TMI Blog1998 (2) TMI 601X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of the tenancy. The tenancy was terminated by the respondent in that appeal by notice dated 3.11.1981. The suit for possession was filed on 24.9.83. 3. Both suits were tried along with other suits against tenants of other shops on similar facts by the Senior Sub Judge, Sonepat. In all the suits, the defendants/tenants raised several contentions including challenge to the title of the plaintiffs and the quantum of rent. All the issues were answered in favour of the plaintiffs and decrees were passed on 8.12.88. Appeals in the Court of Additional District Judge suffered dismissal on 26.10.89. Second appeals were dismissed in limine by the High Court with 'one word orders'. It is only these two appellants who have come to this Court. An attempt had been made to canvass all the findings of Courts below but as they are factual and supported by evidence on record we have no difficulty in rejecting the same. 4. The only question which has been argued at length and survives for our consideration is the one set out in the beginning. The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent Eviction) Act, hereinafter referred to as `The Act' came into force on April 25,1973. It is an Act to co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ree as the bar in Section 13 (1) is absolute. In support of this contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on some of the rulings of this Court which will be adverted to a little later. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents has placed before us the following proposition: a) On the date when the suit was instituted it was to enforce a legal right which had already accrued to the plaintiff and stood crystallized under the law applicable to the building at that time. In the absence of any specific provision in the Act to deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to determine the issue pertaining to that right, it cannot be contended that by efflux of ten year period mentioned in Section 1 (3) the Court would lose its jurisdiction. b) The maxim ubi jus ubi remedium can be excluded only by a substantive legislation expressly extinguishing the said right. The Act does not contain any such provision to bring to an end the right of the plaintiff which had already accrued and put in issue in the suit. A judicial vacuum cannot be created by preventing the Court from deciding an issue which has arisen before it unless the right which had accrued in favour of one ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... o no provision preventing the execution of a decree passed in such a suit. Section 13 (1) does not expressly refer to execution of a decree for possession. On a reading of all the provisions of the Act, it is evident that it has not prevented a civil court from adjudicating the rights accrued and the liabilities incurred prior to the date on which the Act became applicable to the building in question. If the Legislature had intended to take away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide a suit which had b een validly instituted, it would have been worded differently. The purpose for which the exemption is granted statutorily under Section 1 (3) is to encourage construction of new buildings. That purpose would be defeated if the owner of the building is deprived of his right to get possession of the building unless he gets a decree within a period of ten years from the date of its completion. In fact the logical consequence of the argument of the appellants if accepted would be that even if a decree is obtained by the landlord within ten years from its completion it cannot be executed after the expiry of the said period of ten years as such execution would not be in accordance w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... suit must end in a decree though that decree may be passed subsequent to the expiry of five years during which exemption form the application of the Section had been granted. 10. In Shri RamSaroop Rai Versus Smt. Lilavati (1980) 3 S.C.C. 452 while dealing with a case under the U.P. Urban Building (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act 1972, Justice Krishna Iyer referred to the object of exemption from the applicability of the Act in the following words: Chronic scarcity of maccommodation in almost every part of the country had made `eviction' litigation explosively considerable, and the strict protection against ejectment, save upon restricted grounds, had b ecome the policy of the State. Rent control legislation to give effect to this policy exists everywhere, and we are concerned with one such in the State of U.P (U.P Act 13 of 1972). The legislature found that rent control law has a chilling effect on new building constructions, an d so, to encourage more building operations, amended the statute to release from the shackles of legislative restriction, ` new construction' for a period of ten years. So much so, a landlord who had let out his new building co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ight direction. The provision for exemption from the operation of the Rent Control Legislation by way of incentive to persons with means to construct n ew houses h as been made in Section 1 (3) of the Act by the Legislature in the legitimate hope t hat construction of new buildings will ultimately result in mitigation of the hardship of the tenants. Such incentive has a clear nexus with the object to be achieved and cannot be considered to be unreasonable or arbitrary. Any such incentive offered for the purpose of construction of new buildings with the object of easing the situation of scarcity of accommodation for ameliorating the conditions in the tenants, cannot be said to be unreasonable, provided the nature and character of the incentive and the measure of exemption allowed are not otherwise unreasonable and arbitrary. The exemption to be allowed must be for a reasonable and definite period. An exemption for an indefinite period or a period which in the facts and circumstances of any particular case may be considered to be unduly long, may be held to be arbitrary. The exemption must necessarily be effective from a particular date and must be with the object of promoting new co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Union of India Ors, 1989 2 S.C.R. 1005 the suits were filed during the period of exemption of five years under the Notification issued under East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act 1949. Wh en the period of five years expired during the pendency of the suit, the tenants raised objections on the ground that the suit could not be decreed in view of Section 13 of the Act. The contention was rejected by the Bench of Three Judges. Referring to the provisions of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act and the Notification made thereunder the Court said: The emphasis is on the institution of the suit within the period of exemption of five years. Once the landlord institutes a suit before the expiry of the period of exemption, the decree even if passed after the period of five years will not be subject to the provisions of Section 13 of the Act. This is the true meaning of t he Notification. The Notification does not enlarge the period of exemption instead it safeguards t he rights of the parties it safeguards the rights of the parties which crystallise on the date of institution of the suit. The Court proceeded to trace the case law on the subject and rejected the sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... isions subsequent thereto have held that Vineet Kumar is not good law. We have already construed the relevant provisions of the Act which prevents the civil court from continuing the suit and passing a decree which could be executed. 21. Learned counsel for the appellants attempted to make a distinction between the provisions of the Section 20 of the U.P. Act and Section 13 of the present Act. The wording in the former is as follows: .1m20 Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shall be instituted for the eviction of a tenant from a building, notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy b y efflux of time or on the expiration of a notice to quit or in any other manner' According to the learned counsel bar against the institution of a suit would stand on a different footing from bar against eviction as such which is contained in Section 13 of the Act. In our opinion the difference in language does not help t he appellants ion any manner. We have already pointed out that Section 13 of the Act does not make any reference to a decree passed in a civil suit. When a suit is validly instituted and the rights of parties which had crystallised ont eh date of the suit are d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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