and/or an order of direction in the like nature prohibiting the respondents and/or their agents and/or their subordinates from ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... y to result in conviction for an offence under TADA. The moment there is a debatable area, in the case, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction. 15.In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426) it has been categorically laid down that the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint taken on their face value and accepted in its entirety constitute an offence. The High Court is not justified in quashing the criminal proceedings. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma (1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 1 (1994) 2 SCC 664: 1994 SCC (Cri) 595 2 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426) this Court had ruled that writ petition should not be entertained against charge-sheet while exercising jurisdiction. If the matter is considered on merits in the guise of prima facie evidence, it would amount to a pre-trial. To the same effect are the following rulings: 1. State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid1 (SCC pp. 669-70, para 7). 2.State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal2. 3.State of Bihar v. PP Sharma3 (SCC p. 269, para 68). 4.Maninder Kaur v. Rajinder Singh 1992 Supp (2) SCC 25 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 522 . 5. Radhey Shyam Khemka v. State of Bihar (1993 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... preparation and keeping of bombs are illegal. It tantamounts to terrorising the people. Therefore, this would be a terrorist act under Section 3(1). If the Act itself is illegal it cannot be justified on the plea of self-defence. The question is whether a right of private defence exists under Indian Penal Code or any other law. Further, Section 3(3) is also attracted. 19.This Court in Yogendra Morarji v. State of Gujarat7 (SCC p. 234, para 30) has dealt with the right of self-defence. The right of self-defence commences not before a reasonable apprehension arises in the mind of the accused. 20.The finding of the High Court that there are no materials in support of allegation of conspiracy under Section. 3(3) proceeds on misappreciation of the material and is contrary to the averments contained in the chargesheet. It is not necessary to bring home the charge of conspiracy to establish the time and the place of conspiracy or even the actual words of communication. It is not necessary to prove who entered into conspiracy and the nature of conspiracy. The existence of conspiracy can be inferred from the conduct of the various accused prior to and subsequent to the conspiracy. Ex ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... atements. All of them can be looked into. In support of the above submissions, it is urged that the judgment of the High Court is perverse and is liable to be set aside. 24.Mr U.R. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants submits that a charge-sheet in criminal law is a mere narration. It is a manifestation of evidence collected. No charge-sheet is ever construed in a restricted way, as has been done by the High Court. In this case the High Court has grievously erred. 25. When a police report is filed cognizance is almost automatic. In fact, in A.C. Aggarwal, Sub-Divisional Magistrate v. Ram Kali (AIR 1968 SC 1, 5 : (1968) 1 SCR 205 : 1968 Cri LJ 82 this Court held that when Section 190(1)(b) of the Code uses the words may take cognizance it means, must take cognizance and that it has no discretion in the matter. In law, no reasons need be given for taking cognizance under Section 193. 26. Mr Ram Jethmalani, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the respondents submits that a report of the police constitutes the facts found as a result of investigation. Under Section 173 of the Code the Court is called upon to take action. The report in the acc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... bar to prosecution. (ii) The FIR and the complaint do not make out the offence. (iii) When there is no legal evidence. The High Court can interfere during investigation (i) not under the inherent powers but under the Constitution of India; (ii)after cognizance before charges are framed. This can be done both under the inherent powers and Article 226 of the constitution of India: (a) on account of the existence of legal bar or where there is no material for issuing process or action; (b) there is not enough/no legal evidence; (c) after charges are framed when there is legal evidence to sustain the charges. 32. It is incorrect to contend that the High Court has appreciated the evidence. In order to determine whether the bar has been removed, it can examine the same. As a matter of fact, this Court in State of Maharashtra v. Abdul Hamid Haji Mohammed1 (SCC at p. 669) has held that mens rea is necessary in deciding the abetment. Therefore, primarily the Court has to decide whether an order of sanction exists or not. 33. The sanction in this case is void for the following reasons: (a)The order of sanction states that the Commissioner of Police accord ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and convicted. Hence, it is submitted the order of sanction must be examined in this light. The Designated Court must record the motive as postulated under Section 3(1). If, therefore, the dominant intention is selfdefence, the matter will have to be viewed only from that angle. In Sanjay Dutt v. State through CBI (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 1433 :(1994) 3 Scale this Court held that the accused could prove in relation to offences which do not require mens rea, an innocent possession will not bring the offence under Section 5. Therefore, it is submitted in cases where mens rea is required like Sections 3 and 4, it must relate to sovereignty and integrity of India. Hence, the Court will have to determine the dominant intention as laid down in Mathuri v. State of Punjab (1964) 5 SCR 916: AIR 1964 SC 986 :(1964) 2 Cri LJ 57 . In this case, the dominant intention is self-defence. Therefore, it will not constitute an offence under TADA. In the `harge- sheet/police report, the ingredients of neither Sections 3 nor 4 are mentioned. The documents, if taken into consideration, refer to two confessions. They would only point to selfdefence. 36.Mr Dipankar Ghosh, learned Senior Couns ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oceedings, and (2) to secure the well-considered opinion of a superior authority before a prosecution is lodged against them. Similar provisions are found in other enactments, for example, Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. 43. Similarly, when Section 20-A(2) of TADA makes sanction necessary for taking cognizance - it is only to prevent abuse of power by authorities concerned. It requires to be noted that this provision of Section 20-A came to be inserted by Act 43 of 1993. Then, the question is as to the meaning of taking cognizance. Section 190 of the Code talks of cognizance of offences by Magistrates. This expression has not been defined in the Code. In its broad and literal sense, it means taking notice of an offence. This would include the intention of initiating judicial proceedings against the offender in respect of that offence or taking steps to see whether there is any basis for initiating judicial proceedings or for other purposes. The word 'cognizance' indicates the point when a Magistrate or a Judge first takes judicial notice of an offence. It is entirely a different thing from initiation of proceedings; rather it is the condition precedent to the init ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n invoking the power under Article 226 of the Constitution on the ground that the detention of the accused is not under the provisions of TADA Act. We may hasten to add that this can happen only in extreme cases which would be rare and that power of the High Court is not exercisable in cases like the present where it may be debatable whether the direct accusation made in conjunction with the attendant circumstances, if proved to be true, is likely to result in conviction for an offence under TADA Act. The moment there is a debatable area in the case, it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and the gamut of the procedure prescribed under TADA Act must be followed, namely, raising the objection before the Designated Court and, if necessary, challenging the order of the Designated Court by appeal in the Supreme Court as provided in Section 19 of TADA Act. In view of the express provision of appeal to the Supreme Court against any judgment, sentence or order, not being an interlocutory order of a Designated Court, there is no occasion for the High Court to examine merits of the order made by the Designated Court that the Act a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... se against the accused, then alone the proceeding could be quashed. 47.In State of Bihar v. PP Sharma3 (at SCC pages 224-225, headnote) it is held: At a stage when the police report under Section 173 CrPC has been forwarded to the Magistrate after completion of the investigation and the material collected by the Investigating Officer is under the gaze of judicial scrutiny, the High Court would do well to discipline itself not to undertake quashing proceedings in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In this case the High Court fell into grave error in appreciating the documents and affidavits produced before it by treating them as evidence, delving into the disputed questions of fact in its jurisdiction' under Articles 226/227 and pronouncing the respondents to be innocent and quashing the criminal proceedings by converting itself into a trial court. This was not at all a case where High Court should have interfered in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. The appreciation of evidence is the function of the criminal courts the Special Judge was seized of the matter. He had heard the arguments on the question of cognizance and had reserved the orders. The High Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts for shares to take recourse to the provisions of the Companies Act, cannot be accepted. It is a futile attempt on the part of the appellants, to close the chapter before it has unfolded itself. It will be for the trial court to examine whether on the materials produced on behalf of the prosecution it is established that the appellants had issued the prospectus inviting applications in respect of shares of the Company aforesaid with a dishonest intention, or having received the moneys from the applicants they had dishonestly retained or misappropriated the same. That exercise cannot be performed either by the High Court or by this Court. If accepting the allegations made and charges levelled on their face value, the Court had come to conclusion that no offence under the Penal Code was disclosed the matter would have been different. This Court has repeatedly pointed out that the High Court should not, while exercising power under Section 482 of the Code, usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court. The power under Section 482 of the Code has been vested in the High Court to quash a prosecution which amounts to abuse of the process of the court. But that power cannot be exercised by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ial. We have already held that for the purpose of quashing the proceedings only the allegations set forth in the complaint have to be seen and nothing further. 53. In this legal background we will analyse the facts as contained in the charge-sheet: 1. Accused Mohd. Rashid Khan and his relatives reside at 43, B.B. Ganguly Street, Calcutta-12. He used to maintain a group of antisocials. Local people were scared of him and his men. No one dared to object or raise voice against them as all knew the consequences. 2. The said Mohd. Rashid Khan had his office in Premises No. 266, B.B. Ganguly Street. 3.Accused Rashid Khan, a Satta Bookie, used to run his satta business inside Satta Gali at Premises Nos. 266 and 267, B.B. Ganguly Street. 4. The investigation revealed that since last 5/6 years Accused 3 Pannalal Jaysoara had been manufacturing bombs on the first floor of 267, B.B. Ganguly Street as and when required by Accused 1 Md. Rashid Khan, the Satta Bookie. Kalloo @ Sarafaraz Khan, a henchman of Accused 1 picked up Accused 3 Pannalal Jaysoara first for preparing bombs for their group and through accused Kalloo @ Sarafaraz Khan, Accused 3 Pannalal Jaysoara was introduce ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Gali who saw this. Thereafter accused Murtaza, Khalid and Hassu and Khurshid kept two drums and four bags together and placed a plastic sheet. Accused Khalid and Hassu opened those bags and brought out explosive materials and some small tin containers. Then accused Tenia, Ukil, Hassu and Khurshid started mixing the explosive materials while accused Gulzar, Khalid and Murtaza started straining the materials. Accused Gulzar tried to open the lid of a drum but he was asked by accused Khalid and accused Murtaza not to do so. As such he did not open the lid of the drum. Soon after accused Nisar Gulzar, Khalid and Murtaza were straining those explosive materials. Accused Lala, Kalloo and Imtiaz came inside the first floor of 267, B.B. Ganguly Street and supervised this manufacturing process. Owner of Khaskhas Godown, E.M. Naushad and his men were present inside the first floor of the said building i.e. inside his godown-cum-residential place at that time. At about 21.00/21.30 hours of that night, an electrician of that locality who used to sleep in the night inside the Khaskhas Godown regularly also came there but being rebuked by accused Murtaza he left the Khaskhas Godown. Some other ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed or got damaged. The facts also disclose that confessions were made by Accused 3, Pannalal and Accused 6, Md. Gulzar under Section 164 of the Code before the Magistrate. 54. Now, we come to the order granting sanction. The order of sanction by the Commissioner of Police is dated 11-6- 1993. It inter alia says: WHEREAS, it appears from all the reports, recorded statements of witnesses, confessional statement of accused persons viz. Pannalal Jaysoara and Md. Gulzar, the seizure lists, opinion of experts, Order No. 4509-P dated 11- 6-1993 from the Joint Secretary to the Government of West Bengal case diary etc. in connection with Bowbazar PS. C/No. 84 dated 17-3-1993 under Sections 120-B/436130213071- 326 IPC, under Sections 3 and 5 of Explosive Substances Act, under Section 3 and TADA Act, placed before me, that on 16-3-1993 at about 23.59 hours there was an explosion due to blast of bombs and explosive materials which caused destruction of Premises No. 267, B.B. Ganguly Street, Calcutta-12 and damage to Premises Nos. 266, 268-A, 43/3, 42/1, B.B. Ganguly Street, 1, Haberly Lane, 37, Robert Street, Calcutta-12 etc. and death of 69 persons and injuries to large number o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... judgment criticises the order of sanction. It inter alia holds : It has been specifically alleged that no sanction order was given by the Commissioner of Police - Respondent 3 before the Designated Court took cognizance on 14-6-1993. Respondent 3 has not affirmed an affidavit denying the said allegations made by the petitioner. The said affidavit affirmed by S.K. Sanyal also does not disclose that he was authorised to affirm the affidavit on behalf of the Commissioner of Police - Respondent 3. There is, therefore, no specific denial by the Commissioner of Police of the averment in the writ petition that no sanction had been granted by him prior to the Designated Court taking cognizance. It is significant that although it is alleged in the said affidavit of S.K. Sanyal that he produced the case diary including the sanction order to the Designated Court and the Designated Court returned the same to him for making copies as the Court did not have the necessary infrastructure, the same is not recorded in the proceeding before the Designated Court nor there is any mention in the sanction order filed in Court and subsequently returned as appears from the record of the Designated C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing the order of sanction and taking cognizance ordered as follows: This order, however, will not prevent the respondent-State to take steps for making any fresh application for sanction before the Commissioner of Police on the basis of fresh materials, if there be any, and accordingly to apply for taking of cognizance before the Designated Court on the basis of such fresh materials if the same is permissible and if the respondent is so advised in accordance with law. From the above analysis of the judgment, it is clear what actually the High Court has done is to appreciate the evidence at the pre-trial stage. 58.The affidavit of Mr Tushar Kanti Talukdar, Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, which came to be filed pursuant to the permission granted by the Court, categorically states that sanction was accorded by him. The Commissioner had gone through the voluminous records and came to the conclusion on his own. It is further stated by him as under: I state that I had examined in particular the statements of witnesses indicating that the accused persons along with others conspired to create disharmony between the two major communities and over a period had systematically ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... izance I had placed all the papers including the two sanctions and the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code before the Court. I say that it was well within the competence of the learned Chief Metropolitan Magistrate to be informed that investigation under Sections 3 and 4 of TADA Act was being carried on and to correct the records by adding Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act. Again in paragraph 12, the affidavit proceeds to state: I further say that it was only in course of the investigation that materials indicating commission of offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the said Act of 1987 had transpired. I further say that after the cognizance had been taken on the basis of the charge-sheet and the materials collected after investigation being the materials in the case diary which include two sanctions and the statements recorded under Section 161 of the Code and the documents seized and various seizure lists the learned Designated Court issued warrant of arrest against the absconding accused persons. Paragraph 13 mentions as follows: I say that the sanction under the said TADA 1993 was granted on 11-6-1993 being No. 1 by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta and u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sidered the relevant material placed before it and after a consideration of all the circumstances of the case it sanctioned the prosecution. In the present case the investigation was complete on the date of sanction and police reports had been filed before the Magistrate. The sanctioning authority has specifically mentioned in the sanction order that the papers and the case diary were taken into consideration before granting the sanction. Case diary is a complete record of the police investigation. It contains total material in support or otherwise of the allegations. The sanctioning authority having taken the case diary into 3 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222: 1992 SCC (Cri) 192 consideration before the grant of sanction it cannot be said that there was non-application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority. It is nobody's case that the averment in the sanction order to the effect that case diary was taken into consideration by the competent authority, is incorrect. We, therefore, do not agree with the finding of the High Court and set aside the same. (emphasis supplied) Finally, we are at a loss to understand as to why and on what reasoning the High Court assumed extraor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... emphasis supplied) 65.Equally, reliance is placed on State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy31 In para 10, p. 704, it is held as under: [I]t is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or not there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore, it is the duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. 66.In our considered view, certainly the Designated Court could do all these at the time of framing of charges and not the High Court under Article 226, as has been done in the instant case. 67.We are not in a position to accept the submissions of the learned counsel for the respondent that in order to find out whether a valid sanction existed, the High Court had appreciated the findings. 68.Equally, much cannot be said of the fact that the order of sanction mentions sanction for prosecution , since it i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ential, it is a material consideration. But it is not legitimate to speculate as to possible but unproved motives. The difficulty in all cases where two persons are accused of a crime and where the evidence against one is inadmissible against the other is that however carefully assessors or a jury are directed and however firmly a Judge may steel his mind against being influenced against one by the evidence admissible only against the other, nevertheless the mind may inadvertently be affected by the disclosures made by one of the accused to the detriment of the other. Neither of these rulings would apply because the question of leading evidence by the prosecution in relation to conspiracy, as stated above, would arise only during the stage of trial which is yet to commence in the instant case. 72. As to the fact of conspiracy, the charge-sheet clearly mentions the same. Therefore, factually, this finding is wrong. We are not in a position to accept the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that if the bombs are for self-defence, there is no mens rea and therefore, no offence under TADA. The finding of the High Court on this aspect is as under: It may be n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion only, it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful; and punishable if for a criminal object, or for the use of criminal means.' 9. This Court in E. G. Barsay v. State of Bombay34 held: `The gist of the offence is an agreement to break the law. The parties to such an agreement will be guilty of criminal conspiracy, though the illegal act agreed to be done has not been done. So too, it is an ingredient of the offence that all the parties should agree to do a single illegal act. It may comprise the commission of a number of acts. Under Section 43 of the Indian Penal Code, an act would be illegal if it is an offence or if it is prohibited by law.' In Yash Pal Mittal v. State of Punjab35 the rule was laid as follows: (SCC p. 543, para 9.`The very agreement, concert or league is the ingredient of the offence. It is not necessary that all the conspirators must know each and every detail of the conspiracy as long as they are co-participators in the main object of the conspiracy. There may be so many devic ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 'Terrorism' is one of the manifestations of increased lawlessness and cult of violence. Violence and crime constitute a threat to an established order and are a revolt against a civilised society. 'Terrorism' has not been defined under TADA nor is it possible to give a precise definition of 'terrorism' or lay down what constitutes 'terrorism'. It may be possible to describe it as use of violence when its most important result is not merely the physical and mental damage of the victim but the prolonged psychological effect it produces or has the potential of producing on the society as a whole. There may be death, injury, or destruction of property or even deprivation of individual liberty in the process but the extent and reach of the intended terrorist activity travels beyond the effect of an ordinary crime capable of being punished under the ordinary penal law of the land and its main objective is to overawe the Government or disturb harmony of the society or 'terrorise' people and the society and not only those directly assaulted, with a view t o disturb even tempo, peace and tranquillity of the society and create a sense of fear and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o be applied finally before finding the accused guilty or otherwise, is not exactly to be applied at the stage of Section 227 or 228 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. At this stage, even a very strong suspicion founded upon materials before the Magistrate, which leads him to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged, may justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. (emphasis supplied) 80.The confessional statements of the two accused were very much there before the Court. There is no reason to believe that the Court had not looked at the same. 81.The other finding that what can be looked at is only the police report, cannot be sustained. In Satya Narain Musadi v. State of Biharl4 (SCC at pages 157-158, para 10) it was held as under: The report as envisaged by Section 173(2) has to be accompanied as required by sub-section (5) by all the documents and statements of the witnesses therein mentioned. One cannot divorce the details which the report must contain as required by sub-section (5) from its accompaniments which are required to be submitted under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... amongst a section of people or that they had any of the intents specified in Section 3(1) of the Act. We are clearly of the opinion that this is a perverse reasoning. 84.On intention and motive, we only need to refer to Corpus Juris Secundum (A Contemporary Statement of American Law), Volume 22. It is held at page 116 (Criminal Law) as under: Intention (a) In general (b) Specific or general intent crimes (a)In general.- As actual intent to commit the particular crime toward which the act moves is a necessary element of an attempt to commit a crime. Although the intent must be one in fact, not merely in law, and may not be inferred from the overt act alone, it may be inferred from the circumstances. 85.As regards motive in American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn., Vol. 21, in Section 133, it is stated as under: 133. Motive.- In criminal law motive may be defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act or as the moving power which impels to action for a definite result. 86.Tested in the light of the above, suffice it to hold the preparation and storage of bombs, as pointed out above, are per se illegal acts. The intention that it wa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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