TMI Blog1997 (2) TMI 563X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d Rubber Industries Private Limited, is the tenant of the ground floor in the suit house. The appellant is the landlord. On August 25, 1985 the said building was destroyed by fire. On February 11, 1991 the appellant filed a suit in the City Civil Court, Bombay (Suit No.1407 of 1991) for a perpetual injunction restraining the first defendant from carrying on any construction in the suit premises. The appellant's case was that inasmuch as the building, which was the subject-matter of tenancy between the parties, has been destroyed by fire, the tenancy of the first defendant has come to an end. (The second respondent herein is the Managing Director of the first respondent and was impleaded as the second defendant in the suit.) The appellant applied for a temporary injunction restraining the first defendant from carrying on any construction. An ad-interim injunction was granted by the Civil Court on February 15, 1991. The first defendant applied for vacating the interim injunction but his application was dismissed on July 24, 1991. Meanwhile, on April 11, 1991 the plaintiff moved the Civil Court for punishing the defendants under Order 39 Rule 2-A of the Civil Procedure Code ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dent to imprisonment for a period of one month. The court made the following further significant direction: Since the construction is clearly both unauthorized and in breach of the order of injunction and since there are no daintier orders passed in the first defendants suit No. 4597 of 1987 in the Chamber Summons the 3rd defendants shall forthwith take action under their notice dated 23.5.91. The Court Receiver has already been appointed Receiver of the property in the plaintiff's Notice of Motion No. 949 of 1991. The Court Receiver shall take possession of the suit premises and seal the same until the 3rd defendants act upon their notice dated 23.5.91. The first defendant shall pay costs of this Notice of Motion fixed at ₹ 1,000/- condition precedent. In July, 1992 the Defendants 1 and 2 filed appeals in the Bombay High Court against the order making the interim injunction absolute pending the suit. The High Court stayed the order punishing the defendant for contempt but did not stay the order granting injunction in favour of the plaintiffs. On July 15, 1994, the High Court appointed a commissioner to ascertain whether the construction activity was still bein ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Applicants have been restrained from carrying out any construction work. As is set out hereafter, it is clear to court that inspite of this injunction order, construction work has been carried on almost continuously by the Appellants. The learned Judge then referred in extenso to the elaborate material placed before him and recorded the finding that all these reports clearly indicate that there is wilful and blatant breach of order of injunction passed by the City Civil Court. It is clear that in breach of the injunction order, there has been construction. The breach is wilful and blatant. The extent to which the Appellants have gone is also indicated by the fact that, as stated above, inspite of knowledge of order of this Court, the Commissioner appointed by this court was initially obstructed. To Court it is very clear that here is a party who has absolutely no regard for the orders of the court. Such a party must be made to bear the consequences of their own action......To Court it is clear that the applicants have chosen to wilfully and blatantly flouted the order of injunction. It may be that the Applicants have a very good case. However, no matter how good a case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ief asked for by him. After referring to the judgment of the High Court in Vishanji Virji Mepani and to the orders of this Court in the Special Leave Petition, the High Court observed: therefore the view taken by this Court that city Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit filed by Respondents came to be confirmed. The petitioner herein has now prayed that it may be allowed to occupy and carry on business in the premises which were occupied by it without paying any payment or royalty and security. If the City Civil Court is having no jurisdiction to decide the suit itself, all the orders passed therein come to an end and are required to be treated as non-est. The learned counsel for Respondents tried to point out that Petitioner is guilty of violating some interim or interim orders passed in the suit and contempt proceedings in that respect are pending. But that is immaterial and irrelevant for consideration of the relief prayed by Petitioner, particularly when the original orders passed were without jurisdiction. Hence, in my opinion (a) deserves to be granted which runs as follows: `(a) the Petitioner/Appellant be allowed to occupy and to carry out business in the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1 and 2 have violated the order of injunction issued by the court) is not sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case, the learned Judge has not chosen to deal with the same probably for the reason that he has allowed their appeal on the question of law. Counsel submitted that Defendants 1 and 2 have not carried out any construction in the suit premises after the grant of injunction by the Civil Court and that whatever construction was done was done earlier to the grant of injunction by the Civil court. The first and foremost question in this appeal is whether the High Court was right in holding that since it has been found ultimately that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, the interim orders made therein are non-est and hence Defendants 1 and 2 cannot be punished for their violation even if they had flouted and disobeyed the said interim orders when they were in force. We are of the considered opinion that the High Court was not right in saying so. The landlord-plaintiff came forward with the suit alleging that by virtue of the fire resulting in the destruction of the suit house, the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... further suggests that if any party thinks that an order made by the Civil Court is without jurisdiction or is contrary to law, the appropriate course open to him is to approach that court with the plea and ask for vacating the order. But it is no open to him to flout the said order. But it is no open to him to flout the said order assuming that the order is without jurisdiction. It is this principle which has been recognised and incorporation in Section 9-A of Civil Procedure Code (inserted by Maharashtra Amendment Act No. 65 of 1977), says Mr.Sorabjee. Section 9-A reads as follows: 9-A. Where by an application for interim relief is sought or is sought to be set aside in any suit and objection to jurisdiction is taken, such issue to be decided by the Court as preliminary issue at hearing of the application. (1) If, at the hearing of any application of granting or setting aside an order granted any interim relief, whether by way of injunction, appointment of a receiver of otherwise, made in any suit, an objection for the jurisdiction of the court to entertain such suit is taken by any of the parties to the suit, the Court shall proceed to determine at the hearing of such a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat it is open to the defendants to flout them merrily, without fear of any consequence. Admittedly, this could not be done until the High Court's decision on the question of jurisdiction. The question is whether the said decision of the High Court means that no person can be punished for flouting or disobeying the interim/interlocutory orders while they were in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience committed prior to the decision of the High Court on the question of jurisdiction. Holding that by virtue of the said decision of the High Court [on the question of jurisdiction], on one can be punished thereafter for disobedience or violation of the interim orders committed prior to the said decision of the High Court, would indeed be subversive of rule of law and would seriously erode the dignity and the authority of the courts. We must repeat that this is not even a case where a suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or only with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed out hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court bonafide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the defendants cannot escape the consequences of their disobedience and violation of the inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing, because the does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or fore some other legal reason. In any such case, the `void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. We may also refer to yet another decision of this Court in Ravi S.Naik v. Union of India [1994 Suppl. (2) SCC 641 at 662] S.C. Agrawal, J., speaking for the Division Bench, observed: In the absence of an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the stay order passed by the High Court could not be ignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could not be a subject-matter of court proceedings and his decision was final. It is settled law that an order, even though interim in nature, is binding still it is set aside by a competent court and it cannot be ignored on the ground that the court which passed the order has no jurisdiction to pass the same. More ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... risdiction to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void. Lord Cottenham, L.C. said in Chuck v. Cremer: (1) (1 Coop. Temp. Cott.342). `A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular, cannot be permitted to disobey it....It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves judge whether an order was null or valid-whether it was regular or irregular. that they should come to the court and not take upon themselves to determine such a question. That the course of a party knowing of an order, which was null or irregular, and who might be affected by it, was plain. He should apply to the court that it might be discharged. As long as it existed it must not be disobeyed.' Such being the nature of this obligation, two consequences will in general follow from its breach. The first is that anyone who disobeys an order of the court (and I am not now considering disobedience of orders relating merely to matters of procedure) is in c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the learned Judge. We do not, however, wish to go into the said controversy in view of Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code and the correct principle of law, as we understand it. The above decision has been distinguished by another learned Single Judge in Kapil v. S.Anthony [1984 (2) Bombay Case Reporter 199] precisely on this ground, viz., with reference to Section 9-A Civil Procedure Code. The learned Judge has opined that by virtue of Section 9-A, the court does possess the jurisdiction to pass interim orders and they have to be obeyed by the person concerned even though ultimately it may be found that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the said suit. The other decision of the Bombay High Court, which is also strongly relied upon in the order under appeal, is of the Division Bench in Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale and another v. Vidyavardhini Sabha and others [1984 MLJ 520]. That was a case where the Revenue Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass any interim order in an appeal preferred under Section 71 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. The Tribunal, however, passed an interim order restraining the holding of a meeting. The persons, against whom the order was issued, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Revenue Tribunal and not of a civil court. Probably, for that reason, the Bench has not referred to Section 9-A of the Civil Procedure Code. Be that as it may, for the reasons given by us hereinbefore and in the light of the law laid down in the decisions of this Court referred to above, it must be held that the decision of the Bombay High Court in Dwarkadas Mulji was wrongly decided and that the decision in Vivekanand Atmaram Chitale must be held to be in applicable to the orders of a civil court. The learned counsel for the Defendants 1 and 2 submitted that this is not a proceeding for contempt but a proceeding under Rule 2-A of Order 39 of the Civil Procedure Code. Learned counsel submitted that proceedings under Order 39 Rule 2-A are a part of the coercive process to secure obedience to its injunction and that once it is found that the Court has no jurisdiction, question of securing obedience to its orders any further does not arise. Learned counsel also submitted that enforcing the interim order after it is found that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the said suit would not only be unjust and illegal but would also reflect adversely upon the dignity and authority of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rders. It can yet pass appropriate orders. At the same time, it should also decide the question of jurisdiction at the earliest possible time. the interim orders so passed are orders within jurisdiction when passed and effective till the court decides that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. These interim orders undoubtedly come to an end with the decision that this Court had no jurisdiction. It is open to the court to modify these orders while holding that it has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Indeed, in certain situation, it would be its duty to modify such orders or make appropriate directions. For example, take a case, where a party has been dispossessed from the suit property by appointing a receiver or otherwise; in such a case, the court should, while holding that it has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit, must put back the party in the position he was on the date of suit. But this power or obligation has nothing to do with the proposition that while in foce, these orders have to be obeyed and their violation can be punished even after the question of jurisdiction is decided against the plaintiff provided the violation is committed before the decision of the c ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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