TMI Blog1959 (10) TMI 45X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ble difficulty on one aspect of the case which relates to the submission of Messrs, Pathak and Jagdish Swarup that the provisions of the U.P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as also the schedule to the Act show that it is a lax not on land but on the person who holds the land. The Act undoubtedly lays down that a person having a small area of land has to pay proportionately a small amount of tax but, if the same and is held by another person who already holds a vast area of land, that very small portion of land would be assessed to a higher amount of tax. The incidence of tax is thus not dependent entirely on characteristics of the land itself, such as its area, quality of soil or value whether rental, annual or capitalised. Such characteristics remaining common, the same parcel of land under the Act gives rise to a larger liability of tax if it happens to be held by a person who already holds other lands as compared with the liability when the land is held by a person who does not hold any other lands, IB would appear in these circumstances that the manner, in which the tax incidence has been imposed by the Act, lends support to the vie ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t that the incidence of tax is made dependent on the extent of landholding of a particular landholder would convert a tax, which otherwise would be a tax on land, into a tax on the capital assets of the landholder in respect of his land-holdings. In this connection, a parallel is provided by the entry relating to taxes on income under which the Indian Income Tax Act was enacted. That entry also does not contain any provision that the tax to be imposed must be a tax on a person in respect of his income. The entry specifically permits imposition of taxes on income. In the case of the Central Legislature, the entry is No. 82 of. List I in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution permitting imposition of taxes on income other than agricultural income. In the case of the States, the entry is No. 46 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution permitting imposition of taxes on agricultural income. The Indian Income Tax Act, 1939, which was enacted under entry No. 54 of List I of Schedule VII of the Government of India Act, 1935, corresponding to entry No. 82 of List I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, in prescribing the incidence of tax of incomes, follows a schem ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... e Act; (2) that there is a delegation of essential legislative functions by the U. P. Legislature and as such the impugned Act is ultra vires; and (3) that the incidence of taxation is so high that the tax is confiscatory in nature and imposes unreasonable restrictions on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners under Clauses (f) and (g) of Article 19(1) of the Constitution of India. Mr. Jagdish Swarup has also made the same submissions but in a different way, Mr. Rama Shanker Prasad contended that the tax to be levied by the impugned Act is nothing but land revenue and inasmuch as Ss. 251 and 267 of the U. P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act provided that the land revenue of a Bhumidar cannot be increased, the effect of the Act would be that the same would be considerably increased in the name of a tax. It is also contended by him that there cannot be two statutes for the recovery of the same tax and, in any case, the land revenue cannot be recovered twice over from the same person. In the end he has submitted that inasmuch as Section 7 of the Act gives the power of making assessment to the same person who issues the notice asking for the return, the asse ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ture. Mr. Pathak has also contended that it is a well known rule of interpretation of fiscal statutes that for the determination of the question as to what is the object of the tax, the charging section alone must be looked into if the language of that section is unambiguous and it is not permissible to look into the machinery sections in order to find out as to what is the subject-matter of taxation. Mr. Pathak has also submitted that even the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 3 should not be looked into for determining the object of the tax, because, according to him, the proviso is redundant for contradictory to the enacting clause in Section 3 (1) of the Act. I will come to the question as to whether or not it is permissible to look to the Act as a whole to find out as to what is the object of taxation and also to the effect of the proviso in the present case at a later stage, and for the present would content myself with the consideration of the language of Section 3 (1) of the Act without the proviso. After having carefully examined the provisions of Section 3 of the Act I have come to the conclusion that the object of the tax is not the annual value of each land ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... hat for two reasons. In the first place, on is used also in the sense o[ on the basis of. In the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, amongst the meanings given to the word on the following also appear; Indicating non-material basis, ground or footing -- Indicating the ground, basis or reason of action, opinion etc. . . . indicating that which forms the basis of income, taxation, borrowing, betting, profit, or loss . In my opinion the word on here has been used in the sense of footing or basis. Therefore even though the words on the basis of or on the footing of have not been used in the sub-section that does not in any way restrict the meaning of the word on in the present context and it must be held that the expression on the annual value of each land holding in the context must mean on the basis of the annual value of each land holding . The word on is also frequently used like upon (see Stroud's Judicial Dictionary), 5. If instead of on we use the word upon the section would read as follows and the point would be absolutely clear : There shall .......... be charged, levied and paid, for each agricultural year, a tax on holding upon the ann ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... oes not exceed thirty acres. 7. The proviso clearly shows that it is the land holding and not the annual value of the holding which is the subject-matter of taxation. It is not possible to read the proviso detached from the main clause of Sub-section (1) of Section 3 because, as I 'have said above, the proviso is not contained in a separate sub-section but forms part of Sub-section (1) itself and after the words at the rates specified in the schedule there is no full stop but only a colon. Therefore, according to the ordinary rules of grammar the whole of Sub-section (1) including the proviso has got to be read together. In Jennings v. Kelly 1940 AC 206, the House of Lords say that there is no rule that the first or enacting part is to be construed without reference to the proviso. The proper course is to apply the broad general rule of construction which is that a section or enactment must be construed as a whole each portion throwing light, if need be, on the rest, Viscount Maugham in his speech in that case at page 219 says: The principle is equally applicable in the case of different parts of a single section and nonetheless that the latter part is introduced ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... re, as in the present case, the language of the main enactment is clear and unambiguous, a proviso can have no re- percussion on the interpretation of the main enactment, so as to exclude from it by implication what clearly falls within its express terms. The territory of a proviso therefore is to carve out an exception to the main enactment and exclude something which otherwise would have been within the section. It has to operate in the same field and if the language of the main enactment is clear it cannot be used for the purpose of interpreting the main enactment or to exclude by implication what the enactment clearly says unless the words of the proviso are such that that is its necessary effect' (vide also Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Attorney General for Canada, 1946 AC 32.) (underlined by me here in ..... .). The facts of the Privy Council case and those of the Supreme Court case mentioned above are very different from the facts of our case. There the proviso was being used to destroy or mutilate the effect of the enacting clause. Obviously the proviso could not be used for that purpose. In our case the enacting clause as also the proviso operate i ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ion. 11. In (1937 AC 863) it was observed as follows : It is well established that you are to look at the 'true nature and character of the legislation' 1882 AC 829, the pith and substance of the legislation. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field. This judgment was noticed by Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. F. N. Balasara AIR 1951 SC 318. The pith and substance of a particular Act can be gathered only after perusing the Act as a whole, In fact Mr. Pathak's argument that it is a tax on the capital value of land cannot be complete unless he takes the aid of Section 5 of the Act and the relevant rules. Section 3 of the Act only provides that the standard on which the tax is levied shall be the annual value. It does not deal with the manner in which the annual value will be determined. That is dealt with by Section 5 of the Act. That section runs as follows : 5. Annual value.--(1) For the purposes of this Act, annual value of a land holding shall be deemed to b ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ich the tax is to be assessed is not of assistance, except in so far as it may throw light on the general character of the tax. 12. I have looked carefully into the case reported in 1936 AC 352. In my opinion there is nothing in that case which would justify the conclusion that for gathering the pith and substance of a tax it is not open to a Court to have a general review of the entire Act. 13. The learned counsel has placed reliance upon the following passage from the judgment of Broomfield, J., in Sir Byramjee v. Province of Bombay. We have to discover what is the 'essential character' of the tax, what it is in pith and substance,' apart from the mere machinery by which it is assessed, and we are to look mainly at the charging Sections of the Act for this purpose. The learned counsel also relied upon the following observations of Kania J., in that very case: In Provincial Treasurer of Alberta v. Kerr (1933) AC 710 the importance of the words in the taxing Section was stressed in the following terms (p. 720): Identification of the subject-matter of the tax is naturally to be found in the charging section of the Statute, and it will only be ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ars to me that it is clearly a tax on the holding and not on the annual value and the annual value is only the measure of the tax. This conclusion finds full support from the provisions of Sub-section (2) of Section 3 which is a part of the charging section itself as also from Ss. 7, 11, 15 and 17 of the Act and also from a perusal of the preamble and the long title to the Act. I have already given above what Sub-section (2) of Section 3 provides. Section 7 provides for the publication of a notice requiring every land holder to furnish a return in connection with the payment of the Holding tax'. Section 11 provides for an appeal against an assessment in respect of 'land holding*. Section 15 empowers the assessing authority to issue a notice when in its opinion any land holding has not been assessed or has been assessed at too low a rate. Section 17 provides that the holding tax shall be payable by the person who holds the land holding. The preamble states that to provide for the Imposition and collection of a tax on large land holdings the Act has been enacted. The long title states that the Act is to provide for the imposition and collection of a tax on large land ho ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... though it would not, of course, control every provision, for we very often find that the subsequent provisions of a statute extend beyond the limits of the preamble. 20. The third case cited by Mr. Pathak is Omrao Begum v. Government of India 10 Ind App 39 (PC). That case is an authority for the proposition that the provisions of a section in the statute, cannot be controlled by any words in the preamble.' That case is distinguishable on the facts of the case before us. In our case the preamble is not sought to control the provisions of the Act. It is being considered along with the various provisions of the Act and I have already said above that it is not inconsistent either with the charging section or with the other sections in the Act. This case can, therefore, be of no help to the learned counsel, 21. Mr. Pathak has next relied upon the case of Secretary of State v. Maharaja of Bobbili 46 Ind App 302: (AIR 1919 PC 52). The Privy Council expressed itself in the following words in that case : The case depends upon the proper construction to be put upon the Act referred to. Its preamble is not without importance. I find nothing in the case to justify the co ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t, 1935 (hereinafter referred to as the 1935 Act). Entry No. 49 of List II reads as follows : Taxes on lands and buildings. In the 1935 Act its counterpart was Item No. 42 which reads as follows : Taxes on lands and buildings, hearths and windows. , Under the Government of India Act, 1919, the Provincial Legislatures had authority to law a tax on land as also on buildings but not to implement the revenues of the province and only for the benefit of the local authorities. As is well known there were no lists in the 1919 Act. Till then India did not come to have a federal form of Government and that being so there could be no question of two sovereign spheres of legislation. However, the Provincial Legislative Council were given some powers by way of administrative convenience and under the provisions of Section 80A(3)(a) of the Government of India Act, 1919, the Scheduled Taxes Rules were framed. Rule G of those rules reads as follows : 3. The Legislative Council of a province may, without the previous sanction of the Governor General, make and take into consideration any law imposing, or authorizing any local authority to impost, for the purposes of such local ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... in the Act make it abundantly clear that the 'impugned Act only purports to tax land or land holding. It thus appears to me that it was within the competence of the State Legislature to have enacted the present Act. Once it is found that the subject matter of the impugned Act is within the competence of the State Legislature nothing can prevent them from legislating about it, there being no prohibition in the Constitution against it. (See Jagannath Baksh v. United Provinces, , which was affirmed by the Privy Council in Jagannath Baksh v. United Provinces AIR 1948 PC 127). It may also be mentioned that there is nothing in Entry No. 49 of List II or in any provision in the body of the Constitution to justify the argument that the State Legislature cannot impose a tax on capitalised value of agricultural land, assuming that the present Act 'purports to impose such a tax. I am saying assuming because I have shown later on in this judgment that the impugned Act does not purport to impose a capital levy. Similarly there is nothing in Entry No. 49 of List II or in any provision in the body of the Constitution to justify the conclusion that the State Legislature cannot impose ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rate of not exceeding 20 per cent of the annual value of such buildings and land. The annual value of the land and the buildings was to be determined under Section 5 of that Act. The argument was that the basis of the tax was the annual value of the building and land and inasmuch as annual value was the fairest standard for measuring income it was a tax on income which would fall under Entry No. 54 of List I and could not fall under Entry No. 42 of List II. Their Lordships held that the broad contention that whenever the annual value is the basis of a tax the tax became one on income was not correct and that other factors had to be taken into consideration. It was further held that the charging section spoke of a tax on land and buildings and not one on income and that though annual value was the basis the annual value was not the actual income but only hypothetical or notional income meant only for the purposes of that tax. While doing so, Fazl Ali, J., observed as follows (P. 87) : If a tax is to be levied on property it will not be irrational to correlate it to the value of the property and to make some kind of annual value the basis of the tax, without intending to tax ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... was to permit a tax on land or building or on both an the basis of its capital value and, therefore, further held that the Parliament while enacting the 1935 Act must have been aware of this legislative practice and must have intended to permit under entry No. 42 of List II a tax on land or building or on both on the basis of its capitalised value. Having said that, they held the Bombay rule to be intra vires. 29. The considerations which governed the learned Judges of the Federal Court as also of the Bombay High Court in the two cases mentioned above are also present in the case before us and even if it be assumed in our case that the annual value is the capitalised value of land, the capitalised value is only the basis and' not the object of taxation. In this view of the matter there is no difficulty in holding that the U. P. Legislature was competent to have passed the impugned Act. 30. I will now deal with the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the impugned Act purports to impose a capital levy. It may straightway be mentioned that the argument that the impugned Act purports to tax capitalized value is based on assumptions. In this connection the argum ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... considering the effect of entry No. 86 of List I there can be levied no tax on the capitalised value of non-agricultural land under entry No. 49 of the State List, it must be held that the State Legislature is not competent to levy a tax on the capitalised value of agricultural land also under the cover of that entry. Entry No. 86 of List I speaks of taxes on capital assets. The question is whether the words 'capital assets' mean the total assets of all the properties in the hands of a person or even the value of one unit of a person's property. In the case of, Kania, J., (as he then was) expressed his clear opinion that under entry No. 55 of List I of the 1935 Act (equivalent to entry No. 86 of the Union List of the Constitution) the tax contemplated by that entry was on the total capital assets and not on individual portions of person's capital. The other learned Judge who was a member of the Bench, Chief Justice Beaumont, said that it was unnecessary to consider the argument based on entry No. 55; but nevertheless he observed that an analysis of the language employed in entries Nos. 54 and 55 respectively affords scope for the argument that the assets mentione ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ady pointed out, I have come to the conclusion that even if the capital value of lands is taken into consideration by the Municipal Corporation in determining the amount of tax to be levied on the open land, the tax does not become a tax on the capital value of the assets. But, with respect, I do not read these observations of the learned Chief Justice as expressing his considered decision that under Entry 42 in List II it would not be competent to the local Legislature to consider the capital value of lands at all. Therefore, I must hold that the learned trial Judge was wrong in coming to the conclusion that Rule 350A framed by the Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad was 'ultra vires'. Vyas, J., who was the other learned Judge sitting with Gajendragadkar, J., in the Ahmedabad case: AIR1954Bom188 , observed as follows : However, in support of their contention that the capital value of the lands and buildings cannot be taken into consideration at all for the purpose of levying a tax under Entry 42 of List II, the plaintiffs have relied on certain observations of the learned Chief Justice in the abovementioned case of: [1952]21ITR458(Bom) and those observations are ( ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ax would fall under entry No. 49 of List II and not under entry No. 86 of List I of the Seventh Schedule. It was held by the Federal Court in the case of Subrahmanyan v. Muttuswami, relying upon the case of Great West Saddlery Co. v. The King AIR 1921 PC 148, that the rule of construction is that the general language in the items of the Federal Legislative List in Section 100(1) of the 1935 Act yields to particular expressions in the Provincial Legislative List. The Supreme Court in the case of Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan: [1955]2SCR303 , observed as follows : It was argued that the heads of legislation mentioned in the Entries should receive a liberal construction, and the decision in AIR 1941 FC 10 , was quoted in support of it. The position is well settled and in accordance therewith, it could rightly be held that the legislation falls also under Entry No. 18. But there being an Entry No. 36 specifically dealing with acquisition, and in view of our conclusion as to the nature of the legislation, we hold that it falls under that Entry. (See also the case of Saligram v. Emperor: AIR1943All26 ). It cannot be denied that entry No. 49 specifically provides for lands o ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... and there are no entries in List I directly dealing with land. On the basis of the rule that in case of doubt all the entries in the three Lists must be carefully scanned to see as to in which particular entry the impugned legislation fits in or in which List that subject falls, it would appear that even with regard to a tax on the capitalised value of non-agricultural land the only relevant entry would be No. 49 of List II and not entry No. 86 of List I. I have already said above that it is really riot necessary for us to decide as to under what head would a legislation taxing the capitalised value of non-agricultural land fall because that is not the point which we have to decide in the present case. In fact it was observed by the Federal Court in the case of C. P. Motor Spirit Act, following Citizens Insurance Co. v. Parsons (1882) 7 AC 96, as follows ; In performing this difficult duty, it will be a wise course for those on whom it is thrown to decide each case which arises as best they can, without entering more largely upon an interpretation of the statute than is necessary for the decision of the particular question in hand. 36. It may be stated that when confront ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... sed value of agricultural land, because, as will appear from entry No. 86 of List I itself, while providing for taxation on the assets of other forms of properly they excluded the assets or capitalised value of agricultural land from its operation expressly. The tax on the capitalised value of agricultural land was, therefore, within the conception of the Constituent Assembly. The possibility therefore, of its falling under the residuary powers has got to be completely excluded. 37. If the present Act cannot fall under the residuary powers then it must' fall under some entry in one of the three lists, and the only entry under which it can fall is 49 of the State List to the exclusion of all other entries in all the three lists. The words in Article 246(3) of the Constitution are in respect of an expression borrowed from the Australian Constitution, and not in relation to which expression has been used in the Canadian-Constitution. The words in respect of connote the idea of pith and substance. The pith and substance of the present tax being a tax on land it was within the competence of the State Legislature to pass the impugned Act. 38. The argument that Mr. Khare a ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... guous, as, for example, when the words establishing two mutually exclusive jurisdictions are wide enough to bring a particular power within either, recourse must be had to the context and scheme of the Act. Again, if the text says nothing expressly, then it is not to be presumed that the Constitution with-holds the power altogether. 'On the contrary, it is to be taken for granted that the power is bestowed in some quarter' unless it be extraneous to the statute itself (as, for example, a power to make laws for some part of His Majesty's dominions outside of Canada) or otherwise is clearly repugnant to its sense. For whatever belongs to self-government in Canada belongs either to the Dominion or to the provinces, within the limits of the British North America Act. (Underlined by me here in ''). These observations apply with greater force to our Constitution. 40. The next submission of Messrs. Pathak and Jagdish Swarup is that the .various provisions of the Act as also the Schedule would show that it is not a tax on land but on the person who holds the lands. The argument is supplemented by the submission that a person having a small area of land has to pa ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... niently and economically as possible, and with the minimum restrictive effect pa production. Actively, they have become an engine of social and economic betterment, capable of reducing extreme inequalities of wealth of checking inflation and profiteering in wartime, and of contributing Jo stable employment at high levels in peace time ...... The sense of social responsibility and, with it, the role of Government have steadily grown. In response to these changes, it was inevitable that the functions of taxation should be broadened and its standards recast ....... Equality in taxation is now generally conceived in terms of ability to pay. Deceptively simple in appearance, this concept involves many difficulties of application. At the outset, one notes that ability to pay as such is subjective, an attribute of persons not things. Yet its measure for tax purposes is necessarily objective, an external quantity such as income or wealth. 'Ability to pay' thus equips the policy-maker, not with a specific rate-making formula, but with a general guide to tax relationships among individuals....... progression is, in practice, essentially a 20th centaury phenomenon.....but later e ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ing down principles it would amount to delegation of essential legislative functions. While examining this argument it will be noticed that the, multiple contemplated by Sub-section (1) of Section 5 has been fixed by the State Government itself as 121/2 times for the whole of the State. That power has not been delegated to any one. As regards the principles which have got to be adopted in cases where there are no hereditary rate the Legislature has left it to be prescribed as to what should be the basis of fixing the amount which is to be multiplied by the multiple mentioned in Section 5 (1) of the Act. It is beyond doubt that it was not possible for the State Legislature to fix any principle for the whole of the State under Section 5 (2) of the Act because local conditions vary and in order to make the incidence of taxation reasonable regard must be had to the nature of the soil, the district in which the land falls and its potentialities. So far as hereditary rates are concerned all these considerations were fully given effect to before the same were fixed but with regard to those areas where the hereditary rates are not fixed it was natural that the rates which were to ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ce and they were subject to modification, whether by way of repeal or amendment on a motion made by Parliament during the session in which they are so laid. This makes it perfectly clear that Parliament has in no way abdicated its authority, but is keeping strict vigilance and control over its delegate. Therefore, reading Section 4 along with Section 3(2) of the Act it cannot be said in the special circumstances of this case that there was excessive delegation to the Central Government by Section 3 (1). We are, therefore, of opinion that the Act cannot be struck down on the ground of excessive delegation. On the authority of that case it must be held that in the case before us also there was no excessive de legation. 44. Apart from it, what has been left in the present Act to the rules in general and rule 5 in particular is not relating to the determination of the policy of law and legal principles but only to provide the details and the manner in which to execute the law, the policy of law and legal principles having been enacted into a binding rule of conduct by the Legislature itself. Thus matters like the deciding of the multiple or the principles contemplated by Secti ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... wever, contended that the amount of tax assessed at least on the petitioners would be excessive and inasmuch as in addition to the payment of the tax the petitioners will have to pay the land revenue also, the total sums made payable would amount to the value of the land itself. He has relied upon the case of Arunachala Nadar v. State of Madras: AIR1959SC300 , and has placed before us the following observations of their Lordships : Before we scrutinize the provisions of the Act, the law on the subject may be briefly noticed. lender Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India all persons have the right to practice any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. Clause (6) of that Article enables the State to make any law imposing in. the interest of general public reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by Sub-clause (g) of Clause (1). It has been held that in order to be reasonable, a restriction must have a rational relation to the object which the legislature seeks to achieve and must not go' in excess of that object (See Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh: [1950]1SCR759 .) The mode of approach to ascertain the reasonablen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... rovides for a tax on land, Entry No. 45 provides for land revenue. In the face of there being two clear and distinctly different entries in List II it cannot be assumed that they relate to the same tax. Whereas the land revenue is the share of the Government or the sovereign power in the surplus profit after defraying the expenses of cultivation of the land, a tax on land is not a tax on profits and has got nothing to do with it. That being so the argument of the learned counsel that the tax is nothing but land revenue fails. Apart from it, even if it be assumed that a tax on land is land revenue, the impugned Act having been passed by the State Legislature after the Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the latter would be deemed to be repealed by the former to the extent that there is any inconsistency, between the two, assuming there to be one. However, I have already said above that the two taxes are different and there is no conflict between the two Acts. The ether contention of Mr. Rama Shanker Prasad that the authority who issues the notice under Section 7 of the Act becomes a judge of his own cause is also not correct. Reliance was placed upon the case of Nageswar ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ature did not think it proper to tax non-agricultural land but only agricultural land the Act cannot be said to be discriminatory. It is a matter of policy which is not justiciable. Similarly, the mere fact that there is a graded I scale of tax and the large land holdings are assessed to a larger tax does not make the provisions of the Act discriminatory. There is, in my opinion, a clear classification and that is based on a reasonable basis. I am also of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention that whereas the agricultural land is made the object of taxation other property, as for example buildings etc., have not been so made liable. There again there is a clear classification and there is a rational basis for it. 48. After having carefully considered the various submissions made by learned counsel I am of the opinion that the impugned Act has been validly passed and is intra vires of the State Legislature. I, therefore, hold there are no merits either in the petitions before us or in the special appeal. I would, therefore, dismiss all the petitions and the special appeal with costs, 49. It may be stated that in some of the petitions before, us some quest ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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