TMI Blog1963 (2) TMI 59X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lied for the permit. The Regional Transport Authority, adopting the marking system prescribed in' G.O. Ms. No. 1298 (Home) dated April 28,1956, awarded marks to different applicants : the appellant of the highest number of Marks, viz., 7, and the first respondent got only 4 1/4 marks, with the result the appellant was preferred to the respondent and a permit was issued to him. It is not necessary to notice the marks secured by the other applicants before the Regional Transport Authority, for they are not before us. Total of the said marks secured by each of the said two parties was arrived at by gadding the marks given under the following heads: Viable Unit Work shop Residence- Experience Special circumstances Total 1 2 3 4 5 K.M.S 4 1 1 1/2 1/4 7 S.R.V.S 1 1 1 1 1/4 4 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... irst respondent had a branch office at Kumbakonam and, therefore, the office at Tanjore or Mannargudi could not be treated as a branch office. Aggrieved by that order, the first respondent filed a petition before the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution for setting aside that order. Ramachandra lyer, J., who heard the said application allowed it. The main reason given by the learned judge for allowing the petition was that the Appellate Tribunal omitted to give any mark in respect of residential qualification, which amounted to refusal to take into consideration the admitted fact, namely, the existence of a workshop at Mannargudi and therefore, it amounted to a breach of s. 47 (1) (a) and (c) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The same idea was expressed by the learned judge in a different way thus: It............ in regard to residential qualification, it (the Appellate Tribunal) declined to consider whether the office workshop at Mannargudi are sufficient to entitle the petitioner to any marks under head for the mere reason that it was a branch of a branch office. He held that the said refusal was an error apparent on the face of the record; and he accordingly quashed ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an order made by a Tribunal in breach thereof does not confer a right on a party affected and, therefore, the Appellate Tribunal's order made in derogation of the said directions could not be a subject-matter of a writ. The argument of Mr. Viswanatha Sastri, learned counsel for the first respondent, may be summarized thus : The petitioner (appellant herein) -has a fundamental right to carry on business in transport. The Motor Vehicles Act is a law imposing reasonable restrictions in public interest on such right. The Appellate Tribunal can decide, on the material placed before it, whether public interest would be better served if the permit was given to the appellant or the first respondent within the meaning of s. 47 of the said Act. The Government, in exercise its powers under s. 43 of the said Act, gave administrative directions embodying some principles for enabling the Tribunal to come to a conclusion on the said point. The Tribunal had jurisdiction to decide the said question on the basis of the principles so laid down or dehors them. In either view, it only decides the said question. The first respondent raised before the Tribunal that public interest would be better ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jurisdiction, as when it decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal, even if they be erroneous. (4) An error in the decision or determination itself may also be amenable to a writ of certiorari but it must be a manifest error apparent on the face of the proceedings e.g., when it is based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions of law. This view was followed in Nagendra Nath Bora, v. The Commissioner Hills Division and Appeals, Assam , Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun [1960] 1 S.C.R. Shri Ambica Mills Co. v. S. B. Bhutt ) [1961] 3 S.C.R. 920 and in Provincial Transport Services v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur [1963] 3 S.C.R. 650. But the more difficult question is, what is the precise meaning of the expression 'manifest error Apparent on the face of the proceedings ? Venkatarama Ayyar, J., attempted to define the said expression in Hari Vishnu Kamat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lls to be decided on the facts of each case. Das Gupta, J., makes yet another attempt to define the expression when he says in Satyanarayan v. Mallikarjun [1960] 1 S.C.R.890, at p. 141 thus : An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record. As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error in the present case is far from self- evident and if it can be established, it has. to be established, by lengthy and complicated arguments. The learned judge here lays down the complex nature of the arguments as a test of apparent error of law. This test also may break, for what is complex to one judicial mind may be clear and obvious to another : it depends upon the equipment of a particular judge. In the ultimate analysis the said concept is comprised of many imponderables : it is not capable of precise definition, as no objective criterion can be laid down, the apparent nature of the error, to a large extent, being dependent upon the subjective element. So too, in some cases the boundary between error of law and erro ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hority to discharge its duties, under s. 47 of the Act more satisfactorily, efficiently and impartially. To put it differently, the directions so given cannot enlarge or restrict the jurisdiction of the said tribunal or authority but only afford a reasonable guide for exercising the said jurisdiction. Concretely stated, an applicant in advancing his claim for a permit may place before the Authority an important circumstance in his favour, namely, that he has a branch office on the route in respect whereof- he seeks for a permit. He may contend that he has an office on the route, and that the interests of the public will be better served, as the necessary amenities or help to meet any eventuality in the course of a trip will be within his easy reach. The Government also under s. 43A may issue instructions to the Regional Transport Authority that the existence of an office of a particular applicant on the route would be in the interests of the public and, therefore, the said applicant should be given a preferential treatment if other things are equal. The issue of such an instruction only emphasizes a relevant fact which an authority has to take into consideration even if such an ins ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e decision of the Appellate Tribunal was based upon an obvious error. It took the view that if a company bad a branch office at one particular place, it could not have in law any other branch office though it had one in fact. Whatever conflict there may be, on which we do not express any opinion, in a tax law or the company law, in the context of the marking system and the evaluation of an amenity in the interest of the public, it is obviously an untenable proposition to hold that even if a company has a well equipped office on a route in respect of which a permit is applied for, it shall be ignored if the company has some other branch somewhere unconnected with that route. That was what the Appellate Tribunal held and in our view it is an error apparent on the face of the record. On that erroneous view, the Appellate Tribunal did Dot decide the relevant question raised, namely, whether the respondent has any such office at mannargudi. Both Ramachandra Iyer, J., at the first instance, and Anantanarayanan and Venkatadri, jj., in 'appeal, rightly pointed out this error. As this is an error apparent on the face of the record, they quashed the order of the Appellate Tribunal and le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... one Gopalan Nair. On appeal, the Appellate Tribunal set aside that order and gave the permits to respondents, 3 and 4. Both the Regional Transport Authority and the Appellate Tribunal considered the applications on the basis of G.O. No. 1298 issued by the Government of Madras on April, 28, 1956. The Regional Transport Authority gave 4 marks each to the appellant and Gopalan Nair under Col. 1, which dealt with the building (1strength to viable units, and refused, to give any marks to respondents 3 and 4 under the said column on the ground that they were fleet owners; with the result that the appellant and Gopalan Nair secured more marks than respondents 3 and 4 and were, therefore, given the permits. But the Appellate Tribunal held that the appellant and Gopalan Nair were not entitled to claim the benefit of the marks under Col. 1, as they had secured less marks than respondents 3 and 4 under Cols. 3 to 5, for they held, on a fair obstruction of the said G.O., that it was only when the marks obtained by applicants under Cols. 2 to 5 were equal, recourse could be had to 'Col. 1. On that basis, the Appellate Tribunal quashed the order of the Regional Transport Authority and gave t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Madras and gave to the appellant (therein) 5 marks and to the respondent 6 marks. Though the respondent got 6 marks, he was not given the permit, as in the view of the said Authority he was guilty of misconduct. As between the other applicants, the appellant having secured the highest number of marks, he was given a permit. But on appeal the Appellate Tribunal reallotted the marks and under the reallotment the appellant got the highest number of marks; and because of that fact and also for the reason that he was a small operator of two buses, who should be given an opportunity to build up a viable unit as quickly as possible, he was given the permit by the Appellate Tribunal upholding the order of the Regional Transport Authority. One of the question raised there was whether the appellant was entitled to marks under Col. 2 for repair and maintenance, facilities at Dharapuram- the Appellate Tribunal found that he had such facilities. The appellant filed a writ in the High Court and the learned single judge thought that some mistakes had been committed by the Appellate Tribunal in the allotment of marks and that it acted in contravention of the directions given by the Government ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r of the Appellate Tribunal on the ground that it misconstrued the directions contained in the Government Order relating to small operators. But a division Bench of that Court in Letters Patent appeal held, relying upon the earlier decision of this Court, that the said directions were only administrative in nature and that they did not confer any legal rights and in that view allowed the appeal. This Court again following the earlier decisions dismissed the appeal holding that by construing the administrative directions the Tribunal did not take irrelevant considerations or refused to take relevant considerations in the matter of issue of permits. It is always a controversial question whether the issue of a permit to a small operator or to a big operator would be in the interest of the public and a Tribunal is certainly entitled to take either view. It will be seen from the aforesaid decisions that this Court only laid down that the instructions given under s. 43A of the Motor Vehicles Act were only administrative directions and that the infringement of those instructions by the Tribunal did not confer any right on a party to apply to a High Court for a writ under Art. 226 of the C ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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