TMI Blog1977 (8) TMI 4X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ith the aid of her personal assets, entered into a partnership with her father-in-law, Gur Narain Khanna, in the name and style of Gur Narain Jagat Narain Co. Her minor son, Ravi Narain Khanna, was admitted to the benefits of that partnership. Each of the three partners had a one-third share in the profits of the partnership, while the appellant and her father-in-law had an equal share in the losses. The firm owned two cinema houses: Nishat Talkies, Kanpur, and Novelty Talkies, Lucknow. Separate accounts were maintained in respect of the two businesses and separate profit and loss accounts used to be drawn up. On August 31, 1961, a sum of Rs. 67,284.57 stood to the credit of the appellant in the books of Nishat Talkies. That amount consisted of a sum of Rs. 16,666.67 in the capital account and Rs. 50,617.90 in the current account. On September 1, 1961, the appellant made a sworn declaration stating that she was the sole and absolute owner of the amounts standing to her credit in the books of Nishat Talkies and of her share in that business and declaring unequivocally her intention to treat both her capital and her share in the business of Nishat Talkies as the joint family ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rty and, therefore, there was no joint family stock in which the appellant could throw her separate property. In a further appeal, the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal accepted the appellant's contention, holding that there was no justification for discriminating against a Hindu female on the ground of sex and that there was no reason why a Hindu female who was a member of an undivided family could not, by an unequivocal expression of intention, impress her separate property with the character of joint family property. The Tribunal observed that the appellant was not trying to enlarge her rights under the Hindu law or to improve her status under that law by abandoning her exclusive right in her self-acquired property. Surrender of interest by a female was not, according to the Tribunal, foreign to the genius of Hindu law and, therefore, no restriction could be placed on a female's right to abandon her exclusive interest in favour of the joint family of which she was a member. At the instance of the revenue, the Tribunal referred for the opinion of the Delhi High Court the following question: " Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal rightly he ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed family. We will proceed to examine the first question. The High Court is not quite correct in the unqualified statement it has made in its order granting a certificate to the appellant to appeal to this court that this question is res integra. The question, in our opinion, is fairly, if not fully, covered by a considered judgment of this court in Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai v. Desai Mallappa [1961] 3 SCR 779; AIR 1961 SC 1268. The appellants therein brought a suit against their uncle and another for partition of joint family properties, their case being that they and respondent No. 1 were each entitled to a half share in those properties. The trial court passed a decree in favour of the appellants, except in regard to certain items. That decree was challenged by respondent No. 1 in the Madras High Court, one of his contentions being that, in any case, the appellants were not entitled to a share in the properties at Jonnagiri, items Nos. 4 to 61. This contention was accepted by the High Court which modified to that extent the decree of the trial court. In an appeal filed in this court by certificate granted by the High Court, one of the main contentions raised on behalf of th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... speaks of properties held by a Hindu female as a limited owner. But the question was framed in that manner because the properties which had devolved on Channamma on her father's death were held by her as a limited owner and not as her absolute properties. The ultimate decision of the court that the Jonnagiri properties which had devolved on Channamma could not be treated as the properties of the joint family is not based upon or governed by the consideration that she had a limited estate in those properties. The decision of the court, as Gajendragadkar J., has stated at more than one place in the judgment, is : " The rule of blending postulates that a coparcener who is interested in the coparcenary property and who owns separate property of his own may by deliberate and intentional conduct treat his separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property. If it appears that property which is separately acquired has been deliberately and voluntarily thrown by the owner into the joint stock with the clear intention of abandoning his claim on the said property and with the object of assimilating it to the joint family property, then the said property becomes a part of the joi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llesappa [1961] 3 SCR 779; AIR 1961 SC 1268 is quoted in Mulla's Hindu Law, 14th edition, page 277, as an authority for the proposition that the doctrine of blending cannot be applied to the case of a Hindu female who has acquired immovable property from her father, for she is not a coparcener. The judgment of this court in Lakkireddi Chinna Venkata Reddi v. Lakkireddi Lakshmama [1964] 2 SCR 172; AIR 1963 SC 1601, that of the Privy Council in Rajanikanta Pal v. Jagamohan Pal [1923] LR 50 IA 173; AIR 1923 PC 57 and of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Gift-tax v. Munshi Lal [1972] 85 ITR 129 (Delhi) do not deal with the question whether a Hindu female, not being a coparcener, can blend her separate property with joint family property. The statement of law in Lakkireddi [1964] 2 SCR 172 ; AIR 1963 SC 1601 that property, separate or self-acquired, of a member of joint Hindu family may be impressed with the character of joint family property if it is voluntarily thrown by the owner into the common stock with the intention of abandoning his separate claim therein, is to be understood in the context that property devised under a will was alleged in the case to have been impresse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e of an impartible estate, there is no reason why a Hindu female should not have the right to blend her separate property with joint family property. The analogy is misconceived because the true rule of blending, as we have explained above, is that the right to blend is limited to coparceners. Having considered the decisions cited at the Bar, it may be useful to have a fresh look at the doctrine of blending. The theory of blending under the Hindu law involves the process of a wider sharing of one's own properties by permitting the members of one's joint family the privilege of common ownership and common enjoyment of such properties. But while introducing new shares in one's exclusive property, one does not by the process of blending efface oneself by renouncing one's own interest in favour of others. To blend is to share along with others and not to surrender one's interest in favour of others to the exclusion of oneself. If a Hindu female, who is a member of an undivided family, impresses her absolute, exclusive property with the character of joint family property, she creates new claimants to her property to the exclusion of herself because, not being a coparcener, she has no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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