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1994 (9) TMI 2

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..... uestion is whether the rule is attracted to all proceedings pending at its enactment. The said rule 1BB concerns the mode of valuation of house property wholly or mainly used for residential purposes for the purposes of ascertaining the net wealth under the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. Section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act is the charging section. It seeks to bring to charge for every assessment year the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undivided family and company. The expression "net wealth" is defined in section 2(m) of the Act. Section 2(q) defines "valuation date". Section 4 enumerates the assets to be included in computing "net wealth". Sections 5 and 6 exempt certain assets in India and outside from being included in computing the net wealth. Section 7-and this provision is of particular relevance here-speaks of how the value of the assets has to be determined. Section 7(1), as it stood during the relevant period, i.e., prior to April 1, 1989, when it stood substituted by the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1989, with effect from April 1, 1989, provided: " 7. (1) Subject to any rules made in this behalf the value of any asset other than cas .....

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..... some delays in filing them. We condone the delays. We grant special leave in the special leave petitions. We may here refer to the facts of Civil Appeals Nos. 3563-64 of 1993 which are representative of the batch. The Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Gujarat-IV, Ahmedabad, assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated December 21, 1989 of the Gujarat High Court in Wealth-tax Reference No. 15 of 1987. The assessment years are 1977-78 and 1978-79, respectively. Assessments were made on February 8, 1983, by which time rule 1BB had been introduced into the Rules. The assessee, a Hindu undivided family, contends that its immovable properties be valued by applying the the said rule 1BB even though the assessments in question pertain to the orders prior to April 1, 1979, on which date the said rule came into force. The Wealth-tax Officer rejected this claim and proceeded to value the immovable properties independently of this said rule 1BB. The appeals preferred by the assessee before the Commissioner of Wealth-tax (Appeals) were allowed and the appellate authority held in favour of the applicability of rule 1BB. The appeals of the Revenue before the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, .....

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..... or creating any new obligation. . . ." Again in CWT v. Niranjan Narottam [1988] 173 ITR 693, the Gujarat High Court followed Kasturbhai Mayabhai's case [1987] 164 ITR 107 (Guj). The decision of the High Court in Kasturbhai Mayabhai's case is also under appeal in the present batch of appeals. A similar view has been taken by the Karnataka High Court in CWT v. Vidyavathi Kapur [1984] 150 ITR 319; the Madhya Pradesh High Court in CWT v. Lachmandas Bhatia [1987] 163 ITR 586; the Delhi High Court in CWT v. O. P. Tandon [1992] 195 ITR 688; the Calcutta High Court in Smt. Manjushree Biswas v. CWT [1988] 171 ITR 348 and Dilip Kumar Mitra v. CWT [1993] 200 ITR 336. The basis of distinction between statutes affecting rights and those affecting merely procedure is well-recognised. Dixon C. J. in Maxwell v. Murphy [1957] 96 CLR 261 at 267 drawing upon the following words of Lord Justice Mellish in Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger [1876] 3 Ch. D. 62 (CA) at 69, said: "No suitor has any vested interest in the course of procedure, nor any right to complain, if during the litigation the procedure is changed, provided, of course, that no injustice is done." It is true that if one traces .....

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..... . The latter regulates the conduct and relations of courts and litigants in respect of the litigation itself; the former determines their conduct and relations in respect of the matters litigated." ". . . . What facts constitute a wrong is determined by the substantive law; what facts constitute proof of a wrong is a question of procedure . . . ." "So far as the administration of justice is concerned with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law defines the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of the one to the other." In Izhar Ahmad Khan v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 1052 ; [1962] Suppl. 3 SCR 235 at 251, it is observed (at page 1059 of AIR 1962 SC): "The division of law into two broad categories of substantive law and procedural law is well-known. Broadly stated, whereas substantive law defines and provides for rights, duties and liabilities, it is the function of the procedural law to deal with the application of substantive law to particular cases and it goes without saying that the law of evidence is a part of the law of procedure." In Kesoram Industries and .....

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..... f all procedural rules is to enable justice to be done between the parties consistently with the public interest'." In Jose Da Costa v. Bascora Sadashiva Sinai Narcornin, AIR 1975 SC 1843; [1976] 2 SCC 917 at 925, this court laid down as follows (at page 1849 of AIR 1975 SC): "Before ascertaining the effect of the enactments aforesaid passed by the Central Legislature on pending suits or appeals, it would be appropriate to bear in mind two well-established principles. The first is that 'while provisions of a statute dealing merely with matters of procedure may properly, unless that construction be textually inadmissible, have retrospective effect attributed to them, provisions which touch a right in existence at the passing of the statute are not to be applied retrospectively in the absence of express enactment or necessary intendment' (See Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd. v. ITC, AIR 1927 PC 242). The second is that a right of appeal being a substantive right the institution of a suit carries with it the implication that all successive appeals available under the law then in force would be preserved to the parties to the suit throughout the rest of the career of the su .....

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