TMI Blog1928 (6) TMI 3X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... were attached to the institution and that the defendant was not a fit person to continue as Mahant. He accordingly ordered his removal from the office and settled a scheme for the appointment of his successor, who was to be assisted by a committee of management. He also ordered the defendant to submit accounts for a specified period for the scrutiny of the committee, and further directed that an allowance of ₹ 75 per mensem be paid out of the Gurdwara income to him as maintenance for his lifetime and that he be given a house at Amritsar for residence. The costs of the suit were ordered to be paid by the defendant personally and not from the Gurdwara income. 2. From this decree two appeals were lodged to this Court: C.A. 2630 of 1922, presented on 23rd October 1922 by the defendant praying for the dismissal of the suit, and C.A. 182 of 1923, preferred on 8th January 1923, by the plaintiffs objecting to the grant of maintenance allowance and the house for residence to the defendant. When these appeals came up for hearing before a Division Bench on 26th March 1928, a preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the plaintiffs that the Sikh Gurdwaras Act 8 of 1925 having in t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich we are concerned in this and the connected references were included in Schedule 1 and no proceedings had admittedly been taken within the prescribed period to have them excluded from it, it was decided at the hearing, with the concurrence of all parties, to limit the arguments to Gurdwaras of class (A) only. I shall accordingly discuss the matter in so far as it relates to such Gurdwaras alone and not concern myself with those which fall under class (B) or class (C). 5. Dr. Narang, who appeared for the plaintiffs-respondents began his arguments by boldly asserting that as a result of the enactment of the (Punjab) Act 8 of 1925 and of the Sikh Gurdwaras Supplementary Act 24 of 1925 (passed by the Central Legislature) all cases relating to Notified Sikh Gurdwaras, which were pending on 1st November 1925, in all civil Courts (including the High Court on its appellate side) became automatically dead and that from that date these Courts lost all power to proceed further with them and to give decisions thereon. He was, however, unable to refer us to any provision in these Acts in support of this contention, and was eventually constrained to admit that the bar applied (if at all) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tration is to be carried on. Now the terms of Sub-section (4), Section 3 are clear, explicit and imperative, and admit of no exception whatever. They determine conclusively the nature of certain Gurdwaras and lay down the law as to their future control and management. Pending litigation is not excluded from their purview and (provided the conditions laid down in the sub-section are fulfilled) it is not open to any Court including this Court, to determine whether or not a Notified Gurdwara is a Sikh Gurdwara or to settle a scheme for its future control and management. These two matters are, therefore, settled by the legislature and this Court cannot, go into them. 7. I shall next consider Sub-section (1), Section 31, on which reliance was placed on behalf of the respondents. This sub-section reads as follows: No Court shall continue any proceedings in so far as such proceedings involve any claim relating to a gurdwara specified in Schedule 1 or in regard to which a notification has been published under the provisions of Sub-section (2), Section 3, if such claim could have been made in a petition forwarded to the Local Government under the provisions of Section 5 or Section ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lay to the newly constituted Supreme Court, observed: The Judiciary Act is not retrospective by express enactment or by necessary intendment. And the before the only question is: Was the appeal to His Majesty in Council a right vested in the appellants at the date of the passing of the Act, or was it a mere matter of procedure? It seems to their Lordships that the question does not admit of doubt. To deprive a suitor in a pending action of an appeal to a superior tribunal which belonged to him as of right is a very different thing from regulating procedure. In principle, their Lordships see no difference between abolishing an appeal altogether and transferring the appeal to a new tribunal. In either case there is an interference with existing rights contrary to the well-known general principle that statutes are not to be held to act retrospectively, unless a clear intention to that effect is manifested. 10. It is an established canon of interpretation that statutes should be interpreted if possible, so as to respect vested rights Hough v. Windus [1884] 12 Q.B.D. 237, and in the absence of anything in an enactment to show that it is to have retrospective operation, it ca ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of interpretation to be followed in interpreting statutes which purport to affect vested rights, let us now proceed to apply them to Sections 29 and 32, Sikh Gurdwaras Act. It is admitted that in neither of these sections is there an express prohibition against an appellate Court proceeding to determine in a pending appeal the particular matters specified therein. The Bar applies in terms to suits or proceedings and not to appeals. It has, however, been contended on behalf of the respondents that an appeal is in reality a continuation of the suit, in which the decree under appeal was passed by the Court of the first instance, and, therefore, the sections must be held to include in their ambit, if not expressly at least by necessary implication, the entire litigation beginning with the filing of the plaint or the making of the initial application in the trial Court, and ending with the decision of the Court of ultimate appeal or revision. In support of this contention reliance was placed on Gobind Chundar Roy v. Guru Churan [1888] 15 Cal. 94, Dinonath Ghose v. Shama Bibi [1901] 28 Cal. 23, Settappa Goundan v. Muthia Goundan [1908] 31 Mad. 268, Kristama Chariar v. Mangam Mal [ ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of Jessel, M.R., in Holme v. Guy [1877] 5 Ch. D 901, where a similar interpretation was put on the expression suit, petition or other proceedings' in Section 2, (English) Charitable Trust Act, 1853. 15. An examination of these and other cases leads to the conclusion that suit proceeding and words of similar connotation have different meanings in different statutes and that it is not possible to lay down a general rule of interpretation which would be applicable to all cases. In each particular case the question has to be examined in reference to the context and that meaning is to be preferred which will best fit in with it. 16. I have given my most careful consideration to the phraseology used in Sections 29 and 32 and have examined it in reference to other parts of the Act, and have reached the conclusion that the word suit or proceeding must be construed in a narrow sense as signifying an action in the trial Court or proceedings ejusdem generis and cannot be held to include appeals. Taking Section 32 first we find it laid down that where in any suit or proceeding pending at the commencement of the Act, in a civil or revenue Court it has become or becomes necessar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... Tribunal is admittedly subordinate, or an inferior appellate Court like that of the District Judge or the Senior Sub-Judge, and whether the appeal is before the High Court as a first or second appeal or has been filed under the Letters Patent against a decree passed by a single Judge of the Court itself. 18. In cases in which the order of the Tribunal has been appealed against under Section 34, there will be simultaneously pending in the High Court two appeals, arising out of the same suit one against the decree of the Sub-Judge and the other against the order of the Tribunal. In one of them the Court has to adjudicate on the findings of the Tribunal on the issues referred to it, and in the other it has virtually no judicial functions to perform so far as the matters covered by the issues are concerned. It is conceded that such a position is highly anomalous and inconvenient and may at times lead to serious complications. In these circumstances, I am not, in the absence of clear words to the contrary, prepared to hold that Section 32 applies to appeals. 19. The phraseology used in Section 29 is similar to that in Section 32 and on similar considerations suit or proceedings ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n the face I am not prepared to hold that the legislature intended, as if it were by a side wind and without expressing itself more clearly than it has done, to effect so material a change in the jurisdiction and powers of the appellate Courts, including the High Court, to deal with matters properly pending before them. As pointed out by Jassell, M.R., in Jacobs v. Brett [1875] 20 Eq. 1: Nothing is better settled than that an act of Parliament which takes away the jurisdiction of a superior Court of law must be expressed in clear terms. I do not mean to say that it may not be done by necessary implication as well as by express words, but at all events it must be done clearly. It is not to be assumed that the legislature intends to destroy the jurisdiction of a superior Court. You must find the intention not merely implied but necessarily implied. 20. In my opinion, Section 29 is no bar to this Court deciding the question whether the appellant had been properly removed by the trial Court, though it may be that in view of Section 3 it may not be possible for it to grant to the appellant all the reliefs claimed by him. I would, therefore, hold that neither Section 29 nor Sec ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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