TMI Blog2019 (9) TMI 971X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the outstanding sum (as at the year-end) as a loan or advance in the balance-sheet of the lender or the borrower company. It is nobody's case that the provision stands invoked on account of such reflection, which has not been shown to be incorrect, so that there is no factual basis to the argument. The provision would in fact apply even if the shareholder does not, as is usually the case for an individual shareholder, maintain books of account, and which is so in the present case only because of it being a corporate entity. On the contrary, it is the assessee who draws on the accounts, stating it to be a running account and, further, a low retention period, and on that basis plead that the provision shall not apply. The provision is applicable qua any payment and, therefore, would (or would not) apply with reference to each specific sum. It is immaterial whether such payment/s is recorded in the books of account or not, and the only thing relevant is if it is in the nature of a loan/s or advance/s. The assessee s argument, which is even otherwise not backed by any material and only in the nature of a bald statement, is therefore without merit. Chargeability of the d ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... mount, but in the form of an open current account with regular debits and credits during the year; the opening balance (as on 01.4.2013) being in fact at a debit (i.e., receivable) of ₹ 279.48 lacs, which though stood liquidated by 15.4.2013, turning into a credit (payable) balance of ₹ 304.91 lacs on that date. The peak balance for the year was at ₹ 3266.12 lacs on 06.11.2013. GAPL was a company in which public is not substantially interested, i.e., is company other than that defined u/s. 2(18) of the Act. To the extent of it s accumulated profit, therefore, the loan or advance to the assessee was liable to the assessed in it s hands as deemed dividend u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act. The accumulated profit up to 31.3.2013, i.e., immediately prior to the current year, stood at ₹ 67.36 lacs. The profit for the year, as per the audited accounts, was at ₹ 150.00 lacs, so that, on a pro-rata basis (i.e., up to 06/11/2013), it worked to ₹ 49.81 lacs. The total accumulated profit up to that date, i.e., ₹ 117.17 lacs, was accordingly, after show causing the assessee, brought to tax u/s. 2(22)(e) r/w s. 56 of the Act in assessment. In app ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... for s. 2(22)(e) to apply, but only as an open, mutual and current account. The credit obtained only for a period of 82 days during the relevant year. It was under these circumstances that the Hon ble jurisdictional High Court in CIT v. Suraj Dev Dada [2014] 367 ITR 78 (P H), where the credit was for 55 days only, held that the provision of s. 2(22)(e), which was to stop the misuse by taking funds out of the company by way of a loan or advance instead of dividend and, thereby, avoid tax, could be invoked. Similar view, it was submitted, was expressed by the Hon'ble Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Gayatri Chakraborty [2018] 407 ITR 730 (Cal), rendered after considering the decisions by the Apex Court in Sarda (P.) (supra) and CIT v. Mukundray K. Shah [2007] 290 ITR 433 (SC). The decisions in Tarulata Shyam (supra) and Sarda (P.) , it was argued, are distinguishable inasmuch as there were no mutual benefits and obligations in the facts of the said cases. In both these cases there were only one-way transactions during the year, i.e., payment by the payer-company to the assessee-shareholder, while in the instant case there are transactions both ways; the assessee-company al ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum (whether as representing a part of the assets of the company or otherwise) made after the 31st day of May, 1987, by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who is the beneficial owner of shares (not being shares entitled to a fixed rate of dividend whether with or without a right to participate in profits) holding not less than ten per cent of the voting power, or to any concern, in which such shareholder is a member or a partner and in which he has a substantial interest (hereafter in this clause referred to as the said concern) or any payment by any such company on behalf, or for- the individual benefit, of any such shareholder, to the extent to which the company in either case possesses accumulated profits; but dividend does not include ( i) . ( ia) ( ii) any advance or loan made to a shareholder or the said concern by a company in the ordinary course of its business, where the lending of money is a substantial part of the business of the company; ( iii) any dividen ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... FC BANK Ch. No.: xxx 08/05/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No.: xxx 13/05/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No.: xxx 0.00 23/05/2013 FLC INSURANCE EXP Policy No. xxx 29/06/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No.: xxx 12/07/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No. : xxx 0.00 ' 29/07/2013 FLC INSURANCE EXP Policy ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... 55600000.00 326612455.00 Cr 13/11/2013 to 29/11/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No. xxx 2121455,00 Cr 29/11/2013 HDFC BANK Ch. No. 10000000.00 7878545.00 Dr 29/11/2013 to 08/01/2014 HDFC BANK Ch. No. xxx xxx 1349481.00 Cr 05/02/2014 to 03/03/2014 HDFC BANK ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ard insurance payment. The same, though liable to be construed as dividend u/s. 2(22)(e), do not form part of the qualifying sum of ₹ 3266.12 lacs for us to dilate thereon. Continuing further, the entire credit of ₹ 3266.12 lacs stands repaid from 13/11/2013 to 29/11/2013, on which (later) date the assessee had in fact paid in excess by ₹ 78.79 lacs. The loan/advance by the assessee swelled to ₹ 284.29 lacs (by 04.12.2013), all through direct payments, only to be received back, in full, before the year-end, on which date the credit balance of GAPL stood at ₹ 14.48 lacs (including a credit on account of interest, net of TDS, at ₹ 4.67 lacs). 4.3 The question that therefore assumes significance is if the fact of the subsequent repayment (of loan/advance) relevant, i.e., in determining if the amount received from the payer-company is to be, or is not to be, considered as dividend u/s. 2(22)(e)? This is as de hors the amounts paid by the assessee to GAPL, which are again, as we shall presently see, only in the nature of loans/ advances, either prior to 15/10/2013, or subsequent to 28/11/2013, the sums received by it from GAPL are on ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... d earlier been held in K.M.S. Lakshmana Aiyer v. ITO (Addl.) [1960] 40 ITR 469 (Mad). The matter was carried to the Apex Court, which affirmed the decision by the High Court per its larger bench decision in Tarulata Shyam (supra). Section 2(22)(e), it was argued therein, should be read down inasmuch as it carried an irrebuttable presumption of a loan or advance to a substantial shareholder being a distribution of profit and, thus, dividend thereto, by definition, by a company (in which public is not substantially interested). It worked unfairly on those repaying the loan as against those retaining it. Besides, it may lead to double tax, as where the repaid amount is again lent to the shareholder during the year inasmuch as the same amount is liable to be regarded as dividend. The Apex Court agreed that the provision was harsher than sec. 108 of the Commonwealth Income-tax Act, which was its inspiration. However, the Parliament had itself exercised its legislative judgment, raising a conclusive presumption that in all cases where loans are advanced to a shareholder in a private limited company having accumulated profits, the advance should be deemed to be the dividend income ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or is a deemed dividend, income taxable under the residuary head, income from other sources , arises. The charge being on accrual or receipt the statutory fiction created by s. 2(6A)(e) and s. 12(1B) would come into operation at the time of the payment by way of advance or loan, provided the other conditions are satisfied. 19. We do not propose to examine the soundness or otherwise of the illustrations given by Mr. Sharma since they are founded on assumed facts which do not exist in the present case. 20. For the foregoing reasons we would answer the question proposed in favour of the Revenue and dismiss this appeal with costs. The consistent view, therefore, right from the stage of the assessing authority, to the Apex Court, was the same, i.e., the repayment of a loan/s or advance/s was inconsequential for the purpose of application of the fiction of the provision of deemed divided, introduced on the statute book from AY 1955-56 onwards. Why, in a given case, the repayment may be after the close of the relevant year, and which would therefore have little bearing in the matter, while ought to be given regard to if the fact of t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... t case is striking. The repayment of the loan or advance, which gets deemed, on receipt, on account of the legal fiction, as a distribution of profit and, thus, as income in the hands of the payee share-holder, is therefore of no consequence. As explained by the Apex Court it is this presumption juris et de jure which forms the foundation of the statutory fiction. The decisions in CIT v. K. Srinivasan [1963] 50 ITR 788 (Mad); CIT v. P.K. Badiani [1970] 76 ITR 369 (Bom); and Walchand Co. Ltd. (supra) were, besides K.M.S. Lakshmana Aiyer (supra), also noted with approval in Tarulata Shyam (supra). The Hon ble Court also drew on its decision in Navnit Lal C. Jhaveri v. AAC [1965] 56 ITR 198 (SC), also relied upon before it. The first question afore-stated (refer para 4.3) is, accordingly, answered in the negative. The second question, i.e., as regards the relevance of the retention period, does not consequently arise. 4.5 Continuing further, clearly, there is two-way traffic, i.e., receipt of loan or advance, as well as its repayment, in the instant case. That the repayment was in excess, constituting a loan/advance by the sha ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... jgopal s contention was to be accepted, the result would be that if a shareholder borrows a large amount during the year, but repays it on the last day of the year, it would not be considered to be a loan, though the facts show that he did borrow a loan. Such a contradiction of the real fact would result if Mr. Rajgopal s contention were to be accepted. Mr. Rajgopal further contended that in any event the highest amount to the assessee s debit on any day of the year should be the amount to be deemed to be dividend. This argument, again, ignores the principle laid down by us, that the position at the date of each payment must be considered. Moreover, there is another reason and that is that if it were to be so done, it would not enable the position of the balance of the accumulated profits being taken into account, as more than one shareholder may have borrowed loans from the company in an account similar to that of the assessee. All these contentions of Mr. Rajgopal ignore the basic fact that s. 2(6A)(e) uses the words any payment which means, every payment, and s. 2(6A)(e) requires the determination of two factors, viz., whether the payment is a loan and whether at the date wh ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... n its books of account). Why, the same carries interest, implying that the same impinges on every amount received and repaid, as well as paid and received back, i.e., to all the debits and credits in account, representing financial transactions. That the same are in the nature of a financial accommodation is not in dispute. Money received on account of a business transaction (viz. advance against purchases), or otherwise received in the course of money lending business, from the payee-company, are excluded, by definition, from the purview of s. 2(22)(e), which targets only a loan/s or advance/s simpliciter . It is only in this context, i.e., where the amount advanced is for the purpose of business of the payee-company, that the same would stand excluded. No business purpose of GAPL, which is not in the business of money lending, is shown. The amounts paid and received in the instant case are clearly in the nature of a loan/s, i.e., sums borrowed, which though is not at a fixed amount or for a fixed period of time. This variability, though, would not alter the nature of the amounts as loan (or advance signifying, here, a temporary loan). The charge of interest, confirms, if any ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... ions of Section 2(22) (e) of the Act could not be invoked. These findings were not shown to be erroneous or perverse in any manner. 11. In view of the above, no substantial question of law arises in this appeal. Consequently, finding no merit in the appeal, the same is hereby dismissed. ( emphasis, supplied) The only finding recorded by the Hon'ble Court is that the findings by the first and the second appellate authority have not been shown to be erroneous or perverse. How could that, by itself, one wonders, be regarded as a statement of law by it; it, in fact, clearly holding that in its view no substantial question/s of law arises for its adjudication? How could then it be regarded as having expressed any view or answered the substantial question of law raised before it? Rather, it s observation even leaves the scope for the Hon ble Court, while stating its view in a later case on a substantial question of law, expressing a different view, i.e., based on the arguments advanced and the position of law urged on the basis of judicial precedents. The jurisdiction of the High Court under the Act, which is the t ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... eems fit. ( 6) The High Court may determine any issue which- ( a) has not been determined by the Appellate Tribunal; or ( b) has been wrongly determined by the Appellate Tribunal, by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in sub-section (1). ( 7) Save as otherwise provided in this Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), relating to appeals to the High Court shall, as far as may be, apply in the case of appeals under this section. (emphasis, supplied) The Hon'ble Court might as well have declined admission, stating that no substantial question of law arises out of the order by the Tribunal. That it went through the Tribunal s order, delineating the facts as recorded by it, as well as it s decision, prior to holding that, in its view, no substantial question of law arose in the facts of the case and its adjudication by the Tribunal, only shows that it chose to make its this finding (as to the non-arising of any substantial question of law out of the order by the Tribunal) transparent. Nothing, thus, turns on the ass ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... anding to the contrary, firstly adjusted against the amount due. The payment, unless given as a consideration for value received earlier (or even to be received), itself creates an obligation for repayment, so that nothing turns, as explained by the Hon ble Courts, by the fact of its repayment which, as afore-discussed, could be immediately, or though to no consequence, after a length of time. Why, the payment received being only as it would be required (for its purposes) by the assesseeshareholder, should the length of time of retention be of any consequence; the income having been already arisen on the receipt of loan/advance? The retention in Walchand Co. Ltd . (supra) was only 23 days, though found of no consequence by the Hon ble Court. In fact, where the sums are borrowed for the purpose of its business by the shareholder, as in the instant case, it would be guided in the matter by business considerations, i.e., the need for funds, besides being liable to be returned only where not required for the time being, therefor. That is, it is the business, for which the borrowing has been made, that would dictate the length of retention, besides of course the terms of the bor ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... uch as he would be interested in repayment, is of no significance or consequence as far as the deeming fiction of the provision is concerned. As explained in Tarulata Shyam (supra), the payee may, in law and in fact, be liable to repay and, in fact, even repay, but the provision nonetheless stands attracted on the receipt of the loan/advance where the other conditions of the provision are satisfied. A loan or advance for business purpose, i.e., where it serves a business purpose of the lending company, is excluded. No such business purpose informs the lending of GAPL to the assessee in the instant case, as none has been exhibited or, in fact, even stated. That the two companies are, as stated without being shown, in the same line of business, is incidental; the borrowing by either being guided by its own business interest, and the lending to each other being only for the reason that the two fall, as it appears, under the same management. It would, as aforeexplained, be doing a disservice to its own business if it did not do so, though there is nothing to suggest that. The balance outstanding (as at the year-end) is reflected as a loan or advance in the audited final accounts ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the decisions by the higher courts of law laying down the law in the matter. Loans borrowed by a shareholder from a company, the dissenting Justice stated, do not come within the general definition of income. As such, if the shareholder had been paid his share of profit ostensibly as a loan which is really a share of profit, it can be taxed as income under an appropriate enactment. However, any ad hoc payment to a shareholder as a loan/advance, unrelated to his share in the accumulated profit, cannot rationally come within the expression of dividend . That is, it was not open to the Legislature to describe any payment of money by a company to a shareholder by the word dividend , and then provide that such payment will come within the expression income for the purpose of any law enacted by virtue of Entry 82, List 1, Schedule VII to the Constitution. The definition of dividend must have a rational connection with the concept of dividend in the context of the profit of a company and its distribution amongst the shareholders at any time after the profits have been earned. It was in fact unreasonable to provide that a particular shareholder should be deemed to have re ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... etence, must receive a wide interpretation, the caveat being that there has to be a rational connection between the item taxed and the concept of income liberally construed. It also noted suitable conditions/exceptions being provided for in the impugned provisions (of ss. 2(6A)(e) and 12(1B)), as by way of restriction on their scope to transactions of/by companies, in which public is not substantially interested, with its major shareholders, i.e., holding over a threshold (10%) voting power therein; exclusion of transactions in the ordinary course of business where the payer-company is in the business of money-lending; and, thirdly, making the deeming (of the loan/advance or payment) as dividend subject to and, further, to the extent of, accumulated profits of such company, all of which were regarded as necessary and suitable safeguards. Similar attempts, it noted, were also made by other countries in their domestic incometax law. That the provision may cause hardship in some cases was considered as irrelevant (for determining the question of legislative competence). The argument with regard to the loan being interest bearing, and of it having been repaid since, were advanced and ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... a permanent payout. The appeal was dismissed with costs. The full bench decision by the Hon ble jurisdictional High Court (reported at 48 ITR 288 (Punj)(FB)) was affirmed. Where, then, one may ask, is there any scope for an argument, introducing the notion of misuse of funds belonging to the payer-company, so that where such misuse is not shown transferring, by implication, the onus of so showing on the Revenue, the section cannot be invoked? The answer to this question could only be in the negative . The aspect that informs the said question is if the section could possibly cover genuine cases of sums borrowed by a shareholder, temporary or otherwise. The question/s, though valid, does not survive after the afore-cited decisions by the larger benches of the Apex Court, which bind even its lower constitution benches. Similar arguments/s, it would be noted, was also advanced in Tarulata Shyam (supra), stating that a condition similar to that in section 108 (1) of the Commonwealth Income Tax Act, from which the provision draws its inspiration, be read into the provision to make it reasonable . The Apex court discountenanced the same, stating that such a conditions/s was not ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... efore us, continue to be so raised decades after the decisions by the larger benches of the Apex Court; the assessee also referring in its written submissions, not adverted to during hearing, to the decision in CIT (TDS) v. Schutz Dishman Bio-tech (P.) Ltd . (TA No. 958 of 2018, dated 21/12/2015, at PB pgs. 10-12). The said decisions, which have been carefully perused, are without reference to the deliberations; the findings and the observations by the Apex Court per its larger bench decisions, since followed per its division bench decisions. There is in fact no reference to even the earlier judgments by the same Court. That apart, the decisions are distinguishable on facts inasmuch as the same are based on mutual benefits and adjustment entries without specifying the nature of the adjustments, while in the instant case the same are only receipt and payment of money, i.e., a loan or advance simpliciter . How, again, one wonders, is the fact of the assessee having also lent money to the company which, again, could be in the same year or in a preceding year, or even in the subsequent year, relevant. It is the lending transaction, as opposed to a business transaction, where the ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... lso be clarified that the provision is attracted irrespective of the status of the shareholder. That is, is applicable to a share-holder, as explained in Sadhana Textile Mills (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [1991] 188 ITR 318 (Bom), to a corporate shareholder, as the assesse-company. We consider it pertinent to clarify this as it is stated that the provision is not applicable to an Inter Corporate Deposit (ICD), i.e., a deposit, by definition, by one company to another. It is in fact nobody s case that the running account between the two entities constitutes an ICD(s) . Be that as it may, the provision covers any payment which is in the nature of a loan and advance, which the impugned borrowing/s is, so that the same gets hit by the provision irrespective of whether or not it stands to be regarded also as an ICD. The only thing relevant is if the payment can be regarded and, rather, is, in substance, a loan or an advance , both terms being judicially well defined . An ICD, a deposit by definition, is, rather, only in the nature of a loan; deposits being a species of loans/advances. Its exclusion would therefore only be where the depositor (lending) company is in the business of money le ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... the-less consider the same. Section 56, in its relevant part, reads as under: Income from other sources. 56. ( 1) Income of every kind which is not to be excluded from the total income under this Act shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head Income from other sources, if it is not chargeable to income-tax under any of the heads specified in section 14, items A to E. ( 2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of sub-section (1), the following income shall be chargeable to income-tax under the head Income from other sources, namely:- ( i) dividends; Clearly, therefore, dividend in section 56 refers to the dividend as defined u/s. 2 (22) of the Act. We have already held that the impugned sums qualify to be dividend u/s. 2(22)(e). The only thing therefore that needs to be examined is if the same stands excluded from the purview of the total income u/s. 2(45) of the Act. Chapter III of the Act, comprising sections 10 to 13B, specifies such incomes. Section 10(34), brought on the statute-book w.e.f. 01.4.2004, reads as u ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... er paras 4.1 thro 4.10), to which therefore regard is to be had. We may, while concluding our order, extract from the decision in Sarada (P.) (supra) (pg. 448), i.e., apart from adverting similar extracts in the foregoing part of this order, if only to emphasize the unanimity and unambiguity in the law as clarified and settled by the larger benches of the Apex Court: Sec. 2(22)(e) as it stood at the material time defined dividend to include any payment by a company, not being a company in which the public are substantially interested, of any sum by way of advance or loan to a shareholder, being a person who has a substantial interest in the company.. to the extent to which the company... possesses accumulated profits . In the instant case there is no dispute that the appellant had a substantial interest in the company. The nature of the company is also not in dispute. From the facts as stated hereinabove, it appears that the withdrawals made by the appellant from the company amounted to grant of loan or advance by the company to the shareholder. The legal fiction came into play as soon as the monies were paid by the company to the appellan ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... or advance being both ways would not carry any special significance in the context of the provision inasmuch as both qualify, independently, to be a loan or advance, which in the present case is with interest, further, establishing, if it was required, the payments to be purely financial transactions, i.e., loan/advance(s) simpliciter , squarely covered within the ambit of the provision, which seeks to place restriction on payments to a substantial shareholder by a company in which public is not substantially interested nothing more and nothing less. In fact, loan/advance by one to another would only be if the funds are for the time being surplus with the lending company and, thus, independent of a subsequent loan, if any, to the borrower company. Further, it would arise only where, though available, the money is, at the same time, required by the borrowing company, so that there is no certainty under such an arrangement, both with regard with the quantum and time of the source of funds for such an arrangement to be regarded as viable or a dependable one, or to contend of the loan being temporary. No business purpose has been shown or otherwise stated, so that the contention in ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... f the order forwarded to: ( 1) The Appellant: G. G. Oils Fats Pvt. Ltd., 2301, Bhupindra Flour Mills, Amrik Singh Road, Bathinda ( 2) The Respondent: Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-1, Bathinda ( 3) The CIT(Appeals), Bathinda ( 4) The CIT concerned ( 5) The Sr. DR, I.T.A.T. This is the true copy of the order pronounced on 05.07.2019, as corrected and modified by the corrigendum order dated 11.07.2019, both on record, and also being uploaded herewith. By Order IN THE INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL AMRITSAR BENCH, AMRITSAR. BEFORE SH. SANJAY ARORA, ACCOUNTANT MEMBER AND SH. N. K. CHOUDHRY, JUDICIAL MEMBER I. T. A. No. 508/Asr/2017 Assessment Year: 2014-15 G. G. Oils Fats Pvt. Ltd., 2301, Bhupindra Flour Mills, Amrik Singh Road, Bathinda Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax, Circle-1, Bathinda [ PAN: AADCG 8857 H] ( Appellant) (Respondent) ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X ..... have in fact been deliberated and concluded by the Apex Court ), after the sentence (at pg. 26) beginning with the words: There was no inconsistency, it clarified, .) and ending with the words Income-tax Act. , the following sentence be read: The dividend u/s. 2(6A)(e) (corresponding to s.2(22)(e) of the Act), it explained, was, as opposed to dividends u/ss. 2(6A)(a) to (d), not a permanent payout, ; 7. In para 4.7 (in sub-para 4, beginning with the words All these aspects have in fact been deliberated and concluded by the Apex Court ), after the sentence (at pg. 27) beginning with the words: It must be remembered, . ), the word therein be read immediately after the word observed ; 8. In para 4.7 (in sub-para 5, beginning with the words These conditions were reiterated by the Apex court in Tarulata Shyam (supra), .. ), at page 27, the words before the Tribunal be read after the words of the nature raised and before the words in Suraj Dev Dada (supra) , in the sentence beginning with the words It is surprising indeed .. at page 28 of the order; 9. In para 5, in the sentence beginning wit ..... X X X X Extracts X X X X X X X X Extracts X X X X
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