TMI Blog2003 (3) TMI 79X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... question of law, for the opinion of this court: "Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in law in allowing the exemption under section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth-tax Act in respect of seven items of jewellery claimed to represent art treasures?" In this batch of cases, we are concerned only with the said question. In order to express our opinion, it is just and necessary to notice the relevant facts: The issue relates to the assessment years 1980-81 to 1986-87. His Exalted Highness, the late Nawab Sir Mir Osman Ali Khan Bahadur, created "HEH the Nizam's Jewellery Trust" by the indenture dated March 29, 1951. The said settlor specified the names of the beneficiaries, their respective shares and also indicated' the purposes wherever required for which the trust was created. The specified, items of jewellery were handed over to the persons named therein and the balance 89 items of the jewellery formed the principal fund of the trust. The power of the trustees to sell the jewellery is contained in clause 13 of the trust deed. The sale of jewellery could take place only after the death of the settlor and his eldest son, Prince Azam J ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 429 of 1979 in the Supreme Court. The 37 items of the jewellery of the trust had become the subject matter of litigation and the Supreme Court issued directions directing the Union Finance Secretary, who is also the chairman of the trust, for taking custody of the jewels. Thus, the possession of the most valuable 37 items out of 89 items of the jewellery of the trust was taken away from the trust and remained with the Union Finance Secretary. The Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, declared the seven most valuable items out of 37 items of the jewellery as "art treasure", by Notification No. 664(E), dated November 8, 1982, published in the Gazette. The trustees are admittedly prohibited to sell any of these items, since the sale of these items is prohibited under the provisions of the Antiquities Act. The case of the assessees is that those seven items, declared as "art treasure", shall be exempted under section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth-tax Act, 1957. These items were prohibited for sale on the valuation dates under consideration. The Tribunal accepted the submissions made by the assessees and accordingly held that the seven items, declared as "art treasure", could ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e identified as "works of art" and not as any jewellery. The assessees have not claimed exemption on the ground that those items are precious. The assessees have not claimed such benefit with regard to any such jewellery. The exemption is claimed on the ground that those seven items of assets are "works of art". In nutshell learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the assessees, contended that when once the asset falls under section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth-tax Act, the same is liable to be exempted from being included in the net wealth of the assessee. The Wealth-tax Act is an Act to provide for the levy of wealth-tax. It is a self-contained code. In the Statement of and Reasons appended to the Wealth-tax Bill, 1957, it is that "the object of this Bill is to impose an annual tax on the net wealth of individuals, Hindu undivided families and companies. The proposed tax is an important constituent of an integrated tax structure which Government have been aiming at for some time...it is consistent with the avowed goal of the attainment of a socialistic pattern of society"--a forgotten expression. Learned senior standing counsel contended that the jewellery, which is considere ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ection 77(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The Explanation provides that "any expenditure incurred or authorised in connection with the election of a candidate by a political party--shall not be deemed to be--expenditure in connection with the election incurred or authorised by the candidate". The Supreme Court while construing this provision read sections 13A and 139(4B) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which though exempting the income of political parties from house property, other sources or voluntary contributions require them to maintain audited accounts and to file income-tax return for each assessment year. The Supreme Court took the view that the political parties which are not maintaining audited and authentic accounts and are not filing returns of income, are not entitled to plead that they have incurred or authorised any expenditure in connection with the election of a candidate within the meaning of Explanation 1 to section 77(1) and held that the said provision does not give protection to the expenditure which comes from an unknown or black source. In the same context, the Supreme Court observed that the main income of a political party comes from contrib ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the applicability of other laws of the land. Even if it is a codifying Act unless a contrary intention appears it is presumed not to be intended to change the law. Furthermore where the codifying statute is silent on a point then it is permissible to look at other laws. The Supreme Court observed: "In J.K. Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1173; [1969] 2 SCR 481, it was held that cognate and pari materia legislation should be read together as forming one system and as interpreting and enforcing each other. In Vidyacharan Shukla v. Khubchand Baghel, AIR 1964 SC 1099; [1964] 6 SCR 129, it was held that the Code of Civil Procedure has to be read along with the Limitation Act. In State of Madras v. A. Vaidyanatha Iyer, AIR 1958 SC 61; [1958] SCR 580, 590 it was held that the Prevention of Corruption Act should be read along with the Evidence Act. In Mannan Lal v. Chhotaka Bibi [1970] 1 SCC 769; [1971] 1 SCR 253, it was held that the Code of Civil Procedure has to be read along with the Court Fees Act. In Vasudev Ramchandra Shelat v. Pranlal Jayanand Thakar [1974] 2 SCC 323; [1975] 1 SCR 534, this court observed that the Companies Act should be read along with the Transfer of ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... "work of art" means a painting, Sculpture or other production in, the fine arts, esp., one of high quality; anything constructed or composed with manifest skill. Problems of definition as to what are the arts and "work of art" elude solution. In the New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Volume 2, 15th edition, it is stated: What are the arts, and what is art in general? This is still a controversial question after centuries of debate. No particular definition commands universal assent. Several meanings are still frequently used, of which the oldest is the broad, technical sense. In this sense, the English term art and its equivalents in Greek and Latin covered not only what are now called "fine arts" or 'aesthetic arts' but any kind of transmitted, useful skill, such as agriculture, medicine, and war...In the 19th and 20th centuries, there has been a tendency to abandon the term art in speaking of the purely utilitarian skills and to call them instead "industries," "technics," "branches of engineering," or "applied sciences." Without the prefix fine, the word art alone is now commonly understood to mean the fine or aesthetic arts. To produce an experience of beauty or aesthetic satisfac ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... . In a difficult case, the number of relevant interpretative criteria may be so high that the task of the court in assessing their effect is, correspondingly, difficult. Even the statutory language apparently free from the sins of semantic ambiguity might not, in the context of the purpose, connote or convey its lexicographic thrust; but would acquire a different shade or colour imparted to it by the variations of the interpretation criteria. The ambiguity need not necessarily be a grammatical ambiguity, but one of appropriateness of the meaning in a particular context. Francis Bennion in his Statutory Interpretation, 1984 edition, page 390, refers to the nature of the task in weighing the factors: '....it is necessary for the interpreter to assess the respective weights of the relevant interpretative factors and determine which of the opposing constructions they favour on balance... We may speak of the factors tending in a certain direction as a bundle of factors. This is figurative, but then so is the idea of factors being 'weighed'. The court is unlikely even to consider the factors one by one, and certainly will not proceed in any mechanistic way.... We find that one bund ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the assessees have made efforts for selling those articles also. Learned senior standing counsel submitted that it would not be enough to claim exemption under section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth-tax Act on the ground that the asset is a "work of art", but the assessee must further plead and establish that such "work of art" is not intended for sale. The burden is on the assessees. There is no dispute with the proposition canvassed by learned senior standing counsel. It is very well settled that where the statute's meaning is clear and explicit, words cannot be interpolated. But if the words of an instrument are ambiguous in the sense that they can reasonably bear more than one meaning, that is to say, if the words are semantically ambiguous, or if a provision, if read literally, is patently incompatible with the other provisions of that instrument, the court would be justified in construing the words in a manner which will make the particular provision purposeful. That, in essence is the rule of harmonious construction. It is submitted by learned senior standing counsel that the intention on the part of the assessees to sell the said articles itself would be enough to deny the be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tion under the provisions of section 5(1)(xii) of the Wealth-tax Act, viz., those articles are of "works-of art" and not intended for sale. Sri Y. Ratnakar, learned counsel appearing for some of the assessees, contended that this court could express its opinion only on questions of law and under no circumstances can interfere with the findings of the Tribunals unless such findings are also challenged. The question whether the seven items are of "works of art" is a question of fact and the Tribunal as a finding of fact found the said articles to be the "works of art". Such findings do not give rise to any question of law. Learned counsel also submitted that the finding by the Tribunal that these articles were not intended for sale is also a finding of fact and this court cannot disturb such finding of fact. Learned counsel relied upon various authorities in support of the submission that this court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunal. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment, with those reported decisions, since it is so well settled that this court cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the Tribunals, unless such findings, themselv ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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