TMI Blog1970 (2) TMI 35X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1963. After paying this duty in full, the petitioner preferred an appeal to the Appellate Controller who, by his order dated August 10, 1965, granted him some relief. While so, the Assistant Controller, Kakinada, issued a notice GIR/130 r/7-2-68 to the petitioner under section 59 of the Estate Duty Act, which will hereinafter be referred to as the " Act ", calling upon the latter to deliver an account of all the property in respect of which estate duty is payable on or before February 27, 1968, alleging that he had reason to believe that property chargeable to duty had been under-assessed. It is to restrain the Assistant Controller from proceeding with the enquiry in pursuance of this notice that the petitioner invokes the jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the Constitution, as, according to him, the impugned notice besides being vague I and unwarranted, was issued long after the expiry of the period prescribed therefore by section 73A(b) of the Act. The Assistant Controller filed a counter, pleading, among other things, that he came to know some time after the appeal preferred by the petitioner was disposed of, that certain properties chargeable to duty had escaped ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on of the property included in the account or of omission to include therein any property which ought to have been included, or of assessment at too low a rate or otherwise, he may at any time, subject to the provisions of section 73A, require the person accountable to submit an account as required under section 53 and may proceed to assess or reassess such property as if the provisions of section 58 applied thereto." Section 73A lays down : " Limitation for commencing proceedings for assessment or reassessment. No proceedings for the levy of any estate duty under this Act shall be commenced - (a) in the case of a first assessment, after the expiration of five years from the date of death of the deceased in respect of whose property estate duty became payable; and (b) in the case of a reassessment, after the expiration of three years from the date of assessment of such property to estate duty under this Act." Section 73A(a) prima facie limits the period beyond which no proceedings for levy of any estate duty could be commenced in the case of a first assessment, which is to be made under section 58 of the Act, to five years from the date of the death of the deceased in res ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ., taxably adv., assessment. " So, if " assessment " is to be understood as evaluation of the property for the purpose of taxation and fixing the tax payable thereon, it has to be said that the assessment in this case under section 58 of the Act was completed even on June 27, 1963, when the value of the estate was determined and duty was imposed by the Assistant Controller. But, our attention was invited by Sri Anantha Babu, the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, to Kalawati Devi Harlalka v. Commissioner of Income-tax , C. A. Abraham v. Income-tax Officer, Kottayam and S. Sankappa v. Income-tax Officer, Central Circle II, Bangalore , in support of his contention that the word " assessment ", when employed in a statute, intended for the purpose of levying a tax can bear a very comprehensive meaning, and should, therefore, be construed in a broad and not narrow or restricted sense. In Kalawati Devi Harlalka v. Commissioner of Income-tax , the meaning and amplitude of the expression " procedure for the assessment " occurring in section 297 of the Indian Income-tax Act fell to be considered. Their Lordships pointed out " It is quite clear from the authorities cited above that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ole procedure laid down in the Act for imposing liability upon the its taxpayer. The Indian Income-tax Act is no exception in this respect. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that their Lordships had to interpret the words " assessment " and " procedure for assessment " in the manner they did having regard to the context in which the expressions were used and that the interpretation given by them does not hold good for interpreting the same or similar words occurring in a different statute. It has now come to be recognised quite well that the same expression may be used to convey different meanings not only in different statutes but also at different places in one and the same enactment. The same word or phrase used in different Acts need not therefore necessarily carry the same meaning. The meaning that has to be given to it depends upon the context in which it is employed. Reference may be made in this connection to Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court sounded a note of caution against construing expressions ,used in one Act with reference to their use in another Act when they observed : " It is not a sound principle of construct ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ew of the proviso to section 62(b) of the Act which lays down that no appeal shall lie under sub-clause (iv), clause (a), of that section unless the duty has been paid before the appeal is filed. The appeal preferred by the petitioner simply placed the order passed by the Assistant Controller in jeopardy but did not have the effect of rendering that order ineffectual. The mere filing of an appeal does not by itself operate as a stay of assessment in the absence of a provision to that effect anywhere in the Act and it is, therefore, not correct to say that the order of assessment made by the Assistant Controller in this case lacked finality or that the date on which the assessment was made by him cannot be taken as the starting point for computing the period of limitation, simply because there was a possibility of the assessment being varied or set aside in appeal. The next contention urged for the 1st respondent is that the assessment made by the Assistant Controller on June 27, 1963, merged in the appellate order dated August 10, 1965, and that the date of the latter order alone should be taken as the date of assessment for the purpose of computing the period of limitation. Mada ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e appellate authority for want of territorial jurisdiction it would not be open to it to issue a writ to the original authority which may be within its territorial jurisdiction once the appeal is disposed of, though it may be that the appellate authority has merely confirmed the order of the original authority and dismissed the appeal .... the decree of the lower court merges in the decree of the appellate court, and on the same principle it would not be incorrect to say that the order of the original authority is merged in the order of the appellate authority whatsoever its decision-whether of reversal or modifi cation or mere confirmation." The facts of the case referred to above would thus clearly show that the applicability of the doctrine of merger had to be considered by their Lordships for the purpose of determining the question of jurisdiction and not of limitation with which alone we are concerned in this case. The question that fell to be considered in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Amritlal Bhogilal Co. was as to whether the order made by the Income-tax Officer granting registration to a firm would also merge along with the assessment made by him in the decision rende ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sales tax in respect of various quarters under the provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act. They successfully appealed to the Assistant Collector of Sales Tax against the assessments on the ground that the Sales Tax Officer had wrongly rejected their claim to certain deductions from the taxable turnover. Some time later, the Orissa High Court gave judgment in another case from which it appeared that the Assistant Collector was wrong in allowing the deductions in question. Thereupon, the Collector of Sales Tax, in exercise of his revisional powers under section 23(3) of the Act, revised the orders of the Assistant Collector, by raising the taxable turnover. The respondents questioned the order of the Collector of Sales Tax before the High Court of Orissa under article 226 on the ground that it was illegal, having been made beyond the period of 3 6 months from the end of the relevant periods prescribed by sub-section (7) of section 12. The High Court held that the orders made in revision were illegal as they were really reassessments of turnover which had escaped assessment or had been under-assessed and, under sub-section (7) of section 12 of the Act, such reassessment could not be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ot, therefore, have the effect of postponing the date of assessment for the purpose of limitation, in the absence of a statutory provision. To hold otherwise would entail the undesirable consequence of keeping the person accountable in constant dread of being called upon once again to submit an account of the estate of the deceased for an indefinitely long period even after the initial assessment contemplated by section 58 is completed as the Act provides for an appeal to the Appellate Controller, another appeal to the Appellate Tribunal, reference to the High Court and an appeal to the Supreme Court which would naturally occupy considerable time. It could not have been the intention of the legislature to keep the sword of Damocles hanging on the head of the accountable persons for such a long period to justify the contention that by the words " date of assessment " employed in section 73A(b) it meant the date on which the appeal or other proceedings referred to in section is 62 to 65 of the Act are disposed of. That the legislature could not have intended to place the accountable person in a state of uncertainty and suspense for such an unduly long period can also be seen from t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the petitioner did not have the effect of postponing the date of commencement of the period of limitation mentioned in section 73A(b) of the Act. The heading of section 73A(b), viz., Limitation for commencing proceedings for assessment or reassessment would similarly bring out in bold relief that by " date of assessment ", the legislature meant the date of assessment made by the primary authority under section 58 and not the date of disposal of the appeal, reference or revision provided by the statute as the words " assessment and reassessment " occur prominently only in sections 58 and 59, Part VII of the Act, and not in sections 62 to 65 which provide for appeals and reference. There is yet another reason why we should interpret the word " assessment " used in section 73A(b) in the manner stated above, even on the assumption that it also admits of the construction sought to be put on it by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent. The Estate Duty Act is a fiscal statute and it is well established that wherever the provisions of such a statute admit of more interpretations than one, they should receive the construction which is more favourable to the taxpayer. Nawab Khazi Ju ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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