TMI Blog1961 (4) TMI 106X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ever mention that though the constitutional objection, adverted to is common to all the three petitions, it is sufficient to refer to the facts of the case in Writ Petition No. 67 of 1959 which is typical of the cases before us. The petitioner-Jyoti Pershad-is the owner of a house in Delhi in which respondents 3 to 11 were tenants. Each of these nine individuals occupied a single room in this house. As the petitioner considered the house to be old and required to be demolished and reconstructed, he submitted a plan to the Council of the Delhi Municipal Committee and applied for sanction for the reconstruction of the house. The plan was sanctioned and thereafter the petitioner filed suits against these nine tenants under s. 13(1)(g) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 38 of 1952 (which will hereafter be referred to as the Rent Control Act). The suits were resisted by the tenants. Two matters had to be proved under s. 13(1)(g) of the Rent Control Act by a plaintiff before he could obtain an order of eviction:(i) that there was a plan which had been sanctioned by the municipal authorities which made, provision for the tenants then in occupation of the house being accommodated i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 4 of the Rent Control Act to the Senior Sub-Judge, Delhi. These appeals were finally disposed of against the tenant-appellants, some on the merits and some by reason of abatement, by the end of October, 1957. Under the rules governing the construction of houses on plans sanctioned by the Delhi Municipal Com- mittee, the sanctioned building had to be completed within a period of one year from the date of sanction. As a result of this rule the sanction obtained by the petitioner lapsed and he had, therefore, to obtain fresh sanction if in consequence of his success in the appeals before the Senior Sub-Judge he still desired to demolish and reconstruct the building. Meanwhile, two changes came about in the law governing matters relevant to the present case: The first was that the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 96 of 1956, which will be hereafter referred to as the Act, was enacted by Parliament and came into force in the Delhi area. Section 19 of that Act which is impugned in these petitions runs: 19. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no person who has obtained any decree or order for the eviction of a tenant from a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... petent authority by his order dated January 13, 1958 on the ground that the sanction to reconstruct the building which the petitioner had obtained from the municipality in 1956 had expired. The order recited: since it may take some time for the petitioner to obtain fresh sanction for reconstruction and there is also the possibility of sanction not being given at all, it would be no use continuing with these proceedings until it is definitely known that the landlord has obtained sanction for reconstruction. These nine applications are accordingly filed with the option to the petitioner to have them revived without payment of extra fee in case he is able to obtain sanction. Thereafter the petitioner applied to the municipal authorities for sanctioning a building plan. As stated earlier, the building plan approved by the municipality could permit only a building consisting of one floor in which there were three living rooms and sanction for the construction of a building with such accommodation was granted. With this sanctioned plan, the petitioner renewed his application under s. 19 for permission to execute the decree of the Civil Court and evict the tenants. By order dated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r as it enabled the competent authority to withhold permission to those who had obtained decrees for eviction from executing their decrees, unconstitutional, it would be necessary to read the material provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1952, which imposes a restriction on the right of landlords, inter alia to evict tenants from the premises occupied by them. Chapter III of that Act imposes a control over the eviction of tenants. A tenant is defined (Vide s. 2(j)) as meaning any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises including such sub-tenants or others who have derived title under the tenant under the provisions of any law before the commencement of the Act. Section 13(1) enacts: Notwithstanding anything to the contrary con- tained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated): . This blanket protection is, however, subject to the conditions enumerated in the proviso which reads: Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding f ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ts of a landlord-decreeholder who had satisfied the requirements of the Rent Control Act before obtaining his decree that was stated as amounting to an unreasonable restriction on the right to hold property guaranteed by Art. 19(1)(f). This will be a convenient stage at which we might set out in brief outline the argument urged by learned Counsel for the petitioner. They were mainly three: (1) Section 19(3) of the Act vests an unguided, unfettered and uncontrolled power in an executive officer to withhold permission to execute a decree which a landlord has obtained after satisfying the reasonable requirements of the law as enacted in the Rent Control Act. Neither s. 19 of the Act nor any other provision of the Act indicates the grounds on which the competent authority might grant or withhold permission to execute decrees and the power conferred is, therefore, arbitrary and offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. (2) The same point was urged in a slightly different form by saying that the Power conferred on the competent authority by s. 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative power and was, therefore, unconstitutional. (3) The vesting of a power in an executive ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... down. (2) The enactment or the rule might not in terms enact a discriminatory rule of law but might enable an unequal or discriminatory treatment to be accorded to persons or things similarly situated. This would happen when the legislature vests a discretion in an authority, be it the Government or an administrative official acting either as an executive officer or even in a quasi-judicial capacity by a legislation which does not lay down any policy or disclose any tangible or intelligible purpose, thus clothing the authority with unguided and arbitrary powers enabling it to discriminate. The legislature must declare the policy of the law and the legal principles which are to control any given cases and must provide a standard to guide the officials or the body in power to execute the law. The essential legislative function consists in the determination or choice of the legislative policy and of formally enacting that policy into a binding rule of conduct. [Harishankar Bagla v. The State of Madhya Pradesh [1955] 1 S.C.R. 380, 388]. No rules have been framed and no directions given on these matters to regulate or guide the discretion of the licensing officer. Practical ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he rule as to equal protection, that the rules for the guidance of the designated authority, which is to exercise the power or which is vested with the discretion, should be laid down in express terms in the statutory provision itself. The Saurashtra case would seem to lay down the A principle that if the impugned legislation indicates the policy which inspired it and the object which it seeks to attain, the mere fact that the legislation does not itself make a complete and precise classification of the persons or things to which it is to be applied, but leaves tile selective application of the law to be made by the standard indicated or the underlying policy and object disclosed is not a suffi- cient ground for condemning it as arbitrary and, therefore, obnoxious to article 14. [Kedar Nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal [1934] S. C. R. 30, 46]. So long as the policy is laid down and a standard established by a statute, no unconstitutional delegation of legislative power is involved in leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of subordinate rules within prescribed limits and the deter- mination of facts to which the policy as declared by the Legislature is to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d by the statute but on the ground of the same being ultra vires as not being sanctioned or authorized by the enactment itself. The situation in such cases would be parallel to the tests to be applied for determining the validity of rules made under statutes which enable the rule-making authority to enact subsidiary legislation to carry out the purposes of the Act . The criteria to be applied to determine the validity of such rules could, in our opinion, be appropriately applied to determine the validity of the action under the provisions like the one dealt with under the last two heads. In the light of what we have stated above we have now to consider the point urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the Act has vested in the competent authority the power to withhold eviction in pursuance of orders or decrees of Courts with- out affording any guidance or laying down any principles for his guidance on the basis of which he could exercise his discretion. In other words, that the Act lays no fetters and has vested in him an arbitrary and unguided power to pick and choose the decree- holders to whom he would permit execution and those to whom he would refuse such reli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the entire building. In the latter case certainly the occupants of the building would have to be evicted and the building vacated and power is conferred for effectuating this purpose vide s. 7 (1) and 7 (3). It might be that the whole area might consist of dwellings of the type which require demolition and it is Chapter IV that makes provision for this category of cases which is headed Slum Clearance and Re- development . In such cases the buildings in the entire area are to be ordered to be demolished, and in that event the dwellers would, of course, have to vacate, but it is presumed that alternative accommodation would necessarily have to be provided before any such order is made. The process would have to be carried out in an orderly fashion if the purpose of the Act is to be fulfilled and the policy behind it, viz., the establishment of slum dwellers in healthier and more comfortable tenements so as to improve the health and morals of the community, is to be achieved. Chapter V makes provision for the acquisition of land in order to compass the re-development of slum areas into healthy parts of the city, by providing amenities and more substantial and better accommodation ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not last for ever but to a limited period, though this could not naturally be defined by reference to fixed dates. We see force in this submission as well. In view of the foregoing we consider that there is enough guidance to the competent authority in the use of his discretion under s. 19(1) of the Act and we, therefore, reject the contention that s. 19 is obnoxious to the equal protection of laws guaranteed by Art. 14 of the Constitution. We need only add that it was not, and could not be, disputed that the guidance which we have hold could be derived from the enactment, and that it bears a reasonable and rational relationship to the object to be attained by the Act and, in fact, would fulfil the purpose which the law seeks to achieve, viz., the orderly elimination of slums, with interim protection for the slum dwellers until they were moved into better dwellings. We are further of the opinion that the order of the competent authority in the present case is not open to challenge either, because it would be seen that the grounds upon which he has rejected the petitioner's application for execution is in line with what we have stated to be the policy and purpose of the Act. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... h administering the law, affords no basis either for the contention that there has been an excessive delegation of legislative power as to amount to an abdication of its functions, or that the discretion vested is uncanalised and unguided as to amount to a carte blanche to discriminate. The second is that if the power or discretion has been conferred in a manner which is legal and constitutional, the fact that Parliament could possibly have made more detailed provisions, could obviously not be a ground for invalidating the law. The next point argued by learned Counsel for the petitioner was that the power conferred on the competent authority by s. 19(3) of the Act was an excessive delegation of legislative power. As we have pointed out earlier, this submission is really another form, or rather another aspect of the objection based on the grant of an unfettered discretion or power which we have just now dealt with. It is needless to repeat, that so long as the legislature indicates its purpose and lays down the policy it is not necessary that every detail of the application of the law to particular cases should be laid down in the enactment itself. The reasons assigned for repell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... orm of presenting the case of the objection under Art. 14, and what we have said in dealing with the first point of the learned Counsel would answer this portion of the objection. There are, however, a few more matters which have relevance about the objection on the score of the restriction not being reasonable within Art. 19(5) and the tests to be applied to determining its reasonableness to which we should refer. It has already been pointed out that the restrictions imposed on the right of the landlord to evict have a reasonable and rational connection with the object sought to be achieved by the Act, viz., the ultimate elimination of slums with protection to the slum-dwellers from being meanwhile thrown out on the streets. The question might still remain whether this restriction on the rights of the landlords is excessive in the sense that it invades and trenches on their rights in a manner or to an extent not really or strictly necessary to afford protection to the reasonable needs of the slum-dwellers which it is the aim and object of the legislation to subserve. The criteria for determining the degree of restriction on the right to hold property which would be considered reas ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mpetent authority is unguided and that he had an unfettered and arbitrary authority to exercise his discretion at his sweet-will and pleasure the existence of a provision for appeals might not impart validity to such legislation. The reason for this is that the appellate power would be subject to the same vice as the power of the original authority and the imposition of one sweet-will and pleasure over another of a lower authority, would not prevent discrimination or render the restriction reasonable. But if, as we have held earlier, the Act by its preamble and by its provisions does afford a guidance to the competent authority by pointing out the manner in which the discretion vested in him should be exercised, the provision as to an appeal assumes a different significance. In such cases, if the competent authority oversteps the limits of his powers or ignores the policy behind the Act and acts contrary to its declared intention, the appellate authority could be invoked to step in and correct the error. It would, therefore, be a provision for doubly safeguarding that the policy of the Act is carried out and not ignored in each and every case that comes up before the com ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Learned Counsel next drew our attention to s. 38 of the Rent Control Act which reads: The provisions of this Act and of the rules made thereunder shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. If this section stood alone, the argument of learned Counsel that by reason of the width and sweep of its language, even a special legislation, such as the Act was comprehended within the non obstante provision would have required serious consideration, but that has been rendered unnecessary, because even apart from s. 19 of the Act which opens with the words: Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for tile time being in force , s. 39 of the Act also contains a non obstante clause on the same lines as s. 38 of the Rent Control Act. The result therefore would be that the provisions of the special enactment, as the Act is, will in respect of the buildings in areas declared slum areas operate in addition to the Rent Control Act. The argument therefore that the Act is inapplicable to buildings covered by the Rent Control Act is without subst ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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