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TMI Blog1965 (10) TMI 72X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ered by a Division Bench of this court on the 21st July, 1961. On appeals preferred against that judgment by the revenue, the Supreme Court set aside the judgment and remanded these and the other petitions which were all heard together. Of the two contentions formulated above, the first, relating to the constitutionality of the Act in relation to entry 86, was subsequently overruled by the Supreme Court in Banarsi Dass v. Wealth-tax Officer [1965] 56 I.T.R. 224 (SC) and only the second remained open to the petitioners and was pressed before us, not to mention the point taken in O.P. No. 684 of 1959, against the merits or the propriety of the order of assessment. 2. As directed by the Supreme Court, an opportunity was given to the Petitioners and to the department to file fresh affidavits. Section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, which is impugned as discriminatory, is in these terms : "3. Subject to the other provisions contained in this Act, there shall be charged for every financial year commencing on and from the first day of April, 1957, a tax (hereinafter referred to as wealth-tax) in respect of the net wealth on the corresponding valuation date of every individual, Hindu undiv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitions that the term "Hindu undivided family" in section 3 is comprehensive to include all joint or undivided families composed of those who follow the Hindu religion, whatever be their personal law, whether Makkathayam or Marumakkathayam or Aliyasanthana or Mitakshara or Dayabhaga law, but not Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwads or other non-Hindu undivided families. Though learned counsel for the petitioners at one stage contended that the term "individual" can refer only to a single individual human, being, and supported the contention by relying on the references in section 4 to "wife", "daughter" and "child" of an "individual", I am satisfied that the meaning of the term is not to be so restricted; the contention is also against the weight of authority. I also feel that the term "individual" in singular includes "individuals" in plural. The argument for the revenue that the Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwads and other non-Hindu undivided families are comprehended by the term "individual" has its roots really in the interpretation of that term in entry 86, by the Division Bench of this court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... indu undivided families. But for the rule insisting on the construction of a legislative entry in its widest amplitude, I shall be experiencing great difficulty in imagining that a Joint family can ever be comprehended by the term "individual", in a taxing Act, especially in the context of the antithesis mentioned. In the case of Banarsi Dass [1965] 56 I.T.R. 224, 231. A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1387 cited above the Supreme Court stated the converse position at page 1391 to be that: "The tax legislation may, for convenience or other valid reasons, have made a distinction between individuals and Hindu undivided families; but it would not be legitimate to suggest that the word 'individual' occurring in an organic document like the Constitution must necessarily receive they same construction." 7. The use of the term "Hindu undivided family" in antithesis with "individual" was not, as the argument of counsel for the revenue implied, to distinguish and separate undivided families on the basis of religion into those of Hindus and of non-Hindus, but was to distinguish an agglomeration or a group of individuals formed or associated by agreement or co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f reasoning is inconsistent with it. Section 5, sub-section (1), clause (ii), of the Act provides that: "Wealth-tax shall not be payable by an assessee in respect of the following assets, and such assets shall not be included in the net wealth of the assessee- .... (ii) the interest of the assessee in the coparcenary property of any Hindu undivided family of which he is a member. " 10. There is no corresponding exclusion of the interest of the assessee in the property of any other undivided family, though it is true that it has been recently held by a Full Bench of this court that the undivided share of a member of a Hindu Marumakkathayam tarwad is not liable to be attached or sold ; there is no ruling of this court on the point regarding the undivided share of a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad. The Madras High Court has been of the view that the undivided share of a member of a tarwad is liable to be attached and sold. Section 15A as introduced by the Wealth-tax (Amendment) Act, 1964, provides for the signing and verification of a return to be made under sections 14 and 15 of the Act. While clause (b) of section 15A has provided that in the case of a Hindu undivided fam ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... st incorporated by a Baronetcy Act." In Ramratan Das and Madan Gopal, In re [1935] 3 I.T.R. 183, which was also referred to in the Mysore judgment, the terms, "individual" and "Hindu undivided family", interpreted were employed in section 55 of the Indian Income-tax Act, but the proviso to it mentioned only "individual"; in that context, the term "individual" was construed to take in "Hindu undivided family" for the purpose of the proviso. I do not think, with respect, these can be regarded as authorities for holding that the term "individual", as used in section 3 of the Act, can include a group of individuals as stated by the court knit together by "an involuntary association brought about by their mere birth". In Vysyaraju Badri Narayanamurthy v. Commissioner of Wealth-tax [1965] 56 I.T.R. 298 the Orissa High Court took note of the fact that: "the peculiar problem arising out of the existence of undivided families amongst non-Hindus does not arise in this (that) State and in most other States in India. Moplahs following the Marumakka-thayam law are found only in Kerala. Similarly, Christians followin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... plah tarwad can divide property by mutual consent, though no suit for compelling a partition will lie. These were all cases decided before the passing of the Moplah Marumakkathayam Act, 1938. 14. The several statutes affecting Moplahs of the former Malabar District may be briefly surveyed. The Malabar Wills Act, 1898, was enacted to make provision for the execution of wills by Marumakkathayees or persons governed by Marumakkathayam or Aliyasanthana law of inheritance. The Mappilla Succession Act, 1918, was to extend the rules of Muhammadan law of intestate succession and the Mappilla Wills Act, 1928, was to extend the rules of Muhammadan law of testamentary dispositions to Moplahsy governed by the Marumakkathayam or the Aliyasanthana law of inheritance but these had nothing to do with a Moplah tarwad or its properties. 15. In my view, a comparative study of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, and the Moplah Marumakkathayam Act, 1938, reveals a striking similarity between the tarwads dealt with by them. The basic concepts like karnavan, anandiravan, tarwad, and tavazhi are practically the same. 16. The Marumakkathayam system is defined in both, as the system in which descent is ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on as the Nair tarwad in the Malabar area. We have to take it that, prior to the enactment of the Madras Marumakkathayam Act, 1932, and the Moplah Marumakkathayam Act, 1939, the Moplah tarwad and the Nair tarwad stood more or less on the same position except as regards marriage, divorce, succession to separate property, etc. ... We find that on important matters like the right of division and the quantum of share, the tarwad, Hindu or Muslim, in Malabar differs substantially from the Hindu undivided family. " 18. Speaking with respect notwithstanding the several differences which the Madras High Court has enumerated in the case cited, between a joint family governed by the Hindu law and a Marumakkathayam tarwad, Hindu or non-Hindu, I feel that it is still open to question whether they really count at all in the context of article 14 of the Constitution. However, as between a Moplah tarwad and a Hindu Marumakkathayam tarwad, whatever be the difference in matters of personal law regarding marriage, divorce, and succession to personal and separate property, in point of structure and constitution, of the unity of ownership and possession, of the rights and powers of the karnavan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uot;who are even now being assessed to wealth-tax as individuals", in respect of the net wealth of the tarwads. Though this was not controverted in the counter, it was stated in paragraph 2 that the "non-Hindu undivided families which are in the ordinary course liable to assessments to wealth-tax from 1957-58 onwards in respect of the whole of India are only 18 in number", the number in this State being 1. The petitioner denied this in his reply and explained, that apparently this has reference to "those non-Hindu families, who have been assessed to wealth-tax as such and not the very large number of undivided families which are being taxed only as individuals." This is not clear, for non-Hindu families are not assessed as families but only as individuals. In the affidavit dated the 6th November, 1964, the number of Hindu undivided families assessed to wealth-tax in the year 1961-62 was stated to be 34 and in the year 1962-63 to be 23. At the hearing, learned counsel for the respondent stated that the list of 22 karnavans of Moplah tarwads furnished in paragraph 3(vi) of the affidavit of the petitioner may be taken as correct. Thus, the number of Moplah tar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rson or class from others similarly situated is discriminatory. A few of them, which were relied on, are Charanjit Lal v. Union of India [1951] 21 Comp. Cas. 33 ; [1950] S.C.R. 869, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali A.I.K. 1952 S.C. 75 and Ram Prasad v. State of Bihar A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 215. These are all cases in which a minority, sometimes one or two individuals, were discriminated against. Here, the discrimination is said to be against the majority, the Hindu undivided family, by reason, or in consequence, of the exemption of the minority, the Moplah tarwads, from the burden of wealth-tax. A taxation statute is not immune from attack under article 14. There is no reason to think, nor was it contended, that the exclusion, if any, of non-Hindu undivided families was deliberate or intentional. But then, to attract article 14, as held in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd. [1964] 52 I.T.R. 443 (SC), discrimination need not be deliberate or intentional; that would of course be a clear case, as in Morey v. Doud [1957] L. Ed. 2d. 1485, where by statute an exemption from the necessity to take a licence was granted to one company which was not allowed to others, and the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... riminate, or there must be actual and material discrimination in the practical operation of the law." 23. Willoughby On the Constitution of the United States, volume III, 2nd edition, at page 1949, quotes as follows from County of Santa Clara v. S. Pacific R.R. Co. 18 Fe. Rep. 385: "There undoubtedly are, and always will be more or less inequalities in the operation of all general legislation arising from the different conditions of persons from their means, business, or position in life, against which no foresight can guard. But this is a very different thing, both in purpose and effect from a carefully devised scheme to produce such inequality ; or a scheme, if not so devised, necessarily producing that result. Absolute equality may not be attainable, but gross and designed departures from it will necessarily bring the legislation authorising it within the prohibition." 24. To conform to the decision of the Supreme Court, it has only to be made clear that discrimination to attract article 14 need not be deliberate ; but even if inadvertent, it must be material. I, therefore, come to the conclusion that the discrimination, if any, arising from the exclusion of Mo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ether there has been a partition before the making of the assessment. Even if the partition was on the 25th July, 1958, and not earlier, as contended, section 20(1) would still apply. This section corresponds to section 25A of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, the principle of which has been explained in Lakhmichand v. Commissioner of Income-tax [1959] 35 I.T.R. 416; [1959] Suppl. 1 S.C.R. 415 . I think the plea raised under section 20(1) requires reconsideration by the Wealth-tax Officer. 26. The second point was that no enquiry was held as to the partition and that the theory of the Wealth-tax Officer on which he acted, that the deed of partition could not have been executed on the 30th March, 1958, when the stamp papers were purchased only on the 25th July, 1958, itself was not put to the petitioner. The petitioner in effect complained that the rules of natural justice were not observed by the officer. 27. I consider that, on both these grounds, the assessment order in O.P. No. 684 of 1959 could not be supported ; it is quashed accordingly. O.P. No. 684 of 1959 is allowed. O.P. No. 674 of 1958 also is allowed, on the ground that the Moplah Marumakkdthayam tarwad of the petition ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... one lakh of net wealth ... Nil. (ii) on the next rupees four lakhs of net wealth ... 05% (iii) on the next rupees five lakhs of net wealth ... 1.0% (iv) on the next rupees ten lakhs of net wealth ... 2.0% (v) on the balance of net wealth ... 2.5% (b) In the case of every Hindu undivided family : (i) on the first rupees two lakhs of net wealth ... Nil. (ii) on the next rupees three lakhs of net wealth ... 0.5% (iii) on the next rupees five lakhs of net wealth ... 1.0% (iv) on the next rupees ten lakhs of net wealth ... 2.0% (v) on the balance of net wealth ... 2.5%" (The rest of the Schedule is not material and is not reproduced). 33. The constitutionality of the Act was impugned on two main grounds namely : "(1) want of legislative competence to tax families under entry 86 of List I of the 7th Schedule of the Constitution ; and / (2) violation of article 14 of the Constitution. " 34. In the decision in Mammad Keyi v. Wealth-tax Officer, Calicut [1962] 44 I.T.R. 277 legislative competence was upheld by a Division Bench of this court. It was ruled -that the term "individual" in section 3 of the Wealth-tax Act, whatever be i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ative of article 14 of the Constitution. 37. According to Shri Nambiar, the term " Hindu undivided family " comprises a family which is Hindu in personnel, that is, which is composed of persons who are Hindus by religion, and not merely a family governed by the Hindu personal law. Thus, the expression would cover in its sweep Hindu joint families governed by the Marumakkathayam law, Aliyasan-thana families and also Nambudiri families or illoms. There was no controversy on this part of the case, and counsel for the revenue was at one with counsel for the petitioners in regard to the scope and content of the expression "Hindu undivided family" in section 3 of the Act. 38. Counsel however joined issue on the ambit of the expression "individual" occurring in section 3 of the Act. According to Shri Nambiar, the said expression would not comprehend non-Hindu joint families. It was claimed that there were at least three such joint families in this country, namely: (1) Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwads. (2) Certain Christian families governed by Hindu law, and (3) Families of a section of Muhammedans-the Khojas-following the Hindu law. 39. It was the conten ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... x legislation may, for convenience or other valid reasons, have made a distinction between individuals and Hindu undivided families ; but it would not be legitimate to suggest that the word" individuals "occurring in an organic document like the Constitution must necessarily receive the same construction." 42. The above observations seem to throw some doubt whether the identical construction could be placed upon the word "individual" occurring in a taxing statute in juxtaposition with the word "Hindu undivided family". It is contended that the word "individual" taking its colour from the context in which it is used in juxtaposition with "Hindu undivided family" would not comprehend a non-Hindu family or a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad. The argument is sought to be supported by reference to sections 5(ii), 15A(b), and section 20 of the Act and the Schedule thereto. I am not prepared to say that there is no force in this contention ; but at the same time, the antithesis may well be between "Hindu undivided family" which was a concept well known to the law and an "individual" which might well comprise groups o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... arwad. 46. If so, the next question would be whether the differential treatment accorded to a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad by assessing it as an "individual" with a lower limit of exemption from tax, and a higher incidence of taxation (vide the Schedule to the Act) would amount to discrimination in comparison with the preferential treatment accorded to a Hindu undivided family, which is given a higher limit of exemption and a more beneficial incidence of taxation. It is claimed that a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad and a Hindu undivided family in general, and a Hindu Marumakkathayam tarwad in particular, are similarly situated, and the differential treatment accorded to them is violative of article 14 of the Constitution. 47. It is unnecessary to consider, whether a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad and a Hindu undivided family governed by the Hindu law are similarly placed. No such family of the latter type is before us, either in this O.P. or the cases heard along with it and I refrain from expressing any opinion on the question. For the same reason, I express no opinion as to the similarity or otherwise between a, Christian or Muhammedan family governed by the Hindu law ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion among Moplahs. But the Explanation to section 2 of the said Act excluded tarwad property from its operation unless the person', dying intestate was exclusively entitled to it. The Mappilla Wills Act of 1928 (Madras Act VII of 1928) applied the Mohammedan law to the testamentary dispositions of Moplahs governed by the Marumakkathayam law, in respect of property covered by the Mappilla Succession Act of 1918. Neither the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act (Central XXVI of 1937) nor its Madras amendment by Act XVIII of 1949, had any effect on the rights and incidents of a Moplah tarwad. See Puthiyapurayil Abdurakiman Kardavan v. Thayath Kancheentavida Avoomma A.I.R. 1956 Mad. 244 and Achamma v. Yousuff [1958] K.L.J. 305. 52. The above is a brief resume of the position of the Marumakkathayam Moplahs of the Malabar area of this State. Little has been said to justify the classification of the Moplah tarwads as a category separate from the Hindu Marumakkathayam tarwads. As two entities similarly situated are subjected to the different incidence of taxation, I am of the view, that there is discrimination against the Moplali Marumakkathayam tarwads, by reason of the fav ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t clear that criticism of public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded, would be within reasonable limits and would be consistent with the fundamental right of freedom of speech and expression. It is only when the words, written or spoken, etc. which have the pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that the law steps in to prevent such Activities in the interest of public order. So construed, the section, in our opinion, strikes the correct balance between individual fundamental rights and the interest of public order. It is also well-settled that in interpreting an enactment the court should have regard not merely to the literal meaning of the words used but also take into consideration the antecedent history of the legislation, its purpose and the mischief it seeks to suppress (vide (1) Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar [1955] 6 S.T.C. 446 ; [1955] 2 S.C.R. 603 and (2) R. M. D. Chamarbaugwalla v. Union of India A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 628. Viewed in that light, we have no hesitation in so construing the provisions of the sections impugned in these cases as to limit their application to acts involvi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on and that it is not bound to tax everything in order to tax something. Legislation aimed at a particular object need not be all embracing; and is not open to attack on the ground that, while certain objects have been brought within the purview of a taxing statute, those similarly situated, have been left out or are excluded. 59. In Sakhawant Ali v. State of Orissa AIR. 1955 SC. 166, 168, 169 the validity of section 16(1)(ix) of 4he Orissa Municipal Act came up for consideration. The section stated that: "(1) No person shall be qualified for election to a seat in a municipality, if such person .. . (ix) is employed as a paid legal practitioner on behalf of the municipality or as legal practitioner against the municipality ..." 60. The above section was attacked as contravening article 14 of the Constitution. The classification was claimed to be of legal practitioners, employed on payment, on behalf of, or against, the municipality. The object or purpose to be achieved by the provision was the purity of public life, by avoiding situations where there was conflict between interest and duty. It was urged that besides the category provided for in the section, such confli ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... stated as two distinct and different forms. 64. In East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1962] 13 S.T.C. 529 I A.I.R. 1962 S.C, 1733, 1735, the Supreme Court approved the following statement of the law in Willis on Constitutional Law, page 587: "A State does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and ever rates for taxation if it does so reasonably. . . The Supreme Court has been practical and has permitted a very wide latitude in classification for taxation." The above case was concerned; with the validity of the levy of sales tax on Virginia tobacco. The levy as attacked as discriminatory on the ground that nattu tobacco had not (been taxed. In paragraph 4 of the A.I.R. report A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1733 the differences between the two types of tobacco are pointed out and it is stated that these differences would justify Virginia tobacco being treated as a class in itself. In paragraph 5 of the same report1, the argument of counsel is noticed that the differences between the two types of tobacco are not germane to the levy of sales tax, and so there is no valid classification ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have been selected for the purpose of taxation, article 14 has been contravened. This argument is entirely fallacious. It is not disputed that tea and jute are the main products of the State of Assam and it is not surprising that the Assam legislature, therefore, levied tax on the said two articles. Besides, the legislature which is competent to levy a tax must inevitably be given full freedom to determine which articles should be taxed, in what manner and at what rate ; vide Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of U.P. [1962] 46 ITR 169 (S.C.) It would be idle to contend that a State must tax everything in order to tax something. In tax matters,' the State is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates for taxation if it does so reasonably. The Supreme Court of the United States of America has been practical and has permitted a very wide latitude in classification for taxation.' (Willis on Constitutional Law, page 587). This approach has been approved by this court in the case of East India Tobacco Co. v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1962] 13 S.T.C. 529; A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1733". 67. I may next refer to the decision of a Division Bench of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not arise in this State and in most other States in India. Moplahs, following the Marumakkathayam law are found only in Kerala. Similarly, Christians following the Hindu law of coparcenary, even after conversion, must be very few indeed. It is open to Parliament to say that the number of undivided families of non-Hindus who may be assessable to wealth-tax is so negligible that it is not necessary to treat them as a separate entity. Again, it is open to the legislature to classify a Hindu undivided family as a distinct unit apart from an individual, for the purpose of levying a separate rate of tax. This is a well known feature found in the Indian Income-tax Act also, and, as far as I know, such classification has not been challenged as offending article 14. With respect, therefor, I am unable to agree with the view take of by the Kerala High Court." 72. In Rajah Sir M.A. Muthiah Chettiar v. Wealth-tax Officer [1964] 53 I.T.R. 504 ; [1964] 2 M.L.J. 273 a Division Bench of the Madras High Court sustained the validity of the Act. The decision appears to take the view that a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad is included in the term "individual" (see page 286). The argumen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... On the above conclusion that a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad is liable to be excluded from the definition of the term "individual", the petitioner's tarwad, being outside the ambit of the Act, is not liable to be assessed under its provisions. It follows that the O.P. must be allowed on this ground, and I do so. There will be no order as to costs. O.P. No. 684 of 1959 : 76. The petitioner in the above O.P. is the karnavan of a Namboodiri illom, who seeks to quash the order of assessment under the provisions of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957, for the assessment year 1957-58. The main challenge to the order has been on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the Act, in that it discriminates against Hindu undivided families by omitting the Moplah tarwad altogether from taxation. Alternatively, it is argued that even if the Moplah tarwad is included within the purview of the Act, it is dealt with differently, and this again would amount to discrimination. These arguments have been considered and dealt with by me in my judgment in O.P. No. 674 of 1958. The challenge to the constitutionality of the Act must therefore fail. 77. Regarding the attack on the merits of the assess ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... als forming a natural unit must be deemed to have been excluded. 81. The general scheme of the Act is to assess all persons who happen to own wealth beyond the particular limit fixed by the statute to wealth-tax. Even in a taxing statute it is the duty of the court to attribute to the words their reasonable meaning. Since the Act imposes a general tax on the entire wealth of the community, the presumption is of equality of incidence of tax rather than of the exemption of a few. The specific mention of "Hindu undivided family" in section 3, according to me, does not result in the exclusion of a group of individuals who form a unit by reason of their birth from the operation of section 3 of the Act. The Act contemplates that in the case of members of the "Hindu undivided family", the unit of assessment shall be the family itself and not each individual member. A "Hindu undivided family" including a Marumakka-thayam tarwad or a Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad has no separate legal existence distinct from the members of the family or tarwad. This position is supported by the observations of the Supreme Court in C.A. Cheriyan v. A. Menon AIR 1963 SC 128. Suc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... aid that although the taxing power may sub-divide a class it cannot unjustly discriminate between the sub-division so made." 83. In Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh [1962] 46 I.T.R 169, 179 their Lord-ships of the Supreme Court observed : "A taxing statute can be held to contravene article 14 if it purports to impose on the same class of property similarly situated an incidence of taxation which leads to obvious inequality. There is no doubt that it is for the legislature to decide on what objects to levy what rate of tax and it is not for the courts to consider whether some other objects should have been taxed or whether a different rate should have been prescribed for the tax. It is also true that the legislature is competent to classify persons or properties into different categories and tax them differently, and if the classification thus made is rational, the taxing statute cannot be challenged merely because different rates of taxation are prescribed for different categories of persons or objects. But, if in its operation, any taxing statute is found to contravene article 14, it would be open to courts to strike it down as denying to the citize ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rn their religious and social life, it is strangely intermingled with the rules of property and of succession that govern the Nayars. Their rules of marriage are exactly identical with those that govern other Muhammadans but their rules of property are regulated according to Marumakkathayam law. Sometimes we find the rules of Muhammadan law modifying those of Marumakkathayam law, especially with regard to self-acquired property and this admixture at times gives rise to/certain curious problems, by no means, easy of solution." 87. The learned author has further pointed out the development of certain peculiar customs among Moplahs governed by Marumakkathayam law on account of the recognition of the Marumakkathayam rule of inheritance and at the same time of the Muhammadan rule as to marriage. It is, therefore, not possible to hold that a Hindu Marumakkathayam tarwad and Moplah Marumakkathayam tarwad are so similar that the classification made by the legislature is not at all rational. The provision in the schedule of the Act for a lower limit of exemption to "individual" and a higher limit of exemption to "Hindu undivided family" cannot amount to hostile dis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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