TMI Blog1979 (12) TMI 159X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... vision Bench of this Court where Mr. Soli Sorabjee, the Solicitor General of India, put in appearance on behalf of the respondent and raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeal. The preliminary objection raised by the Solicitor General was mainly on the ground that the order impugned being a purely interlocutory order within the meaning of s. 11(1) of the Act, no appeal lay to this Court. The Division Bench in view of the nature of the substantial question of law involved referred the case to a larger Bench even at the stage of preliminary hearing because if the. appeal was admitted for hearing, it would impliedly involve a decision on the question raised by the Solicitor General by way of a preliminary objection. We have heard the counsel for parties at very great length on the various aspects of the respective points of view put forward by the counsel for the parties. It is manifest that if the preliminary objection raised by the respondent finds favour then the appeal has to be dismissed in limine as being not maintainable. If, however, the preliminary objection is overruled and the contention of the appellant is accepted, the appeal will have to be a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... urces were considered by the Commission. ........................ 3. The recommendations of the Commission were examined carefully by 'he Government, keeping in view, among others, the following basic considerations:- (i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice; (ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to society; and (iii) The procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair-deal to the poorer sections of the community. The occasion has been availed of to consider and adopt where appropriate suggestions received from other quarters based on practical experience of investigation and the working to criminal courts. In addition to ensuring fair deal to the accused, separation as provided for in the Bill would ensure improvement in the quality and speed of disposal, as all Judicial Magistrates would be legally qualified and trained persons working under close supervision of the High Court. 5. Some of the more important changes proposed to be made with a view to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order' used in this sub-section relates to various stages of the trial? namely, appeal, inquiry, trial or any other proceeding. The object seems to be to cutdown the delays in stages through which a criminal case passes before it culminates in an acquittal, discharge or conviction. So far as the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is concerned, it has got a wide and diverse area of jurisdiction inasmuch as it regulates the procedure of trial not only of the large number of offences contained in the Indian Penal Code but also in other Acts and statutes which apply the Code of Criminal Procedure or which are statutes in pari material the Code. Having regard, therefore, to the very large ambit and range of the Code, the expression 'interlocutory order' would have to the given a broad meaning so as to achieve the object of the Act without disturbing or interfering with the fairness of the trial. Fortunately, however, there are a few decisions which have interpreted the expression 'interlocutory order' as appearing in s. 397(2) of the Code. Before we come to the decisions, certain features may be noticed here. In the first place, the concept of appeal against interlocu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... application under this section has been made by any person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them. Sub-section (3), however, does not limit at all the inherent power of the High Court contained in s. 482, as mentioned above. It merely curbs the revisional power given to the High Court or the Sessions Judge under s. 397(1) of the Code. We need not dilate on this aspect because we are not called upon to consider the interpretation of S. 397(3) of the Code, although in one of the cases cited before us this aspect has been gone into and that is why we have indicated the same. Mr. Mridul contended that as the Special Courts Act has fully applied the procedure of the Code to the trial of the offences by the Special Judge, the expression 'interlocutory order' has been used exactly in the same sense as in s. 397(2). In other words, the contention was that s. 11 of the Act is modelled on s. 397(2) of the Code by telescoping sub-section (2) of the said section into s. 11(1) of the Act. In support of his contention reliance was placed in the case of Amar Nath Ors. v. State of Haryana ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ision before the Additional Sessions Judge against the order of the Judicial Magistrate releasing the appellants but the revision petition was dismissed by the Judge. Thereafter the informant filed a regular complaint before the Judicial Magistrate against all the accused including the appellants. The learned Magistrate after having examined the complaint found that no case against the appellant was established. A further revision was taken up before the Sessions Judge who accepted the revision and directed further inquiry, on receipt of which the Magistrate issued summons to the appellants straightaway. Against this order the appellants went up in revision to the High Court which dismissed the petition in limine, obviously on the ground that the order passed by the Magistrate was an interlocutory one. That is how the matter came up by special leave before this Court. It would thus had been that before the stage of trial of the case reached the appellants had been released by the Magistrate who accepted the final report that no case was made against them. Even a complaint which was in the nature of a protest petition against the final report filed before the A Magistrate was also d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hich the aforesaid decision was rendered. The prosecution case was that in a press conference held at New Delhi on September '7, 1974, the appellant before the Supreme Court is said to have made certain statements and handed over a press hand-out containing allegedly some defamatory statements regarding Shri A. R. Antulay, the then Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra. The State Government decided to prosecute the appellant for an offence under s. 500 of the Indian Penal Code after obtaining the necessary sanction under s. 199(4) (a) of the Code. Armed with the sanction, the Public Prosecutor filed a complaint in the court of the Sessions Judge, Greater Bombay. The Sessions Judge took cognizance of the complaint and issued process against the appellant. At the time when the appellant was being heard in the Sessions Court, the allegation against him was resisted on three grounds- (1) that the court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offence without a formal commitment of the case to it; (2) that the sanction given was bad inasmuch as it was not given by the appointing authority; and (3) that the sanctioning authority had not applied i s E; m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Court and, on the other, it put a bar on the exercise of that power in relation to any interlocutory order. In such a situation it appears to us that the real intention of the legislature was not to equate the expression interlocutory order as invariably being converse of the words ''final order . There may be all order passed during the course of a Proceeding which may not he final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (Supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order- pure or simple. Some kinds of orders may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in subsection (2) of Section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of intermediate orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 131 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise the as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397 (2). xxx xxx xxx Yet for the reasons already alluded to, we feel no difficulty in coming to the conclusion, after due consideration, that all order rejecting, the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted, will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Maharashtra a show that it is wrong to say that at the stage of framing charges the court cannot apply its judicial mind to the consideration whether or no. there is any ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused. As observed in the latter case, the order framing a charge affects a person's liberty substantially and therefore it is the . A duty of the court to consider judicially whether the material warrants the framing of the charge. It cannot blindly accept the decision of the prosecution that the accused be asked to face a trial. Great stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the fact that the Court had observed that the stage of framing of charges was a very important matter because it affected a person's liberty substantially and, therefore, the Court should consider judicially whether the materials warrant framing of the charge. There can be absolutely no doubt regarding the correctness of the observations made by Chandrachud J. This decision, however, is no authority for holding that an order framing a charge is not an interlocutory order. In the aforesaid case, this Court was called upon to exercise its jurisdiction und ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ory order as contained in s. 397 (2) of the Code could not have arisen for consideration. Secondly, the decision was given on the scope and ambit of s. 251A of the Code of 1898 AS amended by the Act of 1958. Dealing with the scope of sub- sections (2) and (3) of s. 251A of the Code of 1898, this Court observed as follows:(1) The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the of offence by the accused is not supportable either on the, plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principal of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the mate rial on the record it must not blindly ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... whatsoever in considering the scope and ambit of s. 11: Appeal 11 . (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the supreme Court both on facts and on law. (2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of any judgment. sentence or order of a Special Court: Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period of thirty days. It was further contended that even if the non obstante clause was not there, the aim and object of the Act being speediest disposal of cases, cutting down all possible delay, the term 'interlocutory order' should be so interpreted so as to advance the object of the Act rather than retard it. As against this, Mr. Mridul, counsel for the appellant, submitted that the non obstante clause d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the Act which contains several clauses, the relevant portions of which may be extracted Thus: Whereas Commissions of Inquiry appointed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 have rendered reports disclosing the existence of prima facie evidence of offences committed by persons who held high public or political offices in the country and others connected with the com mission of such offences during the operation to the Proclamation of Emergency, dated the 25th June, 1975, issued under clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution: .. .. .. .. And Whereas the offences referred to in the recitals aforesaid were committed during the operation of the said Proclamation of Emergency, during which a grave emergency, was clamped on the whole country, civil liberties were curtailed to a great extent, important fundamental rights of the people were suspended, strict censorship was imposed on the press, judicial powers were severely crippled and the parliamentary democratic system emasculated; .. .. .. .. And whereas the ordinary criminal courts due to congestion of work and other reasons cannot reasonably be expected to bring those prosecutions to a speedy termination; ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ter such a declaration is made that the matter is brought before the Special Court, designated by the Central Government. It thus appears that before a case to the Court a three-tier system has already been adopted which eliminates any possibility of miscarriage of justice or any element of unfairness or foul play. Furthermore, although the Special Judge functions as a Sessions Judge for the purposes of the trial and follows a procedure provided for the trial of warrant cases, the fact remains that the Judge is a high judicial dignitary, being a sitting Judge not subordinate in any way to the Government. The Special Judge appointed, therefore, is a very experienced judicial officer who must be presumed to act in an extremely must and equitable manner keeping himself alive to the rules of natural justice and fair play. In fact, this Court has held in a number of cases: That where a power is vested in a very high authority, the abuse of the power is reduced to the minimum. In this connection, we may refer to two decisions of this Court. In the case of K. L. Gupta Ors. v. The Bombay Municipal Corporation Ors this Court observed as follows:- The fact that no appeal from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ge that can be corrected by this Court. Coming back now to the question at issue, the dominant purpose of the Act is to achieve not only speedy determination but a determination with the utmost despatch. We may refer to certain observations made by this Court while deciding the Presidential Reference in order to emphasise the most expeditious disposal of the case, a goal which the Act seeks to subserve. In In Re The Special Courts Bill, 1978,(1), Chandrachud, C.J. speaking for the Court observed as follows:- ....In relation to the objective mentioned in the sixth paragraph of the Preamble that it is imperative for the functioning of parliamentary democracy and the institutions created by or under the Constitution of India that the commission of such offences should be judicially determined with the utmost dispatch; and the latter in relation to their status, that is to say, in relation to the high public or political office held by them in India. .. .. .. .. If it be true, and we have to assume it to be true, that offences were committed by persons holding high public or political offices in India under cover of the declaration of emergency and in the name of democr ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ll impede the progress of the trial and delay the disposal of the case which is against the very spirit of the Act. We are of the opinion that it was for this purpose that a non obstante clause was put in s. ll of the Act so as to bar appeals against any interlocutory order whether it is of an intermediate nature or is quasi final. The Act applies only to specified number of cases which fulfil the conditions contained in the provisions of the Act and in view of its special features, the liberty of the, subject has been fully safeguarded by providing a three-tier system as indicated above. Let us now examine the scheme of the Act. Under s. 4 a Special Court is to take cognizance or try cases as are instituted before it or transferred to it as hereinafter provided. Section S provides that if the Central Government is of opinion that there is prima facie evidence of the commission of an offence and that in accordance with the guidelines contained in the Preamble, the said offence should be dealt with under this Act, the Central Government shall make a declaration to that effect. In other words, s. 5 imposes a further screening process by providing that the Central Government which ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ckest dispatch and an expeditious disposal of the case so as to cut down all delays which may be caused by providing for appeal against interlocutory orders also. As the non obstante clause expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we cannot call into aid the provisions of s. 397(2) of the Code which would amount to frustrating the very object which s. 11 seeks to advance. Mr. Mridul realising the force of the non obstante clause has submitted a very attractive and ingenious argument. In the first place, he submitted that as the Act does not provide for any revision against intermediate or quasi final orders. and as the object was to give a very fair trial to the accused, hence instead of a revision, an appeal has been provided. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument, which is not at all borne out by the plain language employed in s. 11 (1) . When the Act excludes the Code then it is obvious that it excludes an appeal against any type of an interlocutory order. The absence of revision is more than compensated by giving the accused a right of an appeal against any judgment or order of the Special Judge as of right and open on facts and law. Th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and any other Act only in so far as they regulate the conditions referred to therein. The observations of Das, J. clearly show that the effect of non obstante clause was to supersede the Indian Bar Councils Act and any other Act in so far as they regulate the conditions referred to therein, If we apply this test to the present case then it is manifest that the non obstante clause would have the effect of overriding and excluding the provisions of the Code. Applying the test laid down by Sastri, C. J., we find that the position may be summed up as follows. - (1) We should exclude the statute concerned from consideration. in the instant case 'The Code'; (2) We should construe the words used according to their natural and ordinary meaning instead of referring to the statute which is sought to be excluded. We entirely agree with the approach indicated by Sastri, C.J. and which is also binding on us. Let us see what is the effect of interpreting the non obstante clause according to the test laid down by the decision, referred to above, and particularly the observations of Sastri C. J. Let us for the time being forget the provisions of s. 397(2) of the Code or the- in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion (Cummins v. Herron, 4 Ch. D. 787); unless action was not thereby concluded.. But an order under the old R.S.C., ord. 25, r. 3, dismissing an action on a point of law raised by the pleadings was not 'final within the old Ord. 58, r. 3, because had the decisions been the other way the action would have proceeded. Halsbury's Laws of England (Third Edition, Vol. 22, pp. 743- 744) describes an interlocutory or final order thus: Interlocutory judgment or order: An order which does not deal with the final rights of the parties, but either (1) is made before judgment, and gives no final decision on the matters in dispute, but is merely on a matter of procedure, or (2) is made after judgment, and merely directs how the declarations of right already given in the final judgment are to be worked out, is termed 'interlocutory'. An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute, may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with which it deals..... In general a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed 'final'. At page 743 of the same volume, Blackstone says thus: Final judgments are such as at o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sum up, the essential attribute of an interlocutory order is that it merely decides some point or matter essential to the progress of the suit or collateral to the issues sought but not a final decision or judgment on the matter. in issue. An intermediate order is one which is made between the commencement of an action and the entry of the judgment. Untwalia J. in the case of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra (supra) clearly meant to convey that an order framing charge is not an interlocutory order but is an intermediate order as defined in the passage, extracted above, in Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 60. We find ourselves in complete agreement with the observations made in Corpus Juris Secundum. It is obvious that an order framing of the charge being an intermediate order falls squarely with in the ordinary and natural meaning of the term 'interlocutory order'. as used in s. 11(1) of the Act. Wharton's Law Lexicon (14th Edition, p. 529) defines interlocutory order thus: An interlocutory order or judgment is one made or given during the progress of an action, but which does not finally dispose of the rights of the parties. Thus, summing up the natural and log ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... his connection, he observed as follows: The question must depend on what would be the result of the decision of the Divisional Court, assuming it to be given in favour of either of the parties. If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purposes of these rules it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose Of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory. That is the rule which I suggested in the case of Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange, and which on the whole I think to be best rule for determining these questions; the rule which will be most easily understood and involves the fewest difficulties. In other words, the test adopted by Lord Esher in this case has been consistently followed by this Court in later cases and appears to us to contain the most valuable guidelines to judge whether an order is final or interlocutory. Applying this test to the present case it would follow that if the Special Judge did not frame a charge and discharged the accused, the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for the defendant. The question was whether an appeal lay to the Court of Appeal against the reference made by the arbitrator. In view of the peculiar circumstances of the case, Jessel, M. R. with whom Lord Lindley concurred, 'held that appeal lay as the order seeking the opinion of the court was not an interlocutory order. It is manifest that in this case the proceedings would have terminated. In any event if the case was referred back to the arbitrator, then the arbitrator would have to give his award and therefore the reference proceedings terminated. If, however, the reference was not made to the arbitrator, then the judgment was to be entered for the defendant. Thus, the order passed in this case undoubtedly could not be said to be an interlocutory order even in the widest sense of the term. At any rate, the preponderance of the authorities of the English Courts favour the view that an interlocutory order is one which finally disposes of the rights of the parties as observed by Lord Alverstone in the case of Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council, (supra) cited above. We might, however, state that although Lord Halsbury had expressed his dissent from Salaman v. Warne ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er agreed with Lord Evershed. This is rather important because even though the case was struck cut on the ground that the action was frivolous and proceedings were stayed, the order was treated to be an interlocutory one although it had decided k an important aspect of the case. In a recent decision in the ease of Salter Rex g Co. v. Ghosh, Lord Denning reviewed the entire case law on the subject and ultimately preferred the view taken by Lord Alverstone in Bozson's case (supra) and Lord Esher in Salaman's case. In other words, both the Salaman's and the Bozson's cases were endorsed by Lord Denning. In this connection, Lord Denning observed as follows :- There is a note in the Supreme Court Practice (1970) under R.S.C. Ord. 59, r. 4, from which it appears that different tests have been stated from time to time aS to what is final and what is interlocutory. In Standard Discount Co. v. La Grange [18771 3 C.P.D. 67 and Salaman v. Warner [1891] 1 Q.B. 734 Lord Esher M.R. said that the test was the nature of the application to the court: and not the nature of the order which the court eventually made. But in Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council [1903] 1 KB 547 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ally determined. Thus, it was pointed out that the concomitant of a final order would he the same whether it is a civil case or a criminal case and the definition given by the English Judges would apply to both. This case was noticed in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King which, in our opinion, is a leading case on the subject or, if we may say so, it is the locus classicus so far as the nature of an interlocutory order is concerned. In this case, Kania C.J. speaking for the Court referred to the decision of Sulaiman J. (supra) and also noticed the view of Lord Esher in Salaman v. Warner (supra) as also the view of Lord Alverstone and observed as follows: The question then is what is the meaning of judgment, decree or final order of a High Court in this section ? The expression final order has been judicially interpreted and its meaning is now well settled. After referring to a number of decisions the learned Chief Justice observed as follows:- The effect of those and other judgments is that an order is final if it finally disposes of the rights of the parties. The orders now under appeal do not finally dispose of those rights, but leave them to be determined by the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rd judgment or decree is used, whether it is preliminary or final, it means the declaration or final determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the Court. In criminal proceedings, an examination of the discussion in paras 260-64 of Vol. IX of Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edition) shows that the word judgement is intended to indicate the final order in a trial terminating in the conviction or acquittal of the accused In our opinion, the decisions of the Courts in India show that the word judgment , as in England, means the determination of the rights of the parties in the matter brought before the Court. Another important observation made by the Chief Justice which appears to be directly in point may be extracted thus: In our opinion, the term judgment itself indicates a judicial decision given on the merits of the dispute brought ' before the Court. In a criminal case it cannot cover a preliminary or interlocutory order. Thus, the Chief Justice clearly indicated that in a criminal case a final order cannot cover a preliminary or interlocutory order. Ultimately, the Chief Justice concluded by the following observations: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Gujarat where it was held that generally speaking a judgment order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. The English decisions as also the Federal Court decisions were referred to in this case and after considering the decisions, this court observed as follows : The meaning of the two words final and interlocutory has, therefore, to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose f-or which it is required. However, generally speaking, a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final....An interlocutory order, though not conclusive of the main dispute may be conclusive as to the subordinate matter with WHICH it deals ....If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order is undoubtedly a final one but if the suit is still left alive and has yet to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order.. This test was adopted in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King where the court also held that the words judgment and 'order' have the same meaning whether the proceeding is a civil or a criminal proceeding. In Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. v. Dominion of India the Federa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ory order as it does not terminate the proceedings but the trial goes on until it culminates in acquittal or conviction. It is true! that if the Special Court would have refused to frame charges and discharged the accused, the proceedings would have terminated but that is only one side of the picture. The other side of the picture is that if the Special Court refused to discharge the accused and framed charges against him, then the order would be interlocutory because the trial would still be alive. Mr. Mridul tried to repel the argument of the Solicitor General and explained the decisions, referred to above, on the ground that the English decisions as also the Federal Court's decisions made the observations while interpreting the provisions of the Government of India Act or the provisions of the Constitution where the word final order was expressly used. It was urged that the same construction would not apply to the present case where the word 'order' is not qualified - by the word 'final'. With due respect to the learned counsel, in our opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn is a distinction without and difference. This court as also the Federal Court h ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... as not right in acceding to the prayers of the accused. This decision, however, in our opinion, does not appear to be of 1. any assistance to the appellant for the reasons that we shall give here after. In the first place, the decision was rendered not on the provisions of the Code of 1973 but under the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Jammu Kashmir State which were quite different from the provisions of the Code of 1973 which does not apply to that State. Secondly, it would appear that the Criminal Procedure Code of 1872 (Act X of 1872) expressly contained a definition of the word trial which was defined thus: Trial means the proceedings taken in Court after a charge has been drawn up, and includes the punishment of the offender: It includes the proceedings under chapters XVI and XVIII, from the time when the accused appears in Court. Thus, the word 'trial' clearly meant the proceedings after charges had been drawn up and included even the punishment of the offender. Furthermore, the definition was wide enough even to include proceeding right from the time when the accused appeared in Court to the culmination of the proceedings. This def ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ainant in any case in which the complaint has been made by a Court. (2) The Magistrate shall ascertain, from the complainant Gr otherwise, the names of any persons likely to be acquainted with the facts of the case and to be able to give evidence for the prosecution, and shall summon to give evidence before himself such of them as he thinks necessary. 253. Discharge of accused-(1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 252 and making such examination (if any) of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary, he finds that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted , would warrant his conviction, he Magistrate shall discharge him. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case if for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate. he considers the charge to be groundless. 254. Charge to be framed when offence appears proved -If, when such evidence and examination have been taken and made, or at any previous stage of the case, the Magistrate is opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence tribal under this Chapter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... old any inquiry but only to find out as to whether a case put up before him is exclusively triable by a Sessions Court and once this is so, he is to send the case to the Court for trial. Thus, there being no inquiry as was the case in the Code of 1898, there is no room for acceptance of the argument of the counsel for the appellant that an inquiry precedes the trial in such a case. This contention, therefore. appears to be without substance. Realizing this difficulty, the learned counsel for the appellant, put forward an alternative argument, viz., that s. 238 of the Code itself consists of two separate stages one starting from s. 238 and ending up to s. 240 and the other starting from s. 242 and ending up to s. 248. We are, however, unable to agree with this argument because it appears that the enactment of s. 251A by virtue of the amendment of 1955 the words 'commencement of trial' were introduced for the first time which clearly denote that the trial starts in a warrant case right from the stage when the accused appears or is brought before the court. This appears to up to be the main intent and purpose of introducing the words 'commencement or trial' by the amen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 240 amount to a trial. the question of a pre-trial, as suggested by the counsel for the appellant, does not arise on a plain interpretation of the language of ss. 238 and 239 which were the-same as s. 251A under the Code of 1898 as amended by the Act of 1955. Similarly, counsel for the appellant drew analogy from the pro visions OF s. 476 to illustrate that the order in question was a final order. Section 476 appears in Chapter XXV of the Code of 1898 which is equivalent to Chapter XXVI of the Code. The Chapter relates to proceeding in a case of offence affecting the administration of justice. The provisions contained in this Chapter amount to a separate and independent proceeding which deals with specific offences affecting administration of justice. The relevant portion of s. 476 runs thus: 476. Procedure in cases mentioned in Section 195- (1) When any Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court is, whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in section 195, sub- section (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 476 the Magistrate ordered filing of a complaint against which an appeal was taken to the Additional Sessions Judge who held that the complaint was justified. A revision was taken to the High 1 Court which dismissed the revision. The High Court, however, gave a certificate under Art. 134(1) (c) and that is how the appeal came before this Court. It was in the background of these provisions that it was urged before this Court that the order passed by the High Court, not being final, the certificate ought not to have been given. This Court, however, pointed out that an order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory for another. The main question which arose in that case was whether the High Court could entertain a revision application against that order. This Court pointed out that as the appellant in that case filed a revision in respect of the complaint for the remaining offence under s. 205 read with s. 114, the order of dismissal dispose of the controversy between parties and the proceeding regarding the question as to whether the complaint in that regard was justified or not was not finally decided and the Court held that the order passed by the High Court in revision was ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are expressly excluded by the non obstante clause and therefore s. 397(2) of the Code cannot be called into aid in order to hold that the order impugned is not an interlocutory order. As the decisions of this Court in the cases of Madhu Limaye'(supra) and Amarnath Ors. v. State of Haryana Ors. (supra) were given with respect to the provisions of the Code, particularly s. 397(2), they were correctly decided and would have no application to the interpretation of s. 11(1) of the Act, which expressly excludes the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure by virtue of the non obstante clause. We feel that one reason why no appeal was provided against an interlocutory order like framing of the charges, as construed by us so far as the Act is concerned, may have been that it would be against the dignity and decorum of the very high status which the Special Judge under the Act enjoys in trying the case against an accused in that the Judge is a sitting Judge of a High Court and therefore must be presumed to frame the charges only after considering the various principles and guidelines laid down by other High Courts and this ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he Indian Penal Code read with ss. 5(1) (d) and 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 5(2) read with s. 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not an interlocutory order within the meaning of s. 11(1) of the Special Courts Act, 1979, hereinafter referred to as the Act. In order to appreciate the controversy, it will be proper to refer, briefly, to the relevant provisions of the Act and to those provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Code, which bear on it. Section 9 of the Act provides that a Special Court shall, in the trial of cases falling within its jurisdiction, follow the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of warrant cases before a magistrate. That procedure has been prescribed in Chapter XIX of the Code and, for convenience of reference I shall take it that wherever reference has been made to magistrate in that chapter it relates to the Judge of the Special Court. It is not disputed before us that the procedure mentioned under the rubric A.-Cases instituted on a police report has been followed by the Judge in making the impugned order. The procedure with which he has been concerned so far, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed and sentenced on that plea, or face the trial. So an order for the framing of the charge is a serious matter for the accused for he is thereafter no longer a free man as he is put to trial according to the procedure laid down in ss. 242 and 243, and consideration of the question whether he is to be acquitted or convicted is deferred until the case reaches the stage envisaged by s. 246. Unlike s. 9 of the Act which provides for following the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of cases referred to in s. 8, the Act does not provide that an appeal against the order of the Special Court shall be heard and decided according to the procedure laid down in the Code. Section 11 of the Act deals with appeals. Sub-section (3) of that section relates to the period of limitation for the filing of the appeal and is of no relevance for purposes of the present controversy. The rest of the section provides as follows,- 11.(1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. (2) Except as aforesaid no appeal or revision sh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 134(1)(c) of the Constitution. The State urged in this Court that the High Court's order dismissing the revision petition was not final as it did not determine the complaint filed by the Magistrate and did not decide the controversy whether the appellant had committed the offence. The trial had in fact still to begin. Article 134(1) (c) as it stood at that time provided that an appeal shall lie to this Court from, inter alia, any final order in a proceeding of the High Court if it certified that the case was a fit one for appeal. This Court referred to the decisions in S. Kuppuswami Rao v. The King, Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. and others v. Dominion of India and others,, State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungh Ramesh and another v. Seth Gondalal Motilal Patni and others, and other cases. It made a reference to Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd edition) volume 22, pages 742-743 and the four tests mentioned therein, including the test in Salaman v. Warner and others and observed as follows,- The question as to whether a judgment or an order is final or not has been the subject matter of a number of decisions; yet no single general test for finality has so far been laid d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wed by this Court in Parmeshwari Devi v. State and another (supra) to which one of us was a party. There, during the course of the trial of a criminal case, the complainant made an application under s. 94 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, praying that Smt. Parmeshwari Devi, who was not a party to the case, may be directed to produce a document. The Magistrate made an order summoning her with the document. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi professed ignorance of the document, and stated that as she was a pardanishin lady she may not be summoned by the Court. The Magistrate thereupon passed an order directing her to attend the court so that if she made a statement on oath that she was not in possession of the document, the court may get a chance to put her a few questions for satisfying itself regarding the whereabouts of the document. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi applied for revision of that order to the Sessions Court and the High Court, but to no avail. When she obtained special leave for appeal to this Court, it was argued that the Magistrate's order was interlocutory and the power of revision conferred by s. 397(1) of the Code could not be exercised in relation to it by virtue of sub- ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on against that order, but it was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge. He then filed a regular complaint before the Magistrate against all the accused, but is was also dismissed. The complainant again went in revision to the Sessions Judge and he remanded the case to the Magistrate for further enquiry. The Magistrate accordingly issued summons to the accused, who moved the High Court under ss. 397 and 482 of the Code for quashing the order of the Magistrate. The High Court dismissed the petition on the ground that as the order of the Magistrate was interlocutory, a revision to it was barred by sub-s. (2) of s. 397 and that consequently the case could not be taken up under s. 482. The matter came to this Court. It proceeded to examine the question whether the impugned order was interlocutory so as to justify the view that it was barred under sub-s. (2) of s. 397 and held as follows,- It seems to us that the term interlocutory order in s. 397(2) of the 1973 Code has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabiliti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... order for the framing of a charge against the accused in this case cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. The matter again came up for consideration in Madhu Limaye v. The State of Maharashtra where one of us was a member of the Bench which heard the case, and one of the other two Judges was a party to the decision in Amar Nath's case. The case arose on a complaint by the Public Prosecutor in the Court of Session, after obtaining sanction under s. 199(4) of the Code, as the alleged offence was under s. 500 I.P.C. for defaming a Minister. Process was issued against the accused. After the Chief Secretary had been examined to prove the sanction of the State Government, the accused filed an application for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the allegations were made in relation to what the Minister had done in his personal capacity and not as a Minister. The accused made two other contentions and challenged the legality and validity of the trial. The Sessions Judge rejected all the contentions and framed a charge under s. 500 I.P.C. The accused challenged that order by a revision petition to the High Court. A preliminary objection was raised there to the ma ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ring the course of a proceeding which may not be final in the sense noticed in Kuppuswami's case (supra), but, yet it may not be an interlocutory order- pure or simple. Some kinds of order may fall in between the two. By a rule of harmonious construction, we think that the bar in sub-section (2) of section 397 is not meant to be attracted to such kinds of interlocutory orders. They may not be final orders for the purposes of Article 134 of the Constitution, yet it would not be correct to characterise them as merely interlocutory orders within the meaning of section 397(2). It is neither advisable, nor possible, to make a catalogue of orders to demonstrate which kinds of orders would be merely, purely or simply interlocutory and which kinds of orders would be final and then to prepare an exhaustive list of those types of orders which will fall in between the two. The first two kinds are well- known and can be culled out from many decided cases. We may, however, indicate that the type of order with which we are concerned in this case, even though it may not be final in one sense, is surely not interlocutory so as to attract the bar of sub-section (2) of section 397. In our opinio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. (supra), on which considerable reliance has been placed by learned Solicitor General, while dealing with this Court's decisions mentioned above, and it will be sufficient to say that they have been adequately dealt with in those cases. They both relate to the right of appeal under s. 205(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 from, inter alia, any final order . In S. Kuppuswami Rao (supra) there were two preliminary objections, one on the ground that consent of the Government was necessary under s. 270(1) but was not obtained, and the other on the ground that the proceedings were against s. 197 Code of Criminal Procedure read with s. 271 of the Constitution Act. It appears that reliance was placed by their Lordships on Salaman's case, to which also I have made a reference; and in arriving at the decision in Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. case, reliance was placed on S. Kuppuswami Rao's. case for taking the view that the law on the point, so far as the Federal Court was concerned, seemed to have been well- settled . These two decisions cannot therefore avail the learned Solicitor General. So on looking up and seeing what has been decided o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... avour of the right, since they are remedial. Accordingly, the right will not be restricted or denied unless such a construction is unavoidable. In a few statutes, however, where the statute pertains to appeals from interlocutory orders, the rule of strict construction has been applied. But, there seems to be no real justification for this departure from the general rule in accord with which a liberal construction would be given by the court. Any doubt regarding the right of appeal should therefore be resolved in favour of the right. There is another reason for this view. Section 11 of the Act gives a right of appeal against any order of a Special Court, and not merely from its final order. The significance of such a dispensation came up for consideration in this Court in The Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi and it was observed by Fazal Ali J., after comparing the language of art. 136 of the Constitution, which, inter alia, provides for special leave to appeal to this Court from any order in any cause or matter passed or made by any court or tribunal, with the provision in arts. 132, 133 and 134 which provide for appeal from a final o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s not provide a right of appeal, s. 397 provides for a revision of the incorrect order. But a reading of the section shows that the revisional power cannot be invoked by the aggrieved party as of right, and all that it does is to empower the High Court or any Sessions Judge to call for and examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior criminal court for the purpose of satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, and as to the regularity of any proceeding of such inferior court. The revisional power is therefore discretionary and is, at any rate, not available to the aggrieved party as of right. Moreover the remedy by way of a revision petition has been hedged round with certain limitations and restrictions, whereas s. 11 ensures a right of appeal both on facts and on law . In fact what s. 11 of the Act does is to do away with the power of revision under the Code [sub-s. (2)], and to substitute for it an unlimited right of appeal against any judgment, sentence or order of the Special Court so long as the impugned order is not of an interlocutory nature. The aggrieved party has, thereby, really lost nothing t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ommitted by the accused ought to be dealt with under the Act. It has designated, under s. 6, Special Court No. 1, New Delhi, to be the court where the prosecution for the offence shall be instituted, and it is not disputed that that court has acquired the jurisdiction to try the accused for the offence in respect of which the declaration has been made. That court, as has been stated, is required to try the case by following the procedure prescribed by the Code for the trial of a warrant case before a magistrate. The accused appeared before the Judge of the Special Court, and it has not been disputed before us that the Judge followed the procedure laid down for cases instituted on a police report. He accordingly satisfied himself, as required by s. 238 of the Code, that he had complied with the provisions of s. 207 which require the supply to the accused of a copy of the police report and the other documents i.e., the first information report, statements recorded under s. 161(3) of all persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses, the confessions and statements (if any) recorded under s. 164 and any other document or relevant extract thereof forwarded with the p ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h order has been made and who is looking forward to an order of discharge, for, in so far as he is concerned, his argument that the charge against him is groundless has not been rejected and he has the expectation that he will not be put on trial at all. Reference in this connection may be made to Century Spinning and Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra where it has been held by this Court that an order framing a charge against the accused does substantially affect the person's liberty . The gravity of the charge and the responsibility of the court in that respect have been stated as follows in that case,- The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charge has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charge does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting author ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... porary injunction etc. To say that an appeal against an order directing the framing of a charge against the accused should be refused on the ground that such an order is interlocutory, is to misunderstand the meaning of an interlocutory order. After all, the question whether an order is final or interlocutory has not to be determined merely from the character of the proceedings in which it is entered, but from the character of the relief granted or refused. For instance, if i na given case a serious point of law relating to the bar of limitation, or the jurisdiction of the court, or a material irregularity in the procedure adopted by it, and/or the framing of a wholly untenable charge, is raised but is rejected by an order of the court dealing with the case, it does not require much argument to hold that it will certainly not be permissible to contend that such an order is interlocutory merely because its decision against the accused has not concluded the case. It will not therefore be permissible to contend that such an order is not revisable under the Code, or appealable under s. 11 of the Act, as the case may be. The dictionary meaning of interlocutory cannot be conclusive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ecial Court No. 1 set up under the Act, the order being an interlocutory order, is incompetent. The question that needs to be answered is: whether framing of charge in a trial conducted according to the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant case filed on a police report is an interlocutory order within the meaning of Sec. 11 (1) of the Act. If it is an interlocutory order, it cannot be gainsaid that the present appeal would be incompetent. Section 11 may be extracted: 11. (1) Notwithstanding anything in the Code, an appeal shall lie as of right from any judgment, sentence or order not being interlocutory order, of a Special Court to the Supreme Court both on facts and on law. (2) Except as aforesaid, no appeal or revision shall lie to any court from any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court. (3) Every appeal under this section shall be preferred within a period of thirty days from the date of any judgment, sentence or order of a Special Court: Provided that the Supreme Court may entertain any appeal after the expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ty of the parties (See Central Bank of India v. Gokal Chand A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 799). Every such interlocutory order may, for the time being, dispose of a particular point of controversy raised in the proceeding, yet nonetheless the order would be an interlocutory order unless by such an order the controversy between the parties is finally disposed of. Again, in legal parlance such an order finally disposing of a dispute between the parties would be a judgment in a civil proceeding. In a criminal proceeding when either the accused is acquitted or convicted and sentence is pronounced upon, the order would be a judgment disposing of case before the Court trying the accused. Till this situation is reached, a number of orders may have to be made, during the progress of adjudication of main dispute, such orders can appropriately and legally be styled as 'interlocutory order'. Where some facet or aspect of a controversy in the course of adjudication of the main dispute between the parties is disposed of by an order but the order has not the effect of finally disposing of the dispute which the parties brought to the court, the order would nonetheless be an interlocutory order and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ve suit in which the rights of the parties have still to be determined, no appeal lies against it. The fact that the order decides an important and even a vital issue is by itself not material. If the decision on an issue puts an end to the suit, the order will undoubtedly be a final one, but if the suit is still left alive and has got to be tried in the ordinary way, no finality could attach to the order. In the aforementioned two decisions Salaman v. Warner , Bozson v. Altrincham Urban District Council and Issac v. Salbstein were referred to and relied upon but it was urged that a different note was sounded by Lord Halsbury in the Bozson's case when he preferred the view expressed in Shubrook v. Tufnell (9 Q.B.D. 621) and therefore the aforesaid two decision particularly approving the ratio in the case of Ramchand Manjimal and Abdul Rahman would not provide a reliable test. It is not necessary to examine all the decisions in detail to find out whether there was some conflict in the view taken in the abovementioned decisions and one taken by Lord Halsbury in view of a recent decision in Salter Rex Co. v. Ghosh wherein Lord Denning after examining the earlier decisions an ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s in the circumstances of the present case, particularly having regard to what had preceded, was undoubtedly a matter of moment, and a valuable right of the appellants had been taken away by the Magistrate's passing an order prima facie in a mechanical fashion without applying his mind. We are, therefore, satisfied that the order impugned was one which was a matter of moment and which did involve a decision regarding the rights of the appellants. If the appellants were not summoned, then they could not have faced the trial at all, but by compelling the appellants to face a trial without proper application of mind cannot be held to be an interlocutory matter but one which decided a serious question as to the rights of the appellants to be put on trial. The test formulated by the Court was that any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order. The fact that the controversy still remains alive was considered irrelevant. The attention of the Court was not drawn to either Kuppuswamy's case or Mohammad Amin Brothers' case. In fact, the Court relied upon Mohan Lal Magan Lal T ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich will be over when complaint is filed and another independent one of a trial upon the complaint so filed. At any rate, a proceeding before the Magistrate commenced to find out whether it is expedient in the interest of justice to file a complaint concludes finally when an order directing the complaint to be filed is made and the statute provides for an appeal against such an order. After the complaint is filed, it cannot be urged that the complaint ought not to have been filed. The complaint would be tried in an ordinary way. Therefore, the first proceeding independent by itself, came to a final end and it is in this sense that the order was held final by this Court. Now, in Amar Nath's case the Magistrate directed a summon to be issued on a private complaint thereby taking cognizance of the case. The case had a zig zag journey. Earlier the Magistrate had declined to take cognizance and dismissed the complaint. As far as the accused were concerned, the matter came to an end. After the remand by the Sessions Judge in a revision application filed by the complainant, the Magistrate directed to issue the summons. In a way, the proceeding was reopened. It is in this context th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a Minister of the State and was defamed in discharge of his public function if the complaint in writing is made by the Public Prosecutor after obtaining sanction of the State Government. The application given by accused Madhu Limaye was that the Court of Sessions had no jurisdiction to entertain the complaint presented by the Public Prosecutor because the allegations were made against Shri Antulay, the then Law Minister, were in relation to what he had done in his personal capacity and not in his capacity of discharging his public functions as a Law Minister. It must, therefore, be clearly borne in mind that the challenge was to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the complaint. This will also be clear from what is stated in the judgment at page 751 that chiefly on the aforementioned ground and some other ground, the jurisdiction of the Court to proceed with the trial was challenged by the appellant. The Court negatived the challenge and framed the charges. Accused Madhu Limaye preferred a revision petition in the High Court which was dismissed, observing that the order sought to be revised was an interlocutory order not amenable to the revisional jurisdiction u/s 397 (1) of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... direction to the accused to file the original deed of dissolution of partnership, an attested copy of which was filed by accused No. 2 in the court. The accused contended that the original was not in their possession. The court made an order summoning Smt. Parmeshwari Devi to appear before the court with the document. She contended before the court that she did not know anything about the document and that she was a purdahnashin lady living in Calcutta and need not be summoned in the court. Her request was rejected and she was directed to forthwith attend the court and produce the document if it is in her possession. Smt. Parmeshwari Devi moved an application for revision before the Addl. Sessions Judge and then before the High Court, both of which were rejected. In her appeal to this court a contention was raised that the order of the Magistrate was an interlocutory order and the power of revision conferred by sub-sec (1) of Sec. 397 of the Code could not be exercised in relation to it by virtue of sub-section (2). This Court allowing the appeal held that 'the Code did not define an interlocutory order but obviously it is an intermediate order, made during the preliminary sta ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... parted from but the power of supervision sought to be constricted was widened by ascertaining a third class of orders, namely, intermediate orders which are neither interlocutory nor final. Having said this can it be said that framing of a charge is an order which would be something other than interlocutory. For that purpose, it is necessary to keep in view the procedure prescribed for trial of warrant cases instituted on a police report as contained in Part A of Chapter XIX of the Code. Sec. 238 provides that when in a warrant case instituted on a police report, the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, the Magistrate shall satisfy himself that he has complied with the provisions of s. 207 which casts an obligation on the Magistrate to furnish to the accused, free of cost, copies of the document therein set out. This is to be done at the commencement of the trial which would mean that when this statutory duty cast by s. 207 is performed by the Magistrate, the trial commences. The trial cannot commence unless the accused is furnished with copies of requisite documents. And the duty is cast on the Magistrate to ascertain at the commen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ated with the name of the law in which it is contained. The fact that the charge is made is equivalent to a statement that every legal condition required by law to constitute the offence charged was fulfilled in the particular case. It is thus an intimation or notice to the accused of what precise offence or what allegations of facts he is called upon to meet. The object of a charge is to warn an accused person of the case he is to answer. It cannot be treated as if it was a part of a ceremonial. (See B. N. Srikantiah Ors. v. The State of Mysore. If this be the purpose of the charge, reference to the provisions contained in Chapter XVII as to the various forms and modes of framing a charge or joinder of charges and joinder of persons to be tried at one trial are beside the point. The importance of framing the charge need not be overemphasised and that this should be shunned becomes apparent from the observations of Bose J. in William Elaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh which reads as under:- We see no reason for straining at the meaning of these plain and emphatic provisions unless ritual and form are to be regarded as of the essence in criminal trials. We are unable to fin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the conclusion that on framing the charge the inquiry anterior to trial of the case is concluded. Let it be recalled that the decision is under a Code which prescribed examination of witnesses prior to framing the charge and the word 'trial' was defined to mean the proceeding taken under the Code after a charge has been drawn up and included a punishment of the offender. The procedure is wholly omitted in the Code of 1974 and the stage of commencement of trial is specifically demarcated in sec. 238 and therefore this decision would not render any assistance in deciding the point under discussion. Merely because emphasis is laid on the court seriously applying its judicial mind at the stage of framing charge, and therefore, it can be said to be an important stage, the order framing the charge even after applying the ratio of the later decisions would not be an order other than an interlocutory order. It would unquestionably be an interlocutory order. If framing of a charges is an interlocutory order excluding the non-obstante clause, no appeal would be against such an order u/s 11 because there is a specific provision in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 11 that except as provided in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... als in the Code itself. It is necessary to bear in mind at this stage a fundamental fact. Unlike the provision contained in Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, either the present or the earlier one which ever provided for any appeal against any interlocutory order. The very concept of an appeal against an interlocutory order was wholly foreign to the Code of Criminal Procedure. There is an understandable difference between an appeal and a revision. Till the prohibition contained in s. 397(4) of the Code was enacted for the first time, interlocutory orders were amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the Sessions Court or the High Court under the Code of Criminal Procedure. But the notion or idea of an appeal against an interlocutory order in any Criminal Procedure Code was foreign to the Criminal Jurisprudence. If this was the statutory position at the time of enactment of the Act, it would be interesting to find out whether the Parliament wanted to make a redical departure by providing an appeal against every interlocutory order-a term which is wider than even an intermediate order as spelt out in the cases of Ama ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... inst under the Act should be concluded with utmost dispatch. Speedy termination of prosecutions is the heart and soul of the Act. The provisions of the Act should therefore receive such construction as would advance the object for which the Act is enacted and not stultify or frustrate the same. This is a well known canon of constriction and need not be embellished by any authority. It was, however, said on behalf of the appellant that by denying the accused a trial by ordinary courts a right to challenge an intermediate order by revision is denied to him and therefore in order to obviate any unfairness in procedure guaranteed by Art. 21 as interpreted in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India the expression 'interlocutory order' should receive such construction as would enable the appellant not to feel the tinge of denial of opportunity to seek correction of an order by a revision petition by enabling him to file an appeal u/s 11(1). This alleged apparent unfairness in procedure is utterly unreal because here the trial is by a sitting Judge of the High Court to be appointed with the concurrence of the Chief Justice of India. Such a highly placed judicial mind will pass interloc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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