TMI Blog2001 (10) TMI 1154X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... shed. An FIR was registered in 1991 for the offence under Section 3 of the Railway Property (Unlawful Possession) Act, 1966, (for short the RPUP Act). An inquiry was conducted under Section 8 of the said Act and on completion of the inquiry a complaint was filed in the court of a judicial magistrate of First Class on 13.1.1992. The magistrate took cognizance of the offence and issued proceedings against four persons arrayed in the complaint including the respondents in this appeal. Thereafter, the case passed through many vicissitudes. On 5.1.1998, the respondent moved an application in the trial court praying that they may be discharged. The magistrate rejected the application and the said order of the magistrate was challenged before t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ir counter affidavit, did not dispute. The complaint was filed on 13.1.1992 and process was issued against the four accused arrayed therein. First respondent thereafter moved the Sessions Court in revision by challenging the order by which the magistrate took cognizance of the offence. Despite the legal position casting burden of proof on the person who is found in possession of railway property, the Sessions Judge had quashed the criminal proceedings on 29.5.1992. The State thereupon moved the High Court in challenge of the said order of the Sessions Judge. On 1.4.1994, the High Court overturned the said order of the Sessions Court. The next stage should have commenced in the trial court soon after the receipt of the records from the Hi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t dismiss the plea for a discharge. The High Court did not consider the case from the angle provided in Section 245 of the Code. As extracted above, the High Court was persuaded to discharge the accused only on the ground that the case was pending for the last seven years. The ideal situation is to have criminal proceedings completed swiftly. But the ideal is far from practical attainment due to a variety of reasons. If one has to abide by the ideal alone, then any period of delay is enough to axe down the criminal proceedings. In Seeta Hemchandra Shashittal vs. State of Maharashtra {2001 (4) SCC 525} this Court made the following observations: This Court has emphasised, time and again, the need for speeding up the trial as undue delay i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aspect to show that the offence now pitted against the respondents is serious in nature. Learned counsel for the respondents invited our attention to the decision of this Court in Rajiv Gupta vs. State of H.P. {2000 (1) SCC 68}. In paragraph 7 of the said judgment learned Judges pointed out that if the trial of a case for an offence punishable with imprisonment up to three years has been pending for more than two years without commencing the trial the criminal court is required to discharge and acquit the accused. As indicated by this Court in Common Cause vs. Union of India {1996 (6) SCC 775}, it is apparent that the said decision has no application to the facts of this case. In the present case, cause of the delay is mostly due to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
