TMI Blog2017 (7) TMI 1012X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... run. Considering that Section 264 is a provision intended to benefit the Assessee, no other interpretation is possible on a plain reading of it. Thus PCIT was in error in holding that the revision petition was time barred. The Court would also like to observe that where in a given case, the PCIT is of the view that a certain petition is time barred, then in terms of the proviso to Section 264 (3), the PCIT should also examine whether there was any justifiable reason for such delay. He need not wait for an application to be filed by an Assessee for that purpose. He may put the Assessee on notice of this fact and require the Assessee to show sufficient cause for the delay. This may avoid needless multiplicity of the proceedings, particula ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... RBSPL. On 29th August, 2012 RBSPL filed its return of income showing a loss of ₹ 1,13,181 without including the interest on certain Fixed Deposit Receipts (FDRs) which came to be transferred to it as a result of the above MOU. On 29th September, 2012, the Petitioner filed a return of income for the AY in question which included interest on the above FDRs. The Petitioner s return was processed under Section 143(1) of the Act on 6th December, 2013. 4. The return filed by RBSPL was picked up for scrutiny. The assessment was completed by an order dated 5th March, 2015 passed by the Assessing Officer (AO) under Section 143(3) of the Act whereby, inter alia, interest on the FDRs was added to the income of RBSPL as unaccounted interest. R ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e came to know about the processing of his return which resulted into refund. 7. At the hearing of this petition on 26th May 2017, the Court noted in para 2 of its order as under: 2. It seems that in the impugned order, the Commissioner of Income Tax ('CIT') has rejected the Petitioner's application under Section 264 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 ('Act') on the ground of limitation by calculating the starting date for the period of limitation from 25th April, 2014 i.e., the date of issuance of the refund although as noted by the CIT himself in the impugned order that actual intimation under Section 143(1) as claimed by the Assessee was received by him much later on 13th April, 2015 . 8. Mr. Zoheb Hossain, ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... act of his return having been processed, he could not have known the contents of the intimation under Section 143(1). That intimation was admittedly communicated to the Petitioner only on 13th April, 2015. 11. There is merit in the contention of the Petitioner. When Section 264(3) uses the expression to the date on which he otherwise came to know of it , it refers to the date on which the Petitioner actually had a copy of the intimation. He could either get it from the Department or get it from any other source. In other words, it would not be sufficient that the Petitioner came to know of the fact that his return had been processed. Till such time the Petitioner had a copy of the intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act, the limitati ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ase, the PCIT is of the view that a certain petition is time barred, then in terms of the proviso to Section 264 (3), the PCIT should also examine whether there was any justifiable reason for such delay. He need not wait for an application to be filed by an Assessee for that purpose. He may put the Assessee on notice of this fact and require the Assessee to show sufficient cause for the delay. This may avoid needless multiplicity of the proceedings, particularly, when the delay is not substantial and can be explained by the Assessee. 15. Since the PCIT has declined to examine the issue on merits, the Court sets aside the impugned order dated 21st December, 2016 passed by the PCIT and restores the Petitioner s revision application to his ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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