TMI Blog2002 (5) TMI 868X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ioner filing a suit earning No.857/85 on 20th July 1985. The DDA, however, later on certified that the said plot belonged to the petitioner and not to the police authorities. In the meantime, having regard to the fact that no award was made, the notification dated 1st November 1966 lapsed on 23rd September 1986, in terms of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. 4. It stands admitted that thereafter the DDA made several requests to the Land Acquisition Authorities to acquire the land afresh, wherefor, letters dated 18th May 1987, 25th July 1989, 23rd March 1994, 29th July 1994 and 8th August 1995 were issued. The suit filed by the petitioner as mentioned hereinabove was decreed by judgment and decree dated 25th November 1992. Despite the same, allegedly on or about 1st July 1996 a large police force entered the petitioner's house and assaulted her younger son despite production of Court's order. The matter was reported to the Chief Justice of this Court by a telegram, which was treated as a Public Interest Litigation. According to the petitioner, to save their skin police authorities lodged a false First Information Report against the petitioner. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Municipal records; 9. Mr. Sandeep Sethi and Mr. G.L.Rawal, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, would submit that this Court could not have issued a writ of or in the nature of mandamus in a criminal writ petition, at the instance of third party, directing the DDA to acquire land and that too upon invoking the provisions of Section 17 thereof. Learned counsel would submit that, having regard to the phraseology used in Section 4 of the said Act, independent application of mind by the acquiring authority was a sin-qua-non for arriving at its satisfaction that the land in question is required or is likely to be required for a public purpose. The learned counsel would argue that the impugned notification suffers from a total non-application of mind, in so far as, such a satisfaction could have been arrived at (a) as regards the identification of land; (b) whether the land was required for public purpose or not; (c) whether land in question necessary to be acquired; and (d) whether the provisions of Section 5A could be given a go by, by invoking the urgency provision as contained in Section 17(1) of the said Act. The learned counsel would contend that in this case ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... awn our attention to the fact that order dated 24th October 2000 was passed by this Court, inter alia, on the basis of the report of the committee, who took more than one hour thirty minutes to find out location of the police station. Learned counsel would urge that police station must have an easy access not only for benefit of the public at large but also having regard to the nature of the duties and functions required to be performed by the authorities. Learned counsel would contend that delay and laches on the part of their officers and/or passage of time by itself may not stand in the way of invoking the emergency clause and in fact passage of a long time itself may be considered to be a relevant criteria therefore. Strong reliance in this connection has been placed on Chameli Singh and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Anr. ; Union of India and Ors. v. Praveen Gupta Ors Smt. Shakuntala B. Modav. Union of India and Ors. S.S. Darshan v. State of Karnataka and Ors. ; A.O. Sareen and Ors. v. State of U.P. and Ors. ; State of U.P. v. Smt. Pista Devi and Ors. ; Deepak Pahwa etc. v. Lt. Governor of Delhi and Ors . . 13 It was submitted that the satisfaction arrived at by the authoriti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e the survey cannot be completed and the levels taken and the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear away any part of any standing crops, fence or jungle; Provided that no person shall enter into any building or upon any enclosed Court or garden attached to a dwelling house unless with the consent of the occupier thereof without previously giving such occupier at least seven days, notice in writing of his intention to do so. 5-A Hearing of objections- (1) Any person interested in any land which has been notified under Section 4, Sub-section (1), as being needed or likely to be needed for a public purpose or for a company may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the notification object to the acquisition of the land or of any land in the locality, as the case may be. (2) Every objection under Sub-section (1) shall be made to the Collector in writing, and the Collector shall give the objector, an opportunity of being heard in person or by any person authorised by him in this behalf or by pleader and shall, after hearing all such objections and after making such further inquiry, if any, as he thinks necessary, either make a report in respect o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... een days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9, Sub-section (1), take possession of any land needed for a public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances. XXXXX (4) In the case of any land to which, in the opinion of the appropriate Government, the provisions of Sub-section (1) or Sub-section (2) are applicable, the appropriate Government may direct t hat the provisions of Section 5A shall not apply, and, if it does so direct, a declaration may be made under Section 6 in respect of the land at any time after the date of the publication of the notification under Section 4, Sub-section (1). 16. The first question which falls for our consideration in these writ petitions is as to whether this Court acted without jurisdiction in passing the order dat ed 24th October 2000 in criminal Writ Petition No. 604/00. The afore-mentioned order dated 24th October 2000 is in the following terms: We have heard learned counsel for DDA Ms. Geeta Mittal with Mr. D.K. Saluja, Director (Planning) DDA. Ms. Mukta Gupta for the State with Mr. T.N. Mohan, DCP (Hqrs.) and Mr. Nityanand, DCP (East) and Mr. Rajiv Awasthi, Mem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were not parties to the said criminal writ petition (CWP 604/00). However a copy of the said petition is available on record. The said writ petition had been filed for issuance of a writ of mandamus/certiorari directing the respondents to make proper arrangements to hold the Courts of S.E.M./D.C.P., who were conducting the trial of externment proceedings under Section 47/48/50 of Delhi Police Act and S.E.M./A.C.P. and under Section 107/150 of Code of Criminal Procedure (in short Cr.P.C. ). No nexus thus appears to exist between prayers made in the said criminal writ petition and the interim order passed. We fail to understand as to why the committee, which was appointed to consider the working conditions of the courts, would make an enquiry and/or submit a report as regards accessibility of the Krishna Nagar Police Station. On 11th October 2000 a Division Bench recorded as under: Because as it exists the access to Police Station is very difficult. If any untoward incident happens the police officials cannot come for help immediately nor public can reach the police station Krishna Nagar easily. Hence it must be ensured that Police Station is easily accessible from the main road ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... xercising its discretion, by mandamus to exercise its discretion, or when exercised, to see whether it has been validly exercised. It would be inappropriate for the Court to substitute itself for the statutory authorities to decide the matter. 30. On a perusal of the impugned order, we do not find that any consideration was given in the impugned orders on the issue in question. This apart, the High Court disposed of the main appeal on the date not fixed for the same, while disposing of the application. It seems that in the background of the anxiety of the management, in view of the various proceedings undertaken including contempt proceedings for implementing the learned Single Judge's order, the Court instead of adverting to the question in issue, concentrated more to see the said 31 persons be approved within the specified time. As we have held above, without the statutory authority applying its mind for their approval and the impugned order not adjudicating the issue in question how could the impugned orders be sustained. The remote suggestion by the learned counsel for the respondents of mala fide also cannot stand as we do not find, firstly, any such allegation on reco ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . It is now settled law that where an authority makes an order in exercise of a quasi-judicial function, it must record its reasons in support of the order it makes. Every quasi-judicial order must be supported by reasons. That has been laid down by a long line of decisions of this court ending with N.M.Desai v. Testeels Ltd., C.A.No.245 of 1970 decided on 17-12-1975 (SC). But unfortuantley, the Assistant Collector did not choose to give any reasons in support of the order made by him confirming the demand for differential duty. This was in plain disregard of the requirement of law . Reference in this connection may also be made to Paul George v. State reported in J.T. 2002(1)SC 226. 25. A writ in the nature of mandamus can only issue, when there exists a legal right in the petitioner and a corresponding legal duty in the respondent. Existence of a legal right in the petitioner in obtaining an order for acquisition of land that too by invoking the emergency clause did not exist. D.D.A. is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It was its duty as a benevolent litigant to point out that such an order should not be passed in absence of the petitio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ant. The Secretary was not allowed to consider whether it would be feasible to prosecute the appellant' whether the complaint of Harshadari of illegal gratification which was sought to be supported by trap was false and whether the prosecution would be vexatious particularly as it was in the knowledge of the Government that the firm had been blacklisted once and there was demand for some amount to be paid to the Government by the firm in connection with this contract. The discretion not to sanction the prosecution was thus taken away by the High Court. 33. The High Court put the Secretary in a piquant situation. While the Act gave him the discretion to sanction or not to sanction the prosecution of t he appellant, the judgment gave him no choice except to sanction the prosecution as any other decision would have exposed him to an action in contempt for not obeying the mandamus issued by the High Court. The High Court assumed the role of the sanctioning authority, considered the whole matter, formed an opinion that it was a fit case in which sanction should be granted and because it itself could not grant sanction under Section 6 of the Act, it directed the Secretary to san ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the orders of the Court as they were not parties thereto. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the order dated 24th October 2000 passed in Criminal Writ No.604/00 was not binding upon the petitioners, as having been passed without jurisdiction, the same is a nullity. It is now a well settled principle of law that the Court itself and particularly a Larger Bench can review its earlier order. Having regard to the principle of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit (the act of the Court shall prejudice no one) when the statutory/constitutional right of the petitioner has been infringed by an order of the Court, the Court will not hesitate to withdraw or review such order. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S.Nayak and Anr. a Bench of seven Judges of the Supreme Court held that the principle of Actus Curiae Neminem Gravabit is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The Apex Court while dealing with the contention as to whether the order passed by a regular court of unlimited jurisdiction can be set aside, observed as follows: 78. The Privy Council in Issacs v. Robertson (1984) 3 All ER 140 held that orders made by a Cou ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e impugned notification suffers from the vice of non-application of mind on the part of the acquiring authority? 33. The order of this Court was passed on 24th October 2000. On 27th October 2000 the Vice Chairman of DDA by a letter addressed to the Principal Secretary (lands) stated as under : Kindly refer to the letters dated 18.5.87, 25.7.89, 23.3.94, 29.7.94 and 8.8.95 regarding acquisition of land measuring 1 bigha 19 biswas of village Chandrawali alias Shahdara. The said land is urgently required for the passage to the land allotted to Delhi Police. The Hon'ble High Court of Delhi in a public interest criminal writ petition No. 604/00 on 24.10.2000 has directed the DDA to acquire the land Under Section 4, 6 read with Section 17(iv) of the Land Acquisition Act and hand over the possession of the land to Delhi Police on or before 30.11.2000 and the case has been fixed for submitting the compliance report on 1.12.2000. Copies of the earlier reference and the Court orders are enclosed for facility of reference. I shall be grateful if you could kindly look into the matter personally and get the notification issued on priority basis so that the compliance report is sub ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... had been any application of mind to the effect that only 307 sq. yds. lands are necessary to be acquired. Had there been any independent application of mind, the appropriate authority would have come to a definite conclusion that the request of the DDA to acquire the entire land is not correct and the public purpose would be served by acquiring 307 sq. yds of lands only. The impugned notification does not say so. Furthermore, requirement was of the DDA and not of the Land Acquisition Collector. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we are, therefore, of the opinion that it is not a case where the provisions of Section 17 of the Act should have been taken recourse to. 37. According to the petitioners there exists alternative route. Had no opportunity of hearing been given, the petitioners could show that in the public interest other lands shall be acquired as having a better potentiality to be used as access to the Police Station. In Jnanedaya Yogam and another (supra), the law has been stated in the following terms. We may now proceed to consider the legality of the impugned acquisition. In our view, on the peculiar facts of this case, basic requirements ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t's existing shop on spot. When we put this to the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, he stated that on principle there may not have been any objection on this aspect but for the fact that astrologers consulted by the appellant temple have advised that the route of the procession cannot be changed and it is only the old route which is a sanctified route. Now it is easy to visualise that this stand of the appellant clearly shows that the so-called need for having the passage for the movement of the elephant and the procession only through the acquired land after demolishing respondent No. 1's shop is not a genuine need of the temple or for that matter of the members of the public, who are the devotees and who would join in the procession every year . 38. In Om Prakash's case (supra) the Apex Court in the fact situation obtaining therein held: 16. In the light of the aforesaid factual position emerging on the record of the case, it becomes clear that there was no relevant material before the State authorities when it invoked powers under Sub-section (4) of Section 17 for dispensing with Section 5A inquiry while issuing the impugned notifications under Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... acilities to Dalits and Tribes being duty of the State, urgency clause under Section 17(1A) and 17(4) could be invoked. In that case the Court found that there id not exist any pre-notification and/or post-notification delay on the part of the officers to finalise and publish the notification. 46. The observations to the effect that larger the delay greater be the urgency appears to have been made having regard to the unhygienic conditions and deplorable housing needs of Dalits, Tribes and the poor which continued to subsist. The said opinion was held to have been formed by the Government on the basis of its constitutional or international obligation and as such the Court did not disturb the findings on the ground that the plea of mala fide was not established. 47. In Smt. Shakuntala B. Moda's case (supra) , a Division Bench of this Court held that mere omission of the word urgency did not render the notification illegal if such urgency can be shown otherwise by the words used in the notification. No exception to the said preposition of law can be taken. 48. In Deepak Pahwa etc. (supra) the Court, in the facts of the case, held that gap of time between publication of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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