TMI Blog1952 (1) TMI 27X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sion of that officer, and in this case the appeal lay to this Court. The appeal in fact was preferred on 28-2-1951. Section 8 (3) provides that such appeal shall be made within a period of 60 days from the date of the decision. The appeal was out of time by two days. The petitioners applied that delay should be condoned under Section 5, Limitation Act, as they had sufficient cause for the delay, and the question that arises for our determination is whether Section 5 applies to an appeal provided under the Land Requisition Act. [2] What calls for our interpretation in the first instance is Section 29 (2), Limitation Act. The section assumed its present form in 1922. Before that amendment there was considerable conflict between the differe ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... upon the language used by the Legislature, viz. a period of limitation different from the period prescribed therefore by the first schedule. The period of limitation may be different under two different circumstances. It may be different if it modifies or alters a period of limitation fixed by the first schedule to the Limitation Act. It may also be different in the sense that it departs from the period of limitation fixed for various appeals under the Limitation Act. If the first schedule to the Limitation Act omits laying down any period of limitation for a particular appeal and the special law provides a period of limitation, then to that extent the special law is different from the Limitation Act. We are conscious of the fact that the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ended for the purpose of determining the period of limitation. The Limitation Act by its operative Section 3 provides that every suit, appeal or application presented to the Court shall be dismissed unless it is filed within the period of limitation, and, therefore, the main thing that the Court has to consider is whether a suit or an application or an appeal is maintainable looking to the provisions of the Limitation Act, and in order to decide that not only has the Court to consider various sections like Section 4 and Sections 9 to 18 but also Section 5, because if a suit, appeal or application is out of time as provided by the first schedule, the Court has still to consider whether such suit, appeal or application should be allowed to be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... applicable to all special or local laws which prescribed a period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application. Sections 4, 9 to 18 and 22 also apply unless the special or local law expressly excludes their application. Sections other than those just mentioned would not apply unless the special or local law expressly provided for their application. It is difficult to accept the contention that although Section 29 (2) (b) expressly precluded the application of Section 5, we must hold that Section 6 is applicable by reference to Section 3. [6] The final argument advanced by Mr. Adarkar is that Section 5 applies to all appeals proprio vigore, and this argument is based upon the different language used by the Legislature in Section 3 a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... cribed by Schedule 1, and yet under Section 29 the Legislature had expressly to make Section 4 applicable when the period of limitation was prescribed by a special or local law. If Mr. Adarkar's contention were right, then Section 4 as much as Section 5 would apply proprio vigore and it was not necessary for the Legislature in S. 29 to state that Section 4 would apply under certain circumstances. Therefore, in our opinion, unless the Legislature expressly makes Section 5 applicable, Section 5 does not apply when no period of limitation for that appeal is prescribed in the Limitation Act and a special period is prescribed by a special law. The intention of the Legislature obviously was that an appellant must prefer the appeal within the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... period as seven days should not be one over which the High Court in a proper case should have any power of control or dispensation but it is necessary to base our construction of the Ordinance and of the Limitation Act upon principle and it is not possible for us on the ground of hardship to give another meaning to the Ordinance. The same view of the law has been taken by the other High Courts. See Chheda Lal v. Officer Commanding, Meerut, I.l.r. (1941) ALL. 356 ; Mittoor -Moideen Hajee, In re, A. I. R. 1923 Mad. 95 and Hasan Imam v. Brahmdeo Singh, 9 pat. 747. Therefore, in giving the construction to Section 29 which we are giving we find that we are taking the same view which the other High Courts in India have taken. [8] The resul ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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