TMI Blog1982 (3) TMI 278X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ne without a difference. It is the common case that the question admits of an answer which would have applicability to workmen irrespective of the aforesaid categorisation. Therefore, enlarging the scope of the question accordingly, we would reframe the question as under: Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit filed by a workman in connection with an industrial dispute, if no steps had been earlier taken by him to have the same referred under Section 10 of the Industrial. Disputes Act to a Labour Court or the Tribunal. The issue being primarily legal, the facts pale into relative insignificance. Nevertheless the matrix thereof giving rise to the question have to be adverted to albeit briefly and it suffices to notice those in R.S.A. No. 1535 of 1974. 3. Sukhi Ram Appellant was employed on (a temporary basis as a Bus Conductor with the Haryana Roadways at the material time in June, 1971. Departmental proceedings for having misappropriated the bus fare collected by him were initiated against him culminating in the termination of his services by the order of the General Manager, Haryana Roadways dated the 25th of August, 1971. He then preferred a suit in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re, to be examined on the anvil of the large principle that if a special jurisdiction or a tribunal is created, in that case the matters, which are within such jurisdiction, are impliedly barred from cognisance of the Civil Court. Though this proposition is well-settled, it nevertheless poses problems in its practical application as evidenced from the earlier conflict of judicial precedent on the point Fortunately, however, in the specific context of the Act, the matter is reduced to a narrow compass within the canvas of the binding precedent of the final Court In The Premier Automobiles Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Kadke and Ors. MANU/SC/0369/1975MANU/SC/0369/1975 : AIR 1975 S.C. 2238, their Lordships examined the issue against a broader canvas of principle and earlier precedents and summed up the law in four, succinct principles. Therefore, within this jurisdiction, it is not necessary to travel beyond the principles now authoritatively laid down. The four principles, which now govern have been spelled out in paragraph 23 of the report are: (1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute, nor does it relate to enforcement of any other right under the Act the remedy lies only in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 39;Industrial dispute' means any dispute or difference between employers and employers or between employers and workmen, or between workmen and workmen, which is connected with the employment or non-employment or the terms of employment or with the conditions of labour, of any person; On the aforesaid definition and the construction placed thereon, it was axiomatic that individual disputes were not within the ambit of the Act unless these were sponsored or adopted by a Union of workmen. To remedy this situation, by Act No. 35 of 1965, Section 2-A which is in the following terms) was inserted in the statute: 4-A. Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to be deemed to be industrial dispute--Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. What then calls for notice in extenso is the relevant part of Section 10 pertaining ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... dy. It is also true that it was not open to the workmen concerned to approach the Labour Court or the Tribunal directly for adjudication of the dispute. It is further well established on the authorities of this Court that the Government under certain circumstances even on the ground of expediency vide State of Bombay v. K.P. Krishnan AIR 1960 S.C. 1223 : (1961) 1 SCR 227 and Bombay Union of. Journalists v. The State of Bombay (1964) 6 SCR 22 : AIR 1963 S.C. 1617 can refuse to make a reference. If the refusal is not sustainable in law, appropriate directions can be issued by the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. But it does not follow from all this that the remedy provided under the Act is a misnomer. Reference of industrial disputes for adjudication in exercise of the power of the Government under Section 10(1) is so common that it is difficult to call the remedy a misnomer or insufficient or inadequate for the purpose of enforcement of the right or liability created under the Act. The remedy suffers from some handicap but is well compensated on the making of the reference by the wide powers of the Labour Court or the Tribunal. The handicap leads only to this conclus ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... issue is--whether the right or obligation giving rise to the Us arises from the Act and Act alone. If this is so, then the only remedy available is to make resort to the Act and the formus and procedures prescribed by it. The jurisdiction of the civil courts would be impliedly barred totally in view of the principles (3) and (4) supra. 9. Though the aforesaid issue appears to be plain on principle, precedent within this Court is equally consistent therewith. Reference may first be made to Dawarka Doss's case (supra). Therein the right invoked was under Section 26-F(2)(a)(ii) of the Act and consequently sprang directly from the Act itself. The learned Single Judge held that in such a case there was an implied bar against the remedy by way of a civil suit even without reference to the ratio in Premier Automobiles Ltd., case (supra;) which was not brought to the notice of the Bench. On appeal, the Letters Patent Bench in Dwarka Dass v. The State of Punjab L.P.A. 1 of 1976 decided on 27th November, 1978 affirmed the judgment holding expressly that the case fell within principle (3) of the Premier Automobiles Ltd. case (supra). No challenge to the correctness of the view in Dwar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n would show that counsel were remiss in not highlighting the finer nuances of principle (2) in the Premier Auto-mobiles Ltd. case (supra). In fact, the matter does not seem to have been adequately debated at all. The earlier view of the learned Single Judge and its affirmance by the Letters Patent Bench in Dewarka Doss's case (supra), was not brought to the notice of the Bench. The issue having been not well presented, the Division Bench in Banarsi Dass's case (supra), relied simply on paragraph-24 of the report in the Premier Automobiles Ltd. case (supra) to negative the claim of the conductor in Haryana Roadways to prosecute his remedy in the civil court. A close reading of the aforesaid paragraph 24 in Premier Automobiles Ltd. case (supra) would show that-their Lordships themselves visualised an individual industrial dispute falling under Section 2-A of the Act as one in which the contingency of a resort to the civil court would be available. They had only observed that industrial disputes within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act would by and large be under the Act and thus governed by principle (3). If principle (2) were to be so literally construed, then the alte ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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