TMI Blog2008 (9) TMI 957X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tuated on Gandhi Road in the city of Dehradun. The respondents are heirs of one Prakash Chand. Initially, the property was let out to Prakash Chand, grandfather of the respondents who are heirs and legal representatives of said Prakash Chand. The tenancy was created in 1956 at a monthly rent of ₹ 18.75 paise per month which was subsequently raised to ₹ 25.50 paise. 4. It appears that the landlords served notice on October 3, 1988 to the tenant terminating his tenancy. A suit for possession was thereafter instituted being Eviction Suit No. 4 of 1989 titled Shamshad Ahmad Ors. v. Prakash Chand in the Small Causes Court, Dehradun and the matter was sub-judice. During the pendency of the suit, landlords made an application to the Prescribed Authority under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act') for possession of the suit shop on the ground that the landlords required the shop bona fide for carrying on business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of Smt. Kishwar Ahmad-applicant No.6 with Kum. Faraha Matloob, daughter of Smt. Kishwar Ahmad and Matloob Ahmad for running business ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... und put forward by the landlords in the application under Section 21 was totally different, distinct and independent of the suit filed by the landlords earlier and hence the application was not liable to be dismissed on that ground. It was also held that it could not be contended that pardanasin lady/ladies cannot do business. No such provision of law was brought to the notice of the Prescribed Authority so as to compel the Authority to dismiss the application on that count. Hence, even that ground also was not well founded for dismissing the application. 8. The Authority, however, observed that neither Matloob Ahmad nor Kum. Faraha Matloob had any experience in doing business in readymade garments. The Authority noted that Kum. Faraha had obtained B.A. degree but she had no experience in readymade garments. Nor Matloob Ahmad who was to retire, had any such expertise. The Authority, therefore, held that in absence of such experience, requirement pleaded by the landlords could not be said to be bona fide or genuine. The Authority also held that if the landlords wanted to do business in readymade garments, they would require an office room. They would also require sufficient spa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... part of it was required for the purpose of doing business in readymade garments by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6 and a part of it was required by Kum. Faraha Matloob for running an office as an advocate. According to the appellate Court, therefore, bona fide requirement of the landlords was proved. 11. Regarding comparative hardship, the appellate Court noted that no attempt whatsoever had been made by the tenant for getting alternative accommodation and hence it could not be said that if the order of eviction would be passed and application of landlords would be allowed, greater hardship would be caused to the tenant. Accordingly, an order passed by the Prescribed Authority was set aside and direction for eviction of tenant was issued. 12. The said order was challenged by the tenant by filing a writ petition in the High Court of Uttaranchal under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. A Single Judge of the High Court, by a brief order, allowed the writ petition, set aside the decision of the appellate authority and dismissed the application filed by the landlords. The said order is challenged by the landlords in the present proceedings. 13. On November ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r is passed by a Court or Authority. In the present case, the date on which an application under Section 21 of the Act was filed, the landlords needed the shop for bona fide requirement. Subsequent events could not deprive them from getting possession of the suit shop. 19. On all these grounds, it was submitted that the order passed by the High Court deserves to be set aside by restoring the order of the appellant authority and by confirming the order of possession granted by the Additional District Judge, Dehradun. 20. The learned counsel for the tenant, on the other hand, supported the order passed by the High Court. He submitted that when the Prescribed Authority dismissed the application filed by the landlords and the appellate authority allowed such application, the High Court was fully justified in entering into the findings recorded by the appellate authority. 21. He also submitted that subsequent events were required to be considered. In view of the fact that Kum. Farah was selected by the Public Service Commission and was appointed as a Judge, the so called requirement as a practising advocate and having an office for that purpose did not survive. The said d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . 27. On merits, in our judgment, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the Prescribed Authority was wrong in dismissing the application filed by the landlords. We had already observed that the Prescribed Authority negatived the contention of the tenant that the application was not maintainable. It, therefore, entered into the merits of the matter and decided it against the landlords. It observed that applicant No.6 hailed from a reputed family of Dehradun and they had a very big business of timber wood . It also noted that applicant No.6 had been enjoying the facilities of car, scooter, telephone, etc. 28. In our opinion, the grievance voiced by the learned counsel for the appellants is well founded that the above grounds and reasons were irrelevant and extraneous so far as the requirement of the landlords was concerned. The authority can undoubtedly decide whether the need or requirement of landlords was or was not bona fide. It can record a finding against the landlords if such requirement is not proved. But the authority cannot decline the prayer of the landlords on the ground that they belonged to upper class society having ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... limits of law. The power is supervisory in nature. The High Court does not act as a Court of Appeal or a Court of Error. It can neither review nor reappreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate Court or inferior Tribunal purports to be based or to correct errors of fact or even of law and to substitute its own decision for that of the inferior Court or Tribunal. The powers are required to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts and inferior Tribunals within the limits of law. 33. In Chundavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, (1986) 4 SCC 447, this Court stated; Unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law calling for intervention it was not for the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to interfere. If there is evidence on record on which a finding can be arrived at and if the court has not misdirected itself either on law or on fact, then in exercise of the power under Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court should refrain from interfering with such findings made by the appropriate authoritie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settled law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227, must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law . It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised `as the cloak of an appeal in disguise.' 37. While dealing with petitions under the present statute, the above principles have been followed. 38. In Om Prakash Ors. v. Sunhari Devi (Smt.) Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 397, a similar question came up for consideration before this Court. There an application under Section 21 ((1)(a) of the present Act was filed by the landlords against the tenants on the ground that they bona fide ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39; or `wish'. The distinction between `desire' and `need' should doubtless be kept in mind. That does not, however, mean that even a genuine need should be treated as nothing more than a desire or wish. The connotation `need' or the word `requirement' should not be artificially expanded nor its language so unduly stretched or strained as to make it impossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for eviction. Such construction would defeat the very purpose of the Act, which affords facility of eviction of the tenant to the landlord on certain specified grounds. 44. In the case on hand, a finding had been recorded by the appellate authority that requirement of the landlords for doing business by Matloob Ahmad, husband of applicant No.6 was bona fide and genuine. Thus, the requirement of the landlords was established. The said finding stands today. The High Court by a cryptic order, without disturbing the said finding which was based on appreciation of evidence, set aside the order of eviction against the tenant, inter alia, observing that Matloob Ahmad was a `retired person' and was getting pension and was living in his village at a d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the High Court was not right in interfering with the order passed by the appellate authority and in dismissing the application of the landlords. The said order, therefore, deserves to be set aside and we do accordingly. 51. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is allowed. The order passed by the High Court is set aside and the order of eviction recorded by the appellant authority and the Additional District Judge III on 25th May, 2001 is restored. 52. The learned counsel for the tenants, at this stage, prayed for grant of time to vacate the suit shop stating that the tenant is doing business in the suit shop and if he is evicted immediately, enormous hardship would be caused to him. Prima facie, in our opinion, the learned counsel for the landlords is right in submitting that the tenant is not using the property. But on overall considerations, we are of the view that ends of justice would be met if we grant time upto March 31, 2009 on usual undertaking being filed by the respondents herein. Such undertaking shall be filed on affidavit within a period of four weeks from today, a copy of which should be given to the learned counsel for the appellants. 53. The appeal ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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