TMI Blog2010 (8) TMI 1071X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... it land was not within the limits of urban area. HELD THAT:- Undoubtedly, the Act, 1976, stood repealed by the Act 1999. However, it has no bearing on this case for the reason that proceeding pending in any Court relating to the Act, 1976, stood abated, provided the possession of the land had not been taken from the owner. Therefore, in a case, where the possession has been taken, the repeal of the Act would not confer any benefit on the owner of the land. Therefore, the law, as exists today, is that the land in dispute could be subjected to the provisions of the Act, 1976, with effect from 17.5.1976, i.e. the date on which the suit land came within the limits of the Municipal Corporation. The Act stood repealed in 1999, but the proceedings pending in any court would stand abated provided the tenure-holder was in possession of the land on the date of the commencement of the Act 1999. The High Court has taken note of the fact that the appellant's revision had been entertained only on the basis of the judgment of this Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum [ 1993 (3) TMI 380 - SUPREME COURT] , which stood over-ruled by the subsequent judgment in N. Audikesava Reddy[ 2001 (11) TMI 1056 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . 17.2.1976, the suit land was not within the limits of urban area. In order to substantiate the claim, reliance was placed on the Judgment of this Court in Atia Mohammadi Begum Vs. State of U.P. Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2465, wherein it has been held that for the purpose of the Act, 1976, the categorization of the land in the Master Plan in existence at the time of commencement of the Act into force was a relevant factor and any subsequent change in the Master Plan cannot be taken into consideration. The said application was allowed by the Hon'ble Minister, exercising his revisional powers by order dated 29.09.1998. 3. Being aggrieved, the PMT filed writ petition No. 1018 of 1999 before the High Court of Maharashtra and the said writ petition has been allowed vide Judgment and order dated 20.02.2006 in spite of the fact that the Act, 1976 stood repealed by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter called `Act 1999') with effect from 18.03.1999. Subsequent thereto, this Court in State of A.P. Ors. Vs. N. Audikesava Reddy Ors., AIR 2002 SC 5 overruled the Judgment in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra). Hence, this appeal. 4. Sh. A.K. Ganguly, learn ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e holder cannot be heard raising any grievances whatsoever. The Act, 1976, stood repealed, but this fact would have no bearing on this case for the reason that possession of the suit land had been taken in 1979 itself. The appeal lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 6. We have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. The Scheme of the Act, 1976 provides that the prescribed authority shall make an order declaring the surplus land. The land would be acquired by the State and tenure holder is entitled to have an amount of compensation. Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976, provides that after acquisition and publication of the Notification under Section 10(1) of the Act, 1976 the land shall be deemed to have vested absolutely in the State Government free from all encumbrances with effect from the date so specified . 7. Section 11 of the Act, 1976, provides for the Mode of Payment of the amount for vacant land acquired. Any person aggrieved, has a right to file an appeal before the Land Tribunal and a second appeal before the High Court. 8. The provisions of Section 10(3) of the Act, 1976 are analogous to Section 16 of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uishing of all rights, title and interests including easementary rights when the title vests in the State. Thus, free from encumbrances means vesting of land in the State without any charge or burden in it. Thus, State has absolute title/ownership over it. 12. In Satendra Prasad Jain Ors. Vs. State of U.P. Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517, this Court held that once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested. The same view has been reiterated in Awadh Bihari Yadav Ors. Vs. State of Bihar Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow Vs. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., Lucknow Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1170; Pratap Anr. (Supra); Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil Anr. Vs. State of Maharashtra Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 405; Allahabad Development Authority Vs. Nasiruzzaman Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424; State of Kerala Ors. Vs. M. Bhaskaran Pillai Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703; M. Ramalinga Thevar Vs. State of Tamil Nadu Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; Printers (Mysore) Ltd. Vs. M.A. Rasheed Ors., (2004) 4 SCC 460; Bangalore Development Authority Ors. Vs. R. Hanumaiah Ors., (2005) 12 SCC 508; and Government of Andhra Pradesh Anr. Vs. Syed Akbar, AIR 2005 SC 492. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 9 of the Act, 1976. 18. The suit land was acquired in 1979. Revision was preferred in 1998, after expiry of about two decades. Section 34 reads as under :- The State Government may, on its own motion, call for and examine the records of any order passed or proceeding taken under the provisions of this Act and against which no appeal has been preferred under Section 12 or Section 30 or Section 33 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order or as to the regularity of such procedure and pass such order with respect thereto as it may think fit .......... 19. Undoubtedly, Section 34 does not prescribe any limitation during which the Revisional power can be exercised by the State Government either on application or suo moto. The question does arise as to whether absence of limitation in Section 34 confers unfettered power to vary or revoke the order of the prescribed authority without any outside limitation in point of duration i.e. does it confer an everlasting or interminable power in point of time. If the contention raised by Mr. Ganguly that such provisions of Section 34 do not prescribe any limitation, and it confers an inte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ly and reasonably. If one has to simply proceed on the basis of the dictionary meaning of the words at any time , the suo moto power under sub- Section (4) of Section 50-B of the Act could be exercised even after decades and then it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties, that too, over immovable properties. Orders attaining finality and certainty of the rights of the parties accrued in the light of the orders passed must have sanctity. Exercise of suo moto power at any time only means that no specific period such as days, months or years are not prescribed reckoning from a particular date. But, that does not mean that at any time should be unguided and arbitrary. In this view, at any time must be understood as within a reasonable time depending on the facts and circumstances of each case in the absence of prescribed period of limitation. 22. The said judgment was approved and followed by this Court in State of Andhra Pradesh Anr. Vs. T.Yadagiri Reddy Ors., (2008) 16 SCC 299. 23. The legislature in its wisdom did not fix a time limit for exercising the revisional power nor inserted th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e not amenable to the judicial review at this belated stage. The High Court, therefore, has rightly dismissed the writ petition on the ground of delay as well. 27. In M/s. Rup Diamonds Ors. Vs. Union of India Ors., AIR 1989 SC 674, this Court considered a case where petitioner wanted to get relief on the basis of the judgment of this Court wherein a particular law had been declared ultra vires. The Court rejected the petition on the ground of delay and laches observing as under:- There is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they have not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and close to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. 28. However, it will be a different case altogether, where the law, under which an order has been passed, is declared ultra vires/unconstitutional and the order, thus, passed is rendered a nullity. The party may ask for appropriate relief as property had been acquired under the law, later so declared void. [See Amrit Bhikaji Kale Ors. Vs. Kashinath Janardhan Trade Anr., AIR 1983 SC 643; and M/s. Ru ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... becoming vacant due to preparation of a master plan subsequent to 17th February, 1976. Further, the provisions of the Act require filing of a statement under Sections 6 7 15 and 16 from time to time as and when land acquires the character of a vacant land. Obligation to file statement under the Act arises when a person comes to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit, which date necessarily may not be 17th February, 1976. It would all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Accordingly, we hold that the master plan prepared as per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Act is to be taken into consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land is vacant land or not and, to this extent, Atia Begum is not correctly decided. (Emphasis added) 30. In view of the above, there is no justification for this Court to enforce the law laid down in Atia Mohammadi Begum (supra), which has subsequently been held not to be valid law. Submission made by Sh. Ganguly, that the initial proceedings instituted against the appellant were a nullity as the land could not be covered under the Act, 1976, remains preposterous. 31. Undoubtedly, the Ac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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