TMI Blog1955 (6) TMI 11X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nion List. I may observe at the outset that most of the important submissions of Mr. lyengar, who has addressed the leading argument for the petitioners, are covered by my decision in Atma Ram Budhia v. State of Bihar, AIR 1952 Pat 359 (A), a Special Bench decision in which my other two colleagues almost entirely concurred. I find that the above decision has been quoted with approval by Rajamannar, C.J., sitting with another learned Judge in a recent case of P. Mathurai Pillai v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 569 (B), where a similar legislation as the one in instance was in question. I do not however claim infallibility for my judgment and I would have gladly revised my views if in the varied and versatile presentation of the subject by Mr. Iyengar I had found anything substantial to deflect me from the opinion which I then held. I regret to say that after giving my anxious consideration to all his arguments I have nothing to that effect. 2. It is idle to repeat what I said in my earlier judgment. It is well known that in deciding about the validity of an impugned legislation the real test is whether in pith and substance, the Act falls under an authorised legislative field. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field and therefore it is necessary to inquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the Act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacted it, then it cannot be held to be invalid merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another Legislature. I shall be content to close my discussion of the tonic by reference to a passage from another recent decision of the Supreme Court in Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., AIR 1954 SC 119 (H), where Mahajan, J., as he then was, stated the law thus: In order to decide these issues it is necessary to examine with some strictness the substance of the legislation for the purpose of determining what it is that the Legislature has really done; the Court,, when such questions arise, is not overpersuaded by the mere appearance of the legislation. In relation to constitutional prohibitions binding a Legislature it is clear that the Legislature cannot disobey the prohibitions merely by employing indire ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ended to the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. It is to be remembered that in Australia all taxing powers belong to the States, except those which are specifically reserved to the Commonwealth; and the question in Australia always is whether a particular tax falls within the field of taxation reserved to the Commonwealth or not; there can be no overlapping of particular legislative spheres. The decisions from Australia must therefore be treated with caution when interpreting the language of the present Constitution. Sir Maurice Gwyer, C.J., sounded this note of warning - In the matter of central provinces and berar sales of motor spirit and lubricants taxation act, 1938, AIR 1939 P.C. 1 (I). His Lordship discussed the distinctive features of the various Constitutions of Canada, Australia and the United State and observed: Disputes with regard to central and provincial legislative spheres are inevitable under every federal constitution, and have been the subject-matter of a long series of cases in Canada, Australia and the United States, as well as of numerous decisions on appeal by the Judicial Committee. Many of these cases were cited in the course of the argument. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... on is to the living body: it is commerce itself; and therefore any import of the nature envisaged by entry 56 of List II of the Constitution is a direct interference with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse and violates Art.301. Entry 56 entitles the State Legislature to levy a transport or carriage tax on goods and passengers because of the use of the road and inland water-ways and not because the goods and passengers have any relation to trade and commerce. Incidentally the transport of the goods or passengers may be in connection with trade or commerce, but the tax envisaged by the entry has no direct connection with them. The nature of the tax as defined by Entry 56 is wholly different and has nothing to do with freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Even a Constitution like the Indian Constitution where endeavour has been made to define the respective legislative heads as precisely and elaborately as possible there is bound to be some amount of overlapping, but an endeavour should be made not to give a technical and pedantic construction to the language of the Constitution so as to lead to conflicts and defeat some of its provisions but a fair construction w ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 12) AC 571 at p.583 (M). Even if we impart a very wide significance to the words used in Art.301, I am not prepared to hold that the imposition of tax such as the one contemplated by entry 56 of List II interferes with the freedom of trade, commerce or intercourse. In that event, many of the taxes which the State Legislature is authorised to levy under the various heads enumerated in List II will have to be declared unauthorised as amounting to interference with trade or commerce and sales tax would be a prominent casualty. Article 265 prescribes that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. This authority of levying and collecting taxes is given to the State Legislatures by virtue of List II read with Art.246 of the Constitution. If we adopt the interpretation suggested by Mr. Iyengar it will lead to a serious inroad upon the rights of the States to raise revenue for their own finances and to an annihilation of the efforts of the makers of the Constitution to safeguard such rights which is evidenced by the enumeration of the various legislative heads in the Lists themselves. The very fact that there are some entries which deal specifically with tra ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... State Legislature. Article 301 runs thus: Subject to the other provisions of this Part, trade, commerce and intercourse throughout the territory of India shall be free. Mr. Iyengar suggests that the freedom of trade and commerce and intercourse is guaranteed, subject only to the provisions of Part XIII of the Constitution and it is not subject to any other Part of Constitution. He argues that this freedom of trade obviously means absolute freedom including the freedom from taxation and therefore any legislation which seeks to curtail that freedom must be held to be in violation of this mandatory provision of the Constitution and therefore void. He claims that this freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse is on par with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution if not even higher. I have already dealt with these contentions earlier; but Mr. Iyengar derives some support for his contention from a recent decision of the Bombay High Court in State of Bombay v. Chamarbauwalia, 57 Bom LR 288 (N), wherein Chagla, C.J., observed that the legislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislatures must be read subject to Art.301 or in other words, neither ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ose commodities carried otherwise. He argues that there is no rational basis for exempting from taxation these commodities carried otherwise than in chest or bales. For the purpose of a valid classification, two ingredients are essential: (i) there must be an intelligible basis for differentiation and (ii) that the said differentiation must have a rational relation to the object of the legislation. It is suggested that in leaving out of account tea and jute carried otherwise, the Legislature has adopted no rational basis for serving the object of taxation envisaged by the Act. The answer to this contention is obvious. The Courts have to permit wider classification under the power of taxation if possible, than merely in the exercise of the police powers. The reason for it undoubtedly is the urgent need for revenue by the various governmental agencies. A State does not have to tax everything in order to tax something. It is allowed to pick and choose districts, objects, persons, methods and even rates of taxation if it does so reasonably. The Constitution does not say how cases shall be decided. All that it says is that the States shall not deny to any person equal protect ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the government of india act, 1935 which now corresponds to Entry No.84 of List I of the present Constitution. The learned Chief Justice further observed: In the present case, it could not be suggested that the tax on retail sales has any connexion with production; it is also imposed indifferently on all motor spirit and lubricants, whether produced or manufactured in India or not. I do not say that this is conclusive, but it is to be taken into consideration. And I think that the distinction drawn by the learned Judge corresponds in substance with the distinction which it seems to me ought to be drawn in the case of the federal and provincial spheres in India, that is, between the taxation of goods at the stage of manufacture or production and their taxation by the provincial taxing authority (as in Australia by the State) after they have become part of what I have called the common stock of that Province. His Lordship had occasion to clarify this last observation in a subsequent decision in AIR 1942 FC 33 (J), in these words: I may perhaps be myself responsible for some of the confusion which seems to have arisen, by reason of the suggestion which I made in AIR ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt of india act which ran thus: Dues on passengers and goods on inland water-ways. We thus find that in the entry as it now stands in the Constitution there were three distinct changes introduced: in place of dues we find the word tax, for passengers and goods , the order has been reversed and goods and passengers has been substituted and the word by road has also been added to inland water ways. There is no doubt that the above changes have enlarged the scope of the entry. The whole object of that entry appears to be to enable the State Legislature to impose tax on the transportation of goods and passengers by the road and inland water-ways. Inland water-ways must evidently refer to water-ways which are used for navigation by public boats or crafts. Similarly, road here cannot possibly refer to private roads or tracks but must refer to public roads used for traffic both vehicular and pedestrian as of right. The contention of the learned Advocate-General that the word road must be held to include both private and public road does not appeal to me. As I said, the entry has to be construed as a whole. Thus the State Legislature is empowered under this head to impose t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... he list. These entries are all enabling and empower the legislature to tax both the objects. It was therefore open to the Legislature to tax goods and passengers either individually or collectively. 7. The terms of the Act itself have now to be examined to ascertain whether it does in fact impose a tax as provided by this entry. The Preamble to the Act, its long and short title all go to indicate that it is an Act to provide for the levy of a tax on certain goods and passengers carried by road or inland water-ways. These provisions are strictly in conformity with the terms of entry 56 of List II. The preamble to an Act discloses the primary intention of the Legislature, but it cannot override the provisions of the Act, if in fact these provisions are in conflict with the preamble itself and lead to some result not warranted by the preamble. As it has been observed earlier we should not be over-persuaded by the mere appearance of the Act, but should examine the whole gamut of the Legislation to determine its true nature and character. The short title of the Act is contained in S.1 of the Act itself which also defines its extent and commencement. But the most important part ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... length of the road or inland water-ways used; and (5) the section itself mentions nothing about the carriage of the goods on roads or inland water-ways. On the contrary the qualifying clause carried by motor vehicle, cart, trolley, boat, animal1 and human agency or any other means except airways is so comprehensive as to cover any movement of the goods even from one part of the factory or tea garden to any other part. 8. The presence or absence of the features explained in items 1 to 4 above does lend some countenance to the case of the petitioners that the tax sought to be levied by S.3 of the Act is more akin to excise duty. At any rate, those factors do not strengthen the inference that the tax proposed is in the nature of a transport or carriage tax on the goods for user of roads or inland water-ways. But the question is whether the qualification contained in the clause indicated in item 5 above makes any difference to the character of the impost and brings it within the ambit of entry 56. Here again, Mr. Iyengar contends that the qualifying clause is merely a camouflage and does not improve the position; the word carried in that clause would incl ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... heir premises. Government therefore could not collect profitably the taxes from the carriers even if there were some few instances of title to the goods having passed to others before their carriage. In such cases, it may be that because the goods are carried actually be somebody in his own rights the producer or dealer could not be made liable for any payment of the tax. For the above reasons, I think that the learned Advocate-General is right in contending that the Legislature in the circumstances thought it fit to impose the tax in the manner indicated in S.3. The section does not stand by itself; it has to be read along with and in the light of S.1 of the Act which clearly indicates that the Act is an Act of taxation of goods carried by road and inland water-ways. Any ambiguity in S.3 is removed by S.1 which undoubtedly brings the tax within the ambit of entry 56. So read the conclusion is obvious that the tax operates on the goods as they move out of the factory or garden for being carried by road and inland water-ways. The producer or dealer must be liable for the payment of the tax but if before the goods leave the factory the title to the goods has already passed to s ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... of petitions filed. RAM LABHAYA, J.:- 11. This order shall dispose of four civil rules nos.8, 9, 26 and 32 of 1955. These rules were issued on petitions under article 226 of the constitution of india. The petitioners have assailed the constitutional validity of the Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Roads or Inland Water ways) Act, 1954. The grounds on which the validity of the Act is challenged are common to all the petitions. 12. The impugned Act was passed by the Legislature of the State of Assam. It received the assent of the Governor of Assam on 9-4-1954 and took effect from 1-6-1954. The professed purpose of the Act is to levy tax on goods carried by road or inland water-ways in the State of Assam. Section 3 of the Act provides that manufactured tea in chests carried by motor vehicle, cart, trolley, boat, animal and human agency or any other means except railways and airways shall be liable to a tax of one pice per pound of such tea and this tax shall be realised from the producer................. Section 4 authorises the levy on the total net weight carried during a return, period. 13. On 30-6-1954 the Commissioner of Taxes, Assam, in the exerc ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... The tax under the Act, it is contended,, is no more than a duty of excise under another name. Being in reality an excise, duty it constitutes an encroachment on the Central sphere. The Central Government alone has the power to levy excise duty under Entry No.84 of the Union List on goads manufactured or produced in India. (4) The impugned act contravenes the provisions of article 14 of the constitution of india, being in its nature a discriminatory piece of legislation. It is contended that the tax is levied only on the manufactured tea in chests, not on manufactured tea in other containers. Besides, tea and jute are the only commodities which are taxed. (5) The impugned legislation is not within the ambit of Entry 56 of List II of the Seventh Schedule. It was outside the limits of the competence of the State Legislature and is colourable inasmuch as under the guise of legislation under Entry 56 of List II it levies a tax on trade, commerce and intercourse, which is also not distinguishable from excise duty. 15. The learned Advocate General has stoutly defended the legislation. He has tried to repel all grounds of attack. His case is that the legislation in question ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this heading was enlarged by including within its scope goods or passengers carried by road also. The State Legislature therefore has power to levy a tax on goods and passengers carried by road or inland water-ways. Almost every word of the entry has been the subject matter of argument. The petitioners are producers of tea. They grow and manufacture it. Tea packed in chests is the result of agricultural and manufacturing operations. The large bulk of it is admittedly transported to Calcutta in the State of Bengal, which is the major tea market in India. The tea is carried through the State of Assam. It may be carried by road or inland waterways or by rail or air. Tea carried by rail or air is not liable to tax under the Act. Manufactured tea in chests when carried by motor vehicle, cart, trolley, boat, animal and human agency or any other means (except railways and air-ways) is liable to tax. This is clear from the language of Section 3 of the Act which creates the liability to tax. The tax in the case of tea is to be realised from the producer and it is to be charged on the total net weight carried during a return period (vide Sections 3 and 4). It is contended that th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e expression goods has been defined in article 366, clause 12 of the constitution. It includes all materials, commodities and articles. It was so defined in the government of india act, 1935 also. The definition is not made exhaustive in spite of its wide sweep. All materials, commodities and articles are included. All these may be goods . But when these commodities, articles or materials pass from the hand of the trader to the consumer for personal use, the expression goods is generally not applied to them. They are then personal effects and if the person to whom they belong is travelling with his personal effect, they would be described as his luggage. There is a distinction between goods on one side and personal effects and luggage on the other. Everything falling within the scope of cl.12 of Art.366 would be goods till they become personal effects . All materials, commodities and articles which go to make personal effects must have been goods at one stage. There is nothing in the definition to suggest that the expression goods is not used in the general sense or that it is so wide as to include within its grasp all personal effects of individuals which th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hen carried in the manner specified in the entries. The word used is carried as distinguished from carrier. Mr. Iyengar has argued that the word carried implies carried by a common carrier. The word carried has a large scope. It does not imply carried by a common carrier necessarily. Interpreting this word in entry 56 as carried by a common or a public carrier is limiting the scope of the entry. The expression may not be qualified the way it is suggested. All that entry 56 requires is that goods should be carried by road or inland water-ways. It makes no mention of the agency through which goods are carried. Goods may be carried by a vehicle belonging to the producer or by a hired vehicle. They would be carried even if the vehicle is not hired. The mere fact that the vehicle utilised belongs to the producer would not put the goods outside the entry which permits taxation of goods carried by road or inland water-ways. Therefore goods even when carried without the employment of a common or public carriers, would fall within the ambit of the entry. 22. The word Carrier , in its general sense, means a person who undertakes to transport the goods of other persons from one place t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 369 at p.372 (S), it was held that a road as used in the Act of Parliament must manifestly mean a public road, a road which the public have a right to use for passage. The word road is on a par with inland water-ways so far as its nature or quality goes. Navigability is the characteristic of inland water-ways. These water-ways are public in character. The carriage has to be by road or water-ways of a public character. Mr. Lahiri has contended that the word road in the entry also should be given its widest meaning and should not be restricted to public roads. This he considers, would be restricting the scope of the entry. I am unable to subscribe to this view. The word road also occurs in entry 13 of List II, which relates to communications, that is to say, roads, bridges, ferries and other means of communication not specified in List I. The Legislatures of the States have power to legislate about the means of communication enumerated in entry 13 of List II. It seems fairly obvious that roads, bridges, ferries about which legislation is authorised by this entry, have a public character. The expression road in this entry could not conceivably include private road ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... conjunction converting two items into one. There is no legal difficulty in taxing goods only or passengers. The two items in entry 56 are enumerative as in the case of several other entries. The entry therefore creates no compulsion for dealing with passengers and goods together in any scheme of taxation. 27. The title and the preamble of the Act use the language of entry 56. Section 1 also provides that the Act may be called the Assam Taxation (on goods carried by roads or inland waterways) Act, 1954. This section also borrows the language of entry 56. This shows the extent of the power given to the State in the matter of taxation under the entry in question. All goods carried by road or inland water-ways can be taxed under the Act. The words in S. 1 of the Act and at other places where they are used, must bear the same meaning as they have in entry 56. The legislation is professedly under that entry. The legislature has obviously adopted a wise expedient.. It could not do better than adopting the language of the entry itself, leaving it to the Court to interpret both the entry and the Act by which power under the entry is made use of. The interpretation that may be placed o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e terms: Two propositions are quite clear, one that a preamble may afford useful light as to what a statute intends to reach, and another that if an enactment is itself clear and unambiguous, no preamble can qualify or cut down the enactment. The contention raised is that the charging section does not limit carriage of goods to carriage by road or inland water-ways. It is expressed in clear and unambiguous terms. It may not be qualified or restricted by what is contained in the title of the Act or in the preamble. This view, in my opinion, is not sound. If the conflict had been between S.3 and the preamble, the principle that the preamble may not be utilised to qualify or restrict the meaning of the Act might well have been called in aid. Here the Act itself contains another explicit provision which the learned counsel for the petitioners has not taken notice of. Section 1 of the Act relates to short title, extent and commencement of the Act It provides that (1) This Act may be called the Assam Taxation (On Goods Carried by Roads or Inland Waterways) Act, 1954. (2) It extends to the whole of Assam. Section 1 being undoubtedly an integral part of the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... where it is to be carried by rail or air. In that case the liability to tax would be attracted no matter how small the distance that the tea travels by a public road. The Act does not provide for computing tax on distance. It is on weight and therefore liability to tax would be incurred even if a relatively short distance is travelled by a public road. This may be hard. But the Courts are not concerned with any hardship that a piece of legislation may cause where it is obviously within the competence of the legislature. They have no power to relieve hardship in such cases. The remedies for any real hardship Be elsewhere. 31. The tax no doubt is on goods. But according to my interpretation of the entry it is not necessary for taxation under the Act to combine goods and passengers. Goods alone could be taxed. The Act correctly construed does not permit taxation when tea or jute is carried on a private road. In this respect there is no conflict between the preamble and the title on the one side and the charging section oh the other. Section 3 has no such implication. Tea and jute both may be taxed under the Act even before their first sales. Entry 56 does not prohibit taxation b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat the framers of the Constitution made a distinction between duties of excise which may fall under entries 84 (List I) and 51 (List II) on the one side and entries 89 (List I) and 56 (List II) on the other. Taxes under entries 89 and 56 are something separate and distinct from duties of excise. It should therefore be possible for the Central1 and the State Legislatures to impose these taxes under these entries without encroachment on the field of excise duties. We have therefore to find the line of demarcation between the two in order to determine whether the legislature by taxiing goods under entry 56 has consciously or unconsciously levied what may be regarded as a duty of excise. The power of the State to levy excise duties is limited to alcoholic liquors and other items mentioned in entry 51 of List II. Tea and jute are not included. If the impost is of the mature of an excise duty, there would be encroachment on the Central sphere. The learned counsel for the petitioners argues that excise duty is a duty or tax on goods manufactured or produced. It is a tax on commodities. It is to be collected from the producer on production or manufacture. He regards the tax in qu ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the political changes which replaced the government of india act by the constitution. The conception of duties of excise remains the same. These authorities therefore give what has been understood by duties of excise in India since duties of excise came to be recognised in this country. 36. The word excise is of Dutch origin. It assumed different connotations at different times. Originally it was used in the sense of toll or tax. During the seventeenth century it acquired in the United Kingdom the sense of a tax on certain articles of luxury such as spirits, beer, or tobacco produced or manufactured in the United Kingdom. By 1939 the expression was used to cover all duties and taxes which together with customs duties were collected and administered by the Commissioners of Customs and Excise. But its primary and fundamental meaning in England is still that of a tax on articles produced or manufactured in the taxing country and intended for home consumption. C.J. Gwyer felt satisfied that this was its primary and fundamental meaning in India too. AIR 1939 FC 1 at p.6 (I). In his view there was no reason in theory why an excise duty could not be imposed even on the retail ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n, and that it extends no further. At page 11 he observed that the Central Legislature will have the power to impose duties on excisable articles before they become part of the general stock of the Province, that is to say at the stage of manufacture or production, and the Provincial Legislature an exclusive power to impose a tax on sales thereafter. Sulaiman, J., when distinguishing a duty on goods produced or manufactured from duty on sale of goods observed (at page 23) that the essence of a tax on goods manufactured or produced is that the right to levy it accrues by virtue of their manufacture or production. It is immaterial whether the goods are actually sold or consumed by the owner or even destroyed before they can be used. If duty is imposed on the goods manufactured or produced when they issue from the manufactory, then the duty becomes leviable independently of the purpose for which they leave it and irrespective of what happens to them later. On the other hand, a duty on the sale of goods cannot be levied merely because goods have been manufactured or produced. Jayakar, J. expressed the view (at page 36) that if the proper imp ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in List 2, the power of the Central Legislature to impose duties of excise was a power to impose duties on the manufacture or produce of the goods and did not extend further, the power to impose a tax upon the sale of goods after manufacture or production being reserved to the Provinces. The majority view was given effect to in AIR 1942 FC 33 (J). In doing so the learned C.J. accepted the general division between the Central and Provincial spheres of taxation which commended itself to the majority of the Court in that case. The majority view, he observed, recognized that the expression duty of excise is wide enough to include a tax on sales; but where power is expressly given to another authority to levy a tax on sales, it is clear that duty of excise must be given a more restricted meaning than it might otherwise bear. On the other hand the fact that duty of excise is itself an expression of very general import is no reason at all for refusing to give to the expression tax on sales the meaning which it would ordinarily and naturally convey. In this case the decisions in 38 Com-W LR 408 (W) and 60 Com-W LR 263 (X), were considered. The propositions laid down in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the factory or workshop for the first time upon the occasion of its sale. But that method of collecting the tax is an accident of administration: it is not of the essence of the duty of excise which is attracted by the manufacture itself. Their Lordships came to the conclusion that the tax imposed by the impugned Act was not a duty of excise in the cloak of a tax on sales. 41. It is of the essence of the excise duty no matter at what stage it is imposed that the tax must be on production and manufacture. A tax on goods produced and manufactured when they leave the factory could be easily a duty of excise if the general concept of excise duties is taken into account. But the question is not what the expression duties of excise may include within its scope speaking generally. The expression has to be interpreted in the context in which it occurs. The Constitution provides for duties of excise and distinguishes these duties from a tax on the carriage of goods. Both the heads of legislation appear in the Union and the State Lists. An excise duty may be imposed and collected at the time when goods produced or manufactured leave the factory or the place of production. But whe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ise and definite terms. There can be no reason in such a case for giving a broader interpretation to one power rather than to the other; and there is certainly no reason for extending the meaning of the expression duties of excise at the expense of the Provincial power to levy taxes on the sale of goods. The reasoning applies fully to the facts of this case. There is no earthly reason why the power of the State to tax goods and passengers when carried by road or inland water-way be completely nullified or taken away in order that the words duties of excise in entry 84 of the Union List should have a very extended meaning that it may have acquired. If that meaning was intended to be given to it by the framers of the Constitution, they would not have provided for taxation on the carriage of goods by air, rail, sea, inland water-ways or roads. The tax on goods and passengers carried was treated as something distinct from duties of excise. The fact that the entry includes passengers also makes its distinctive character manifest. Their Lordships of the Privy Council in AIR 1945 PC 98 (Y) adopted the same ratio by extending their full approval to the decision in AIR 1942 FC 33 ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the place of manufacture or production. Mr. Iyengar has relied on these decisions and Acts and has contended that duties of excise are recovered from the producer and the manufacturer when the goods leave the place where they are manufactured. The tax under the Act is recoverable from the producer or the manufacturer and is recoverable when the goods leave the factory or the place of production. According to legislative practice therefore it should be treated as a duty of excise. He urges that the element of carriage which has been introduced in the Act is a sort of camouflage. It conceals the real nature of the tax or the duty and provides for it a sort of disguise. He refers to the contention of the learned Advocate General that the duty can be imposed even if carriage is on private road or on a water channel, even within the limits of a tea estate and points out that the Act if so interpreted, reveals its real nature and shows clearly that the State was taxing goods produced or manufactured. I have come to the conclusion that the interpretation that the teamed Advocate General has placed on S.3 of the Act is not correct. In my view tea and jute become taxable under S.3 on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ating certain types of conveyances including human agency, the legislature has not exceeded its powers under entry 56, for, entry 56 merely provides a tax on goods carried. The entry does not specify that goods in order to be taxable under entry 56 must be carried by any particular kind of vehicle. Carriage is not limited, for instance, to carriage by mechanically propelled vehicles. If there is carriage of goods it would be within the scope of the entry. It was wholly unnecessary for the legislature to mention in the section the different means by which carriage could be effected, for carriage in whatever way it is effected, attracts liability to taxation under entry 56. Limiting carriage to any particular kind of transport is to restrict its scope and this can be done only by reading something into the entry which does not exist. If goods are carried by boat or trolly, or animal or human agency, they would be taken as carried within the meaning of entry 56. Apart from the general rule that these entries have to be interpreted liberally so that they could be given effect to in their widest amplitude, even if the entry is given its ordinary natural grammatical meaning, carria ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ourt are irreconcilable. They leave us in doubt whether commerce is trade or, intercourse, whether it must be for profit or may be without profit, whether it is confined to tangibles or may include intangibles .It is however clear that traffic is definitely included in the expression commerce and the least that may be deduced from these decisions is that traffic and commercial intercourse are commerce. 49. The word occurs in S.92 of the Australian Constitution and even in Australia the expression has retained the wide significance and import that it carried in the United States. Dixon, C.J., expressed his opinion on the significance of the expression in 87 CLR 49 at v. 67 (Z3), He adopted the very language of Johnson, J., in - Gibbons v. Ogden, (1824) 22 US at p.229 (Z4) and held that the carriage of merchandise from one State to another is not a thing incidental to inter-State commerce, but is the very thing itself, inseparable from it as vital motion is from vital existence. The opinion of the distinguished judge so pithily and so forcefully expressed, received the imprimatur of their Lordships of the Privy Council in - Hughes v. State of New South Wales, 1954-3 All E ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... r trade and commerce etc., is to maintain the economic unity of the country. The purpose could not have been achieved completely if freedom for trade and commerce had been only inter-State. The mandate of the Article therefore is that freedom for trade, commerce and intercourse shall be throughout the territory of India. The territory includes all the States. Freedom throughout the territory would lose much of its meaning if all States could impose restrictions on trade within the territorial limits of the States. This view receives support from the language of Art.302. The Parliament may under Art.302 impose restrictions on trade, commerce and intercourse between one State and another or within any part of the territory of India in public interest. This Article is an exception to the mandate of Art.301 and shows more clearly the scope of Art.301. Where any law of the State restricts the freedom of inter or intra-State trade or commerce, it would conflict with the requirements of Art.301. 51. The freedom provided by Art.301 for trade, commerce and intercourse is not absolute. It is qualified being expressly made subject to the other provisions of Part XIII. Art.302 authorises ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ranteed rights is merely confusing. It has no constitutional significance. The rights created by this Article are like other legal rights enforceable by appropriate proceedings. 56. Article 301 may be distinguished from the provisions contained in Art.19(1)(g) of the Constitution. Art.19(1)(g) guarantees to the citizens the right to practise any profession or carry on any occupation, trade or business. Both trade and business are included in this clause of Art.19. There appears to be a dear distinction between the purposes of the two provisions in the Constitution. While Art.19(1)(g) guarantees to the citizens freedom in the matter of trade, profession or business, Art.301 provides for freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse within the territory of India. It may be said that while the one provides freedom for the individual in the matter of the choice of his trade, profession or business, the other provides for freedom of trade and commerce not in a particular state but in the whole of the territory of India. Free flow of traffic subject to the provisions contained in Part XIII is secured by Art.301, for traffic is surely within the scope of the expression commerce. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ns in the Constitution may afford. In his view provisions in other Parts of the Constitution including those relating to taxation cannot in any way abridge the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. Limitations on this freedom must fall within the four corners of Part XIII. 59. Mr. Iyengar has brought a wealth of learning to bear on the point. The argument was alluring but I confess, I am left unconvinced. The Constitution with all its Parts is one document. It is a co-ordinated whole. Its Parts may be likened to the limbs of the body. These Parts are not designed to produce conflicts. As parts of the same body they have to work in harmony. Each part ought to be so read that all receive full meaning and effect. We have therefore to read Part XIII along with other relevant Parts of the Constitution to discover its real meaning. The words of Art.301 on which Mr. Iyengar relies, do not provide enough support for his contention. The freedom of trade and commerce is no doubt limited by provisions contained in that Part. But neither Art.301 nor any other provision In Part XIII contains any such words as notwithstanding anything contained in other Parts of the Constitutio ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mr. Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Tirtha Swamiar, AIR 1954 SC 282 at p.295 (Z7), when bringing out the distinction between a tax and a fee referred to what he regarded as a neat definition of the expression tax. He quoted the observations of Latham, C.J., of the High Court of Australia in 60 Com-W LR 263 at 3576 (X), to the following effect: A tax is a compulsory exaction of money by public authority for public purposes enforceable By law and is not payment for services rendered. 62. The sovereignty in this country rests in the people, and they through their accredited representatives resolved to constitute India into a sovereign democratic republic and gave to themselves the Constitution. The republic consists of States. The division of legislative power including the powers of taxation was necessary. One result of the division is that legislative spheres of the different legislatures are marked. The powers are defined and delimited, though the residuary power rests in the Parliament. 63. Article 246 read with the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule corresponds to S.100 and the Lists under the government of india act, 1935. That Act provid ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... all legislation imposing taxes on trade and commerce whether by the Union Legislature or by the Legislatures of the States must be in public interest apart from the public purpose that it admittedly serves by adding to the revenues of the State, should have appeared in that Part. It might well have formed part of Art.265. Taxes on trades or professions, on the sale of goods, on consumption, on sale of electricity or water, are exceptions of a specific and limited character. If a general limitation was to be placed on the legislative power of all the legislative bodies, the appropriate place was in that Part. The only restrictions on the powers of taxation are those incorporated in Part. XII. 67. Apart from the restrictions imposed on the power of taxation by the provisions contained in this Part, every law imposing a tax by the State Legislature must be under someone of the entries which authorise taxation. The residuary powers of legislation including the power to make laws imposing a tax vest in the Parliament. The entries in the State List taken together mark the limits of the power of the Legislature of the State. Within these limits the Legislatures of the States have ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 69. The undoubted purpose of Art.301 is to preserve and maintain the economic unity of India. It provides for free flow of traffic. It hits State barriers against the free flow of trade and commerce which is contemplated by it. Both prohibitions against and restrictions on the movement and free flow of goods and commodities would be hit by Art.301. Yet trade, commerce and intercourse could not be absolutely free from all kinds of restrictions. Articles 302 and 304 permit restrictions in public interest. It follows that any legislation which falls under Entries, 42 of List I, 26 of List II and 33 of List III which relate to trade and commerce, must conform to the requirements of Arts.302 and 304. Under these entries restrictions may be placed on the free flow of trade and commerce in public interest. Legislation which regulates trade, commerce and intercourse in public interest would be covered by Arts.302 and 304. This does not admit of any dispute. The question is whether taxation per se regardless of actual effect on the free movement of goods and commodities is hit by Art.301 as restrictive of or reducing the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse. If so, it may be a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... exercised similar goods imported may also be taxed. 70. Mr. Iyengar himself conceded that the States were free to impose taxes on the sale and purchase of goods. It is undeniable that sales and purchases of goods would fall within the ambit of the expression trade and commerce. No provision in Part 13 permits this taxation. If it is not possible to tax trade and commerce except under the provisions of Part 13, tax on the sale of goods would not be possible unless it conformed to the requirement of Art.304(b); yet it was conceded that this was a legitimate item for taxation by the State Legislatures without conforming to the requirement of Art.304(b). The State Legislatures derive this power from Art.246 of Part 12 read with the entries in List II. The imposition of sale tax within the conditions laid down in Art.286 is possible only in pursuance of authority or power derived from Art.246 read with the relevant entry vide - State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd., AIR 1953 SC 252 at p.254 (Z8). If the power to impose tax on the sale of goods is not hit by Art.301, taxation under other entries when it incidentally affects trade or commerce, should also be not hit by Art. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... by the mandate of Art.301. He argues that all that Art.301 aims at is that there should be free movement of trade and commerce. Any legislation regulating trade and commerce falling under Entry 42 of the Union List, Entry 24 of the State List and Entry 33 of the Concurrent List imposing restrictions would be hit by Art.301 if legislative power under relevant entries was exceeded. Stated shortly, his point is that Art.301 contemplates restrictions other than taxation on the free flow of traffic, throughout the territory of India and taxing enactments under authorised heads are completely outside the mischief of Art.301. Mr. Lahiris attitude towards Part 12 is exactly the same as that of Mr. Iyengar to Part 13. He claims an overriding effect for Part 12 which in my opinion it does not possess. If Mr. Iyengars contention represented one extreme, this contention would provide the other. Article 301 provides for freedom of trade and commerce. There are numerous ways of curtailing or abridging this freedom. Trade and commerce in certain specified goods may be completely prohibited by direct legislation. It may be put under severe restrictions. Restrictions can take a large variety ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the Constitution leaving the freedom of trade and commerce, meaning by that expression only the free passage of persons and goods, within or without a State to be dealt with under Art.301 and the following Articles. The question was left open. This question does not directly arise in this case. Here the challenge to the Act is based not so much on the provisions contained in Art.19(1)(g) but on the ground that free passage of trade and commerce is obstructed by the questioned impost. It may however be observed that Art.19(1)(g) is undoubtedly a specific provision which guarantees certain rights to individuals in the matter of trade and business. Article 301 reserves freedom for trade and commerce and does not profess to deal with individual rights. A distinction thus was made between the two by the framers of the Constitution and therefore in matters respecting individual rights, the application of Art.19(1)(g) would be attracted. Where the grievance is as to the freedom of the passage of trade and commerce Art.301 would come into play. Trade and commerce has to be free throughout the territory and as indicated by their Lordships in the observations reproduced above what ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s. The observations on which reliance has been placed would however indicate that the different parts of the Constitution have to be harmonized and cannot be read independently of each other or in isolation. 75. Mr. Lahiri has relied on - Ananthakrishnan v. The State of Madras, AIR 1952 Mad 395 (Z13) in support of his contention. In this ease levy of fees for enrolment as Advocate was called into question. It was argued that it was unconstitutional as it involved abridgment of the fundamental right to carry on a profession. The contention rested on Art.19(1)(g). Rajamannar, C.J., expressed the view that Even if the right to act and plead is deemed to be a right comprised in the right to practise the profession guaranteed under Art.19(1)(g) there is nothing in the Constitution to exempt such right wholly from the taxing power of the State, (using the word State in its larger definition under Art.12). Article 265 which says no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law does not provide for any exemptions. articles 268, 269 and 276 and a number of entries in the three lists in the Seventh Schedule clearly indicate the scope of the taxing power as e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ercourse. 76. In three States there has been legislation under Entry 56. In AIR 1952 Pat 359 (A) the validity of bihar finance act was called into question. By s. 12 of this act a tax on all passengers and goods carried by motor vehicles at the rate of two annas in the rupee on all fares and freights was payable to owners of such vehicles. It was held in this case that the impugned Act was a piece of legislation directly dealing with the imposition of tax on goods and passengers and it does not profess to impose any restrictions whatever either on inter-State trade or on trade with or within the State. All the learned Judges of the Special Bench were agreed in the conclusion that such tax as was imposed by the Act did not adversely affect the freedom of inter or intra-State trade and commerce. Taxation of the nature contemplated by the impugned Act was found to be within the ambit of Entry 56 of the State List and it was held that it did not interfere with trade and commerce. In AIR 1954 Punj 264 (P) the question of competence of the State Legislature to enact the punjab passengers and goods taxation act, 1952 was considered. section 3(3) of this act provided as follows: ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... commerce. It was also found in the case that freedom of trade and commerce was not actually restricted. The implication is that courts may examine if taxation is intended to or actually results in curtailment of the freedom of trade and commerce. The decision when seen in its true perspective and in the light of its necessary implications yields a complete and a clear statement of the law on the point with which I am in respectful agreement. The two other decisions also supported the contention that taxation per se does not offend against Art.301. Mr. Iyengar in the course of his criticism of these decisions has also pointed out that in all these cases the tax was in the ultimate analysis on the distance travelled. Therefore these Acts were in substance measures by which goods or passengers when carried were taxed. He urges that the Assam Act does not take distance into consideration. Instead of the distance it is the weight which is the determining factor in regard to the quantum of tax which may be payable. This element he urges takes it out of the ambit of Entry 56, his contention being that the word carriage is introduced merely for purposes of form or appearance. In ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ers under Entry 56 is the one adopted in those cases. The entry is silent on that point. The words of the entry have to receive their ordinary grammatical meaning. The power may not be curtailed by laying down how and in what manner tax may be computed when goods are carried by road or inland water-ways. It is not the implication of the word carried used in the entry that the tax must depend on the length of the distance travelled and it may not justifiably be read into the entry. Any injustice or hardship involved in the method of computing the tax is not a matter for the courts to go into, if the legislation falls within the scope of the entry 79. The decision in - B.M. Amina Umma v. Income-tax Officer, AIR 1954 Mad 1120 at p.1124 (Z15), also does not support the contention of Mr. Iyengar. It was no doubt observed in this case that it is well settled that taxing legislation is also controlled by the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. But what was intended was made clear in the next paragraph. It was held that what Art.19(1)(g) provides for is the right of a citizen to practice any profession or to carry on any occupation, trad ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... gislative competence of Parliament and the State Legislature must be read subject to Art.301. In other words, neither Parliament nor the State Legislature can legislate so as to interfere with the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse throughout India. The learned Chief Justice has given overriding effect to Art.301 even over the provisions contained in Part 12 of the Constitution. It is true that Art.301 is subject to the provisions of Part 13 and it has not been expressly made subject to the provisions of other parts of the Constitution. But the same could be said of the other parts. Parts 11 and 12 also have not been made subject to Part 13. All these Parts have independent operation and they have to be given effect to as parts of one single indivisible whole. These parts should not have overriding effect in the absence of express provision to that effect. Article 301 no doubt has the distinguishing feature that it is made subject to the provisions of the Part. But this requirement was necessitated by the fact that Art.301 embodied the principle about the freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse in an unqualified form. The provisions that follow engraft some nece ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n given above. It is also conceivable that restrictions may not be in public interest and may have the effect of restricting or prohibiting the free flow of trade. Limiting the speed of vehicles to one mile an hour may make transport economically prohibitive. All this cannot be said about taxation per se. I therefore hesitate to hold that the framers of the Constitution thought that taxation even under authorised heads by the Union and the State should further be justified on the ground of public interest if it imposed any burden on trade, commerce and industry incidentally. If taxation under such circumstances is treated as a restriction per se, it should promote public interest otherwise than by adding to the revenue of the State. The mere fact that the tax is for the purpose of raising revenue would not satisfy the requirements of Arts.302 and 304. It could not be regarded as in public interest per se if Arts.302 and 304 received full effect. It was in this view that Chagla, C.J., held that a tax could not be justified per se and that it must be justified on some other ground than the ground of raising revenue. Taxes can be imposed only by law. Taxation must be covered by som ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... will have the power of scrutiny and veto even though the legislatures are legislating for taxation under heads under which they have the power to legislate. No such power has been conferred by the Constitution on the judiciary in express terms and I hesitate to read it as an implication of any provision in Part 13. Where power of judicial veto was meant to be given as in Part 3, it was given in terms which left no room for doubt as to the existence of the power. So vast a power could not have been left to be spelt out inferentially from the provisions contained in Part 13. 83. In AIR 1953 SC 252 (Z8), their lordships of the Supreme Court considered the competence of the State Legislature to impose sales tax with reference to the provisions contained in Art.286(1). Their lordships were not interpreting Art.301. Observations made by them when interpreting Art.286 are not of any great assistance in interpreting Art.301. In any case the decision does not appear to me to support the contention that taxation per se under authorised heads of List I and List II would amount to abridgment or curtailment of the freedom of trade and commerce, if such taxation imposes any burden however ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... istently with the requirements of each. Giving overriding effect to the one or the other would paralyse some part of the Constitution. Some provisions would be rendered ineffective or nugatory. This is a result which in my humble opinion ought to be avoided by reconciling the demands of the two parts. 86. I have come to the conclusion that the impugned Act falls within the ambit of entry 56 in pith and substance. The State Legislature intended to levy a tax on goods carried by road or inland water-ways. The Act gives effect to that intention and as a result tea and jute both produced and manufactured in the State are taxed when carried by road or inland water-ways. The courts are undoubtedly entitled to look at the substance of the Act imposing the tax in order to ascertain the true nature of the tax and to discover not merely what it says but what it really does. The established Courts of Justice, when a question arises in regard to a Constitution whether the prescribed limits have been exceeded, must of necessity determine that question; and the only way in which they can properly do so, is by looking to the terms of the instrument by which, affirmatively, the legislat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... to discover the true character and nature of the legislation. These weighty pronouncements leave no doubt as to the powers of the court when it is called upon to decide whether legislative power has been exceeded or a constitutional prohibition has been violated by a legislature. It is not the form but the substance that is the determining factor. The substance of the Act may be discovered from all the provisions. Even rules framed may be taken into consideration - Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Ltd., Khulna, AIR 1947 PC 60 (Z19). The legal effect of the legislation would be presumed to be intended. It will be a pointer to the object or the purpose of the legislation. If the impugned legislation is examined in the light of the principles so authoritatively enunciated by distinguished judges, it is difficult to discover any gulf between the profession of the legislature and its actual achievement. It started with the intention of levying tax on goods carried from any point in the State by road or inland water-ways. It has reiterated this purpose in different parts of the Act. When framing rules for giving effect to the purposes of the Act, it has again repeated its in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dom of trade in these commodities may not be attributed to the Legislature. Stopping or restricting trade and commerce in these two commodities would be highly detrimental to the interests of the State The State Legislature could not think of killing the goose that lays the golden eggs. The freedom of trade in the commodities could not have been intended to be restricted even partially, much less totally. In any case there is no basis for holding that the effect of the legislation has been to restrict the freedom of trade in these two commodities to any appreciable extent. Taxation in the circumstances of the case is not such that it may be regarded as an indirect way of achieving what could not have been accomplished directly. The legislation is not hit by Art.301. 87. Mr. Iyengar has urged next that tea is a controlled industry. The Parliament has by law declared that the control of the tea industry should vest in the Union in public interest. In this connection he refers us to the tea act no.29 of 1953. He urges that the impugned Act interferes with the control which the Union has assumed in pursuance of the declaration made by the Parliament under entry 52 of List I. Legi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ision it may not be said in respect of industries the control of which has been taken over under entry 52 that they are within the exclusive power of the Parliament. But even assuming that the proposition laid down in AIR 1954 All 728 (Z20), would apply to an industry, the control of which has been taken over by the Union under entry 52, it would be limited to tea industry as distinguished from trade or commerce in tea. The sphere of industry is production. It is when commodities have been produced that traffic in them begins. They then become part of the general stock. It is after the production stage that trade and commerce commence. If exclusive power could be claimed by the Centre, it would be limited to legislation with respect to the industry and not with respect to trade and commerce. In regard to trade and commerce the power is merely concurrent, vide entry 33 of List III. In regard to the regulation of trade and commerce therefore, the power in the Centre should not be exclusive, it would be concurrent with the State. But as held above the Tea Act and the assumption of control by the Union do not take away the powers of taxation which the State Legislature had under ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... factors that may influence the determination, is not affected. It is worthy of note that there is no express provision in the Act which limits, controls or abridges the States power of taxation under relevant entries of List II. The contention is repelled. 90. The last contention raised by Mr. Iyengar was that the legislation is hit by Art.14 of the Constitution. He urged that distinction is made in the Act between manufactured tea in chests and tea in bags. He stated that a small quantity of tea came out of the factories in bags. Later he said that the quantity was not quite small and part of it went out of the State also. On these facts he urged that the distinction between tea packed in different kinds of containers had no rational relation with the object of legislation. Discrimination thus was repugnant to Art.14. He relied on several decisions of the Supreme Court for showing what discrimination was obnoxious to the provisions contained in Art.14. Law on the point now may well be regarded as settled. In a very recent decision of the Supreme Court reported in - Budhan Choudhry v. State Of Bihar., (S) AIR 1955 SC 191 (Z21) Das, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ties for collecting the tax from their buyers and turn it over to the Government. Each State must, in imposing a tax of this nature, fix its own limits below which it does not consider it administratively feasible or worthwhile to impose the tax. In the light of this decision it would appear that the classification may not be regarded as unreasonable or discriminatory. There is no material on the record for holding that tea in bags is carried by public roads or inland water-ways in substantial quantities inside the State or outside the State. The bulk of the tea from the factory comes out in chests. Climatic conditions in Assam make it necessary. It has not been shown that the tea left out from taxation which leaves the factory in bags is anything more than a negligible part of the total quantity produced. A small quantity of tea going out of the factory for local consumption round about, which is not carried for any considerable distance by road or inland water-ways, could reasonably be exempted from taxation. A State may not be compelled to tax every ounce of tea. Administrative considerations can also support the classification to which objection has been taken. In - V.M. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
