TMI Blog1954 (12) TMI 35X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the power of 'certiorari', the order passed in appeal, or revision by an authority residing outside the jurisdiction of that High Court and within the jurisdiction of another High Court, which is the High Court competent under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue the writ? 2. It is necessary to state shortly the circumstances in which the reference has been made. On 8-9-1949, the Deputy Custodian of' Evacuee Property, Gonda, in the exercise of powers vested in him under the United Provinces Administration of Evacuee Property Ordinance, 1949, declared certain persons to be evacuees and their-property to be evacuee property. The petitioners now before this Court claimed to be sub-tenants of the evacuee, and they were allo ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uee Property, U. P., Luck-now , and the prayer was that a Writ, direction or order of the nature of 'mandamus', prohibition or 'certiorari' or any of these may be issued, quashing tile order of the learned Custodian General so far as it relates to applicants, and a direction be issued to the opposite party to issue a proper notice under Section 8 (4) Evacuee Property Act (to the applicants) and of giving the applicants an opportunity to contest the said notice of eviction after holding that the notice of the learned Custodian General so far as it relates to the applicants is ultra vires and illegal and without jurisdiction. 4. When the petition first came on for hearing, a preliminary objection was taken by the respond ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rity that the answer to this question must be in the negative. It is argued for the petitioners that they have a legal right to contest the notices issued to them under R. 5 read with Section 8(4) of the Act; that that right has been denied by the Custodian General, and that this Court, although it cannot quash the Custodian General's order, can examine that order and, if it finds that it is contrary to law, can issue a 'mandamus' to the Additional Custodian commanding him to ignore the order and proceed on the basis that his own order of 29-7-1952, is a valid and subsisting order. Apart from the technical objection that the Additional Custodian has not been made a party to the petition, we are of opinion that as this Court has ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e 225 of the report: Can then a new law or a change in the old law entitle us to reopen a transaction which has become closed and final? It is common ground that the provisions of the Constitution which are invoked here were not intended to operate retrospectively, and therefore something which was legally good on the 25th January, 1950, cannot be held to have become bad on the 26th of January, 1950. If we had no jurisdiction to sit in appeal over the judgment of the Hyderabad High Court, can we now reinvestigate the cases and pass orders which cannot be passed without virtually setting aside the judgments of the High Court which have become final? Can we in other words, do indirectly what we refused to do directly? It is argued that ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... s jurisdiction not to carry out a quasi-judicial order which the Court has no power to quash. In that case the petitioner had applied for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the respondents from holding an inquiry into certain cases on the file of the Income-tax Investigation Commission of Travancore, and from holding an investigation into his income. The first respondent was the Authorised Official and Income-tax Officer on Special Duty, Trivandrum, and the second respondent was the Income-tax Investigation Commission at New Delhi. A preliminary objection was taken that the Court was not competent to entertain the petition in view of the fact that the second respondent was not amenable to its jurisdiction. The Court overruled the preliminary ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovisions of the latter Act. If this be so, it is somewhat difficult to see why it was considered necessary to make the second respondent a party to the petition at all, for the act of this Commission in nominating the respondent would seem clearly to have been an executive act. It appears that the first respondent was purporting to conduct the proposed investigation under powers which he derived from the Travancore Act, and in such circumstances there would seem to be no reason why, if it thought fit, the Travancore-Cochin Court should not (as in fact it did) issue a writ of prohibition to the first respondent. It appears to us that this decision is no authority for the proposition for which it was cited. 12. The petitioners also relied ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
|
