TMI Blog1922 (2) TMI 1X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hips are of opinion that the case must be disposed of on a principle governing procedure which will appear presently. It is sufficient to state that Mrs. Forbes sold to the appellant her proprietary rights in the subject-matter of the suit, two villages called Mauza Kagsar and Mauza Jamni Kera, by a deed of sale on October 2, 1912. The price, ₹ 42,000, was paid, and the appellant took possession. Shortly afterwards the respondents other than Mrs. Forbes sued the appellant to set aside the sale and for a decree for possession of the former of the two Mauzas on payment of ₹ 15,000. They claimed that they were Gaur Brahmans by caste, and were occupancy tenants of that village and members of an agricultural tribe of the village with ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the defendant to adduce further evidence on the point, including the records of certain proceedings. In the result they allowed the appeal, holding that because the plaintiffs were not suing for themselves alone, but for themselves in conjunction with other persons, their claim to pre-emption was not maintainable. The plaintiffs then applied, under Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for a review of the judgment of the Division Bench, on the ground that the Division Bench ought not to have admitted the additional ground of appeal, and that the learned Judges were misled into holding that the facts found by them disentitled the plaintiffs to a decree. 3. The application for review came before the same Chief Court, n ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ill be observed that the question with which their Lordships have to deal is one concerned not with appeal to a Court of Appeal, but with review by the Court which had already disposed of the case. In England it is only under strictly limited circumstances that an application for such a review can be entertained. In India, however, provision has for long past been made by legislation for review in addition to appeal. But as the right is the creation of Indian statute law, it is necessary to see what such statutory law really allows. The law applicable to the present case is laid down by Order XLVII, Rule 1, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. This rule is enacted in the following terms:- Any person considering himself aggrieved, (a) by ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by absence from sitting. But this circumstance makes no difference to what is prescribed by Rule 5. It is clear that Wilberforce J. was precluded by the language from hearing the application, and this in itself would be a fatal objection to the judgment in review. The Court of Review had to be composed of Scott Smith J. alone, a circumstance not without importance for the larger considerations which follow. 7. But larger considerations present themselves. The Order re-enacts with important variations legislation on the subject of review which has been in operation for a long time past. 8. If their Lordships felt themselves at liberty to construe the language of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, without reference to it ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appears plain from the decision in Charles Bright Go. Limited v. Seller [1904] 1 K.B. 6 where the Court of Appeal discussed the history of the procedure in England and explained its limits. 9. Turning first to the earlier forms assumed in Indian legislation on the matter in question, their Lordships observe that the Bengal Regulation XXVI of 1814, by Section 2, confers on the Courts there mentioned a power of review analogous to that under consideration. excepting that the expression otherwise requisite for the ends of justice is added, an expression which may have been regarded as enlarging the scope of the word sufficient, used as it, was in much the same way as in the present Code. The expression requisite for the ends of justi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... remaining unaltered. But their Lordships are unable to assume that the language used in the Codes of 1877 and 1908 is intended to leave open the questions which were raised on the language used in the earlier legislation. They think that Rule 1 of Order XLVII must be read as in itself definitive of the limits within which review is today permitted, and that reference to practice under former and different statutes is misleading. So construing it they interpret the words any other sufficient reason as meaning a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified immediately previously. Such an interpretation excludes from the power of review conferred the course taken by the second and third Division Benches, composed of Wil ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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