TMI Blog1951 (8) TMI 25X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... A of the Motor Vehicles Act, an application to revise the order of the Regional Transport Authority was made to the Government who set aside the order of the Regional Transport Authority and issued a permit to the second respondent. Thereupon the appellant applied to this Court for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the State of Madras. Our learned brother, Subba Rao, J., held that there were no grounds for interfering with the order of the State Government and dismissed the application. Hence this appeal against that order. 3. A preliminary objection is taken by Mr. D. Narasaraju for the 2nd respondent that no appeal lies against an order of a single Judge either issuing, or refusing to issue, a writ of certiorari, and that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent has no application. This is controverted by the learned counsel for the appellant. While contending that the order appealed against should not be interfered with, the learned Advocate-General controverts the position taken by the 2nd respondent that in matters like this no appeal lies. We have therefore to decide whether the contention put forward on behalf of the 2nd respondent can be acceded to or hot. 4. ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... single Judge. Provided that the Judge may direct any petition posted before him to be posted before a Bench of Judges. It is in pursuance to Rule 4 that this writ petition came on for hearing before a single Judge with the result which we have mentioned above. The learned Counsel contends that since Article 226 provides for the issuing of a writ by the High Court and since the power was already exercised by a single Judge of the High Court in accordance with the rules framed under Article 225 the power of the High Court to Issue a writ in this case has been exhausted and there can be no appeal to the High Court from the decision of the High Court. In other words, what he contends is, the High Court, when once a single Judge has disposed of the matter, has become functus officio because the order must be deemed to have been passed by the High Court as such and not by any single Judge. In this connection our attention was invited to Arts. 132 and 133. Article 132 deals with the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in appeals from High Courts in certain cases and this Article provides that an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, decree or final order o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... this aspect of the matter is as follows: By a process of reasoning based upon necessary and explicit exclusion, if we are to consider the meaning of the word matter in Article 135, it seems to us that the word matter used in Article 135 should not be understood as meaning a civil or criminal proceeding, because both these subjects were specifically dealt with under Articles 133 and 134. Article 132 refers to civil, criminal or other proceeding and is all comprehensive and therefore in whatever nature of proceedings, be it civil, criminal, admiralty, intestate or matrimonial, a question regarding the interpretation of the Constitution arises, then an appeal will lie under Article 132. So far as other proceedings are concerned, Article 133 lays down the scope and limit of the right of appeal in civil appeals. In the same way, does Article 134 provide for the scope and limit of the right of appeal in a criminal proceeding? Therefore It seems to us that the matter referred to in Article 135 should be understood as meaning a matter which is neither civil nor criminal and by the application of the maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius, -- the express mention of one th ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ther it is the original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction. In 'Ryots of Garabando v. Zamindar of Parlakimedi', ILR (1938) Mad 816, Leach, C.J. and Madhavan Nair, J., at page 818 observes as follows: Under Clause (b) a litigant has the right of appeal to His Majesty from any decree or final order passed by a High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction. It is conceded by the learned Advocate for the respondent that the issue of a writ of certiorari means the exercise of original jurisdiction, but he says that it does not mean the exercise of original civil jurisdiction within the meaning of the clause. The distinction here is between civil and criminal. The order complained of referred to a civil matter as opposed to a criminal matter, namely, a decision of a Revenue Court in a revenue case. It was admittedly passed in the exercise of original jurisdiction and in the circumstances it could only have been passed in the exercise of civil jurisdiction. Therefore It was an order passed in the exercise of original civil Jurisdiction. 8. Therefore, unless the matter expressly relates to criminal jurisdiction, it must be taken that the issuing ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ered in 'Hurish Chunder v. Kali Sundari Debi', 9 Cal 482 at p. 558 (PC) and these observations have been followed in 'Sabapathi Chetty v. Narayanaswami Chetti', 25 Mad 55 at p. 558. In this connection we may refer also to 'Vaman Ravji v. Naghesh Vishnu', ILR (1940) Bom 428. We may also refer to the circumstances that to 'Emberumanar Jeer Swamigal v. H.R.E. Board, Madras', ILR (1939) Mad 904, an appeal was entertained against the decision of a single Judge under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent refusing to issue a Writ of Certiorari and it is noteworthy that eminent lawyers like the present Chief Justice and the late Mr. B. Sitarama Rao who appeared for the respondents did not think it worthwhile to raise even a contention that no appeal lies under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent. That the order appealed against is a judgment is clear from the definition of the word judgment in Tuljaram Row v. Alagappa Chettlar', 35 Mad 1, and we need not elaborate on that aspect of the matter any further. 9. It is further contended that even if the power to Issue a writ of certiorari is a civil proceeding, still it is in the nature of a revisional proceedi ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... tribunal, viz., the Regional Transport Authority. Subba Rao, J., was of opinion that this circumstance that the appellant was plying two busses on the route Rajahmundry to Tuni via Jaggampeta was before the Central Road Traffic Board in the grounds of appeal. That being the case, it is not quite correct to say that the matter was then taken into consideration by the Government for the first time. The procedure to be followed by the Regional Transport Authority in considering applications for state carriage permits is laid down in Section 57 of the Motor Vehicles Act which should be taken to be the substantive law regarding such matters. Section 57 speaks of the procedure in applying for and granting permits. Subsection 3 of that section postulates that on receipt of an application for a stage carriage permit from a person the Regional Transport Authority shall make the application available for inspection at the office of the Authority and shall publish the application or substance thereof in the prescribed manner together with a notice of the date before which representations in connection therewith, may be submitted and the date not being, less than thirty days from such publicat ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rant of stage carriage permits and we, therefore, do not wish to elaborate that aspect of the question. The Pull Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in 'Motilal v. Utter Pradesh Government', interpreting the various sections in the Motor Vehicles Act and laying down that it was open to the State Government to take upon itself the task of restricting the use of highways and other allied subjects was very much relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant. Even here. It seems to us that for the decision of the present dispute nothing much useful can be obtained from that decision. The substance of that decision is that it is open to the Government to restrict the use of the highways by particular individuals or bodies, by which act the Government is empowered to run its own stage carriages. As the decision in 'Sri Ramavilas Service Ltd. v. The Road Traffic Board, Madras', 1948-1 Mad L J 85, was prior to the enactment of Section 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, we do not think it necessary to consider the points of law elaborately discussed in that judgment. It is now settled that the power of the Government in exercising its revisional functions should no ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... nt a permit. One of them is Sub-clause (a), namely, the interest of the public generally and another is Sub-clause (e) namely, the operation by the applicant of other transport services and in particular of unremmunerative services in conjunction with remunerative services. In addition to the matters, the Regional Transport Authority shall also take into consideration any representations made by persons already providing road transport facilities along or near the proposed route or routes, representations made by any local authority or police authority within whose jurisdiction any part of the proposed route or routes lie or by any association interested in the provision of road transport facilities. It is therefore clear that apart from the objections put forward by individuals against the granting of permits, the Regional Transport Authority shall also consider these matters. In our opinion, the consideration mentioned in Section 47 should be in addition to the objections raised under Sub-section (3) to Section 57. On behalf of the State Government various decisions where the meaning of the expression having regard to occurring in other statutes were considered and decided were ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... appellant had two stage carriage permits on the route Rajahmundry to Tuni via Jaggampet on that date when the Regional Transport Authority considered the grant of permit, now under consideration was a circumstance existing on that date and known to the Regional Authority and therefore could be taken by it into consideration apart from representations under Section 57(3) as well as matters referred to in Sub-clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section 1 of Section 47 of the Act. If it is possible for the Regional Transport Authority to take these matters into consideration, in our opinion, there is nothing that prevents the Government from considering them. But Mr. Nambiar argues that there is nothing to show that the Regional Transport) Authority considered this aspect of the case, and if it did not, for the first time it is not open to the Government to refer to a matter of this kind in setting aside the order of the Central Road Traffic Board. We are not satisfied that the existence of a fact so well known to the Regional Transport Authority was not before its mind when it granted the permit to the petitioner. The following observations of Subba Rao J. in 'W. P. No. 176 of 1951 ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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