TMI Blog2014 (8) TMI 1124X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 1 vide his 3 memos dated 6.4.2011 filed on that date. These memos show that the Appellant had given the said offer due to the acute financial crisis he was suffering from as he wanted to satisfy his creditors including his bankers to whom he owed substantial amounts. Alas, even after the settlement was fructified, resulting into passing of agreed orders, it has resulted into legal tangle even thereafter, and the Appellant has not been able to get even the said agreed amount. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court was not justified in setting aside the consent decree passed by the learned District Judge. Such a consent decree operates as an estoppel and was binding on the parties from which the Respondents could not wriggle out by taking an after thought plea that its lawyer was not authorised to enter into such a settlement. These appeals are accordingly allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the consent decrees dated 28.04.2011 passed by the trial court are restored. - Civil Appeal Nos. 7164-7166 of 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 23016-23018 of 2012) - - - Dated:- 4-8-2014 - Jasti Chelameswarand A.K. Sikri, JJ. For the Appell ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cts. The Appellant raised his claims in respect of all the three contracts. The Department appointed Mr. Velu as the Arbitrator in one case and Mr. S. Krishnamurthy was appointed as Arbitrator in other two cases. After adjudication of the disputes, awards were passed in all the three cases to the following effect: (i) Award dated 09.06.2006 by Mr. Velu in favour of the Appellant in the sum of ₹ 52,90,776/- together with interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from 09.06.2006 until payment or realisation. (ii) Award dated 25.04.2006 vide which Appellant was awarded a sum of ₹ 39,74,964/- together with interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of award until payment or realisation. (iii) Award dated 25.04.2006 in favour of the Appellant whereby Respondent No. 1 was directed to pay an amount of ₹ 42,56,419/- together with interest at the rate of 18% p.a. from the date of the award until payment or realisation. 5. The Respondent No. 1 challenged all the awards by filing three petitions Under Section 34 of the Act, seeking to set aside these awards. The Appellant filed his replies contesting those petitions. All these petitions were listed before the Princ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the Arbitrators were modified whereby from the award amount, 5% reduction on the principal amount was ordered. Further apart from 40% reduction on the interest awarded till 09.01.2009; total interest accruing beyond that period, was also waived. However, from the date of award i.e. 25.04.2006 to 09.01.2009, interest was calculated at 18% p.a. from where the reduction of 40% in interest amount was granted. 7. To recapitulate the salient facts, the compromise talks took place between the parties at the instance of the Respondents themselves expressing their intention to explore the possibility of settlement as per its letter dated 02.12.2008. Certain meetings were held for this purpose. The Appellant had agreed to forgo substantial part of interest and also 5% of the principal amount. The Superintending Engineer, however, wanted 10% reduction in the principal sums awarded in favour of the Appellant. It is because of this difference the settlement talks failed at that time and the Government decided to pursue the applications Under Section 34 of the Act on merits. However, when the matter came up before the District Judge on 9.4.2011, the Appellant agreed to forgo the entire inter ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... accrued on the awarded amounts after 09.01.2009 apart from the earlier offer made during the negotiations on 09.01.2009 provided that the amount so arrived at be paid in lump sum i.e. in one single installment and the said payment should be made within 3 months. In the said memo the Appellant made it clear that the said offer is made without prejudice to the rights of the Appellant to contest the petition on merit. In response to such offer to forgo further interest from 10.01.2009 for the three award amounts, on 09.04.2011, the Government Pleader, on behalf of the Respondent, made a written endorsement that the offer under the above said memos are in accordance with the negotiations made on 09.01.2009 and offer to forgo entire interest amount from 09.01.2009 was beneficial to the Government. He also affirmed that the Government has no objection for these memos. It was thus argued that when the Government Pleader made the aforesaid endorsement in the manner stated above, and it resulted into passing in agreed order on the basis of settlement arrived between the parties, it was not open to the Respondents to back out therefrom. It was further submitted that the Respondents were sto ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er 14. It is clear from the above that the Government advocate who appeared for the Respondents, had not only found the offer of the Appellant to be in the interest of the Government and beneficial to the Government, but the same was also in accordance with the negotiations held earlier between the parties on 09.01.2009. As noted above, the parties had on an earlier occasion entered into negotiations to find an amicable, out of Court, resolution of the disputes. At that stage, the Petitioner had agreed to forgo substantial part of the benefit which had accrued to him under, the awards. However, the Respondents/Government wanted more concessions which was not agreed to by the Appellant at that time. This resulted in impasse' and the Respondents decided to press its objections Under Section 34 of the Act, on merits. No doubt about this. However, when the matter came up before the Court on 09.04.2011 and the Appellant gave an offer to even forgo further interest accrued under the award after 09.01.2009, and the same was discussed in the Court, this offer was found to be attractive to the Government pleader who was of the view that such an offer was in the interest of the Respon ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public Policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial record are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena. Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the game of litigation . Per Lord Atkinson in Somasundaran v. Subramanian We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpired in court. We cannot allow the statement of the judges to be contradicted by statements at the Bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is' incumbent, upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges, to call attention of the very judges who have m ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nd observed that courts in India have consistently recognised the traditional role of lawyers and the extent and nature of implied authority to act on behalf of their clients. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, has drawn our attention to the copy of the vakalatnama (Annexure R-3) and the contents therein. The terms appended in the vakalatnama enable the counsel to perform several acts on behalf of his client including withdraw or compromise suit or matter pending before the court. The various clauses in the vakalatnama undoubtedly gives power to the counsel to act with utmost interest which includes to enter into a compromise or settlement. 26. The following observations and conclusions in paras 37, 38 and 39 are relevant: 37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority ex ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ower to make a statement on instructions from the party to withdraw the appeal. In that case, Respondent 1 therein, elder brother of the Petitioner filed a suit for declaration against the Petitioner and three brothers that the decree dated 4-5-1990 was null and void which was decreed by the Subordinate Judge, Hoshiarpur on 29-9-1993. The Petitioner therein filed an appeal in the Court of the Additional District Judge, Hoshiarpur. The counsel made a statement on 15-9-1995 that the Petitioner did not intend to proceed with the appeal. On the basis thereof, the appeal was dismissed as withdrawn. The Petitioner challenged the order of the appellate court in the revision. The High Court confirmed the same which necessitated the filing of SLP before this Court. 29. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner in Jagtar Singh case contended that the Petitioner had not authorised the counsel to withdraw the appeal. It was further contended that the court after admitting the appeal has no power to dismiss the same as withdrawn except to decide the matter on merits considering the legality of the reasoning of the trial court and the conclusions either agreeing or disagreeing with it. Rejectin ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... , the counsel making a statement on instructions either for withdrawal of appeal or for modification of the decree is well within his competence and if really the counsel has not acted in the interest of the party or against the instructions of the party, the necessary remedy is elsewhere. 18. Likewise in 2011, this Court in Jineshwardas (D) through L.Rs. and Ors. v. Smt. Jagrani and Anr.: (2003) 11 SCC 372, has held as under: If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. 19. We find that in the present case the Government Pleader was legally entitled to enter into a compromise with the Appellant and his written endorsement on the Memo filed by the Appellant can be deemed as a valid consent of the Respondent itself. Hence the Counsel appearing for a party is fully competent to put his signature to the terms of any compromise upon which a decree can be passed in proper compliance with the provisions of Order XXIII Rule 3 and such decree is perfectly valid. The authority of a Counsel to act on behalf of a party is expres ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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