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TMI Blog2017 (3) TMI 1628X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ed by the Commission and came to hold that the ONGC was not entitled to refund and the claim was wholly unsustainable. 2. The present appeal was presented before the Registry of this Court on 7.2.2008. An office note recorded that the appeal was barred by 71 days. The appeal was listed before the Bench on 29.1.2010 on which date this Court condoned the delay and admitted the appeal. When the matter was taken up for hearing today, Ms. Ranjeeta Ramachandran, learned Counsel appearing for the 1st Respondent raised a preliminary objection that this Court could not have condoned the delay of 71 days in view of the language employed in Section 125 of the Act and further the condonation of delay by this Court was done without notice to the Respondent and hence, deserves to be recalled and as a sequitur, the appeal has to be dismissed without any adverting to the same on merits. For the aforesaid purpose, she has placed reliance on the authority in Suryachakra Power Corporation Ltd. v. Electricity Department, Rep. By its Superintending Engineer, Port Blair and Ors. 2016 (10) SCALE 46. 3. Mr. Saurav Agrawal, learned Counsel appearing for the Appellant would contend that it had applied for ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and Record of Proceedings) Rules, 2007 and opined thus: 25. Section 125 lays down that any person aggrieved by any decision or order of the Tribunal can file an appeal to this Court within 60 days from the date of communication of the decision or order of the Tribunal. Proviso to Section 125 empowers this Court to entertain an appeal filed within a further period of 60 days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing appeal within the initial period of 60 days. This shows that the period of limitation prescribed for filing appeals Under Sections 111(2) and 125 is substantially different from the period prescribed under the Limitation Act for filing suits etc. The use of the expression 'within a further period of not exceeding 60 days' in Proviso to Section 125 makes it clear that the outer limit for filing an appeal is 120 days. There is no provision in the Act under which this Court can entertain an appeal filed against the decision or order of the Tribunal after more than 120 days. 7. The two-Judge Bench placed reliance on Singh Enterprises v. C.C.E., Jamshedpur and Ors. (2008) 3 SCC 70 and Commissioner of Customs and Central Excise v. Hongo Indi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Section 14 would be applicable when there is pursuing of a remedy with due diligence and good faith. We shall advert to the said facet at the later part of our deliberation. 11. In the instant case, as is noticeable, the judgment was reserved on 18.9.2007 and pronounced in open court on 28.9.2007. Therefore, the date of communication would be 28.9.2007 as per the principle laid down in Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board (supra). We entirely concur with the said view. In the case at hand, the certified copy was applied through email on 9.10.2007 and delivered on the same date. Be that as it may, the date of communication is 28.9.2007 and, therefore, the appeal preferred Under Section 125 of the Act should have been filed within 60 days, i.e., 27.11.2007, to come within the period of limitation and further to be entitled to get the benefit of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, he should have filed the appeal within a further period of 60 days, i.e., 26.9.2008. Thus calculated, there is total delay of 71 days and 11 days beyond the expiry of 60 days the limit that is stipulated Under Section 125 of the Act. 12. At this juncture, a submission has been advanced by Mr. Agrawal that in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... is Court could make in order to do complete justice between the parties, must not only be consistent with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent with the substantive provisions of the relevant statutory laws (emphasis supplied). The court therefore, held that it was not possible to hold that Article 142(1) conferred upon this Court powers which could contravene the provisions of Article 32. 14. The said decision has been clarified by a Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corporation etc. v. Union of India etc. etc. 1991 Supp. (1) SCR 251 wherein M.N. Vekatachaliah, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the majority, ruled that: It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court Under Article 142(1) of the Constitution. These issues are matters of serious public importance. The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the apex Court Under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Garg as well as Antulay cases the point was one of violatio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... not relate to the powers of the Court Under Article 142, but only to what is or is not 'complete justice' of a cause or matter and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of the exercise of the power. No question of lack of jurisdiction or of nullity can arise. [Emphasis supplied] 15. In this regard, another Constitution Bench in Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India and Anr. (1998) 4 SCC 409 opined: 56. As a matter of fact, the observations on which emphasis has been placed by us from the Union Carbide case, A.R. Antulay case and Delhi Judicial Service Assn. case go to show that they do not strictly speaking come into any conflict with the observations of the majority made in Prem Chand Garg case. It is one thing to say that "prohibitions or limitations in a statute" cannot come in the way of exercise of jurisdiction Under Article 142 to do complete justice between the parties in the pending "cause or matter" arising out of that statute, but quite a different thing to say that while exercising jurisdiction Under Article 142, this Court can altogether ignore the substantive provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject and pass orders concerning an issu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... alysed thus: ...when a certain period is excluded by applying the principles contained in Section 14, there is no delay to be attributed to the Appellant and the limitation period provided by the statute concerned continues to be the stated period and not more than the stated period. We conclude, there-fore, that the principle of Section 14 which is a principle based on advancing the cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which ultimately end without a decision on the merits of the case. The controversy in the case at hand has to be viewed regard being had to the ratio laid down in the aforesaid authority. 18. In the instant case, as is noticeable, the application for review was filed after expiry of 30 days. Learned Counsel for the Respondent would contend that for filing of review, no time limit is prescribed. Per contra, Ms. Ranjeeta Ramachandran has drawn our attention to Section 120F which confers the jurisdiction on the tribunal and Sub-section (2) of Section 120 clearly prescribes that the tribunal for the purpose of discharging its functions under this Act can exercise t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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