TMI Blog1991 (12) TMI 285X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the appellant was selected as a Consolidator on 5.11.1954 and was sent for training as a Consolidator at Rampur Training College, which he joined on 16.11.1954 and after completing the training he again joined his original posting on 12.2.55. 4. On 24.3.55 the appellant was appointed as a Consolidator in Saharanpur by the Commission of Consolidation, U.P. Government, Lucknow through the S.D.M. Moradabad and was relieved and sent on deputation. As a Consolidator the appellant was transferred from place to place in the normal course. He was transferred from Pilibhit on promotion as an Assistant Consolidation Officer (for short A.C.O.) at Azamgarh on 7.6.1967 and thereafter to Agra and to Lakhimpur. He was once again posted in Azamgarh as A.C.O. While it was so, the appellant received the order of termination of his services on 16.10.1971 from the Consolidation Commissioner, which order did not assign any reason. His case is that he was on deputation. According to the appellant, the only course left open to the Consolidation Commissioner was to revert him back to his substantive post, namely, Lekhpal to which he was having a lien in the District of Moradabad and that he was not giv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... idation, Lucknow is illegal and void and set aside the same. The petitioner shall be entitled to get all the benefits arising out of it according to rules. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs. 8. The State of U.P., respondent herein on being dissatisfied with the order of the Tribunal filed Writ Petition No. 226/80 before the High Court at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench. The High Court by its judgment allowed the Writ Petition and quashed the order of the Tribunal observing thus : It is, therefore, not correct to say that there was no material for terminating the employment of the petition nor it can be accepted that the impugned order against the petitioner was passed to impose any penalty on him. The order also cannot be said to be arbitrary or whimsical. 9. Hence the present appeal by the appellant. 10. The pivotal questions on which the claim of the appellant revolve are (1) whether the appellant was having lien in the post of Lekhpal; and (2) whether he entered into the service in the Consolidation Department on deputation and as such was entitled to be sent back only to his substantive post, namely, the post of Lekhpal, but not to be terminated ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... her he had been permanently appointed to some other post or whether the post of Lekhpal, Shri Harish Chandra held, fell as a permanent vacancy or a temporary one. Moreover, when the appellant is not shown to have been appointed to the post of Lekhpal on a permanent basis and to have held substantively that post, this letter dated 10.6.63 does not assume much significance and relevance. But, on the other hand, when the appellant was appointed only on temporary basis as it is evident from his order of appointment dated 6.4.53 and thereafter newly appointed in some other post, the question of lien does not arise, even on the basis of the letter dated 10.6.63. 15. Mr. Gopal Subramanium appearing for the appellant took much pain in construing the expression 'lien' with reference to the definition of that word as found in the UP. Fundamental Rules and contended that the appellant should have been reverted back only to his original post and not terminated. In the counter affidavit (Annexure P. IV) filed on behalf of the second respondent, namely, S.D.M., Moradabad before the Tribunal, it is stated thus : The petitioner did work as Lekhpal in an officiating capacity from 6. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... llows: Lien means the title of a Government servant to hold substantively, either immediately or on the termination of a period or periods of absence, a permanent post, including a tenure post, to which he has been appointed substantively. 18. We shall now examine what the word 'lien' means. The word 'lien' originally means binding from the Latin ligamen. Its lexical meaning is right to retain . The word 'lien' is now variously described and used under different context such as 'contractual lien', 'equitable lien', 'specific lien', 'general lien', 'partners lien', etc. etc. in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Volume 28 at page 221, para 502 it is stated : In its primary or legal sense lien means a right at common law in one man to retain that which is rightfully and continuously in his possession belonging to another until the present and accrued claims are satisfied. 19. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, 5th Edition, Volume 3 at page 1465 the following passage is found: LIEN. (1) A lien-(without effecting a transference of the property in a thing)-is the right to retain possession ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nguishing the decision of this Court in P.L. Dhingra v. Union of India (1958)ILLJ544SC has observed that a person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier , with which view we are in agreement. 26. Even on the appellant's own showing he was appointed as a Lekhpal on 6.4.53 and held the same till 15.11.1954, that is for a period of nearly one year and seven months. His appointment order unambiguously shows that it was only on a temporary basis. The appellant has not shown that he had been confirmed in a permanent post and that he was holding that appointment substantively either immediately or on the termination of a period so as to make a claim of lien to the post of Lekhpal by availing the benefit of Rules 14-A and 14-B of the U.P. Fundamental Rules. Therefore, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad, it cannot be said that the appellant held the post in a substantive capacity on permanent basis on the date when he was appointed as a Consolidator. In the absence of any such proof on the side of the appellant, we are constrained to hold that he was employed as Lekhpal on a temporary basis ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hout. The order of termination dated 16.10.1971 shows that the appellant at the relevant time was holding the post of temporary Assistant Consolidation Officer and that his services were no more required and that he was paid one month's salary in lieu of notice. As it is not the case of the appellant that his services alone were terminated whilst some of his juniors have been retained in service, the dictum laid down in Om Prakash Goel v. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. [1991]2SCR701a to which we were parties and on which reliance was placed by the appellant has no application to the facts of this case. Mr. Yogeshwar Prasad drew our attention to a recent decision of this Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla [1991]1SCR29 wherein the proposition of law regarding the termination of services of ad hoc or temporary Government servants on assessment of suitability on consideration of adverse entries has been laid down. In that case, this Court after observing that the decision in Nepal Singh v. State of U.P. (1986)IILLJ343SC is per incuriam and distinguishing the decision in Ishwar Chand Jain v. High Court of Punjab and Haryana AIR1 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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